Analysis of Multi-Channel Conflict While Selling Insurance in Banks: A Perspective of Conflict Frequency

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1 IPASJ Internatonal Journal of Management (IIJM) Web Ste: A Publsher for Research Motvaton... Emal: edtorm@pas.org Analyss of Mult-Channel Conflct Whle Sellng Insurance n Banks: A Perspectve of Conflct Frequency Chang Ku Fan 1, L-Tze Lee 2, Lng-Y Wu 3 and Mchael S. W. Du 4 1 Professor, Department of Rsk Management and Insurance, Shh Chen Unversty, Tape, Tawan. 2 Assstant Professor, Department of Accountng and Informaton, Overseas Chnese Unversty, Tachung, Tawan. 3 Graduate Student, Department of Fnance and Bankng, Shh Chen Unversty, Tape, Tawan. 4 Assocate Professor, Department of Rsk Management and Insurance, Shh Chen Unversty, Tape, Tawan. ABSTRACT Mult-channel dstrbuton has become an ncreasngly mportant phenomenon n marketng. However, mult-channel dstrbuton strateges offer tremendous advantages to nsurers, but they also nevtably trgger off some mult-channel conflcts. Unfortunately, obectve and scentfc approaches to academc research are lmted, especally n terms of explorng the causes of mult-channel conflct n an nsurance sector and nvestgatng the frequency of causes of channel conflct. In order to fll ths research gap, ths study employs Delph study and Grey Relatonal Analyss (GRA) to dentfy and analyze the causes of mult-channel conflct whle sellng nsurance n banks and to assess the frequency of factors that cause nsurance dstrbuton channel conflct. Accordng to result of ths study, the most mportant three causes trggerng off mult-channel conflct n the nsurance sector are dfferences n percepton of realty used n ont decson makng, usng coercve powers, and ncompatblty of goals. Keywords: Mult-Channel Conflct, Insurance, Delph Study, Grey Relatonal Analyss (GRA). 1. INTRODUCTION Employng varous channels to serve a gven market s becomng a maor part of the marketng plans of product and servce supplers [10, 21, 33]. A dstrbuton actvty s one of the four man strategc decson areas of most companes and n relaton to ts marketng composton, whch nclude the decson areas of product/servce, prce and communcaton. However, after the composton of a dstrbuton channel, changes are usually more dffcult to be mplemented than other strategy decson [12]. The popular channels that have been employed by nsurance provders nclude nternet-based channels, company-based channels, bank-based channels, agent-based channels, broker-based channels, and other cybermedares (e.g., telephone and TV statons) [28, 32, 36]. Moreover, mult-channel dstrbuton strateges provde tremendous benefts to nsurers. However, they also trgger certan challenges. Interestngly, many pror studes (e.g., [21, 32]) have found that both ntrachannel and nterchannel conflct may have postve, negatve, and neutral effects on dstrbuton performance [2, 4, 12]. Webb and Hogan (2002) [21] also found that channel performance s sgnfcantly affected by the frequency of channel conflct. Mnmzng the occurrence of channel conflct s a means of mprovng channel performance. Therefore, managng dstrbuton conflct to mprove and maxmze dstrbuton performance s an mportant ssue for frms. Unfortunately, pror studes have provded few nsghts for nsurance decson makers related to mult-channel conflct. Obectve and scentfc approaches to academc research are lmted, especally n terms of explorng the causes of multple channel conflct n an nsurance sector and nvestgatng the frequency of causes of channel conflct. The purpose of ths research s to dentfy the factors that cause dstrbuton channel conflcts n the nsurance ndustry. Ths study also contrbutes to both the nsurance marketng lterature and the nsurance marketng management lterature by assessng the frequency of the factors that cause nsurance dstrbuton channel conflct. