A series of discussions aiming to promote debate on some of the pressing issues facing humanitarian action

Transcription

1 Dialogue 7 A series of discussions aiming to promote debate on some of the pressing issues facing humanitarian action Francesco Zizola Indonesia, 2005 Co-operation with Private Security and Military Companies 1

2 The world may not be ready to privatise peace Kofi Annan (Secretary General UN from ) Introduction by Saleem Haddad, Programmes Unit, MSF UK In a world where scarce resources are a source of power, the politicisation of aid should come as no surprise. By extension, the deliverers of this aid will undoubtedly face political and security risks from those who may be threatened by their presence. As NGOs desperately wave the banners of independence, neutrality, and impartiality, the reality is that not everyone will accept their presence in highly polarised conflicts. Within this context, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have emerged as 21st century mercenaries: private actors delivering both military and non-military assistance - including emergency relief - in ways in which traditional humanitarian NGOs cannot. However, the tying of humanitarian relief to broader counterinsurgency missions has sometimes made NGOs partners in missions they do not support, putting into doubt the neutrality of existing aid organisations. This has contributed to the security threats faced by aid workers in highly sensitive contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, often requiring them to deliver relief with some level of armed security - either from local or international PMSCs, existing rebel groups, or the army of a national government. Each of these options poses further problems, and there is a fear that this will lead aid agencies onto a slippery slope where less and less attention is paid to relying on local social contract for security and instead shifts power towards outside private forces. Aid agencies are now only one of a number of actors that are increasingly using PMSCs in conflict zones. At the moment, between 10,000 and 20,000 PMSC personnel are working in Iraq and Afghanistan, earning up to $1,500 a day working on Didier Lefevre, Afghanistan, 1986 MSF convoy guards armed protection and state building. This trend is part of a broader phenomenon in which security is being privatised and moving away from being coordinated by the state. In April 2008, MSF organised a roundtable to gather various perspectives on the issue of humanitarian organisations and their cooperation with private military and security companies. This roundtable brought together NGOs, private security companies, human rights organisations, academics, and journalists, with the aim of discussing the increasing involvement of PMSCs in aid and relief processes. The key issues of MSF s discussion evening revolved around the long history of PMSCs as well as their recent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the need for an effective regulatory and accountability framework for these companies. The speakers also highlighted some problems within humanitarian organisations themselves, such as the lack of knowledge about risk and security dynamics, and the lack of know-how within NGOs in how to deal with the changing humanitarian landscape. The discussion - moderated by Paul Foreman, a board member of MSF-UK - brought together Dr. Dominick Donald, an academic expert and chief analyst for Aegis Research and Intelligence, Nick Downie, Head of Security for the Emergencies Team at Save the Children Fund, and Dr. Kevin O Brien, Director of Alesia PSI Consultants, an advisor to the government on public security and strategy matters. This issue of Dialogue will recount the discussion that took place between the three speakers, and will also include some concluding remarks by Marc Dubois, General Director of MSF-UK. 2

3 Putting PMSCs in Historical Perspective Dr. Kevin A. O Brien is the Director of Alesia PSI Consultants Ltd, a UK-based consultancy specialising in support to government on public security and strategy matters. In this article he argues for a more historical view of private security companies, and looks at some of the difficulties in regulating their work. One of the deepest problems when discussing the private security industry (PSI) is the limiting perspective of the now : the failure to appreciate the longer-term historical perspective. When discussing the current contribution of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the focus tends to be on their actual activities today, which are seen not just as indicative of their broader remit, but usually thought to be their key activities. The historical view gives another perspective: this is an old industry. In the UK it began during the 1950s and grew stronger in the 1960s. The companies active then were providing exactly the same kind of support services that one sees now. If we turn to the U.S. we find early examples of such companies operating in Latin America, in support of US government objectives, in the 1920s and 1930s. Even earlier - as referenced in numerous academic articles and dissertations of late - are the ties between today s companies and those exploring in the colonial period, such as the armed wings of the British East India Company, the British South Africa Company, the Dutch East Indies Company, and so on. There is, therefore, a long-term view that needs to be kept in mind - which will give us a better idea of where we have got to today and where we might go in the future. In the current security paradigm, and