Law and Motion Calendar Department Nine (10:00 a.m.) April 3, 2015

Transcription

1 1. GOODIS v. THE PINES AT PLACERVILLE PC (1) Defendant Virk s Demurrer to 1 st Amended Complaint. (2) Defendant Virk s Motion to Strike Portions of 1 st Amended Complaint. (3) Defendant Ang s Demurrer to 1 st Amended Complaint. (4) Defendant Ang s Motion to Strike Portions of 1 st Amended Complaint. Defendant Virk s Demurrer to 1 st Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed a 1 st amended complaint against Dr. Virk and others asserting causes of action for elder abuse, wrongful death and medical malpractice. Defendant Virk demurs to the elder abuse cause of action on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to establish defendant Virk subjected plaintiffs decedent to physical abuse, neglect, or financial abuse within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act; and plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to establish defendant Virk neglected plaintiffs decedent in a reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious way. Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer on the ground plaintiffs have adequately alleged facts to establish reckless neglect by Dr. Virk. Defendant Virk replied to the opposition. The elements of a cause of action under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adults Act, section et seq. (hereinafter the Elder Abuse Act) are statutory, and reflect the Legislature's intent to provide enhanced remedies to encourage private, civil enforcement of laws against elder abuse and neglect. (See Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 33, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986 (Delaney).) (Intrieri v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 72, 82.) "Abuse of an elder or a dependent adult" means either of the following: (a) Physical abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with 1

2 resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering. (b) The deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering. (Welfare and Institutions Code, ) "Neglect" means either of the following: (1) The negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. (2) The negligent failure of an elder or dependent adult to exercise that degree of self care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. (Welfare and Institutions Code, (a).) Neglect includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1) Failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter. (2) Failure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs. No person shall be deemed neglected or abused for the sole reason that he or she voluntarily relies on treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in lieu of medical treatment. (3) Failure to protect from health and safety hazards. (4) Failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration. (5) Failure of an elder or dependent adult to satisfy the needs specified in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, for himself or herself as a result of poor cognitive functioning, mental limitation, substance abuse, or chronic poor health. (Welfare and Institutions Code, (b).) In order to sufficiently state an elder abuse by neglect cause of action, the plaintiffs must meet the requirements of Section (Benun v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 113, 119.) To establish elder abuse, a plaintiff must show defendant was guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of [physical, neglectful, or financial elder abuse]. (Welf. & Inst.Code, ) (Benun v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 113, 119.) The sponsor of the elder abuse legislation took the position that the high standard of proof imposed by section clear and convincing evidence of liability, 2

3 and a showing of recklessness, malice, oppression, or fraud adequately protects providers of care from liability for acts of simple negligence, or even gross negligence. The sponsor urged that existing limitations on damages and attorney fees should not apply in such extreme cases. (Delaney, supra, at p. 32, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) The purpose of the Elder Abuse Act is essentially to protect a particularly vulnerable portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and custodial neglect. (Delaney, supra, at p. 33, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) (Benun v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 113, 123.) The Act excludes liability for acts of professional negligence. ( ; Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 32, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986 (Delaney ).) [FN 7.] Hence, it does not apply to simple or gross negligence by health care providers. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 785, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222, 86 P.3d 290 (Covenant Care ).) FN7. Section provides: Notwithstanding this article, any cause of action for injury or damage against a health care provider, as defined in Section of the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the health care provider's alleged professional negligence, shall be governed by those laws which specifically apply to those professional negligence causes of action. To obtain the remedies provided by the Act pursuant to section 15657, a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is guilty of something more than negligence; he or she must show reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. (Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 31, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) Recklessness refers to a subjective state of culpability greater than simple negligence, which has been described as a deliberate disregard of the high degree of probability that an injury will occur. (Ibid.) Oppression, fraud and malice involve intentional or conscious wrongdoing of a despicable or injurious nature. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court teaches that neglect under the Act refers not to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the failure of those 3