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Motvatons for Multple Dstrbuton Channels The use of multple channels to serve a gven product market s becomng the rule rather than the excepton [10, 33]. The prncpal ncentves for frms to develop multple dstrbuton channels are to ncrease market share, to reduce costs [11, 18, 27], to reach target markets [16, 31], to reach new market segments [13, 27], and to share nformaton and knowledge about customers [27]. Moreover, many frms worldwde have adopted multple channel marketng strateges. Ths ncreasngly prevalent trend, whch s also known as multple dstrbuton strategy, has dramatcally changed the demands that are placed on channel managers [21, 30]. Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2014 Page 1

2 IPASJ Internatonal Journal of Management (IIJM) Web Ste: A Publsher for Research Motvaton... Emal: edtorm@pas.org 2.2 Multple Dstrbuton Channel Conflcts Conflct s a process n whch one party perceves that ts nterests are beng opposed or negatvely affected by another party [17]. Although some conflct can be functonal and enhance a channel s performance, much of the lterature ndcates that conflct s nurous to the channel [19]. To adopt multple channels may create conflct n the demand for nternal company resources and conflctng obectves for varous channels, and such conflcts ncrease the potental for customer confuson and dssatsfacton [16, 21, 23, 27]. Smlarly, concurrent channels eventually create ntrabrand competton among the suppler s channels. Ths s because ndependents have grounds to suspect the suppler of creatng a tlted playng feld that s desgned to favor ts employees [1]. Moreover, a study by Chen and Chang (2010) [30] found that nsurers that adopted a drect dstrbuton system were more effcent than those that employed a multdstrbuton system. Samaha et al. (2011) [35] also found that consstent wth pror lterature, and expect conflct to have negatve effects on both channel member cooperaton and flexblty. 2.3 Causes of Dstrbuton Channel Conflct To manage channel conflct, t s necessary for marketng dstrbuton managers to dentfy the causes of channel conflct and to mnmze ths conflct. Many channel conflct studes (e.g., [21, 37]) agree that there are two types of channel conflct. The frst type s ntrachannel conflct, whch s also termed vertcal conflct and refers to the frcton between a frm and the members of ts dstrbuton channels. The second type s nterchannel conflct, whch s also termed horzontal conflct and refers to the frcton between two or more channels at the same level. An nterchannel conflct stems prmarly from competton between channel partcpants and fear of channel cannbalsm. Interchannel conflct s dstnct from ntrachannel conflct, whch has been the focus of most studes. Interchannel conflct occurs when one coalton beleves that another coalton s seekng to gan scarce resource at ts expense [22]. Therefore, marketng management expects multple channel conflct to be a common occurrence when frms have multple channels and lmted resources. A lack of channel management on the suppler s part s also a cause of nterchannel conflct because t s lkely to produce a confusng stuaton n whch nterchannel competton becomes nterchannel conflct [1, 21]. Many other studes have observed that poorly desgned channel structures, poor algnment wth customer segments, communcaton dffcultes, and the use of coercve powers consttute addtonal causes of nterchannel conflct. Conflct between authorty and responsblty occurs when an unsutable channel structure desgn s used. As a result, channel mplementaton and performance suffer [29]. Other relatve studes reveal that the negatve effect of conflct overshadows the benefts assocated wth all other postve relatonshp marketng actvtes [35]. In addton to napproprate channel structure desgn, targetng the same customers s also a cause of channel conflct. Because most producers sell through several channels smultaneously, channels typcally compete to reach the same consumer segments. Furthermore, customers evolve, belong to dfferent segments, and contact dfferent channels at dfferent ponts n tme. In these stuatons, t becomes dffcult for the manufacturer to prevent ts two channels types from competng for the same customer [1]. In such a context, channel conflct s vrtually guaranteed [6]. Two or more channels target the same customer segments s gong to result n: (1) channel economcs deterorate; (2) threatened channel stops performng or retalates aganst the supplers. An nvestgaton of U.S.