1 NSTIC National Program Office Discussion Draft STANDARDS CATALOG Contents Introduction Source Documents Introduction This document is a contribution from the NSTIC National Program Office to the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group Standards Coordination Committee. The document contains an illustrative list of some of the applicable standards, guidelines, policies, profiles and frameworks, and basic metadata and analysis about each. This document is based on limited research and the collection of documents for this catalog does not reflect endorsement by the NSTIC National Program Office and likewise exclusion does not reflect non-endorsement. Page 1 Generated: 10/04/ :20
3 ID: ANSI X Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Category: Cryptographic Protocol Specification Date: 11/20/2001 ANSI x url Description: ID: ANSI X Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Category: Cryptographic Protocol Specification Date: 11/20/2001 ANSI Description: ID: BAE Governance Backend Attribute Exchange (BAE) v2.0 Governance Category: Attribute Provider Policy Date: 1/23/2012 ICAM Description: Guidance on how to use Backend Attribute Exchange in a trusted and federated manner within the Federal government. It explains how BAE endpoints perform discovery, the trust model and metadata management. The document scope diagram indicates that it should also cover conformance and interoperability but those topics were not evident. No stipulations. Page 3
4 ID: BAE Overview Backend Attribute Exchange (BAE) v2.0 Overview Category: Attribute Provider Policy Date: 1/23/2012 ICAM Description: High level explanation of Backend Attribute Exchange, including an overview of the document suite, roles and responsibilities, technical and business goals for BAE, design patterns and implementation guidance. No stipulations. Attribute Authority, Attribute Subject, Authoritative Source, Backend Attribute Exchange, Backend Attributes, BAE Broker, BAE External Service, BAE Internal Service, BAE Relying Party, BAE Requester, BAE Responder, Batch Processing, Cardholder Unique Identifier, Claimant, E-governance Certification Authorities, E-governance Metadata Authority, E-governance Trust Services, Endpoints, Extensible Markup Language, Federal Agency Smart Credential - Number, Federal Identity, Credentialing And Access Management, Federal Public Key Infrastructure Management Authority, Governance, Hypertext Transfer Protocol, Metadata, Metadata Authority, Card Issuer, Relying Party, Security Assertion Markup Language, Service Provisioning Markup Language, Shared BAE Broker, Simple Object Access Protocol, Locale Identifier ID: BAE SAML 2.0 Profiles Security Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Identifier and Protocol Profiles for Backend Attribute Exchange (BAE) v2.0 Category: Authentication Protocol Interoperability Profile Date: 1/23/2012 ICAM Description: A SAML 2.0 profile to support direct or brokered attribute exchange over the Backend Attribute Exchange system. It supports names based on FASC-N (from a PIV authentication certificate), UUID (from a PIV-I authentication certificate) or a general X.509 Subject Distinguished Name. It provides a mechanism for looking up sources of metadata information from a repository based on the FASC-N (for government users) and the AKI and organization name for non-government PIV-I users. The document recommends that BAE servers not store user identities in log files, but it is not required. Security: The document is an information security profile. It promotes security by specifying a mechanism for relying parties to obtain user attributes. Interoperability: The document promotes interoperability by providing a common profile for BAE messages. Page 4
6 ID: FBCA CP 2.25 X.509 Certificate Policy For The Federal Bridge Certification Authority Category: Trust Framework Provider Policy Date: 12/9/2011 FBCA Description: RFC 3647 compliant certificate policy for the Federal Bridge CA. It defines a total of 12 policies, including the following assurance levels for human end users: Rudimentary, Basic, Medium, PIV-I Card Authentication, Medium Hardware, and High. The FPKI management authority is required to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment. PII shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure, and will only be released to third parties when required by law or court order. No notification is required in the event of such disclosure. Security: The document is a information security policy for the FBCA. Interoperability: The document supports interoperation of digital certficates between different Federal government PKIs. The document provides a PKI repository interoperability profile