looking at the relationship between PMSCs and statutory security forces, the governments they work for, and the activities they engage in both domestically and overseas, we are witnessing a significant shift in the number and range of activities that are being contracted out. These companies do meet a need - however, despite the fact that these PMSCs are doing the work for the agencies that have contracted them to do it, the majority of concerns expressed about their activities lands only on the companies, rather than their clients. Understanding the Relationship Between NGOs and PMSCs PMSCs do fulfil a need. Today, outside the core military functions exercised by statutory (primarily Western) military forces, including their peacekeeping duties, outsourcing is the norm. For governments in the UK and the US, and now emerging in Canada and the Netherlands, the use of PMSCs as battlefield contractors is integral to military operations, a fact that is acknowledged upfront. If one looks at the development of the range and type of support given - as well as the range of different clients supported - there is a notable move away from core military functions being executed by statutory military forces and police forces to these being contracted out to private companies. One needs to look no further than the role of police support activities in the Balkan conflicts, where these were contracted out under the OSCE, UN and NATO periods there. The activities of many companies since the 1980s has been to provide training, intelligence, and advisory services on behalf of Western governments to other governments including those in sub-saharan Africa, and the range is widening. It now covers the whole range of services previously performed by national security, police and intelligence services. In focusing on the NGO question in relation to PMSCs, there are three ways to encapsulate the relationship between NGOs and PMSCs in the field: First, there is the relationship with privatised security forces hired locally by humanitarian agencies. This often gets overlooked when the focus is so heavily on Western companies operating in this field, but it is a steadily increasing trend. The biggest problem with this type of relationship is that these forces are often also themselves involved in the conflict as conventional forces. Therefore, the local population that you are trying to protect does not see them as neutral. One example of this type of contract was in eastern Congo in the mid-1990s. Despite the fact that PMSCs are doing the work for the agencies that have contracted them, the majority of concerns expressed about their activities lands only on the companies, rather than their clients The second type is contracts with security companies nationally. This is a highly significant area too, often using security companies that come from the countries where you are working. These, too, may be local military forces moonlighting as private companies. The third type is contracts that Western PMSCs and security advisors have arranged themselves, contracting with local agencies to provide services that they would have provided themselves had they not been so overstretched. All three types present a number of potential problems in the field, particularly if you are hiring such contractors locally. How do you know their track record and other engagements in other parts of the world? How do you know whether they have been involved in human rights violations elsewhere? Regulation and Accountability Thankfully these issues are now being addressed in a number of ways. Recently, there have been a number of studies - by the Canadian and Dutch governments, as well as within the UN - to try and understand the operational issues in the field and how this affects work on the ground. It is also worth noting that recent studies in this field - such as James Cockayne s Commercial Security in the Humanitarian Space (International Peace Academy, 2006) - are increasingly assessing the NGO- PMSC relationships in the field. Additionally, there is currently a significant effort by the Swiss government and the ICRC to reform international humanitarian and human rights law tenets

4 surrounding PMSCs at the state level - to address for the first time key regulatory issues and establish a regulatory framework based on International Human Rights Law - which is also supported by the Canadian government. The UK government has found it particularly difficult to tackle problems in this area without an international framework in which to set the national standards. Yet regulation and accountability of PMSCs at both national and international levels remain very difficult issues; not the least of which is the enforcement of such regulation. The numerous and diverging investigations into the Blackwater incident last year by the Iraqi and US governments is exemplary of this: it is difficult to investigate and even more difficult to enforce codes of conduct, even those voluntarily adhered to. Finally, we should look at the future. The UN approach to this development is unclear and muddled at present. The use in Africa and elsewhere of Chinese commercialised elements of the People s Liberation Army is another interesting development. In the U.S. there is a lot of effort to get to grips with this area of contracting given the tensions around Blackwater, with Congress recently expressing significant concern over the degree of outsourcing, both domestically and overseas. Ultimately, will we see more of the type of activities we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will we see