-Mexcan channel relatonshp performance conducted by LaBahn and Harch (1997) [9] found that enhancng communcaton among marketng channels can reduce conflct because marketng channels are typcally composed of multple companes, each pursung ts own nterests, and because these nterests are competng. Another cause of channel conflct, n addton to relyng on poorly desgned channel structures, targetng the same customer segments, and experencng communcaton dffcultes, s the use of coercve powers. Cather and Howe (1989) [8] found that conflct was postvely correlated wth the use of coercve power for both ndependent and exclusve agency nsurers; ths result suggests that puntve agency management strateges are assocated wth ncreased tenson between nsurers and agency channels. The studes by Rosenberg and Stern (1970; 1971) [25, 26] and Rosenberg (1974) [24] ndcated that goals, domans (roles), and perceptons are causes of ntrachannel conflct. The authors explaned that goals between and among vertcally lnked frms often dffer and may be ncompatble and even mutually exclusve. In the nterdependent arrangement of frms n a sngle channel system, one frm s goals may comprse another frm s constrants, resultng n conflct. Smlarly, usng survey data from automoble dealers, a study demonstrated that relatonshps wth greater nterdependence exhbt less conflct than relatonshps wth lower nterdependence [34]. 2.4 Relatonshp between Dstrbuton Channel Conflct and Its Performance The relatonshp between channel conflct and ts performance has been explored n prevous studes. Rosenberg (1974) [24] found that channel conflct may affect a dstrbutor s performance. Webb (2002) [20] and Chen and Chang (2010) [30] obtaned smlar fndngs and showed that multple channels enable frms to capture customers n dfferent market segments and yeld hgher sale volumes, although such channels also pose many challenges, such as channel conflcts. 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3 IPASJ Internatonal Journal of Management (IIJM) Web Ste: A Publsher for Research Motvaton... Emal: edtorm@pas.org Moreover, the drect negatve effect of perceved unfarness on relatonal behavors (channel member cooperaton and flexblty) and, subsequently, fnancal performance s smlar to or greater than the effects of conflct and opportunsm [35]. However, merely dentfyng the causes of multple channel conflct cannot decrease channel conflct or mprove the performance of dstrbutors. Webb and Hogan (2002) [21] found that channel performance s sgnfcantly affected by the frequency of channel conflct. In other words, dstrbuton admnstrators who want to mprove a channel s performance must dentfy and manage the most frequent causes of channel conflct. 3. METHODOLOGY In order to acheve the obectves of ths study, the methodology n ths study conssts of two phases (see Fgure 1). In the frst phase, the causes of mult-channel conflct whle sellng nsurance n banks were confrmed by usng Delph study and Kendall s ω test. Delph study s employed to evaluate the experts atttude tendency toward the factors of mult-channel conflct. Kendall s ω test s conducted to estmate whether the experts atttude tendency toward factors of channel conflct s consstent or not. In the second phase, the relatve frequency of factors causng mult-channel conflct s calculated effectvely by employng the Grey Relatonal Analyss (GRA). The sample, the Delph study and GRA are descrbed as follows: Process / Method Achevement Lterature Revew Develop Delph study protocol. The Frst Phase Delph study and Kendall s ω test Identfy the causes of mult-channel conflct whle sellng