based on LDAP and HTTP and the naming convention defined in the CP, and also provides PIV-I as an interoperable smart card profile. Access, Access Control, Accreditation, Activation Data, Affiliated Organization, Applicant, Archive, Attribute Authority, Audit, Audit Data, Authenticate, Authentication, Backup, Binding, Biometric, Certificate, Certification Authority, CA Facility, Certificate, Certificate Management Authority, Certification Authority Software, Certificate Policy, Certification Practice Statement, Certificate-related Information, Certificate Revocation List, Certificate Status Authority, Client (application), Common Criteria, Compromise, Computer Security Objects Registry, Confidentiality, Cross-certificate, Cryptographic Module, Data Integrity, Digital Signature, Dual Use Certificate, Duration, E-commerce, Encrypted Network, Encryption Certificate, End-entity, Entity, Entity CA, FBCA Management Authority, Federal Public Key Infrastructure Policy Authority, Firewall, High Assurance Guard, Information System Security Officer, Inside Threat, Integrity, Intellectual Property, Intermediate CA, Key Escrow, Key Exchange, Key Generation Material, Key Pair, Local Registration, Memorandum Of Agreement, Mission Support Information, Mutual Authentication, Naming Authority, Non-repudiation, Object Identifier, Out-of-band, Outside Threat, Physically Isolated Network, PKI Sponsor, Policy Management Authority, Principal CA, Privacy, Private Key, Public Key, Public Key Infrastructure, Registration Authority, Re-key (a Certificate), Relying Party, Renew (a Certificate), Repository, Responsible Individual, Revoke A Certificate, Risk, Risk Tolerance, Root CA, Server, Signature Certificate, Subordinate CA, Subscriber, Superior CA, System Equipment Configuration, System High, Technical Non-repudiation, Threat, Trust List, Trusted Agent, Trusted Certificate, Trusted Timestamp, Trustworthy System, Two-person Control, Update (a Certificate) Page 6
7 ID: FBCA Cross-certification Methodology 3.0 Criteria and Methodology for Cross-certification with the U.S. Federal Bridge Certification Authority Category: Identity Provider Policy Date: 1/25/2012 FBCA Description: An addendum to the FBCA CP intended to use by personnel involved in cross-certification activities within the Government and between the FBCA and external CAs. Other cross certification activities (e.g. Shared Service Provider CAs, FCPCA, EGCA) are out of scope. The document provides a detailed workflow from the submission of an applicant for cross-certification, through the evaluation steps of policy mapping, review of compliance audit reports, analysis of operations, technical review and testing, and finally through the specific steps involved in performing the cross-certification. Applicants are required to submit a CP in RFC 3647 format for ease of policy mapping. None. Security: The document is an information security policy and procedures document. Interoperability: The purpose of the document is to provide a method for achieving trusted interoperability between the U.S. Federal Bridge CA and other CAs operating at compatible levels of assurance. Affiliate PKI, Applicant, Bridge CA, Certification Authority, Certificate Policy, Certificate Policy Working Group, Certificate Revocation List, Certification Practice Statement, Cross-certificate, Cross-certification, Digital Signature, Directory, Federal Bridge Certification Authority, Public Key Certificate, Public Key Infrastructure, Repository ID: FICAM Privacy Guidance for Assessors Federal Identity, Credentialing, and Access Management Privacy Guidance for Trust Framework Assessors and Auditors Category: Security Requirements Specification Date: 6/29/2011 ICAM Description: Provides information for trust framework assessors to determine whether Trust Framework Provider participants are complying with FICAM privacy requirements. The document promotes privacy by ensuring that trust framework assessors understand how to determine whether the FICAM privacy requirements are met. Security: The document is guidance for assessors performing accreditations of security related services. Interoperability: This document supports interoperation between Federal and non-federal entities by promoting the Trust Framework Adoption process. Page 7
