CS 290 Host-based Security and Malware. Christopher Kruegel

Transcription

1 CS 290 Host-based Security and Malware Christopher Kruegel

2 Unix

3 Unix / Linux Started in 1969 at AT&T / Bell Labs Split into a number of popular branches BSD, Solaris, HP-UX, AIX Inspired a number of Unix-like systems Linux, Minix Standardization attempts POSIX, Single Unix Specification (SUS), Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS), Linux Standard Base (LSB), ELF 3

4 Unix Kernel vulnerability usually leads to complete system compromise attacks performed via system calls Solaris / NetBSD call gate creation input validation problem malicious input when creating a LDT (x86 local descriptor table) used in 2001 by Last Stage of Delirium to win Argus Pitbull Competition Kernel Integer Overflows FreeBSD procfs code (September 2003) Linux brk() used to compromise debian.org (December 2003) Linux setsockopt() (May 2004) Linux Memory Management mremap() and munmap() (March 2004) 4

5 Unix More recent Linux vulnerabilities Linux message interface (August 2005, CAN ) race condition - proc and prctl (July 2006, CVE ) local privilege escalation - (September 2007, CVE ) security bypass and DoS (May 2008, CVE , CVE ) Device driver code is particularly vulnerable (most) drivers run in kernel mode, either kernel modules or compiled-in often not well audited very large code based compared to core services Examples aironet, asus_acpi, decnet, mpu401, msnd, and pss (2004) found by sparse (tool developed by Linus Torvalds) remote root (MadWifi , Broadcom ) 5

6 Unix Code running in user mode is always linked to a certain identity security checks and access control decisions are based on user identity Unix is user-centric no roles User identified by user name (UID), group name (GID) typically authenticated by password (stored encrypted) User root superuser, system administrator special privileges (access resources, modify OS) cannot decrypt user passwords 6

7 Process Management Process implements user-activity entity that executes a given piece of code has its own execution stack, memory pages, and file descriptors table separated from other processes using the virtual memory abstraction Thread separate stack and program counter share memory pages and file descriptor table 7

8 Process Management Process Attributes process ID (PID) uniquely identified process (real) user ID (UID) ID of owner of process effective user ID (EUID) ID used for permission checks (e.g., to access resources) saved user ID (SUID) to temporarily drop and restore privileges lots of management information scheduling memory management, resource management 8

9 Process Management Switching between IDs uid-setting system calls int setuid(uid_t uid) int seteuid(uid_t uid) int setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) Can be tricky POSIX : If the process has appropriate privileges, the setuid(newuid) function sets the real user ID, effective user ID, and the [saved user ID] to newuid. what are appropriate privileges? Solaris: EUID = 0; FreeBSD: newuid = EUID; Linux: SETUID capability 9

10 Process Management Bug in sendmail : call to setuid(getuid()) to clear privileges (effective UID is root) on Linux, attacker could clear SETUID capability call clears EUID, but SUID remains root Further reading Setuid Demystified Hao Chen, David Wagner, and Drew Dean 11th USENIX Security Symposium,

11 User Authentication How does a process get a user ID? Authentication Passwords user passwords are used as keys for crypt() function runs DES algorithm 25 times on a block of zeros 12-bit salt 4096 variations chosen from date, not secret prevent same passwords to map onto same string make dictionary attacks more difficult Password cracking dictionary attacks, rainbow tables Crack, JohnTheRipper 11

12 User Authentication Shadow passwords password file is needed by many applications to map user ID to user names encrypted passwords are not /etc/shadow holds encrypted passwords account information last change date expiration (warning, disabled) minimum change frequency readable only by superuser and privileged programs MD5 hashed passwords (default) to slow down guessing 12

13 User Authentication Shadow passwords a number of other encryption / hashing algorithms were proposed blowfish, SHA-1, Other authentication means possible Linux PAM (pluggable authentication modules) Kerberos Active directory (Windows) 13

14 Group Model Users belong to one or more groups primary group (stored in /etc/password) additional groups (stored in /etc/group) possibility to set group password and become group member with newgrp /etc/group groupname : password : group id : additional users root:x:0:root bin:x:1:root,bin,daemon users:x:100:chris Special group wheel protect root account by limiting user accounts that can perform su 14