nsurance n banks. The Second Phase GRA Identfy the frequency s rankng of causes trggerng off mult-channel conflct. Fgure 1. The Structure of The Methodology 3.1 Partcpants and Samplng The Delph panel (N = 12) was selected by purposve samplng technque. Purposve samplng s manly used for opnon surveys [5, 7]. For ths study, partcpants were employed by dfferent model banks or nsurance companes n Tawan wth a known nvolvement or expertse n market. Intervews were conducted va e-mal or face to face wth 12 Delph panel partcpants, sx and sx from model lfe nsurance companes and banks n Tawan. All 12 panelsts had already expressed ther wllngness to partcpate n ths research. 3.2 Valdty and Relablty The possble causes of mult-channel conflct were derved frst from the lterature, and then were evaluated by a Delph study panel at least three tmes. Accordng to Johnson and Chrstensen (2000) [3], cross-checkng nformaton and conclusons through the use of multple procedures or source strateges promotes qualtatve research valdty. Smlar Delph panel ntervew questons were used n the frst, second, and thrd round of Delph study procedures. Ths mnmzed varaton n the questons posed, and mproved the relablty of the ntervews. Instruments used n ths Delph study mnmzed the varaton of the questons posed to ntervewees. 3.3 The Grey Relatonal Analyss The second purpose of ths study was to dentfy the frequency s rankng of causes trggerng off mult-channel conflct whle sellng nsurance n banks. The grey system method, as developed by Deng (1989; 1999) [14, 15], has been extensvely appled n varous felds, ncludng decson scence. The GRA s calculated as follows: Let X 0 be the referental seres wth k enttes (or crtera) of X 1, X 2,, X,, X N (or N measurement crtera). Then: X x (1), x (2),..., x ( ),..., x ( k), Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2014 Page 3

4 IPASJ Internatonal Journal of Management (IIJM) Web Ste: A Publsher for Research Motvaton... Emal: edtorm@pas.org X x (1), x (2),..., x ( ),..., x ( k), X x (1), x (2),..., x ( ),..., x ( k), X N xn (1), xn (2),..., xn ( ),..., xn ( k). The grey relatonal coeffcent between the compared seres X and the referental seres of X at the -th entty s 0 defned as: 0 Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2014 Page 4 mn max γ 0( ), (1) ( ) max where ( ) 0 denotes the absolute value of dfference between X 0 and X at the -th entty, that s: 0 ( ) x0 ( ) x ( ), and 0 The grey relatonal grade (GRG) for a seres of X can be expressed as: max max max ( ), mn mn mn 0 ( ). K Γ w γ ( ), (2) Where w represents the weght of -th entty. If the weght does not need to be appled, take for averagng. K Before calculatng the grey relaton coeffcents, the data seres can be treated based on the followng three knds of stuaton and the lnearty of data normalzaton to avod dstortng the normalzed data. They are: (a) Upper-bound effectveness measurng (.e., larger-the-better) x ( ) mn x ( ) x ( ), (3) max x ( ) mn x ( ) where max x ( ) s the maxmum value of entty and mn x ( ) s the mnmum value of entty. (b) Lower-bound effectveness measurng (.e., smaller-the-better) max x ( ) x ( ) x ( ), (4) max x ( ) mn x ( ) If mn x ( ) xob ( ) max x ( ), then x ( ) xob ( ) x ( ), (5) max x ( ) mn x ( ) x ( ) mn x ( ) If max x ( ) xob ( ), then x ( ), or (6) x ( ) mn x ( ) If x ( ) mn x ( ), then ob ob max x ( ) x ( ) x ( ). (7) max x ( ) x ( ) where x ob () s the obectve value of entty. Thus, GRA method can detect the prorty of the frequency s rankng of causes trggerng off mult-channel conflct based upon twelve experts opnons. The procedures of detectng order of the prorty are: (a) Sample twelve experts and measure ther qualty characterstcs for eght ranks. (b) Decde the referental seres and the compared seres. (c) Make data normalzaton for determnng x ( ). (d) Compute ( ) 0. (e) Compute the relatonal coeffcent, ( ) 0, of all compared seres. (f) Compute the GRG, and can be to see the order for eght ranks based upon the expert s opnon RESULTS 4.1 Results of Delph Study and Kendall s ω Test ob

