CPSS IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures: vectors of international convergence

Transcription

1 CPSS IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures: vectors of international convergence Daniela RUSSO Director General of the Directorate General Payments and Market Infrastructure European Central Bank New and more demanding international standards for payment, clearing and settlement systems, including central counterparties (CCPs) have been issued in April 2012 by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). These Principles for financial market infrastructures will provide important support for the G20 strategy to make the financial system more resilient by promoting central clearing and trade reporting of over the counter derivatives. CPSS and IOSCO members strove to adopt the new standards by the end of Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) are expected to observe the standards as soon as possible. Regulators and the financial industry worldwide need to work hand in hand to ensure international convergence in the ongoing implementation process. This article reviews and assesses how the Principles contribute to the global agenda for reforming financial markets, outlines the various roles and functions that the new Principles have for FMIs and regulators, explains the motivation for reviewing regulatory standards for FMIs, and sets out in greater detail the new and strengthened regulatory requirements that have come out of the review process. It emphasizes the importance of consistent implementation at global level for achieving regulatory convergence and explains how the international regulatory community intends to proceed towards this end. Finally, the article sketches some of the core elements of ongoing work in view of developing a recovery and resolution framework for FMIs. Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April

2 Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) for the clearing, settlement and reporting of financial transactions payment systems, central counterparties (CCPs), central securities depositories (CSDs), securities settlement systems and trade repositories form the backbone of the financial system by providing the networks through which financial transactions are being processed and the involved counterparties are interconnected. Owing to this central role, FMIs concentrate significant financial and/or operational risks and deepen interdependencies among the participants in the markets they serve. Sound FMI functioning is therefore a key element of an appropriate framework to safeguard financial stability. While the primary responsibility for taking appropriate measures in this regard rests with the operators of FMIs, FMIs are in addition closely overseen and supervised. As a result of financial globalisation, the membership, product and currency coverage of FMIs and their related financial risk implications have become increasingly cross border in nature. Furthermore, interdependencies between FMIs have also grown significantly (CPSS, 2008). Against this background, authorities have developed global standards for FMIs to ensure robust FMI risk management and disclosure across jurisdictions, including initially the 2001 Core principles for systemically important payment systems, the 2001 Recommendations for securities settlement systems and the 2004 Recommendations for central counterparties. The effective implementation of those standards was promoted through the self commitment of authorities around the world who adopted the standards as well as through their use as benchmarks for financial sector assessments of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. International efforts to promote the safety and resilience of FMIs demonstrated their value during the financial crisis erupting in 2008, when FMIs managed the heightened market instability, spikes in transaction volumes, and the default of Lehman Brothers as a major FMI participant without any major disruptions. Overall, by acting as a buffer for the increased and more volatile trading activity, the smooth functioning of FMIs contributed to market confidence and played an important role in limiting the financial and economic impact of the financial turbulences. Moreover, financial sector segments with less developed FMIs in particular over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets proved much more vulnerable to deficiencies in market transparency and financial risk management during the crisis (Russo, 2010). Considering also the significant systemic risk implications of OTC derivatives markets (ECB, 2009), the G20 decided at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit to enhance the use of FMIs for these products notably through mandatory central clearing and reporting obligations. 1 Nevertheless, there is no room for complacency regarding the safety of FMIs. First, the growing use of FMIs across financial markets partly as a consequence of the G20 OTC derivatives reform agenda, but also relating to the growing use of CCPs for other products such as repos warrants particular attention to ensure that FMIs apply state of the art risk management technologies and enable effective market discipline through adequate disclosure. Second, the crisis highlighted specific challenges in today s financial system e.g., relating to liquidity risk management, scarcity of high quality collateral, inherent procyclicality of the financial system and complexity of effective oversight and supervision in a cross border context that are relevant not only for financial institutions but just as much for FMIs. Third, public sector support to financial institutions during the crisis may to some extent have limited the financial implications for FMIs. Against this background, it should be ensured that FMIs would be fully prepared for even more severe stress scenarios. It is against this backdrop that in 2010 the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) decided to review and update the existing international standards for FMIs. Following extensive public consultation the Principles for financial market infrastructures (PFMIs) replacing the previous CPSS and IOSCO standards for FMIs were issued in April In addition, the G20 called for trading of standardised OTC derivatives on electronic trading platforms or exchanges, where appropriate, and for higher capital requirements for non centrally cleared OTC derivatives. 2 CPSS and IOSCO members had committed to adopt the new Principles by the end of 2012 and to put them into effect as soon as possible. FMIs are expected to observe them as soon as possible. 70 Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April 2013