even more robust field activities by PMSCs - such as that of Executive Outcomes in the 1990s? It is very likely that we will see all of these activities and more in the future. Counter-insurgency: The Role of the 80% Dominick Donald, Chief Analyst for Aegis Research and Intelligence, highlights the evolution of the non-military element of counter-insurgency operations, and looks at how Iraq left a void for non-military actors that needed to be filled. I work for a Private Security Company (PSC) but I am not here to talk about our activities. I would like to highlight some of the changes that are taking place, particularly in the U.S, in thinking about counter-insurgency, and the implications of these changes for humanitarian work and humanitarian space. I do not think companies like mine will necessarily benefit from these changes, but I do think that humanitarian agencies need to think about these new developments and how they will be affected before these changes hit them from behind. Counter-insurgency is hot news at the moment and many people talk about best practice, but in fact it has developed as an ad hoc learning process. What has become accepted is that the military element of counter-insurgency is not the most important one. There are different percentages for the non-military element given in different theories - from 60 to 80 percent - but the key is that the non-military element of counter-insurgency is bigger than the military element. This runs from basic hearts and minds work such as education and health, to building up government agencies and building up infrastructure. Since the 1950s we have known that getting the military right is only a small part of the campaign. If you get the military section 100 percent right, but not the non-military, you still lose. It is necessary to get the whole package right to be successful. Governments involved in counter- insurgency used to be able to tailor the 80 percent to their objectives because in the old days they ruled that space. They were the government. The local population might not want them to be the government and hence the insurgent activity, but while they were the government they could control everything and make the necessary tools of government available to deliver the 80 percent. However since decolonization Western governments have lost the ability to deliver these soft security elements in a counter-insurgency campaign, having shed the tools of colonial government - everything from police forces to district officers and colonial health and agriculture officials. These governments now find themselves conducting expeditionary counter-insurgency operations without the ability to deliver the 80 percent themselves, and having to subcontract someone - perhaps NGOs and other institutions - to deliver it for them. During the 1990s this trend of subcontracting the 80 percent was cast in stone. The assumption was that if the UK government were involving themselves in a peacekeeping or stabilisation operation they would send the military first, but funds were also allocated to NGOs, or to UN agencies through entities such as the EU s ECHO, in order to deliver the 80 percent. These entities, for their own very good reasons, were not part of the overall campaign plan; the assumption was their efforts would improve the climate in which the military operated, and alleviate humanitarian suffering, but they were not subordinated to political or military activity in any way. This

5 Geert van Kesteren, Iraq, 2003 Afghanistan. But in Iraq there was a space to be filled. In Iraq the 80 percent did not turn up and therefore the Coalition turned to non-military government agencies to do it instead. They made a mess of it, partly because they were not organised to do it, did not have the skills or training to do it and didn t have the experience or standards to do it. Until the surge the overall military campaign was going downhill. The surge reflected a process going on in the US military to institutionalise counterinsurgency thinking and practice. This involved getting experts together to draft best practice methodology on counterinsurgency and put it in a form in which it could be used in the field, and a more strategic concept - a Campaign Plan - was put in place. These guys went back to the people of the 1950s and 1960s who emphasized the 80 percent, and this showed the military the importance of the 80 percent and the necessity of providing trained people to deliver it. But there remained the key problem of who was going to deliver the 80 percent. The US military has now institutionalised counter-insurgency to a remarkable degree, reflected in the latest Stabilisation Operations Doctrine, which for the first time places Stabilisation Operations (with counter-insurgency as a subset) on a par with defence and winning overseas wars as the roles for the US military. Military people are realists, and so in this Doctrine they had to address who was going to deliver the 80 percent. They assume that initially it will be the military, but ideally they eventually want to be able to hand it over to the relevant US Government departments to deliver. The military know, however, that this may not happen. Bureaucracy being what it is those departments may not turn up. became the way Western governments responded to crises. It sort of worked, inasmuch as the national interest driving the intervention might not be that great, so the consequences of a diffuse 80 percent response not tailored to the military-political effort would not really be felt - the direct consequences of things