9 ID: ICAM OpenID 2.0 Profile OASIS Interoperability Guidelines Category: Authentication Protocol Interoperability Profile Date: 11/18/2009 ICAM Description: ID: ICAM SAML 2.0 WB SSO Profile Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Web Browser Single Sign-on (SSO) Profile Category: Authentication Protocol Interoperability Profile Date: 12/16/2011 ICAM Description: A SAML 2.0 deployment profile designed to meet Federal government requirements and minimize government risk, promote a consistent user experience and maximize interoperability. It includes three SAML features: single signon, session reset and attribute exchange. It does not require the use of any specific attributes in the authentication exchange, provide a discovery mechanism for attributes, nor discuss the impact of Backend Implementers are referred to FICAM TFPAP Section 3.3 and advised that many of those privacy principles can be achieved outside the scope of SAML. Security: The document is an information security profile. It requires IdPs and RPs to use "approved cryptographic modules per [FIPS140]" but does not clearly specify whether FIPS certification is required, nor what security level. Interoperability: The document promotes interoperability by providing a common SAML 2.0 profile. Account, Approved, Assert, Authentication Session, Binding, Consolidated Metadata, Digital Encryption, Digital Signature, Discovery, Extensible Markup Language, Holder-of-key Assertion, Identity Provider, Metadata, Persistent, Protected Session, Pseudonymous Identifier, Security Assertion Markup Language, Security Token Service, Signature Verification ID: IETF ID OAuth 2.0 The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework Date: 7/31/2012 IETF Description: The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. Access Token, Refresh Token, Authorization Code, Authorization Grant, Authorization Server, Authorization Endpoint, Client, Client Identifier, Client Secret, Client Password, Protected Resource, Resource Owner, Resource Server Page 9
10 ID: IETF ID OAuth 2.0 Threat Model OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations Category: Security Considerations Date: 8/14/2012 OASIS Description: This document gives additional security considerations for OAuth, beyond those in the OAuth specification, based on a comprehensive threat model for the OAuth 2.0 Protocol. ID: IETF ID SCIM 1.0 Simple Cloud Identity Management: Protocol 1.0 Category: SDO informational track Date: 3/15/2012 IETF Description: ID: IETF ID SWD Simple Web Discovery (SWD) Category: Attribute Discovery Protocol Specification Date: 7/6/2012 IETF Description: ID: IETF RFC 2026 The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3 Category: Document Development Standard Date: October 1996 IETF Description: Describes the standards drafting process for IETF and related organizations. Page 10
12 ID: IETF RFC 4122 A Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) URN Namespace Category: Naming Standard Specification Date: July 2005 IETF Description: ID: IETF RFC 5280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile Category: Credential Interoperability Profile Date: May 2008 IETF Description: ID: IETF RFC 5849 The OAuth 1.0 Protocol Date: 4/1/2010 IETF Description: An informational track RFC, OAuth provides a method for clients to access server resources on behalf of a resource owner (such as a different client or an end-user). It also provides a process for end-users to authorize third-party access to their server resources without sharing their credentials (typically, a username and password pair), using user-agent redirections. Client, Server, Protected Resource, Resource Owner, Credentials Page 12
14 ID: InCommon IAAF 1.1 InCommon Identity Assurance Assessment Framework Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 5/9/2011 InCommon Description: The document defines the identity assurance trust model used by InCommon and provides the process for assessing and certifying Identity Provider Operators. Some discussion of the subject trusting the IDP to protect privacy, and real-time versus pre-approved consent for sharing PII. No requirements though. Security: The document is an information security assurance framework. Interoperability: The document promotes interoperability by specifying the requirements for a service to operate at the defined identity assurance profiles. Address Of Record, Assertion, Attributes, Attribute Service, Authentication Secret, Credential, Credential Store, Identity, Identity Attributes, Identity Management System, Identity Provider, Idms Database, Idms Operations, Idp Operator, Protected Channel, Registration, Registration Authority, Relying Parties, Service Provider, Subject, Token, User Agent, Verifier ID: InCommon IAP 1.1 Identity Assurance Profiles Bronze and Silver Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 1/23/2012 InCommon Description: Defines requirements for InCommon Silver and Bronze identity assurance certification. These profiles are intended to be compatible with the US federal government ICAMTrust Framework Provider Adoption Process,Levels of Assurance 1 and 2. The requirements