15 File System File tree primary repository of information hierarchical set of directories directories contain file system objects (FSO) root is denoted / File system object files, directories, symbolic links, sockets, device files referenced by inode (index node) 15

16 File System Access Control permission bits chmod, chown, chgrp, umask file listing: - rwx rwx rwx (file type) (user) (group) (other) Type r w x s t File read access write access execute suid / sgid inherit id sticky bit Directory list files insert and remove files stat / execute files, chdir new files have dir-gid files only deleteable by owner 16

17 SUID Programs Each process has real and effective user / group ID usually identical real IDs determined by current user authentication (login, su) effective IDs determine the rights of a process system calls (e.g., setuid()) suid / sgid bits to start process with effective ID different from real ID attractive target for attacker Never use SUID shell scripts (multiplying problems) 17

18 File System Shared resource susceptible to race condition problems Time-of-Check, Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) common race condition problem problem: Time-Of-Check (t 1 ): validity of assumption A on entity E is checked Time-Of-Use (t 2 ): assuming A is still valid, E is used Time-Of-Attack (t 3 ): assumption A is invalidated t 1 < t 3 < t 2 18

19 TOCTOU Steps to access a resource 1. obtain reference to resource 2. query resource to obtain characteristics 3. analyze query results 4. if resource is fit, access it Often occurs in Unix file system accesses check permissions for a certain file name (e.g., using access(2)) open the file, using the file name (e.g., using fopen(3)) four levels of indirection (symbolic link - hard link - inode - file descriptor) Windows uses file handles and includes checks in API open call 19

20 Overview Case study /* access returns 0 on success */ if(!access(file, W_OK)) { f = fopen(file, "wb+"); write_to_file(f); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Permission denied when trying to open %s.\n", file); } Attack $ touch dummy; ln s dummy pointer $ rm pointer; ln s /etc/passwd pointer 20

21 Examples TOCTOU Examples Filename Redirection Setuid Scripts 1. exec() system call invokes seteuid() call prior to executing program 2. program is a script, so command interpreter is loaded first 3. program interpreted (with root privileges) is invoked on script name 4. attacker can replace script content between step 2 and 3 21

22 Examples TOCTOU Examples Directory operations rm can remove directory trees, traverses directories depth-first issues chdir(.. ) to go one level up after removing a directory branch by relocating subdirectory to another directory, arbitrary files can be deleted Temporary files commonly opened in /tmp or /var/tmp often guessable file names 22

23 Temporary Files Secure procedure for creating temporary files 1. pick a prefix for your filename 2. generate at least 64 bits of high-quality randomness 3. base64 encode the random bits 4. concatenate the prefix with the encoded random data 5. set umask appropriately (0066 is usually good) 6. use fopen(3) to create the file, opening it in the proper mode 7. delete the file immediately using unlink(2) 8. perform reads, writes, and seeks on the file as necessary 9. finally, close the file 23

24 Temporary Files Library functions to create temporary files can be insecure mktemp(3) is not secure, use mkstemp(3) instead old versions of mkstemp(3) did not set umask correctly Temp Cleaners programs that clean old temporary files from temp directories first lstat(2) file, then use unlink(2) to remove files vulnerable to race condition when attacker replaces file between lstat(2) and unlink(2) arbitrary files can be removed delay program long enough until temp cleaner removes active file 24

25 Prevention Handbook of Information Security Management suggests 1. increase number of checks 2. move checks closer to point of use 3. immutable bindings Only number 3 is acceptable! Immutable bindings operate on file descriptors do not check access by yourself (i.e., no use of access(2)) drop privileges instead and let the file system do the job Use the O_CREAT O_EXCL flags to create a new file with open(2) and be prepared to have the open call fail 25

26 Prevention Series of papers on the access system call Fixing races for fun and profit: how to use access(2) D. Dean and A. Hu Usenix Security Symposium, 2004 Fixing races for fun and profit: howto abuse atime N. Borisov, R. Johnson, N. Sastry, and D. Wagner Usenix Security Symposium, 2005 Portably Solving File TOCTTOU Races with Hardness Amplification D. Tsafrir, T. Hertz, D. Wagner, and D.Da Silva Usenix Conference on File and Storage Technologies (FAST),