3 This article reviews the main changes introduced by the PFMIs (Section 1), priorities regarding their effective and consistent implementation (Section 2), as well as their interaction with the on going work of CPSS and IOSCO on FMI recovery and resolution (Section 3). It closes with some conclusions from the analysis (Section 4). 1 Overview of some important new requirements CPSS and IOSCO have strengthened the international standards for FMIs by raising minimum requirements including and in particular for the management of financial risks. An FMI or its participants may face credit and liquidity risks arising from the FMI s payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Although there is often significant interaction between credit and liquidity risk, these risks are distinct concepts and are therefore addressed in separate principles, which was not the case in the previous international standards for payment systems, CCPs, and securities settlement systems. In addition to these new and more demanding financial risk requirements, the PFMIs also contain a number of new requirements that did not previously exist mainly aimed at addressing business risk, the need to protect indirect participants through effective segregation, and the need to address risks relating to tiering. 1 1 New credit risk requirements A clear distinction has been introduced between current exposures and potential future exposures, both of which need to be covered fully with a high degree of confidence. While current exposures can be precisely determined, the determination of potential future exposures is more difficult and requires the development of adequate stress scenarios that the FMIs need to be able to handle with sufficient collateral. The PFMIs put much greater emphasis and contain more guidance on the definition of such crisis scenarios. In particular, they have strengthened the minimum requirements applicable to CCPs by specifying that CCPs which are involved in activities which have a more complex risk profile or which are systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain at a minimum financial resources to cover the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would cause the largest credit exposure to the CCP. The previous CPSS IOSCO Recommendations for CCPs only required the coverage of the largest single exposure and did not consider a participant s affiliates. Of note, the PFMIs clarify that these are only minimum standards, which may very well call for much higher collateral requirements if market conditions are expected to be particularly severe. A further important new requirement in the PFMIs concerns payment systems that employ a deferred net settlement (DNS) mechanism. Such systems may face financial exposures arising from their relationships with their participants or their payment and settlement processes. Importantly, the PFMIs distinguish between DNS systems with and without settlement guarantee. A DNS payment system that explicitly guarantees settlement, whether the guarantee is from the FMI itself or from its participants, should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover fully all current and potential future exposures using collateral and other equivalent financial resources. Even if a DNS payment system does not provide a settlement guarantee, but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its payment and settlement processes, it should maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system. The latter is an important new qualification that has been introduced in the PFMIs to explicitly recognise the systemic impact that a default of an important participant could have even if the payment system itself is not exposed to credit risk. Finally, and very importantly, the PFMIs contain provisions requiring contingency planning for credit losses that are not covered by the resources which are part of the regular risk management waterfall and go thus beyond the amount of financial resources as required by the PFMIs. An FMI should analyse and plan for how it would address any such uncovered credit losses. An FMI s rules and procedures should indicate its process to replenish any financial resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner. For instance, an FMI s rules and procedures might provide the possibility to allocate uncovered credit losses by writing down potentially unrealised gains Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April

