OCCURRENCE REPORTING IN RAILWAYS. DG workshop Valenciennes, 29 October 2014 EKSLER Vojtech

Transcription

1 OCCURRENCE REPORTING IN RAILWAYS DG workshop Valenciennes, 29 October 2014 EKSLER Vojtech

2 Current occurrence reporting in railways Common Occurrence Reporting: a roadmap CONTENT

3 Current common accident reporting in the EU RU/IM/ECM NIB NSA Occurrence Why reporting? Operational risk management under their SMS Safety culture enhancement / Continuous improvements Independent investigation / choice, speed, Regulatory risk assessment / Authorization and re-certification Supervision planning and performance / Assurance of public ERA/EC NEEDS Operational Regulatory Regulatory risk assessment / Safety oversight / Assurance of public

4 Current common accident reporting in the EU Subsidiarity / key competences of different stakeholders EU (ERA, EC) ACCIDENTS CSI REPORTING (EU level) INCIDENTS Member States (NSAs) (HAZARDOUS) EVENTS RUs / IMs / ECMs

5 Current common accident reporting in the EU

6 Current common accident reporting in the EU Annual number of rail occurrences in EU-28 ACCIDENTS INCIDENTS SERIOUS ACCIDENTS < 10 p.a. NON-SIGNIFICANT ACCIDENTS ~ 6,000? p.a. SIGNIFICANT ACCIDENTS > 2,000 p.a. INCIDENTS ~ 40,000? p.a. (HAZARDOUS) EVENTS

7 Current common accident reporting in the EU Example: potential of accident precursors monitoring for safety data analysis + learning from accidents Accident precursors p.a. ( ) SPADs + Wrong-side signaling failures Significant accidents p.a. ( ) Train collisions with a railway vehicle Ratio 6, / 221 Broken rails & wheels & axles + truck buckles Train derailments 14, / 74

8 Diverse national approaches to occurrence reporting Availability of a national wide database on railway incidents as reported by NSAs of MSs and the basic arrangements. Regime Database keeper Reporting entities Country 1 NSA RU+IMs CZ,DK,EE,FI,FR,NL,NO,SE 2 NSA RUs+IMs+ECMs+keepers LV 3 NIB RU+IMs AT,BE,HU 4 IM IM PT,SK, (NL) 5 Other RU+IMs UK Source: ERA survey among NSAs (2013)

9 Target problems summary Absence of tools for assuring that EU remains leader in railway safety worldwide Absence of specific data for evidence-based regulations at EU level (derailments, SPADs, ) (Impact assessments) Need to enhance development of safety/just culture Approaches to occurrence reporting and supervision vary considerably among MSs undermining the common safety framework application Occurrence data insufficiently explored and shared at national level

10 Rationale In addition to helping to solve problems and challenges identified: EU level solution may bring more efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. for harmonized supervision, riskbased regulations) Beneficial for MSs that have not yet established relevant occurrence reporting environment or considering its revision Facilitating cooperation and coordination of activities and actions among NSAs and ERA

11 Main consideration issues Cost-effectiveness of the EU-wide approach Voluntary/Mandatory requirements Obligations/Rights/Confidentiality issues

12 Approach taken Development approach Early consultation with stakeholders (Workshop) Analysis of national reporting systems and potential benefits of common reporting (Study) Tendering procedure in progress, study could start later this year Provisional schedule TRL study RISC67 Workshop Study Development?

13 TRL study into causes of accidents Designing of taxonomy

14 Theoretical development TRL study Literature review Existing risk models - Rail - Other industries Risk data Development of Accident Precursor Inventory (API) Fault tree development

15 Theoretical development TRL study EXISTING / ANALYZED RISK MODELS GB Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) Det Norske Veritas (DNV) freight train derailment Rail Optimisation Safety Analysis model (ROSA) Risk landscape model Federal Office of Transport for Swiss Railways Irish Rail Safety Risk Model Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) Safety Risk Model (SRM) London Underground Quantified Risk Assessment (LUQRA) Korean Risk Assessment Models

16 Theoretical development TRL study Informed by: Literature review Other precursor models Information from UIC and ERA data High level fault trees have been constructed There is likely to be more variation at lower levels Publicly available information was limited Step 2 provided further information

17 Theoretical development TRL study

18 Theoretical development TRL study STUDY AVAILABLE FOR A DOWNLOAD AT ERA WEBSITE