are directly applicable to Identity Provider Operators that use Authentication Secret-based Credentials, but equivalent or stronger credentials could be used instead. No stipulations. For Silver profiles, there are requirements to store PII in the form of registration records (Sec ). Security: The document is a information security profile at OMB levels of assurance 1 and 2. Interoperability: The document promotes interoperability by specifying the requirements for a service to operate at the defined identity assurance profiles. INCOMMON BRONZE IDENTITY ASSURANCE PROFILE ID: Kantara Federal Privacy Criteria Identity Assurance Framework: Additional Requirements for Credential Service Providers: US Federal Privacy Criteria Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 2/15/2012 Kantara Initiative Description: These additional criteria supplement the Kantara IAF level of assurance requirements found in the Service Assessment Criteria (SAC). The requirements found in the IAF SAC and these additional criteria apply only to CSPs, not to Relying Parties (RPs). Page 14
15 ID: Kantara IAF 1000 Identity Assurance Framework: Overview Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 12/31/2009 Kantara Initiative Description: The IAF comprises a set of documents including an Overview publication, the IAF Glossary, a summary Assurance Levels document, and an Assurance Assessment Scheme (AAS), which encompasses the associated assessment and certification program, as well as several subordinate documents, among them the Service Assessment Criteria (SAC), which establishes baseline criteria for general organizational conformity, identity proofing services, credential strength, and credential management services against which all CSPs will be evaluated. The present document provides an overview of the IAF documents and program. ID: Kantara IAF 1100 Identity Assurance Framework: Glossary Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 12/31/2009 Kantara Initiative Description: Glossary of terms used by Kantara Identity Assurance Framework. No stipulation. Security: The document defines terms used in a security assurance framework. Interoperability: No stipulation. Accreditation, Annual Conformity Review, Applicant, Approval, Approved Encryption, Approved Service, Assertion, Assessment, Assessor, Assurance Level, Assurance Review Board, Assurance Assessment Scheme, Attack, Attribute, Audit Organization, Accreditation Applicant, Authentication, Authentication Protocol, Authorization, Bit, Certification, Claimant, Certification Body, Certified Service, Credential, Electronic Credentials, Credential Management, Credential Service, Credential Service Provider, Cryptographic Token, Electronic Credentials, Electronic Trust Service, Electronic Trust Service Provider, Federal Information Processing Standards, Federated Identity Management, Federation Operator, Grant Category, Grant (of Rights Ofuse), Grantee, Identification, Identifier, Identity, Identity Assurance Work Group, Identity Assurance Framework, Identity Authentication, Identity Binding, Identity Proofing, Identity Proofing Policy, Identity Proofing Service Provider, Identity Proofing Practice Statement, Information Security Management Systems (ISMS), Issuer, Kantara-approved Assessor, Kantara-accredited Service, Kantara Initiative Board Of Trustees, Kantara Initiative Mark, Kantara Trust Status List, Network, Password, Practice Statement, Public Key, Public Key Infrastructure, Registration, Relying Party, Role, Security, Service Assessment Criteria, Signatory, Specified Service, Subject, Subscriber, Threat, Token Page 15
16 ID: Kantara IAF 1200 Identity Assurance Framework: Assurance Levels Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 12/31/2009 Kantara Initiative Description: Definition of the levels of assurances used by the Kantara Identity Assurance Framework. No stipulation. Security: The document defines a set of assurance levels involving increasing levels of security requirements for both functionality and assurance. Interoperability: No stipulation. ID: Kantara IAF 1300 Identity Assurance Framework: Assurance Assessment Scheme Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 10/12/2009 Kantara Initiative Description: Consists of a set of requirements which assessors must fulfill in order to become 'Kantara-Accredited', a statement of applicable 'credit' granted to assessor applicants with certain prior -qualifications, a description of the application processes from both the Kantara perspective and the applicant's, and guidance on undertaking assessments which will benefit both Kantara- accredited Assessors and Credential Service Providers having their services assessed against the IAF Service Assessment Criteria (SAC) ID: Kantara IAF 1400 Identity Assurance Framework: Service Assessment Criteria Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 12/31/2009 Kantara Initiative Description: Describes the Service Assessment Criteria component of the IAF, including setting out the Assurance Levels. ID: Kantara IAF 1600 Identity Assurance Framework: Assessor Qualifications Requirements Category: Trust Framework Provider Specification Date: 10/13/2009 Kantara Initiative Description: Describes the requirements that applicant assessors must fulfill in order to become Kantara-Accredited Assessors. Page 16