4 by non defaulting participants and the possibility of calling for additional contributions from participants based on the relative size and risk of their portfolios. As such, this provision serves as a starting point for the ongoing work on the recovery of FMIs, which is discussed at greater length below. 1 2 New liquidity risk requirements The PFMIs also contain new requirements to address liquidity risks specifying that an FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI. In contrast to the requirements on credit risk, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should only consider maintaining additional liquidity resources sufficient to cover the default of the two largest participants, whereas coverage of the largest two exposures is a hard requirement for credit risk management. This subtle yet important difference comes from the fact that a given requirement for liquidity risk is potentially significantly more demanding than the same requirement for credit risk. This is because the credit risk principle allows non cash assets to be counted towards the coverage requirement, allowing for appropriately prudent haircuts, whereas the proposals for the liquidity standard require these assets to be convertible into cash via committed secured facilities on the day of default. Also, to take the example of a cash delivery versus payment CCP, to cover the credit risk from a participant s default requires sufficient financial resources only to cover the risk of potential movements in the price of the assets due to be sold on a given day with the required degree of confidence (i.e. probably a small proportion of the value of the asset to be sold). But to cover the liquidity exposures from a default requires financial resources equal to the entire value of the asset to be sold. Moreover, the PFMIs also contain new requirements specifying the range of funding arrangements that are eligible to meet the liquidity risk requirements. More specifically, for the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI s qualifying liquid resources in each currency may include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. The PFMIs also put greater emphasis on the need for the stress testing of liquidity needs and resources. To this end, stress scenarios should consider the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), the multiple roles that participants may play with respect to the risk management of the FMI, and assess the probability of multiple failures and the contagion effect among its participants that such failures may cause. 1 3 New margin and collateral requirements New margin and collateral requirements have been introduced in the PFMIs that go beyond what was required previously. In particular, under the new requirements, initial margin methodologies should be such that they not only consider normal market conditions as was required under the CPSS IOSCO Recommendations for CCPs, but also extreme events that occurred in the past as well as simulated data projections that would capture plausible events outside of the historical data, especially for new products. Collateral requirements have also been strengthened in particular with a view of avoiding concentration risk, wrong way risk and procyclicality. Procyclicality has been a source of concern in the recent financial crisis as it may cause or exacerbate financial instability. For example, in a stressed market, an FMI may require the posting of additional collateral both because of the decline of asset prices and because of an increase in haircut levels. Such actions could exacerbate market stress and contribute to driving down asset prices further, resulting in additional collateral requirements. This cycle could exert further downward pressure on asset prices. 72 Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April 2013

5 In order to avoid such effects, an FMI should, to the extent practicable and prudent, apply stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions in order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments. 1 4 New non financial risk related requirements The PFMIs contain some new provisions aimed at improving the management of risks other than financial risks stemming from the default of a participant. In particular, a new principle has been introduced which requires that a CCP has rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of the positions of a participant s customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions. Appropriate segregation and portability within a CCP is especially important in light of the G20 mandate for the central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives products. Moreover, general business risk has been explicitly recognised as an important source of financial losses that are not related to a participant s default. New requirements have been introduced that are designed to protect participants and the financial system from the risk that an FMI could cease operations suddenly as a result of business losses that are unrelated to participant defaults. Specifically, an FMI is required to hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses so that it can continue providing operations and services, either as a going concern or during its recovery or orderly wind down, if it incurs general business losses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resource principles. Finally, also in response to mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives and as a way of accessing CCPs, indirect participation in CCPs has gained in importance, which has led to much more risk concentration on a few large global dealers. The PFMIs explicitly recognise that dependencies and risk exposures (including credit, liquidity, and operational risks) inherent in such tiered arrangements can present risks to the FMI and its smooth functioning as well as to the participants themselves and the broader financial markets. In response, new provisions have been introduced that require an FMI to identify, monitor, and manage the material risks it faces from indirect participants. The PFMIs even go as far as to encourage direct participation, for example by establishing objective thresholds above which direct participation would normally be encouraged where an indirect participant accounts for a large proportion of the transactions processed by an FMI. 2 Implementation and the need for consistency 2 1 Main implementation tools Given the need for the PFMIs to be compatible with different types of FMIs and the specific legal and institutional settings in multiple jurisdictions, they are formulated as adaptable, high level guidance. In order to ensure that this flexible framework nevertheless promotes an effective level playing field across FMIs and jurisdictions, the CPSS and IOSCO members have agreed to assist each other in the practical application of the PFMIs. Well coordinated approaches are particularly important in view of the increased cross border financial stability implications of FMIs and their high degree of interconnectedness, as set forth above. CPSS and IOSCO have agreed on three main tools to ensure the effective and consistent implementation of the PFMIs. First, the PFMIs specify the responsibilities of authorities in implementing the PFMIs. This includes general criteria for appropriate and effective regulation, supervision and oversight (Responsibility A), powers and resources of authorities for carrying out these functions (Responsibility B), clear definition and adequate transparency regarding the respective policies (Responsibility C), authorities commitment to the adoption of the PFMIs and their consistent application across all relevant FMIs (Responsibility D) and requirements for cooperation across authorities (Responsibility E). While all of these principles are critical to ensure the effective implementation of the PFMIs, Responsibility E is particularly important from a cross border consistency point of view. Responsibility E requires close communication and consultation among all authorities for which an FMI has significant financial stability implications. This is a key tool to achieve Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April