going wrong were limited. Filling the 80 percent Void in Iraq Unfortunately we then had Iraq. In 2003 the military coalition went in, without the humanitarian sector in support, for very good reasons. But the military does not have the capacity to deliver the 80 percent. What should they do in order to secure success? Firstly, they turn to other arms of government. They created the Coalition Provisional Authority. The CPA was created in part because no one else who could deliver the 80 percent turned up. The military also turned to local providers, local NGOs and the local private sector. But a great chunk of the 80 percent still wasn t provided for. As an example of the elements not provided for, my company got a contract co-ordinating the reconstruction effort. As part of that we have a civil affairs function in Iraq, providing low cost quick impact projects (QUIPs) such as immunisation programmes, access to clean water, and books for schools. We have set up charities, in the US and UK, to raise funds for these projects. These projects fulfil a need and we are able to do it, so we do. But secondly they also help us to fulfil our other functions. We know that there are all sorts of issues surrounding whether QUIPs work, but the reality is that they help us to operate throughout the community. Ten years ago a PSC like mine would not be doing this kind of work. Even five years ago we would not be doing that kind of work in In the new Stabilisation Operations Doctrine there is a nice little diagram that shows the various necessary functions, from the overtly military to state building, on a vertical axis, and a timeline on a horizontal axis. The diagram shows that at the beginning of the operation everything is delivered by the military, from being the local mayor to collecting the rubbish, but then gradually the military withdraw. It then shows that at the end of the operation the US government, the international community, or local actors are delivering all of these functions. But for most of these functions, for the middle of the operation, the space is filled by contractors. The military assume that NGOs won t be there. The contractors need not be PSCs, they can be private companies of any kind such as engineering, construction, training, health, or education, and in fact are most likely to come from companies of this kind, but the reality is that PSCs like the one I work for are going to be involved more in this space. We may not be asked to deliver humanitarian aid, as the issue of our legitimacy to do so will always be there, but when the humanitarian work needs to be done, someone has to be found to do it. Private companies, whether PSCs or the kind of contracting companies that are common in the engineering and development sectors, will emerge to fill the gap and to work within the Campaign Plan. As I said you are not going to see PSCs delivering all these functions. It may be that we will fulfil none of them. However, we are ready to work within the Campaign Plan; and if no one else will fulfil these functions, and/or subordinate themselves to the overall political-military effort, then we may find ourselves doing more in this area. 5

6 armed protection and state building. This trend is part of a Pep Bonet, Somalia, 2004 Humanitarian Action in Insecure Contexts Nick Downie, Head of Security, Emergencies Team with Save the Children Fund, examines the controversial issue of PMSCs working alongside NGOs, and, more generally, the emerging difficulties for NGOs working in insecure environments. In the first quarter of 2008 Save the Children UK conducted a survey in cooperation with OCHA and the Centre for International Cooperation. Some of our preliminary findings indicate that we already have contracts with PMSCs operating within the local infrastructure of some of the countries where we work, and we use some specialist services at organisational level. This might be provocative to some but I don t know of any international NGO that has not benefited in some way from the services provided by PMSCs, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also Somalia, Sri Lanka and increasingly, perhaps more indirectly, in many other countries. These are the same PMSCs that today remain unregulated. Sometimes its just one person and a briefcase offering all sorts of security solutions, and we realise quite quickly that it s all for a quick profit, has little capacity apart from off-the-shelf solutions, and then they ll be off to the next paying customer. I have also come across big companies with no insight into the security needs of the aid sector or of the communities in which these clients work. On the other hand I firmly believe that PMSCs have saved the lives of many, many people, both humanitarian workers and their beneficiaries, that they are a major security resource for the delivery of aid; and therein lies my dilemma. I have previously worked as an aid worker in Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq and Bangladesh. Because of the lack of regulation and issues of reputation, as well as the insecurity that comes along with PMSCs, I try to keep them at arms length. Until I can be sure that necessary accountabilities are in place, I can t morally say I am satisfied with PMSCs working directly with our staff and certainly not with our beneficiaries However, they have a level of expertise that we (the aid sector) cannot do without right now, but contact has to be very controlled and limited to what is vital. On the other hand, security management in many NGOs is so poor, and in highly insecure and often unreadable