4 responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations. [Citation.] Thus, the statutory definition of neglect speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide medical care. [Citation.] (Covenant Care, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 783, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222, 86 P.3d 290.) (Emphasis added.) (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, ) the facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded with particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims. (Covenant Care, at p. 790, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222, 86 P.3d 290.) (Emphasis added.) (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, ) The 1 st amended complaint alleges: defendants Cheema, Ang, and Virk are and at all relevant times were physicians duly licensed to practice medicine in California and employees and agents of defendant The Pines at Placerville Healthcare Center (The Pines); during plaintiffs decedent s two month stay at The Pines plaintiffs decedent would develop pneumonia, dehydration, Coumadin toxicity, and acute renal failure due to defendants reckless neglect; decedent died on September 4, 2013 with a primary diagnosis of acute kidney failure, elevated INR levels, and acute upper GI bleed with blood loss and anemia from angiodysplasia; on July 26, 2013 The Pines drafted an order that decedent s INR levels were to be monitored every other day while he was on antibiotics, however, the monitoring should have continued until the decedent was at a therapeutic level; defendant doctors Cheema, Ang and Virk continued to approve administration of Coumadin without reviewing the current INR test results; there were Coumadin flow sheets indicating decedent received Coumadin doses on various dates and that the medication was held for several dates without explanation; on 4

5 August 21, 2013 decedent was transported to the emergency room with a documented INR level of 9.3, which is near lethal level; the normal INR for a person on Coumadin is around 2; as a result of all the defendants reckless conduct, decedent s condition continued to deteriorate until he passed away on September 4, 2013; and the reckless conduct consisted of failure to monitor PT/INR for Coumadin therapy leading to Coumadin toxicity, failure to provide adequate nutrition, failure to notify decedent s family and physician of changes in decedent s health condition, failure to conduct and document accurate nursing assessments, failure to provide decedent with a safe and comfortable environment, failure to provide regular physician visits, failure to keep decedent free from pain, and failure to update the plan of care and provide the necessary care and services required. (1 st Amended Complaint, paragraphs 6, 16, 18-20, 23, 24, and 27.) Plaintiff contends that the opinion in Sababin, supra, controls in that the circumstances that were found in the Sababin opinion to be sufficient reckless conduct to support an elder abuse cause of action are analogous to the situation described in the allegations of the 1 st amended complaint. Sababin, supra, involved an action where plaintiffs decedent was being cared for in a facility, there was a care plan that required facility employees to monitor her skin daily for redness and breakdown, facility employees were required by the plan to report any skin problems to a physician for a treatment order, and the facility employees ignored the care plan entirely. (See Sababin, supra at pages ) The appellate court reversed the trial court s entry of summary adjudication on the elder abuse by neglect cause of action and found triable issues of material fact remained. The appellate court stated: Covina contends that under Covenant Care, a care facility cannot be held liable for dependent abuse unless there is a total absence of care. We disagree. If some care is provided, that will not necessarily absolve a 5

6 care facility of dependent abuse liability. For example, if a care facility knows it must provide a certain type of care on a daily basis but provides that care sporadically, or is supposed to provide multiple types of care but only provides some of those types of care, withholding of care has occurred. In those cases, the trier of fact must determine whether there is a significant pattern of withholding portions or types of care. A significant pattern is one that involves repeated withholding of care and leads to the conclusion that the pattern was the result of choice or deliberate indifference. (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, 90.) In summary, the facts shown by the evidence submitted in Sababin, supra, was found to be sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact wherein a jury could find a significant pattern of withholding care, which would form the basis for proving elder abuse by neglect. (Emphasis the courts.) On the other hand, the appellate court in Carter, supra, cited Sababin, supra, at page 406 and found later in the opinion at page 410 that the allegations of conduct attributed to the defendant hospital, including failure to treat pressure ulcers, failure to administer prescribed antibiotics or stock the crash cart, false documentation, and purposefully inadequate testing for medications, were insufficient to state an elder abuse by neglect cause of action. Ignoring all conclusions of reckless conduct and reckless neglect, the specific facts alleged against defendant Dr. Virk are that he continued to provide care to plaintiffs decedent by approving the administration of Coumadin without reviewing the current INR test results and Dr. Virk failed to monitor plaintiffs decedent s PT/INR for Coumadin therapy, which allegedly resulted in toxic levels of Coumadin allegedly causing the eventual death of plaintiffs decedent. In other words, Dr. Virk is not alleged to have engaged in a significant pattern of withholding of care and, in fact, is alleged to have continued to provide care in a negligent manner by not keeping up with review of the INR test results. Taking the allegations of fact as 6