6 the effective on going supervision and oversight of cross border and multicurrency FMIs, in line with the perspectives of all relevant jurisdictions and authorities, as well as common assessments of those infrastructures observance of the PMFIs. Second, the CPSS and IOSCO have developed an assessment methodology that provides guidance for assessing observance of the PFMIs (CPSS and Board of IOSCO, 2012). This framework follows the structure of the key considerations for each of the principles addressed to FMIs and the responsibilities of authorities and sets forth questions and a rating scheme to help assessors to determine the degree of compliance and to prioritise action to address identified shortcomings. The assessment methodology is designed for use both by authorities (i.e. when assessing the observance of the PFMIs by infrastructures and/or their own compliance with the principles addressed to authorities) and infrastructures (i.e. when taking decisions and implementing policies and procedures to ensure effective observance of the PFMIs). In addition, the IMF and the World Bank will employ the assessment methodology in the context of their Financial Sector Assessment Program and technical assistance programmes. Third, the CPSS and IOSCO have issued a disclosure framework for FMIs in order to promote adequate and comparable public information about infrastructures activities, risk profile and risk management practices and their compliance with the PFMIs (CPSS and Board of IOSCO, 2012). The enhanced transparency is intended to facilitate effective market discipline and to thereby provide further impetus for infrastructures compliance with the PFMIs. 2 2 Progress so far The implementation process for the PFMIs is still at a relatively early stage. Authorities had committed to strive for implementation of the PFMIs by the end of 2012 but important rules notably those related to OTC derivatives infrastructures have not yet been fully adopted by all CPSS and IOSCO members. 3 Similarly, cooperative arrangements for several major cross border and multicurrency FMIs are not yet in place. It will be important to address these delays as soon as possible to address the resulting regulatory uncertainty and to promote effective progress towards highest standards of safety and efficiency for all relevant FMIs. Additional concerns arise from risks of overlaps and even inconsistencies of authorities rules for OTC derivatives infrastructures. Such problems could arise for example where authorities may apply domestic requirements to foreign FMIs that seek to provide their services to domestic clients, rather than permitting those FMIs to conduct their activities subject to comparable rules issued by their home jurisdictions. Indeed, whereas European Union rules for OTC derivatives infrastructures notably the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the proposed revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive ( MiFID 2 ) include a general process for recognising equivalent regimes in other jurisdictions, this may not be the case in other major jurisdictions, especially in the United States. Under the Dodd Frank Act foreign FMIs are generally subject to US rules if their activities have a direct and significant connection with US business, which would for most non US FMIs active in the US imply double regulation. Such regulatory overlaps would not only be extremely costly but would also hamper regulatory compliance in cases where the detailed technical rules may not be fully compatible, thereby creating unintended new risks to the effective regulation and oversight of FMIs. The extraterritorial approach envisaged in the United States has therefore raised significant concerns by authorities and infrastructures worldwide. 4 In view of the strong feedback received, the US authorities are currently considering whether there may be enhanced scope for substituted compliance for foreign FMIs in line with their home country rules. Another source of regulatory risk and uncertainty is divergence in the interpretation of the G20 mandate. If the scope of mandatory clearing and reporting obligations differs or requirements for 3 For a recent overview of the state of the implementation of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms across jurisdictions see FSB (2012): OTC derivatives market reforms: fourth progress report on implementation, 31 October, table 2, p See the responses to the CFTC s proposed Interpretative guidance and policy statement of the cross border application of certain swaps provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, which include contributions for example from the European Commission as well as from Asian Pacific authorities, and which are available at: 74 Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April 2013