5 IPASJ Internatonal Journal of Management (IIJM) Web Ste: A Publsher for Research Motvaton... Emal: edtorm@pas.org The ntervews were conducted through e-mal, or face to face. Seventy-fve percent of Delph panelsts had over 11 years of experence n nsurance marketng. Delph panelsts were asked to ustfy ther answers to ntervew questons and to rate ther level of agreement toward the causes of mult-channel conflct, rangng from strongly agree (SA) (5) to strongly dsagree (SD) (1). The ntervew protocol was developed based on the lterature revew. The ntervew explored more fully the perceptons of experts about the causes of mult-channel conflct. Descrptve statstcs of atttude toward each factor trggerng off mult-channel conflct at ntervew were showed as Table 1. In the fnal round, twelve Delph panelsts strongly agreed that dfferences n percepton of realty used n ont decson makng was one of causes for mult-channel conflct. Eleven Delph panelsts strongly agreed that usng coercve powers was cause to trgger off mult-channel conflct. Ten Delph panelsts strongly agreed that resource scarcty and ncompatblty of goals were causes for mult-channel conflct. Moreover, nne Delph panelsts strongly agreed that communcaton dffcultes, poorly desgned channel structure, and poor channel management were causes for mult-channel conflct. Only eght Delph panelsts strongly agreed that relatonshp wth lower nterdependence was one of causes for mult-channel conflct. There were no undecded (UD) (3), dsagree (D) (2) and strongly dsagree (SD) (1) answers for cause tem at round 3. Table 1: Descrptve Statstcs of Atttude toward The Causes of Mult-Channel Conflct at Intervew Round 2 and Round 3 Atttude toward Causes The Causes of Mult-Channel Conflct SA A UD D SD R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 Communcaton dffcultes Poorly desgned channel structure Poor channel management Relatonshp wth lower nterdependence Resource scarcty Dfferences n percepton of realty used n ont decson makng Incompatblty of goals Usng coercve powers Note: Fve Atttudes toward Causes: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecded (UD), Dsagree (D), and Strongly Dsagree (SD). As stated n the methodology, the ssues of dvergence and convergence of opnon are fundamental to a Delph study. Based on the result of a Kendall s ω test (Correlaton Coeffcent = 0.838, Sg. = 0.000), no sgnfcant atttude dfference toward each cause of mult-channel conflct was found between R2 and R3. Moreover, all experts agree proposed eght causes trggerng off mult-channel conflct at R3. Thus, no more round of Delph study s necessary and eght tems proposed by ths study can be dentfed as the causes of mult-channel conflct. 4.2 Result of GRA The GRA questonnare was developed based on the result of Delph study and dstrbuted to 12 experts same as the panelsts n Delph study. The Causes of Mult-Channel Conflct Table 2: Summary of the GRG Communcaton dffcultes Poorly desgned channel structure Poor channel management Relatonshp wth lower nterdependence Resource scarcty Dfferences n percepton of realty used n ont decson makng Incompatblty of goals Usng coercve powers After conductng the grey relatonal analyss, ths research showed the rank of eght causes of mult-channel conflct from the most frequency to the lowest frequency, but stll crucal, causes are showed as followngs (see Table 2): (1) dfferences n percepton of realty used n ont decson makng, (2) usng coercve powers, (3) ncompatblty of Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2014 Page Rank