7 true and ignoring conclusions of law and/or fact for the purposes of this demurrer, the court finds that there are insufficient allegations of specific fact to establish that defendant Virk is guilty of reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. The allegations of fact that a doctor failed to review test results are analogous to the inadequate testing allegation that was found in Carter, supra, to have been insufficient to state neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. The specific facts alleged against defendant Virk do not establish something beyond simple or gross negligence by a health care provider. The demurrer to the elder abuse cause of action is sustained. In an abundance of caution, the court grants ten days leave to amend. Defendant Virk s Motion to Strike Portions of 1 st Amended Complaint. Defendant Virk moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages and treble damages on the following grounds: the action sounds in medical negligence and plaintiffs failed to obtain leave of the court under Code of Civil Procedure, to assert a claim for punitive damages in this medical professional negligence action; and enhanced damages in elder abuse cases, including punitive and treble damages, are not available in this case against defendant Virk, because plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action for elder abuse. Plaintiffs oppose the motion to strike on the ground that plaintiffs have adequately alleged facts to establish reckless neglect by Dr. Virk to support a claim for enhanced damages of punitive and treble damages for elder abuse. Defendant Virk replied to the opposition. For the same reasons as stated in the ruling on the demurrer, the court finds that the allegations of fact in the 1 st amended complaint are insufficient to establish an elder abuse cause of action against defendant Dr. Virk and, therefore, the enhanced remedies for elder abuse cases are unavailable under the facts pled. 7

8 In addition, plaintiffs not having established that they moved to amend to add a claim for punitive damages against health care provider defendant Virk and that such a motion was granted, the claims for punitive and treble damages are inappropriate in an action for medical malpractice and wrongful death resulting from alleged medical malpractice. Defendant Virk s motion to strike the claims for punitive and treble damages is granted with ten days leave to amend. Defendant Ang s Demurrer to 1 st Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed a 1 st amended complaint against Dr. Ang and others asserting causes of action for elder abuse, wrongful death and medical malpractice. Defendant Ang demurs to the elder abuse cause of action on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to establish defendant Ang subjected plaintiffs decedent to physical abuse, neglect, or financial abuse within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act; and plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to establish defendant Ang neglected plaintiffs decedent in a reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious way. Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer on the ground plaintiffs have adequately alleged facts to establish reckless neglect by Dr. Ang. Defendant Ang replied to the opposition. The elements of a cause of action under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adults Act, section et seq. (hereinafter the Elder Abuse Act) are statutory, and reflect the Legislature's intent to provide enhanced remedies to encourage private, civil enforcement of laws against elder abuse and neglect. (See Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 33, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986 (Delaney).) (Intrieri v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 72, 82.) 8

9 "Abuse of an elder or a dependent adult" means either of the following: (a) Physical abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering. (b) The deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering. (Welfare and Institutions Code, ) "Neglect" means either of the following: (1) The negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. (2) The negligent failure of an elder or dependent adult to exercise that degree of self care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. (Welfare and Institutions Code, (a).) Neglect includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1) Failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter. (2) Failure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs. No person shall be deemed neglected or abused for the sole reason that he or she voluntarily relies on treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in lieu of medical treatment. (3) Failure to protect from health and safety hazards. (4) Failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration. (5) Failure of an elder or dependent adult to satisfy the needs specified in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, for himself or herself as a result of poor cognitive functioning, mental limitation, substance abuse, or chronic poor health. (Welfare and Institutions Code, (b).) In order to sufficiently state an elder abuse by neglect cause of action, the plaintiffs must meet the requirements of Section (Benun v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 113, 119.) To establish elder abuse, a plaintiff must show defendant was guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of [physical, neglectful, or financial elder abuse]. (Welf. & Inst.Code, ) (Benun v. Superior Court (2004) 123 9