17 ID: Kantara SAML 2.0 Profile Kantara Initiative egovernment Implementation Profile of SAML V2.0 Category: Authentication Protocol Interoperability Profile Date: 6/11/2010 Kantara Initiative Description: Contains an implementation profile for egovernment use of SAML V2.0, suitable for the purposes of testing conformance of implementations of SAML V2.0. It is not a deployment profile, and does not provide or reflect specific behavior exptected of implementations when used within a particular deployment context. ID: Kantara UMA User-Managed Access (UMA) Core Protocol Category: Access Management Protocol Specification Date: 8/1/2012 Kantara Initiative Description: Authorizing User, Authorization Manager, Protected Resource, Host, Claim, Requester, Requesting Party, Resource Set, Scope Page 17
18 ID: NIST FIPS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES Category: Security Requirements Standard Date: 12/3/2002 NIST Description: A set of security requirements specifically pertaining to systems that implement cryptographic mechanisms such as encryption, hashing, digital signatures, random number generation or message authentication. The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; module ports and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security; operational environment; cryptographic key management; electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC); self-tests; and design assurance. Security Levels 1 through 4 impose increasingly stringent requirements on the requirements, with Level 1 not required to demonstrate any physical security requirements or authenticate users, whereas Level 4 requires tamper response mechanisms, resistance to a range of environmental conditions and identity based authentication of users. This document is the basis of the FIPS cryptographic certification scheme administered by NIST and Canada's CSE. No stipulations. Security: The document is an information security standard. The document specifies security requirements on the functionality and design assurance of cryptographic modules. Interoperability: The document promotes interoperability by providing a baseline set of requirements for cryptographic modules. Approved, Approved Mode Of Operation, Approved Security Function, Authentication Code, Automated Key Transport, Compromise, Confidentiality, Control Information, Critical Security Parameter, Cryptographic Boundary, Cryptographic Key, Cryptographic Key Component, Cryptographic Module, Cryptographic Module Security Policy, Crypto Officer, Data Path, Differential Power Analysis, Digital Signature, Electromagnetic Compatibility, Electromagnetic Interference, Electronic Key Entry, Encrypted Key, Environmental Failure Protection, Environmental Failure Testing, Error Detection Code, Finite State Model, Firmware, Hardware, Hash-based Message Authentication Code, Initialization Vector, Input Data, Integrity, Interface, Key Encrypting Key, Key Establishment, Key Loader, Key Management, Key Transport, Manual Key Transport, Manual Key Entry, Microcode, Operator, Output Data, Password, Personal Identification Number, Physical Protection, Plaintext Key, Port, Private Key, Protection Profile, Public Key, Public Key Certificate, Public Key (asymmetric) Cryptographic Algorithm, Random Number Generator, Removable Cover, Secret Key, Secret Key (symmetric) Cryptographic Algorithm, Seed Key, Simple Power Analysis, Software, Split Knowledge, Status Information, System Software, Tamper Detection, Tamper Evidence, Tamper Response, Target Of Evaluation, TEMPEST, TOE Security Functions, TOE Security Policy, Trusted Path, User, Validation Authorities ID: NIST FIPS Digital Signature Standard Category: Cryptographic Protocol Specification Date: June 2009 NIST Description: Page 18