6 IPASJ Internatonal Journal of Management (IIJM) Web Ste: A Publsher for Research Motvaton... Emal: edtorm@pas.org goals, (4) resource scarcty, (5) communcaton dffcultes, (6) poor channel management, (7) poorly desgned channel structure, and (8) relatonshp wth lower nterdependence. 5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 5.1 Concluson The above analyss supports the argument that, there are many causes whch trgger off mult-channel conflct. In vew of ths, because of the lmtaton of resources n lfe nsurance companes, attempt to deal wth the most mportant causes s an approprate approach to mprove the effcency of mult-channel desgn, and provde the suggeston for bancassurance to enhance the banks and lfe nsurance companes performance. Accordng to result of ths study, the most mportant three causes trggerng off mult-channel conflct are dfferences n percepton of realty used n ont decson makng, usng coercve powers, and ncompatblty of goals. 5.2 Suggestons (a) Role Shft n Jont Decson Makng. Jont decson makng requres a partnershp among provders and varous dstrbutors workng together to share the marketng segments, desgn polces or plan market postons based on dstrbutor preferences, provder experence and marketng research evdence. Ths often necesstates a shft n the perceved roles of provders and dstrbutors, the provson of evdence-based nformaton about realtes n nsurance market ensure that nsurers and dstrbutors are actvely engaged. Falure to deal wth the dfferences when dstrbutors perceve the ob n negatve terms wll result n ncreased absenteesm and turnover and lower ob satsfacton. (b) Balance the Leadershp Power Usng. An essental component of management s to nfluence the people or unts admnsters manage so that they do what admnsters want them to do. Coercve power s a common method of nfluencng employee behavor. A manager uses coercve power by forcng employee complance through use of threats. Whle coercon may work n the short-term, frms do rsk long-term problems ncludng low employee ob satsfacton resultng n hgh employee turnover. Productvty may even decrease n the long-term. Coercon also tends to be an obstacle to employee creatvty and nnovaton because of the fear and nsecurty t creates. Therefore, to avod usng coercve power, an effectve marketng manager s suggested to rely heavly on Expert Power and Reverent Power to rouse ther teams and to prompt the most desrable outcomes. (c) Reframng goals to Resolve Incompatblty. In many cases, provders and dstrbutors are absolutely convnced they have opposng goals and cannot agree on anythng to pursue together. However, f goals are reframed or put n a dfferent context, the partes can agree. To face the problem of ncompatblty of goals among the dstrbutors, the wnwn approach suggested by ths study s a conscous and systematc attempt to maxmze the goals of both dstrbutors through collaboratve problem solvng. Ths method focuses on the needs and constrants of both dstrbutors rather than emphaszng strateges desgned to conquer. Full problem defnton and analyss and development of alternatves precedes consensus decsons on mutually agreeable solutons. References [1] A. S. Vnhas, E. Anderson, How Potental Conflct Drves Channel Structure: Concurrent (Drect and Indrect) Channels, Journal of Marketng Research, 42(4), pp , [2] A. T. Coughlan, E. Anderson, L. W. Stern, A. I. El-Ansary, Marketng Channels, 7th ed., Prentce-Hall, Englewood Clffs, NJ, [3] B. Johnson, L. Chrstensen, Educatonal Research: Quanttatve and Qualtatve Approaches, Boston, MA, US: Allyn and Bacon, [4] B. Rosenbloom, Marketng Channels: A Management Vew, 7th ed., Cengage Learnng, New York, NY, [5] B. Wllams, A Sampler on Samplng, New York: John Wley and Sons, [6] C. B. Buckln, P. A. Thomas-Graham, E. A. Webster, Channel Conflct: When Is It Dangerous? The McKnsey Quarterly, 3, pp , [7] D. Sngh, F. S. Chaudhary, Theory and Analyss of Sample Survey Desgns, New York: John Wley and Sons, [8] D. A. Cather, V. Howe, Conflct and Channel Management n Property-Lablty Dstrbuton Systems, The Journal of Rsk and Insurance, 56(3), pp , [9] D. W. LaBahn, K. R. Harch, Senstvty to Natonal Busness Culture: Effects on U.S.-Mexcan Channel Relatonshp Performance, Journal of Internatonal Marketng, 5(4), pp , [10] G. L. Frazer, Organzng and Managng Channels of Dstrbuton, Journal of the Academy of Marketng Scence, 27(2), pp , [11] G. L. Frazer, K. D. Anta, Exchange Relatonshps and Interfrm Power n Channels of Dstrbuton, Journal of the Academy of Marketng Scence, 23(4), pp , Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2014 Page 6