10 Cal.App.4th 113, 119.) The sponsor of the elder abuse legislation took the position that the high standard of proof imposed by section clear and convincing evidence of liability, and a showing of recklessness, malice, oppression, or fraud adequately protects providers of care from liability for acts of simple negligence, or even gross negligence. The sponsor urged that existing limitations on damages and attorney fees should not apply in such extreme cases. (Delaney, supra, at p. 32, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) The purpose of the Elder Abuse Act is essentially to protect a particularly vulnerable portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and custodial neglect. (Delaney, supra, at p. 33, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) (Benun v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 113, 123.) The Act excludes liability for acts of professional negligence. ( ; Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 32, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986 (Delaney ).) [FN 7.] Hence, it does not apply to simple or gross negligence by health care providers. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 785, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222, 86 P.3d 290 (Covenant Care ).) FN7. Section provides: Notwithstanding this article, any cause of action for injury or damage against a health care provider, as defined in Section of the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the health care provider's alleged professional negligence, shall be governed by those laws which specifically apply to those professional negligence causes of action. To obtain the remedies provided by the Act pursuant to section 15657, a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is guilty of something more than negligence; he or she must show reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. (Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 31, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986.) Recklessness refers to a subjective state of culpability greater than simple negligence, which has been described as a deliberate disregard of the high degree of probability that an injury will occur. (Ibid.) Oppression, fraud and malice involve intentional or conscious wrongdoing of a despicable or 10

11 injurious nature. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court teaches that neglect under the Act refers not to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations. [Citation.] Thus, the statutory definition of neglect speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide medical care. [Citation.] (Covenant Care, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 783, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222, 86 P.3d 290.) (Emphasis added.) (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, ) the facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded with particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims. (Covenant Care, at p. 790, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222, 86 P.3d 290.) (Emphasis added.) (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, ) The 1 st amended complaint alleges: defendants Cheema, Ang, and Virk are and at all relevant times were physicians duly licensed to practice medicine in California and employees and agents of defendant The Pines at Placerville Healthcare Center (The Pines); during plaintiffs decedent s two month stay at The Pines plaintiffs decedent would develop pneumonia, dehydration, Coumadin toxicity, and acute renal failure due to defendants reckless neglect; decedent died on September 4, 2013 with a primary diagnosis of acute kidney failure, elevated INR levels, and acute upper GI bleed with blood loss and anemia from angiodysplasia; on July 26, 2013 The Pines drafted an order that decedent s INR levels were to be monitored every other day while he was on antibiotics, however, the monitoring should have continued until the decedent was at a therapeutic level; defendant doctors Cheema, Ang and Virk continued to approve administration of Coumadin without reviewing the current INR 11

12 test results; there were Coumadin flow sheets indicating decedent received Coumadin doses on various dates and that the medication was held for several dates without explanation; on August 21, 2013 decedent was transported to the emergency room with a documented INR level of 9.3, which is near lethal level; the normal INR for a person on Coumadin is around 2; as a result of all the defendants reckless conduct, decedent s condition continued to deteriorate until he passed away on September 4, 2013; and the reckless conduct consisted of failure to monitor PT/INR for Coumadin therapy leading to Coumadin toxicity, failure to provide adequate nutrition, failure to notify decedent s family and physician of changes in decedent s health condition, failure to conduct and document accurate nursing assessments, failure to provide decedent with a safe and comfortable environment, failure to provide regular physician visits, failure to keep decedent free from pain, and failure to update the plan of care and provide the necessary care and services required. (1 st Amended Complaint, paragraphs 6, 16, 18-20, 23, 24, and 27.) Plaintiff contends that the opinion in Sababin, supra, controls in that the circumstances that were found in the Sababin opinion to be sufficient reckless conduct to support an elder abuse cause of action are analogous to the situation described in the allegations of the 1 st amended complaint. Sababin, supra, involved an action where plaintiffs decedent was being cared for in a facility, there was a care plan that required facility employees to monitor her skin daily for redness and breakdown, facility employees were required by the plan to report any skin problems to a physician for a treatment order, and the facility employees ignored the care plan entirely. (See Sababin, supra at pages ) The appellate court reversed the trial court s entry of summary adjudication on the elder abuse by neglect cause of action and found triable issues of material fact remained. The appellate court stated: Covina contends that under 12