environments agencies often do not know what their workers are doing or whether they are actually operating in a manner that does mitigate the obvious risks. It is becoming more and more difficult to find experienced aid workers willing to work in emergency situations because they know how difficult it is. Its perhaps not surprising to see that in places such as Iraq, Somalia or Afghanistan, the average age of humanitarian aid workers appears to be something like twentytwo years. But what about experience, and what of competence to deal with security and safety issues that were not presented on such a scale until more recently? I am faced with a lot of personal and professional dilemmas: having come into the humanitarian sector from the security world, the issues for me are stark. Ultimately, we are so vulnerable, so at risk, and we face an uphill battle against an evolution of insecurity that we can do very little about, and so we need to take a stand together to do more to ensure impartiality of aid and the protection of humanitarian space. This can be done by influencing the engagement of PMSCs within the humanitarian and corporate environment, as a precursor to more substantial changes to our operating environment and to the way we work that appear to be coming - if not happening already. 6

7 PMSCs: Where is the Alternative? For the delivery of reconstruction aid in Iraq and Afghanistan, PMSCs have taken billions of pounds, dollars and euros in aid, however in the absence of regulated forces, who else is going to do it? At the same time, PMSCs, like everyone else, do fail to maintain what should be the highest standards of operations. The problem is that when those standards are not maintained, because of the very nature of some PMSC work, the consequences have been clearly devastating and globally reported. Having said that, I don t know how Afghanistan could have stood back up without PMSCs conducting the currency transfer. I don t know how the elections in Afghanistan could have happened without the support of PMSCs, and it is the same situation in Iraq. The dilemma is: where was the alternative? Referring to Dominick s discussion about NGOs that never turned up, these same aid agencies that sat on the start line also thought that there would be much more security than otherwise proven. Agencies expected security to be sorted out and then NGOs would be able to work. Regardless, there were never going to be enough NGOs for the size of the task in Iraq, and I generally don t think NGOs are built to be able to operate in environments of such extreme risk. The main dilemma for me as an organisation s security manager is making the organisation and its staff realise that things have changed in some places and in many ways, and trying to change attitudes so that we can better appreciate dangerous circumstances. Insecurity has spread and grown over the last few years and the humanitarian sector has increasingly had to put their collective heads down and sometimes even get out, leaving others more capable to get on with business. A real problem in the NGO world is that there is a large skills gap. NGOs are often operating with managers who learnt their operating skills when the problems we face today did not exist; this means that the sectors understanding of the situation is lacking. We do not have all the necessary skills to operate within the environments as they are now. Other people are filling those gaps, and why not, if needs are to be met? A change in mindset needs to occur on all sides, remaining mutually exclusive is silly. The privatization of aid train is not going to stop; the aid sector must influence its direction. We must also change the way we work and the way others work too. The PMSC part needs to be regulated, and not by its own hands. We are so vulnerable, so at risk, and we face an uphill battle against an evolution of insecurity that we can do very little about, and so we need to take a stand to do more to ensure impartiality of aid and the protection of humanitarian space There were never going to be enough NGOs for the size of the task in Iraq; NGOs aren t built to be able to operate in environments of such extreme risk The Dilemmas of Security Management in NGOs Many NGOs working in Somalia have had to rely on PMSCs - often local, armed militia standing guard or serving as an armed escort - in order to do their work. I think it is better in those circumstances to have a professional force and I wonder who is going to manage and train that force because NGOs are not doing that well. In Somalia I have had to negotiate with guards armed with AK47s and buzzing with the effects of Khat (herbal stimulant), and in South Sudan I have had the same issue except those guards were in an alcohol-induced stupor. Many NGOs use PMSCs in Somalia because they literally have no choice; not to do so would be extremely dangerous. In the last five years we have seen an increase in PMSC contracts as we have begun to recognise increased insecurity. We recognise that we need to improve our own security management. To be expeditious in improving our security we need the expertise that some PMSCs deliver. However, to protect the integrity of our operations, I don t want international PMSCs directly interacting with our staff and beneficiaries except under certain conditions. Until I can be sure that necessary accountabilities are in place I can t morally say I am satisfied with PMSCs working directly with our staff and certainly not with our beneficiaries. As well as the use of local PMSCs for security work, Save the Children