Roger N. Silvers, CMA

Transcription

1 Roger N. Silvers, CMA (717) EDUCATION Ph.D (Expected) University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. GPA: 3.98 Major: Accounting; Minor: Financial Economics; B.A Lynchburg College, Lynchburg, VA Major: Accounting RESEARCH ACTIVITIES General Interest My primary research explores the influence of public and private financial policies on capital markets, including their respective consequences for U.S. competitiveness amidst global markets. This interest has prompted research related to SEC enforcement policies and consequences, international accounting, cross-listing, securities law, insider trading, and corporate insurance. Dissertation SEC Enforcement of Non-U.S. Firms: Is Bonding Really a Myth? Dissertation Chair: Pieter Elgers Other Working Papers The Valuation Impact of SEC Enforcement Actions on Non-Target Non-U.S. Firms with P. Elgers Director and Officer Incentive Compatibility and Investor Judgments: An Experimental Investigation with S. Perreault The Effect of Firm-Imposed Insider Trading Restrictions on Cost of Equity Capital with H. Choy Works in Progress Are Earnings Attributes Related to Enforcement? Who Benefits from the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? The Effect of SEC Enforcement on Cross Listing Decisions and Valuation Premium with Q. Zhu SEC Enforcement of Non-U.S. Firms: The Impact of IOSCO s Information Sharing Agreement Conference Presentations "The Valuation Impact of SEC Enforcement Actions on Non-Target Cross-Listed Firms" 2011 Edwards Symposium on Financial Markets & Institutions, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan Financial Management Association, Denver, CO AAA Annual Meeting, Denver, CO AAA International Accounting Section, Tampa, FL. Securities Litigation: Understanding the Disciplining Mechanism 2011 Audit Mid-year Meeting, Savannah, Georgia Does Disclosure of D&O Liability Insurance Policies Influence Investor Judgments?" 2011 Public Interest Section Mid-year Meeting, Chicago, IL.* 2011 Mid-Atlantic Regional Meeting, Baltimore, MD. Updated December 2011 Page 1 of 6

2 *presented by co-author S. Perreault -Roger N. Silvers, CMA- "The Effect of Firm-Imposed Insider Trading Restrictions on Cost of Equity Capital" 2010 AAA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA European Accounting Association Annual Meeting, Istanbul, Turkey Financial Management Association Annual Meeting, Reno, NV. RECOGNITION Scholarships/Awards/Grants Eugene M. Isenberg Scholarship Award, 2011 Isenberg AIS Graduate Student Research Award, 2011 Arthur H. Carter Scholarship in Accounting, International Accounting Section (IAS) Grant, 2011 Honors and Achievements J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium, 2011 International Accounting Section Doctoral Consortium, 2011 Distinguished Teaching Award Nominee, 2010, 2011 DuPont Finance Field Program selection, 2006 Pole Vault Champion, Old Dominion Athletic Conference, 2001 Outstanding Male Track Athlete of the Year, 2001 TEACHING ACTIVITIES Interests Cost, Managerial, Financial Courses Taught Introduction to Accounting II (Managerial), University of Massachusetts Fall, 2011* Rating: (pending) 44 Students Fall 2010* Rating: 4.4, (out of 5.0) 54 Students Spring 2010* Rating: 4.6, (out of 5.0) 46 Students Spring 2009 Rating: 4.5, (out of 5.0) 46 Students *Distinguished Teaching Award Nominee Teaching Assistance Financial Statement Analysis-MBA, University of Massachusetts: 2010, 2011 PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Professional Experience University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA DuPont de Nemours, Wilmington, DE Versatek Enterprises, LLC, Lititz, PA Professional Affiliations American Accounting Association American Finance Association European Accounting Association Financial Management Association Institute of Management Accountants Updated December 2011 Page 2 of 6

3 Certifications Certified Management Accountant (CMA) 2009 (Active) Six Sigma Greenbelt Certification 2006 Microsoft Certified Excel Specialist (Expert Level) 2006 Professional Service Discussant & Presenter, Edwards Symposium on Markets and Institutions, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 2011 Discussant & Presenter, FMA Annual Meeting, Denver, 2011 Discussant, Reviewer, & Presenter, AAA Annual Meeting, Denver, 2011 Discussant, Reviewer, & Presenter, AAA International Accounting Section, Tampa, 2011 Discussant & Presenter, Mid-Atlantic Regional Meeting, Baltimore, 2011 Ad Hoc Reviewer, Northeast Decision Sciences Institute Annual Meeting, 2011 Presenter, AAA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 2010 Discussant, Presenter, FMA Annual Meeting, Reno, 2009 OTHER Website: SSRN Page: Updated December 2011 Page 3 of 6