7 the risk management of OTC derivatives FMIs are not sufficiently congruent across jurisdictions, this could give rise to regulatory arbitrage and may hamper the effective implementation of the G20 reform objective. Indeed, there are indications for substantial differences in these areas, for instance concerning the scope of the mandatory clearing obligation and related exemptions (e.g., for certain asset classes or non financial institutions) as well as requirements for CCPs capital, margin, collateral and segregation arrangements. The international community has fully recognised the above risks. In October 2012, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) urged authorities to take action by end 2012 to identify conflicts, inconsistencies and gaps in their respective rules and to work together quickly to address the identified issues (FSB, 2012). In November 2012, regulators from Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, Canada, Switzerland and the United States issued a joint statement on Operating principles and areas of exploration in the regulation of the cross border OTC derivatives market. 5 While the regulators acknowledged various potential conflicts, inconsistencies and duplicative requirements within their respective (contemplated) rules and considered possible exemptions of foreign financial institutions and infrastructures on the basis of regulatory equivalence, concrete options to address these issues will still need to be discussed. Regulators agreed to meet again in 2013 to continue work on these issues within a reasonable, limited transition period. Given that the G20 deadline for OTC derivatives reform in principle expired already by end 2012 and more generally with a view to supporting the timely and effective implementation of the PFMIs, regulators should commit to a clear roadmap as soon as possible. Furthermore, it would seem helpful for regulators to consider transitional moratoria on the cross border application of their rules until the respective issues have been fully resolved. 3 Recovery and resolution The disorderly failure of an FMI can lead to severe systemic disruptions if it causes markets to cease to operate effectively. Ensuring that FMIs can continue to perform critical operations and services as expected in a financial crisis is therefore central to the recovery plans they formulate and the resolution regime that applies to them. Maintaining critical operations should allow FMIs to serve as a source of strength and continuity for the financial markets they serve. This aim is all the more necessary given the commitment made by G20 leaders in 2009 that all standardised OTC derivatives should be cleared through CCPs. To support this G20 commitment, the FSB identified four safeguards to help establish a safe environment for clearing OTC derivatives through a global framework of CCPs. One of these safeguards is to establish effective resolution regimes. Accordingly, all types of FMIs should generally be subject to regimes and strategies for recovery and resolution. Consistent with this approach, the PFMIs require that FMIs have effective strategies, rules and procedures to enable them to recover from financial stresses. The Financial Stability Board s Key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions further require that jurisdictions establish resolution regimes to allow for the resolution of a financial institution where recovery is no longer feasible. An effective regime must enable resolution without causing systemic disruption or exposing the taxpayer to loss. For FMIs, this means applying particular emphasis on ensuring that the relevant authorities are given powers to maintain an FMI s critical services if they consider this necessary to maintain stability. To this end, CPSS and IOSCO published for public comment a consultative report on the Recovery and resolution of financial market infrastructures. The consultation ended on 28 September CPSS and IOSCO are currently in a process of reviewing the comments received in the consultation in order to assess whether and how to elaborate further on the Principles and to provide guidance to FMIs and authorities. In parallel, the European Commission released a public consultation on the recovery and resolution of financial institutions other than banks, including FMIs, which ended on 28 December The ECB in general welcomes the European Commission s initiatives in this field, however with the following qualifications. First, in view of the specific nature of FMIs that makes them different from banks, there is a need for establishing 5 See htm. Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April