27 Prevention Series of papers on the access system call Fixing races for fun and profit: howto use access(2) K-race [ do multiple access and open calls, and check that open always opens the same file ] Fixing races for fun and profit: howto abuse atime File system maze [ make very long directory paths, ensuring that it takes long time between each open and access call ] Portably Solving File TOCTTOU Races with Hardness Amplification Fix to k-race [ check each part of the path with a K-race ] 27

28 Locking Ensures exclusive access to a certain resource Used to circumvent accidental race conditions advisory locking (processes need to cooperate) not mandatory, therefore not secure Often, files are used for locking portable (files can be created nearly everywhere) stuck locks can be easily removed Simple method open file using the O_EXCL flag 28

29 Shell Shell one of the core Unix application both a command language and programming language provides an interface to the Unix operating system rich features such as control-flow primitives, parameter passing, variables, and string substitution communication between shell and spawned programs via redirection and pipes different flavors bash and sh, tcsh and csh, ksh 29

30 Shell Attacks Environment Variables $HOME and $PATH can modify behavior of programs that operate with relative path names $IFS internal field separator used to parse tokens usually set to [ \t\n] but can be changed to / /bin/ls is parsed as bin ls calling bin locally IFS now only used to split expanded variables preserve attack (/usr/lib/preserve is SUID) called /bin/mail when vi crashes to preserve file change IFS, create bin as link to /bin/sh, kill vi 30

31 Shell Attacks Control and escape characters can be injected into command string modify or extend shell behavior user input used for shell commands has to be rigorously sanitized easy to make mistakes classic examples are `; and `& Applications that are invoked via shell can be targets as well increased vulnerability surface Restricted shell invoked with -r more controlled environment 31

32 Shell Attacks system(char *cmd) function called by programs to execute other commands invokes shell executes string argument by calling /bin/sh c string makes binary program vulnerable to shell attacks especially when user input is utilized popen(char *cmd, char *type) forks a process, opens a pipe and invokes shell for cmd 32

33 File Descriptor Attacks SUID program opens file forks external process sometimes under user control on-execute flag if close-on-exec flag is not set, then new process inherits file descriptor launch program works exactly like this malicious attacker might exploit such weakness Linux Perl getpwuid() leaves /etc/shadow opened (June 2002) problem for Apache with mod_perl 33

34 Resource Limits File system limits quotas restrict number of storage blocks and number of inodes hard limit can never be exceeded (operation fails) soft limit can be exceeded temporarily can be defined per mount-point defend against resource exhaustion (denial of service) Process resource limits number of child processes, open file descriptors 34

35 Signals Signal simple form of interrupt asynchronous notification can happen anywhere for process in user space used to deliver segmentation faults, reload commands, kill command Signal handling process can install signal handlers when no handler is present, default behavior is used ignore or kill process possible to catch all signals except SIGKILL (-9) 35

36 Signals Security issues code has to be be re-entrant atomic modifications no global data structures race conditions unsafe library calls, system calls examples wu-ftpd 2001, sendmail , stunnel 2003, ssh 2006 Secure signals write handler as simple as possible block signals in handler 36

37 Shared Libraries Library collection of object files included into (linked) program as needed code reuse Shared library multiple processes share a single library copy save disk space (program size is reduced) save memory space (only a single copy in memory) used by virtually all Unix applications (at least libc.so) check binaries with ldd 37

38 Shared Libraries Static shared library address binding at link-time not very flexible when library changes code is fast Dynamic shared library address binding at load-time uses procedure linkage table (PLT) and global offset table (GOT) code is slower (indirection) loading is slow (binding has to be done at run-time) classic.so or.dll libraries PLT and GOT entries are very popular attack targets more when discussing buffer overflows 38

39 Shared Libraries Management stored in special directories (listed in /etc/ld.so.conf) manage cache with ldconfig Preload override (substitute) with other version use /etc/ld.so.preload can also use environment variables for override possible security hazard now disabled for SUID programs (old Solaris vulnerability) 39

40 Advanced Security Features Address space protection address space layout randomization (ASLR) non-executable stack (based on NX bit or PAX patches) Mandatory access control extensions SELinux role-based access control extensions capability support Miscellaneous improvements hardened chroot jails better auditing 40