4 Working Paper Abstracts: SEC Enforcement of Non-U.S. Firms: Is Bonding Really a Myth? This study seeks to provide a market-based test of the valuation impact of SEC enforcement actions. I examine the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement policy towards foreign firms under its jurisdiction in the post-2001 time period. In contrast to Siegel (2005) which examines earlier time periods, I find that the current pursuit of foreign firms by the SEC is by no means rare. Indeed the SEC s enforcement intensity is significant and has increased dramatically over the past decade. I use the enforcement events to construct a novel test of the bonding hypothesis that circumvents the issues associated with exchange-listing events (e.g. self-selection and simultaneous changes to firm traits). By examining non-target foreign firm stock returns using event windows surrounding SEC announcements of enforcements against foreign firms, I isolate the effect of a changing legal environment and find the following results: When the SEC takes action against a foreign firm, peer non-target foreign firms experience substantial increases in market valuation. These positive valuation effects are amplified for firms from weak home legal environments, suggesting that the increases in value are due to a perceived increase in SEC scrutiny. Finally, consistent with the market adjusting to the new enforcement regime, the magnitude of the response declines over time. In sum, the results provide evidence that SEC oversight plays a significant role in increasing the value of foreign firms, thereby supporting the legal bonding hypothesis. Securities Litigation: An Examination of the Disciplining Mechanism Although securities lawsuits are regularly filed against companies accused of engaging in inaccurate, aggressive, or fraudulent disclosure, little is known about the actual firm-level effects of litigation as a disciplining mechanism. The costs associated with defending and settling securities lawsuits are often fully covered by a firm s directors and officers (D&O) liability insurer, potentially mitigating the disciplinary role of litigation. We examine how the filing of a class action security lawsuit indirectly affects other costs that are actually borne by the firm itself. We find evidence that the filing of securities litigation dramatically increases both the audit fees and D&O insurance premiums paid by litigant firms, both prior to and subsequent to the lawsuit filing, and that the magnitude of these increases often approaches or exceeds the cost to settle the litigation itself. This suggests that the market s mechanism for disciplining malfeasant firms may not be the litigation settlement itself, but rather the increase in thirdparty expenses arising as a result of a lawsuit filing. Our findings add to the highly publicized and controversial debate on the effectiveness of class action securities litigation on public companies and shareholders. The Effect of Restricted Insider Trading Patterns on Cost of Capital This paper examines the impact of restricted insider trading patterns on a firm s cost of equity capital. We use both cross-sectional (differences between firms with versus those without blackout period restrictions) and time-series (difference between the pre- versus post-restriction period for those firms who do use blackout period restrictions) techniques to ascertain the impact of implementing blackout policies. Cross-sectionally, we find that firms whose insider trading clusters around post-earnings announcement periods enjoy a lower cost of capital than firms without such trade patterns. Time-series analyses provide further support for our cross-sectional findings as we determine that when firms begin following such a policy, their cost of capital subsequently declines. Moreover, consistent with insider trading patterns affecting capital costs, this decrease corresponds to the first year after the initiation and remains lowered throughout the five successive years we examine. In addition to the direct impact of the restriction, we also investigate alternative mechanisms by which restrictions indirectly influence the cost of capital through changes in the information environment via both analyst following and management earnings forecast practices. We find no support for the idea that analyst following is influenced by these Updated December 2011 Page 4 of 6

5 trading patterns. While firms with insider trading restrictions are more likely to disclose management earnings forecasts than firms without such restrictions, we do not find a significant change in management forecast practices following a change in the trading pattern. Does Disclosure of D&O Liability Insurance Policies Influence Investor Judgments? Unlike some foreign regulatory bodies, the Securities and Exchange Commission does not require U.S. registrants to disclose the existence or details of directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance coverage. Although firms are permitted to voluntarily disclose this information, few choose to do so. In this study, we use an experimental approach to investigate how disclosure of D&O liability insurance details affects investor perceptions of the accuracy of a firm s financial reporting. Our results suggest that the disclosure of D&O policy information significantly decreases the perceived quality of a firm s earnings; however, this does not universally lead to a decline in firm value. Our findings indicate that when managers have observable incentives to manage earnings upward, firms may benefit from providing this disclosure because D&O insurance coverage provides a source of redress for investors which compensates them for the increased risk. These findings have broad implications for investors, academics, and regulators concerned with the impacts of financial disclosures on the capital markets. Updated December 2011 Page 5 of 6

6 REFERENCES Dr. Pieter T. Elgers (Chair) Professor of Accounting Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Phone: Dr. Mark T. Bradshaw Professor of Accounting Carroll School of Management Boston College Phone: Dr. Craig Doidge Professor of Finance Rotman School of Management University of Toronto Phone: Dr. Bing Liang Professor of Finance Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Phone: Updated December 2011 Page 6 of 6