Cybersecurity Challenges and Research Direction NSF Research Activities in C

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1 Cybersecurity Challenges and Research Direction NSF Research Activities in C Trustworthy Computing Prof. Ty Znati, Division Director Computer and Network Systems Computer and Information Science and Engineering National Science Foundation Trust in the Information Society Leon, Spain 10 th and 11 th of February 2010

2 The security threat Outline NSF activities in security research Towards a Science of Security Reliability, Privacy and Usability CNCI: A multi U.S. Agency security initiative that seeks Other Related Funding Opportunities at NSF International Collaboration Concluding Remarks

3 From a Network of Networks to a Complex Social technical Machine Our systems have evolved into a complex ensemble of ubiquitous and pervasive devices and people networked together, communicating spontaneously with each other and with their environments, creating content and sharing knowledge, over heterogeneous communications networks and physical substrates

4 The Threat Our nations face serious cyber threats upon our national infrastructures A massive cyber attack upon our Nation s critical infrastructures is plausible and would have staggering adverse consequences. Technology convergence, innovation, and even rapid obsolescence open up new cyber vulnerabilities faster than old vulnerabilities can be closed. Globalization of information technology despite its benefits also has adversely affected our technical leadership and competitiveness.

5 Never Ending Race! Cyber attacks a on our nation s critical infrastructures are increasing and having cascading effects There is the real specter of cyber terrorism on our nation Estonia and Taiwan cases are but forewarnings Botnets are the attack du jour, but other kinds of crippling attacks are predicted On-line crime is reputed to cost $200B/year Ubiquitous/Pervasive it i computing despite its many advantages poses a threat to citizens privacy The future of electronic voting and, even, Internet voting poses threats to our nation s democratic institutions

6 Cornflicker Botnet Cumulative Infections 31 January 2009, SRI International The Conficker Worm A Global Pandemic Artist illustration Over 10,000,000 IPs affected worldwide Command and control mechanism identified and shut down by the Conficker Cabal New versions of malware released on the Internet SRI NSF project identified new versions and new threats 6

7 Without trust in cyber space our critical infrastructures t and privacy are at significant risk

8 Future Global Networks It is not just a technology that connects computers together, but a complex structure deeply embedded in the larger social, economical, legal and political context Different contexts will stress the network in different ways The Challenge is how to avoid banking in un-necessary cultural norms in the design process, while meeting the wide range of functional and performance requirements!

9 Fundamental Challenge As critical as networks are to our lives and diverse sectors of our society, we have little rigorous knowledge when it comes to understanding their complex structure, dynamics and holistic behaviors. A key factor is the interdependence among the physical, informational and social networks Is there a science for understanding the complexity of our networks such that we can engineer them to have predictable (adaptable) behavior?

10 Science Implications Taming complexity for a deeper understanding of both the interactions and inter dependence between the different layers and their components

11 What Makes Things Complex? Complex has many common associations Something is complex if our powers of logic struggle to see through h it if it has many factors, variables and potential outcomes, if it admits no simple formula exposition, must be examined from multiple and complementary angles and points of view Richness of Structure Richness of Behavior Richness of Detail Delicate Relationships

12 Complicated and Complex Systems Complicated Systems A complicated system is one that is composed of a large number of parts, and whose behavior can be entirely understood by reducing it to its parts. Complex Systems A complexsystem consists of a large number of components whose interactions lead to rich dynamics with patterns and fluctuations on many scales of space and time.

13 Complex Systems Characteristics A unique property characterizes complex systems the phenomenon of emergence Non linear interactions among system components that lead to unanticipated, emergent behaviors This property makes it hard to design and control complex systems with strategies derived from simple deduction or linear reasoning

14 Curse of Complexity Unintended and unanticipated consequences of changes in complex systems lead dto unexpected tdfil failures Oscillations, Instabilities Complex systems exhibit various degrees of resolution in their structure and components This makes it difficult to study complex systems using traditional methods Difficult to capture essential relationships between entities Limited ability to reason about the overall behavior

15 Classical Approach to Science Evaluation Modeling Experimentation Do it Over Again Observations Understanding d Refinement Inferences Patterns Assumes some level of specification

16 Knowledge and Abstraction Complexity brings about a marked shift in our concerns with knowledge, our perceptions of problems and attempts at their solutions Hard to determine what can be known and how knowledge can be achieved in the presence of emergent behaviors If abstraction forming is a basic tool for coping with large scale system design, is it still possible to capture global behavior under uncertainty?

17 Toward a Theoretical Foundation To what extent does there exist a structure that gives rise to the properties of large scale complex systems? Are there universal laws that govern the structure and consequently the behavior of complex networked systems? Can a theory be developed to assess the vulnerabilities and fragilities inherent in complex networked systems to better understand their behaviors? How can this knowledge be used to design, organize, build, and manage complex networked systems?