13 Covenant Care, a care facility cannot be held liable for dependent abuse unless there is a total absence of care. We disagree. If some care is provided, that will not necessarily absolve a care facility of dependent abuse liability. For example, if a care facility knows it must provide a certain type of care on a daily basis but provides that care sporadically, or is supposed to provide multiple types of care but only provides some of those types of care, withholding of care has occurred. In those cases, the trier of fact must determine whether there is a significant pattern of withholding portions or types of care. A significant pattern is one that involves repeated withholding of care and leads to the conclusion that the pattern was the result of choice or deliberate indifference. (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, 90.) In summary, the facts shown by the evidence submitted in Sababin, supra, was found to be sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact wherein a jury could find a significant pattern of withholding care, which would form the basis for proving elder abuse by neglect. (Emphasis the courts.) On the other hand, the appellate court in Carter, supra, cited Sababin, supra, at page 406 and found later in the opinion at page 410 that the allegations of conduct attributed to the defendant hospital, including failure to treat pressure ulcers, failure to administer prescribed antibiotics or stock the crash cart, false documentation, and purposefully inadequate testing for medications, were insufficient to state an elder abuse by neglect cause of action. Ignoring all conclusions of reckless conduct and reckless neglect, the specific facts alleged against defendant Dr. Ang are that he continued to provide care to plaintiffs decedent by approving the administration of Coumadin without reviewing the current INR test results and Dr. Ang failed to monitor plaintiffs decedent s PT/INR for Coumadin therapy, which allegedly resulted in toxic levels of Coumadin allegedly causing the eventual death of plaintiffs decedent. In other words, Dr. Ang is not alleged to have engaged in a significant pattern of 13

14 withholding of care and, in fact, is alleged to have continued to provide care in a negligent manner by not keeping up with review of the INR test results. Taking the allegations of fact as true and ignoring conclusions of law and/or fact for the purposes of this demurrer, the court finds that there are insufficient allegations of specific fact to establish that defendant Ang is guilty of reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. The allegations of fact that a doctor failed to review test results are analogous to the inadequate testing allegation that was found in Carter, supra, to have been insufficient to state neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. The specific facts alleged against defendant Ang do not establish something beyond simple or gross negligence by a health care provider. The demurrer to the elder abuse cause of action is sustained. In an abundance of caution, the court grants ten days leave to amend. Defendant Ang s Motion to Strike Portions of 1 st Amended Complaint. Defendant Ang moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages and treble damages on the following grounds: the action sounds in medical negligence and plaintiffs failed to obtain leave of the court under Code of Civil Procedure, to assert a claim for punitive damages in this medical professional negligence action; and enhanced damages in elder abuse cases, including punitive and treble damages, are not available in this case against defendant Ang, because plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action for elder abuse. Plaintiffs oppose the motion to strike on the ground that plaintiffs have adequately alleged facts to establish reckless neglect by Dr. Ang to support a claim for enhanced damages of punitive and treble damages for elder abuse. Defendant Ang replied to the opposition. For the same reasons as stated in the ruling on the demurrer, the court finds that the allegations of fact in the 1 st amended complaint are insufficient to establish an elder abuse 14

15 cause of action against defendant Dr. Ang and, therefore, the enhanced remedies for elder abuse cases are unavailable under the facts pled. In addition, plaintiffs not having established that they moved to amend to add a claim for punitive damages against health care provider defendant Ang and that such a motion was granted, the claims for punitive and treble damages are inappropriate in an action for medical malpractice and wrongful death resulting from alleged medical malpractice. Defendant Ang s motion to strike the claims for punitive and treble damages is granted with ten days leave to amend. TENTATIVE RULING # 1: DEFENDANT VIRK S DEMURRER TO THE ELDER ABUSE CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITH TEN DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. DEFENDANT VIRK S MOTION TO STRIKE THE CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE AND TREBLE DAMAGES IS GRANTED WITH TEN DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. DEFENDANT ANG S DEMURRER TO THE ELDER ABUSE CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITH TEN DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. DEFENDANT ANG S MOTION TO STRIKE THE CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE AND TREBLE DAMAGES IS GRANTED WITH TEN DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. NO HEARING ON THESE MATTERS WILL BE HELD (LEWIS V. SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19 CAL.4 TH 1232, 1247.), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING. MATTERS IN WHICH THE PARTIES TOTAL TIME ESTIMATE FOR ARGUMENT IS 15 MINUTES OR LESS WILL BE HEARD ON THE LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AT 10:00 A.M. ON FRIDAY, APRIL 3, 15

16 2015 IN DEPARTMENT NINE UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED BY THE COURT. ALL OTHER LONG CAUSE ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTS WILL BE SET FOR HEARING WITHIN TEN COURT DAYS OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE TENTATIVE RULING. (EL DORADO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT LOCAL RULES, RULE , et seq.) 16