FLEET ARCTIC OPERATIONS GAME

Transcription

1 FLEET ARCTIC OPERATIONS GAME GAME REPORT U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island Report Prepared By: Director: CDR Christopher Gray Designer: Prof. Leif Bergey Analyst: Prof. Walter A. Berbrick

2 November 14, 2011 The War Gaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College hosted the Fleet Arctic Operations Game on September The following document was prepared by the War Gaming Department faculty and has been reviewed by the appropriate game sponsor staff personnel. The findings in this report reflect the observations, insights and recommendations that were derived from the participants during game play. The War Gaming Department conducts high quality research, analysis, gaming, and education to support the Naval War College mission, prepare future maritime leaders, and help shape key decisions on the future of the Navy. The War Gaming Department strives to provide interested parties with intellectually honest analysis of complex problems using a wide range of research tools and analytical methodologies. Game reports are developed for the game sponsor; however, the game report and related data may be available on an as-requested basis. For additional information please contact the Chairman, War Gaming Department, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI or via electronic mail at wargaming@usnwc.edu. Further information may be found on our website, located at David A. DellaVolpe Chairman War Gaming Department U.S. Naval War College 2

3 Table of Contents Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... 4 I. INTRODUCTION... 7 II. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY... 9 Discussion of Game Design... 9 Game Mechanics Analytic Framing Collection Approach III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS Analysis of Game Moves Updates to Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS IV. RECOMMENDATIONS APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA Appendix A Summary of Game Moves and Scenarios Appendix B - Final Plenary Prioritized Solutions Appendix C - Survey Questionnaires Appendix D Game Schedule Appendix F Limitations of Game Design and Analysis Appendix G Definition of Terms Appendix H Data Collection Roles and Assignments REFERENCES

4 Introduction EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The United States Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island hosted the Fleet Arctic Operations Game (FAOG) on September The FAOG was developed and executed under the sponsorship of Commander, Second Fleet (C2F) initially and then Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) following the integration of the two staffs. The purpose of the FAOG was to identify gaps that limit sustained maritime operations in the Arctic and recommend DOTMLPF- P actions in order to inform United States Navy leadership. After reviewing the research literature, the game sponsor and NWC Wargaming Department (WGD) jointly developed three overarching objectives based on C2F s areas of interest: Develop prioritized DOTMLPF-P maritime actions which support implementation of the Arctic Road Map. List the DOTMLPF-P gaps in maritime forces ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Develop near-term strategies to mitigate these identified gaps. These objectives were framed to consider the operational level factors (e.g., risk, time space, force composition, physical and environmental) that influence the maritime force s ability to perform its missions. Additionally, these objectives allowed for consideration of potential partnerships and interoperability issues encountered among U.S. and international forces and organizations. Participants and Game Structure In addition to serving as a highly analytic event, the FAOG was designed to enhance participants understanding of potential challenges and cooperative strategies for conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Players were selected based on their specialized knowledge of the Arctic region or functional expertise related to planning, operations and cold weather systems. A broad range of backgrounds were sought to ensure that as many perspectives and variables as possible were considered during game play. More than half of the participants in the four planning cells came from military and civilian operational commands and provided expert perspectives from various aspects of sustaining operations in an austere environment. The players in the White Cell were primarily from government, academia and industry and provided expertise on strategy and policy as well as systems and climatology issues concerning the Arctic region. 4

5 Primary Findings Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region. This assertion is due to the poor reliability of current capabilities as well as the need to develop new partnerships, ice capable platforms, infrastructure, satellite communications and training. Efforts to strengthen relationships and access to specialized capabilities and information should be prioritized. Currently, U.S. Forces are characterized by an inability to reliably perform and maintain operations in the austere Arctic environment. Reliability is improved by the acquisition and development of information and capabilities made available through strong relationships in order to complete the mission and reduce the likelihood of risk. The U.S. Navy currently must seek these from external stakeholders. Theme 2: As weather and climate conditions intensify (particularly the presence of ice, strong winds and fog) and as the total time and distance traveled during an operation increases, the greater the risk of both mission failure and loss of or harm to friendly forces becomes. Players placed significant importance on the idea that harsh environmental conditions and large distances will likely create uncertainty in planning and the timeliness of response, which in turn could create conditions which exceed current operational capabilities. Understanding the austere Arctic environment and its impact on the design limitations of aircraft and surface warships is critical to planning operations in the Arctic region. Theme 3: In order to reduce risk, players increasingly relied on additional information and capabilities through partnerships with the USCG, JTF Alaska, tribal leaders, industry, and multinational partners. As risk increased due to extreme climatic conditions and increased operating and support distances, there was a corresponding increase in the need for specialized information and capabilities. As this trend increased, the required information and capabilities became less available in the U.S. Navy and planners were forced to look elsewhere for the capabilities needed to execute their mission tasking. At the low end of the scale, these could be found inside DoD, but eventually planners needed to rely on industry, international partners, or the whole of U.S. Government. This further reiterates that sustainability in Arctic operations is significantly dependent on strong relationships with international, regional and local partners in government and industry. Mechanisms that strengthen these ties should be prioritized in future planning. Theme 4: The future application of solutions developed during the game was influenced by the frequency of operations and desired reliability of U.S. Naval forces in the Arctic. Specifically, the more frequent or consistently expected operations or missions would be conducted, the more suitable long term proposed solutions were found to be. Conversely, when less frequent or consistent operations or missions were anticipated, mitigating strategies or shortterm solutions were found to be acceptable. Long term solutions tended to be more formalized 5