18 Models for Complex Socio Technical Networks Needed are models that capture the interplay between the dynamics of the network (behavior) and the evolution of the network (structure) Network Behavior: Dynamics ON Networks Network Evolution: Dynamics OF Networks

19 National Science Foundation Office of Inspector General National Science Board Office of the Director Administrative Offices CISE Directorate for Biological Sciences Directorate for Computer & Information Science & Engineering Directorate for Education & Human Resources Directorate for Engineering Directorate for Mathematical & Physical Sciences Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences Office Cyberinfrastructure Office of International Science & Engineering Directorate for Geosciences Office of Polar Programs

20 CISE Organization CISE Office of the Assistant Director Dr. Jeanette Wing Assistant Director Dr. Deborah Crawford Deputy AD CCF Computing and Communications Foundations Division i i Director Dr. Sampath Kannan CNS Computer and Network Systems Division i i Director Dr. Ty Znati IIS Information and Intelligent Systems Division i i Director Dr. Haym Hirsh NSF provides 87% of all Federal support for basic research in computer science

21 NSF Mission in CyberSecurity Support leading edge fundamental research on computer based systems and networks that Function as intended, especially in the face of cyber events Process, store and communicate sensitive information according to specified policies Address the concerns of individuals and society about privacy and usability Educate the next workforce and inform the public Systems of national significance, e.g., in critical infrastructures, finance, elections, healthcare, national defense, national scale l databases, air traffic control, and systems important to individuals, e.g., automobiles, office systems, homes Collaborative activities addressing the full scope of dependable systems (reliability, safety, security, etc.) and other research areas (e.g., confidentiality and usability of research data)

22 NSF s Role in Cybersecurity Research and Education Goals Exercise leadership in science and technology to build trust incyber space Create a technological future for cyber space that benefits and advances society for generations to come Strategy Fund foundational, long term open (unclassified) research in cybersecurity Ensure scientific and technical excellence Balance portfolio of theoretical and experimental research Education and training of next generation scientists in cybersecurity

23 FY09: Cyber Trust has Transitioned into Trustworthy Computing (TC) Trustworthy = Reliability + Security + Privacy + Usability Deeper and broader than Cyber Trust Five areas, with particular focus on research that cuts across privacy and usability Fundamentals: new models that are analyzable, cryptography, composability (even though security is not a composable property), new ways to analyze systems Privacy: definition of privacy, threats, metrics, security, regulation, database inferencing, tradeoff with other requirements Usability: for lay users and security administrators Security Architecture: Putting point solutions together, towards a future secure Internet (which includes the network, hosts and applications) Evaluation: experimental, testbed design and deployment

24 Is There a Science of Security? Are there impossibility results? Are there powerful models (like Shannon s binary symmetric channel) so that realistic security and privacy properties can be computed? Possibilities include: Control Theory for security Kirchoff like laws to capture normal behavior of routers and other devices Is there a theory that enables: Secure systems to be composed from insecure components, or even Secure systems to be composed from secure components? Metrics: Is there a theory such that systems can be ordered (or even partially ordered) with respect to their security or privacy? Can entire systems (hosts, networks) and their defenses be formally verified with respect to realistic security objectives and threats? Are there security related hypotheses that can be validated experimentally? What kind of an instrument (testbed) is needed to validate such hypotheses? NSF/IARPA/NSA organized a workshop on SOS, Nov. 2008

25 Research Directions in Trustworthy Anticipate and understand future cyber threats arising from advances in Pervasive computing g( (espp privacy, y,p provenance, attestation) Service oriented architectures (esp composable, provable trusts, policies) Cross enterprise (and cross coalition) sharing and interoperation Research into the foundations of trust The limits of what can and cannot be known about trust Is there a Science of Security? And similarly for Privacy. Covert channels and information hiding affecting security and trust Cryptography research concentrates on faster provably secure algorithms Special economic and societal impact Anonymity, anti spam, anti spyware, competitiveness, critical infrastructures Towards an overarching security architecture that integrates the many but specific solutions NSF PIs have developed Go beyond our current band aid approach to security Test beds and Methodology for Experimentation and Evaluation Continued joint development of research testbeds including DETER, ORBIT, Repository of anonymized sharable test data based on actual events/behaviors Open source software and wide distribution of benchmark results

26 Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative CNCI is a multi U.S. US agency initiative towards securing critical infrastructures Much of it is short term term to shore up current critical systems Grass Roots research directed effort that morphed into CNCI Leap Ahead that is looking out 10 years Organized workshops Many took place and others are in planning stages Interest especially in the intersection of security, policy and economics Industry and international participation sought An education effort with the goal of more security experts at many different levels