8 a European recovery and resolution regime which is specifically designed for the purposes of FMIs and distinct from the resolution framework for banks. Second, a European recovery and resolution regime should cover all types of FMIs including CCPs, CSDs, payment systems, and trade repositories. This is also the approach taken by CPSS IOSCO at global level. Third, in order to ensure international consistency in requirements for the recovery of FMIs, the forthcoming EU recovery and resolution regime for FMIs should be aligned with the international standards as being developed by CPSS and IOSCO. Fourth, the resolution of FMIs requires swift decision taking that cannot afford lengthy coordination processes among a multitude of authorities. Moreover, many FMIs are so large in size and scope that their failure would, on the one hand, endanger the financial system of several countries at the same time, but on the other hand, be too large for the national government of the home country to be supported in case of stress and thereby causing or exacerbating funding problems for the sovereign, which might further destabilise the financial sector. For these reasons, a centralised resolution authority in particular for CCPs, international CSDs, and large value payment systems would be very beneficial. Fifth, while effective recovery and resolution regimes are important for all types of FMIs, FMIs are very different in nature, are exposed to different types of risks, and their failure may have different systemic implications. Careful distinction therefore needs to be made between the different risk profiles that FMIs may have. Finally, the distinction between the resolution regime for FMIs and regular insolvency rules needs to be clearly drawn. A resolution regime for FMIs may either replace ordinary insolvency law or complement it as an intermediate step needed to prevent insolvency. It is vital that the work on the recovery of FMIs both in the European Union and at global level move forward swiftly and be finalised in the course It is equally vital that, similar to the PFMIs, any additional requirements that may be developed to ensure the recovery of PFMIs be implemented consistently across all jurisdictions. 4 Conclusions 4 1 Rulemaking and standard setting should be completed as soon as possible Despite substantial progress, the G20 commitments on OTC derivatives have not been fully met by the end 2012 deadline. Legislation and required regulatory rule making are not yet complete even in the major OTC derivatives market jurisdictions, where most of the progress has been made. Uncertainty about regulatory requirements is impeding progress by market participants to meet the G20 commitments for clearing, reporting and trading. As implementation takes place, the reforms themselves and the reactions of market participants are reshaping markets in ways that are not yet fully understood. More specifically in view of FMIs, work is ongoing to develop an effective framework for ensuring the recovery of FMIs. It is vital that this work both in the European Union and at global level moves forward swiftly and be finalised in the course Risks of remaining inconsistencies need to be addressed Conflicts, inconsistencies and gaps in regulations across jurisdictions need to be addressed, particularly those related to cross border participants and trades. Conflicting or inconsistent cross border application of rules to market participants, intermediaries, infrastructures and products may inhibit the execution or clearing of certain cross border transactions or impose additional compliance burdens. It is therefore important to develop concrete and practical solutions with respect to any conflicting application of rules, identify inconsistent or duplicative requirements and attempt to reduce the regulatory burdens associated with such requirements, and identify gaps and reduce the potential for regulatory arbitrage. The PFMIs play an important part in the G20/FSB financial reforms, including in the key area of OTC derivative market reforms. For the PFMIs to be effective, it is important that they are implemented consistently and in full in all jurisdictions. 76 Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April 2013

9 4 3 Need for comprehensive and continuous assessment of entire reform process The OTC derivatives reform process including for FMIs serving these markets consists of a multitude of individual reforms. Their implementation will not be complete in Rather, it is an ongoing process that needs to be continuously monitored, assessed, and reviewed on a long term basis over several years. A lot of issues have not yet been fully analysed and can only be better understood over the course of time once reforms have been further implemented. For example, the systemic implications of the evolving global financial market infrastructures (such as the emergence of few large globally acting CCPs) are not known. Moreover, it is unclear how much standardisation of OTC derivatives products is needed and how much customisation is acceptable. There is still not even a generally accepted definition of standardisation. Furthermore, while a lot of emphasis has been put on the collection of and access to data, there is no clear understanding on how to use and interpret the data in a meaningful way. Finally and more generally, the collective impact of different market reforms on incentives, liquidity needs, systemic risk protection and overall functioning of markets are not known at this stage. As a result, it will be important to keep momentum in the OTC derivatives reform process beyond To this end, the preparation of a multi year plan for deepening the monitoring of the implementation of OTC derivatives reforms including for FMIs will be helpful. Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April

10 References Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) (2008) The interdependencies of payment and settlement systems, June. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and Board of International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2012) Principles for financial market infrastructures: Disclosure framework and assessment methodology, December. Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2012) OTC derivatives market reforms. Fourth progress report on implementation, pp. 1, October 31. Russo (D.) (2010) OTC derivatives: financial stability challenges and responses from authorities, Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, No. 14, July. European Central Bank (ECB) (2009) OTC derivatives and post trading infrastructures, September. 78 Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 17 April 2013