UK also has a couple of information-based contracts - much of this has to do with due diligence at the UK end of our work, and partly to raise awareness across the organisation. We don t have organisation-wide protocols about how we should interact with PMSCs. An outcome of our research appears to be that we need some rules for our engagement. Many of our staff believe that we benefit from our relationships with PMSCs, but many also don t understand what the negative issues are, or if they do, they don t have the time to do much about the problem. It is probably the same for many other NGOs out there. As an NGO security advisor I am concerned that our reputation and community perceptions of our work are at risk when we work with PMSCs. Equally, I am worried that inappropriate engagement with PMSCs will lead to us becoming more insecure. Many aid workers assisted by PMSCs are already, and will become more, vulnerable because of this engagement. Finally, I would like to reiterate that PMSCs do save lives, but at the same time, they have also been responsible for deaths. Profit driven, armed actors are working all over the world, and there is an overt desire by some sections of the PMSC community to diversify business into what has traditionally been the domain of humanitarian and development NGOs. With the extent of public consumption of global media, aid agencies must be extremely careful about being associated with armed actors in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. I prefer active avoidance rather than associating with this globally resurgent-armed actor. After all, a global community is watching. 7

8 Conclusion: Asking Some Hard Questions Marc Dubois, General Director of MSF-UK, weighs in with some final thoughts about private security companies involvement in relief work. NGOs have historically relied on their neutrality, impartiality, and explicitly humanitarian mission in order to maintain a presence to deliver immediate relief. In recent years, however, new humanitarian actors have challenged this formula, making it increasingly more difficult for NGOs to continue to rely on their reputation in order to deliver relief. While both trends are worrisome, this discussion has focused on the way in which aid is being increasingly delivered more effectively by private military and security companies (PMSCs), who believe that winning a war against counter-insurgents requires devoting 80 percent of their operations to winning hearts and minds. The recent emergence of a global trade in hired private security, often referred to as the privatised military industry, presents a very real threat to humanitarian organisations. The global market for private security was $55.6 billion in 1990, and is expected to grow to $210 billion by 2010, making it an extremely large and ever-growing force in the aid business. In the meantime, humanitarian organisations have lagged behind, failing to keep pace with this shift in terrain. One consequence of this is that we find ourselves unable to operate in some regions because of the lack of security and acceptance. We have found it increasingly difficult to develop a presence in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, and when we are able to access these places, this has been characterised by a poor risk versus benefits balance. This has driven humanitarian actors into closer and more complex associations both with local and foreign military forces, including these aforementioned private security companies. The problem with this close association is that the lines between military and humanitarian action are becoming increasingly blurred. Furthermore, the problem of the militarization of aid goes hand-in-hand with the increasing problem of the humanitarianisation of the military. PMSCs are increasingly repackaging themselves as aid actors - and in fact the only aid actors who can get things done - when it comes to nation building, aid delivery, and post-war reconstruction in politically prioritised contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This complex and interactive dynamic requires us to understand the relationship between the use of armed forces and the needs of humanitarian NGOs for protection, as well as to address concrete solutions to increase the safety of aid workers. This should be done while also reminding ourselves of our fundamental principles, in order to avoid the further weakening of respect for international humanitarian law and its implementation. However, this also requires us to critically examine ourselves and our lack of success in delivering aid in insecure contexts, in order to begin catching up with this changing humanitarian environment. NGOs must begin answering some hard questions on why their role in providing humanitarian aid is shrinking in many contexts. What has changed within humanitarianism and how can we re-gain what has been lost? Is re-gaining this even possible? Have NGOs been pushed out of their own arena, and have we been relegated to filling in ever-shrinking gaps when assisting populations in need? Espen Rasmussen, Somalia, 200 Most of the issues discussed in this series of publications were first explored at the discussion evenings arranged by MSF UK. They cover matters of continuing concern to the humanitarian community and prompt questions to which there are no easy answers. All views expressed in the Dialogue series are those of the authors, and are not necessarily representative of the organisations for which they work. We have asked the authors to give their personal perspectives and thus begin a debate.