27 CNCI: Key Questions to Guide Research 1. How do we optimize/derive identity management and authentication procedures while balancing requirements forprivacy including anonymity on the digital infrastructure? 2. Who is responsible/accountable for the protection of rights and property given the dichotomy between the conduit and the information that flows on it fall under different regulatory/ compliance regimes? 3. How do we reach a vision for a future (trusted, resilient, survivable ) architecture? 4. How do you get industry buy in and connect them to the research agenda? 5. There has been a great deal of research on fail safe, self healing, software networks what is the status and can it be leveraged now for some of the transformation initiatives (e.g., Smartgrid, Nextgen FAA, Health IT)? 6. How can the U.S. collaborate with its allies towards a cooperate cyber defense architecture t and to mitigate t attacks

28 Other Related Funding Opportunities at NSF

29 Scope NetSE Broad Agenda Workshops GENI Future Activities NetSE Program Time

30 NetSE Context Network Design and Architecture Network Foundation People and Information FIND SING NGNI Network Science and Engineering

31 NetSE Program Scope NetSE program encourages researchers to engage gg in integrative thinking to advance, seed and sustain the transformation of networking research to enable the socio technical networks of the future. The focus is on innovative research that address new or as yet unsolved critical network challenges that by their nature require expertise and synergy from different disciplines Computing and other relevant fields such as engineering, mathematics, economics, and the social sciences.

32 Future Internet Architectures Funding opportunity for collaborative, multi disciplinary, fundamental and possibly radical innovationsin networking, leading to the architecture of a Future Internet that is trustworthy, economically viable ibl and preserving of our social norms and values Trust, broadly defined, is a mandatory requirement Expect to fund 2 4 projects at $3M/year for 3 Expect to fund 2 4 projects at $3M/year for 3 years

33 Cyber-Enabled Discovery and Innovation (CDI) Five year initiative Cross NSF Paradigm changing trans disciplinary projects Innovation in computational models, methods and tools

34 CDI s Themes CDI Project Types 1. From Data to Knowledge Enhancing human cognition and generating new knowledge from a wealth of heterogeneous data 2. Understanding Complexity in Natural, Built, and Social Systems Discovering fundamental insights on systems composed of multiple interacting elements 3. Building Virtual Organizations Enhancing discovery and innovation by bringing people and resources together across institutional, geographical and cultural boundaries

35 Expeditions in Computing Program 35 2/18/2010

36 Expeditions In Computing Goals Promote bold, ambitious, transformative research that explores new scientific frontiers which promise disruptive innovations to help define the future of computing Catalyze far-reaching research in the computing and information fields motivated by hard, emerging g problems and/or compelling applications that benefit society Inspire current and future generations of Americans (esp., underrepresented d groups) to pursue CISE careers Stimulate significant research and education outcomes that promise scientific, economic, and/or societal benefits through effective knowledge transfer

37 Global Collaboration Global collaboration among scientists, engineers, educators, industry and governments can speed the transformation of new knowledge into new products, processes and services, and in their wake produce new jobs, create wealth, and improve the standard of living and quality of life worldwide. Arden L. Bement, Jr. NSF Director Cancun, Mexico August 2005

38 Opportunities and Needs for International Cooperation Much attack activity is indiscriminant significant utility in sharing information via distributed sensors With caveat that even so, perspectives are not homogeneous Non-local defenses require international coordination Whether proactive (e.g., anti-spoofing) or reactive Incident response & forensics require international ti coordination Some facets of organized cybercrime appear to have national components NSF (with DHS) is collaborating with the EC (and other bodies on the design of a Future Internet) NSF offers supplements to U.S. PIs

39 International Research Partnerships International ti lresearch hcollaboration Current tstatet In general, we have authorization to encourage, enable joint research; but there is no demand that we do so. Is it Time to Revisit International Collaboration? Allow researchers from each side to participate in research projects Allow for joint projects whereby US and European researchers Should funding be set aside for these activities Should specific calls? How to overcome the red tape?

40 Geographical Dispersion an Issue? Difficult to establish mutual regard and common ground, increased misunderstanding Delays in project schedule and poor monitoring of progress may be problematic Information and awareness distributed unevenly

41 Concluding Remarks Our complex, socio technical networks of the future are too important to be left to random developments Sound Theoretical Foundation Best way to predict the future is to invent it! Science to engineer networks with predictable behavior Science of security to enable a Paradigm Shift True experimentation is needed. Shared experimental infrastructure to enable, understanding, implementation and deployment of socio technical networked systems of the future International collaboration is a must! Industry and Academia

42 Thank You! Acknowledgement: J. Wing, NSF NeTS and NetSE Teams, NSF Trustworthy Computing Team, CISE GENI Team and TwC PIs.