7 IPASJ Internatonal Journal of Management (IIJM) Web Ste: A Publsher for Research Motvaton... Emal: edtorm@pas.org [12] G. S. Mlan, E. Doron, Jose Alberto da Rosa Matos, Dstrbuton Channel Conflct Management: A Brazlan Experence, Benchmarkng: An Internatonal Journal, 19(1), pp , [13] H. H. Fredman, Channel Polcy and Physcal Dstrbuton, Brooklyn College of Cty Unversty of New York, [Onlne]. Avalable: [Accessed: Sept. 01, 2013]. [14] J. L. Deng, Introducton to Grey System Theory, Journal of Grey System, 1(1), pp. 1-24, [15] J. L. Deng, Grey System Theory and Applcatons, Kao-L, Tawan, [16] J. M. Gallaugher, E-Commerce and the Undulatng Dstrbuton Channel, Communcatons of the ACM, 45(7), pp , [17] J. A. Wall, R. R. Callster, Conflct and Its Management, Journal of Management, 21(3), pp , [18] K. Nothofer, D. Remy, The Role of Mult-Channel Management n the Hosptalty Industry, Les Roches Internatonal School of Hotel Management, Crans-Montana: Swtzerland, [19] K. A. Hunt, The Relatonshp Between Channel Conflct and Informaton Processng, Journal of Retalng, 71(4), pp , [20] K. L. Webb, Managng Channels of Dstrbuton n the Age of Electronc Commerce, Industral Marketng Management, 31(2), pp , [21] K. L. Webb, J. E. Hogan, Hybrd Channel Conflct: Causes and Effects on Channel Performance, Journal of Busness and Industral Marketng, 17(5), pp , [22] K. L. Webb, N. M. Ddow, Understandng Hybrd Channel Conflct: a Conceptual Model and Propostons for Research, Journal of Busness-to-Busness Marketng, 4(1), pp , [23] L. Goldkuhl, Multple Marketng Channel Conflct wth a Focus on the Internet: A Dual Perspectve, Thess of Lulea Unversty of Technology, Sweden, [24] L. J. Rosenberg, A New Approach to Dstrbuton Conflct Management, Busness Horzons, 17(5), pp , [25] L. J. Rosenberg, L. W. Stern, Toward the Analyss of Conflct n Dstrbuton Channels: A Descrptve Model, Journal of Marketng, 34(4), pp , [26] L. J. Rosenberg, L. W. Stern, Conflct Measurement n the Dstrbuton Channel, Journal of Marketng Research, 8(4), pp , [27] L. T. Gamarra, C. Growtsch, Sngle-versus Mult-Channel Dstrbuton Strateges n German Lfe Insurance Market, The X European Workshop on Effcency and Productvty Analyss, Bad Honnef: Germany, [28] M. B. Sarkar, B. Butler, C. Stenfeld, Intermedares and Cybermedares: A Contnung Role for Medatng Players n the Electronc Marketplace, Journal of Computer-Medated Communcaton, 1(3), pp. 1-14, [29] M. J. Valos, Structure, People and Process Challenges of Multchannel Marketng: Insghts from Marketers, Journal of Database Marketng and Customer Strategy Management, 16(3), pp , [30] M. S. Chen, P. L. Chang, Dstrbuton Channel Strategy and Effcency Performance of the Lfe Insurance Industry n Tawan, Journal of Fnancal Servces Marketng, 15(1), pp , [31] P. O Connor, J. Murphy, Hotel Yeld Management Practces Across Multple Electronc Dstrbuton Channels, Informaton Technology and Toursm, 10(2), pp , [32] R. E. Dumm, R. E. Hoyt, Insurance Dstrbuton Channels: Markets n Transton, Journal of Insurance Regulaton, 22(1), pp , [33] R. T. Morarty, U. Moran, Managng Hybrd Marketng Systems, Harvard Busness Revew, November- December, pp , [34] S. Hogarth-Scott, S. T. Parknson, Retaler-Suppler Relatonshps n the Food Channel: A suppler Perspectve, Internatonal Journal of Retal and Dstrbuton Management, 21(8), pp , [35] S. A. Samaha, R. W. Palmater, R. P. Dant, Posonng Relatonshps: Perceved Unfarness n Channels of Dstrbuton, Journal of Marketng, 75(3), pp , [36] T. W. Malone, J. Yates, R. I. Benamn, Electronc Markets and Electronc Herarches, Communcatons of the ACM, 30(6), pp , [37] W. N. Seung, Managng Channel Conflct: From a Korean Lfe Insurance Industry Perspectve, LIMRA s MarketFacts Quarterly, 29(3), pp , 2010 Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2014 Page 7