19 ID: NIST FIPS Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors Category: Credential Requirements Specification Date: March 2006 NIST Description: Specifies the architectural and technical requirements for the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card system for Federal employees and contractors. The document provides requirements in the area of identity proofing, registration and issuance, as well as credential lifecycle and management requirements. Further NIST documents incorporated by reference are SP , Interfaces for PIV; SP , Biometric Data Specification for PIV; SP , Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for PIV; SP , Guidelines for the Accreditation of PIV Card Issuers; SP , Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations; SP , PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines; SP , Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export; and SP , Guidelines for PIV Derived Credentials. Security: The document is an information security standard. Page 19
20 ID: NIST FIPS Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors Category: Credential Requirements Specification Date: 7/9/2012 NIST Description: Specifies the architectural and technical requirements for the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card system for Federal employees and contractors. The document provides requirements in the area of identity proofing, registration and issuance, as well as credential lifecycle and management requirements. Further NIST documents incorporated by reference are SP , Interfaces for PIV; SP , Biometric Data Specification for PIV; SP , Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for PIV; SP , Guidelines for the Accreditation of PIV Card Issuers; SP , Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations; SP , PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines; SP , Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export; and SP , Guidelines for PIV Derived Credentials. Protection of personal privacy is an explicit objective of the PIV system, directly from HSPD-12. Agencies or departments issuing PIV cards are required to assign a privacy official, conduct Privacy Impact Assessments, identify information collected including its purpose, protection and disclosure policy, restrict access to PII and define consequences for violating the privacy policies. Technology must permit continuous auditing of compliance with privacy policies. The standard permits card issuers to maintain a documentary chain-of-trust for collected identification data, this will contain PII which must be protected and disposed according to agency policy. Interoperability: The purpose of the standard is to promote interoperability among PIV system components, across departments and agencies and across installations. Access Control, Applicant, Application, Architecture, Asymmetric Keys, Authentication, Biometric, Biometric Information, Capture, Cardholder, Card Management System, Certificate Revocation List, Certification, Certification Authority, Chain-of-trust, Comparison, Component, Conformance Testing, Credential, Cryptographic Key, Authentication Assurance Level, Federal Agency Smart Credential Number, Federal Information Processing Standards, Hash Function, Identification, Identifier, Identity, Identity Proofing, Identity Registration, Identity Verification, Interoperability, Issuer, Match, Model, Off-card, On-card, On-card Comparison, Online Certificate Status Protocol, Path Validation, Personally Identifiable Information, Personal Identification Number, Personal Identity Verification Card, PIV Assurance Level, Private Key, Pseudonyms, Public Key, Public Key Infrastructure, Pki-card Authentication Key, PKI-PIV Authentication Key, Recommendation, Symmetric Key, Validation Page 20
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Trustis FPS PKI Glossary of Terms The following terminology shall have the definitions as given below: Activation Data Asymmetric Cryptosystem Authentication Certificate Certificate Authority (CA) Certificate
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CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT UPDATE Reference: IZENPE-CPS UPDATE Version no: v 5.03 Date: 10th March 2015 IZENPE 2015 This document is the property of Izenpe. It may only be reproduced in its entirety.
CERTIFICATE POLICY KEYNECTIS SSL CA Date: 05/02/2009 KEYNECTIS SSL CA CERTIFICATE POLICY Subject: KEYNECTIS SSL CA Certificate Policy Version number: 1.1 Number of pages: 49 Status of the Project Final
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+ Expiration date + Agency card serial number (back of card) + Issuer identification (back of card). The PIV Card may also bear the following optional components: + Agency name and/or department + Department
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Forum RECOMMENDATIONS for the PROCESSING of EXTENDED VALIDATION SSL CERTIFICATES January 2, 2014 Version 2.0 Copyright 2007-2014, The CA / Browser Forum, all rights reserved. Verbatim copying and distribution