6 and structured in nature while the majority of mitigating strategies were more informal, temporary and less structured. Subsidiary Findings Major DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies and Proposed Solutions The overall assessment produced by the game was that the U.S. Navy does not have the means needed to support sustained operations in the Arctic. This was due primarily to the lack of appropriate ship types to operate in or near Arctic ice, the lack of support facilities in the Arctic, and finally the lack of sufficient or capable logistics connectors to account for the long logistics distances and lack of facilities. As noted in Theme 1, these gaps were mitigated or closed through the use of domestic and international relationships with military, coast guard and industry partners which made information or capabilities available to support scenario missions. However, the game identified that many of these relationships and the information and capability requirements that they enable do not exist or are poorly defined, further exacerbating the materiel issues listed above. Major CONOPS Changes Overall, the players identified the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS as a valuable tool to support sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. There were three primary changes identified to the CONOPS. First, the focus of the CONOPS should be shifted from warfighting to include the missions identified by Task Force Climate Change as more likely to be a requirement. These include HA/DR, regional security cooperation, maritime security and Maritime Domain Awareness missions. Second, the CONOPS needs to address the likelihood that mission requirements will include short notice crisis response actions. Currently, all planning guidance in the CONOPS allows for extended planning and deployment timelines. Third, the CONOPS should be expanded from an Atlantic Fleet perspective to address access to the Arctic from the Pacific and operations in multiple Combatant Commander and fleet areas or responsibility (AORs). Recommendations The recommendations generated by this game are characterized by their potential for immediate impact at the operational level and the feasibility of near-term implementation. These actions are: establish USFF Arctic Working Group or Arctic Center of Excellence; update CONOPS and applicable doctrine to reflect game insights; deploy to the Arctic; build domestic and international relationships; develop and manage lessons learned database; and pursue identified areas for further research. 6

7 I. INTRODUCTION Statement of Sponsor s Interest in this Topic Commander, USFF requested the Naval War College (NWC) to develop and execute a game which explored potential gaps that limit the U.S. Navy s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. This game, referred to hereafter as the Fleet Arctic Operations Game (FAOG), sought to identify specific capability gaps, mitigating strategies and proposed solutions to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Additionally, this game sought to identify improvements to the Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS) within the context of eight distinct scenarios. USFF s primary interest in exploring operations in the Arctic within this context stems from the premise stated in the Arctic Road Map that changing conditions in the Arctic (e.g., opening of new passages and an increase in commercial shipping) will require an increased U.S. Navy presence. In order to respond to any emerging threat or incident in the Arctic, USFF also posited that numerous gaps exist in the Navy s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. The two overarching documents that guided the development of this research project included the C2F Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Initial Draft Version 1 and the United States Navy Arctic Road Map. The CONOPS provided primary reference for the players during game play, and was used during post-game analysis for comparing and contrasting findings of the game. Objectives/Rationale for this Game Based on USFF s area of interest and informed by the scholarly literature review, the Fleet Arctic Operations Game was structured to explore three objectives. The mutually-agreed-upon objectives developed by C2F and the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College are: Develop a prioritized list of DOTMLPF-P maritime actions to support implementation of the Arctic Road Map at the Operational Level. List DOTMLPF-P gaps in the maritime forces ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Develop near-term strategies to mitigate identified gaps and update the Arctic Maritime Response Force (AMRF) CONOPS. It should be noted that all three objectives are primarily analytical in nature. However, this event was also designed to provide experiential value for the players who participated. 7

8 Overarching Research Questions Based upon USFF s area of interest, subsequent literature review by the Naval War College s WGD faculty, and the three primary objectives for this game, the following three overarching research questions were developed: What DOTMLPF-P gaps limit the Navy s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic? What near-term strategies mitigate these DOTMLPF-P gaps? What are the prioritized DOTMLPF-P maritime actions which support implementation of the Arctic Road Map? These research questions are framed to consider the operational level factors (e.g., risk, time space, force composition, physical and environmental) that influence the maritime force s ability to perform its missions. Additionally, these research questions will also consider potential partnerships and interoperability issues encountered among U.S. and international forces and organizations. Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables The two independent variables in this game consist of the DOTMLPF-P gaps (x1) and near-term mitigating strategies (x2). The primary dependent variable is the cells ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. In addition, in order to fully assess the U.S. Navy s ability to conduct sustained military operations in the Arctic, a series of mediator (z) variables, including the operational factors (e.g. time, space, force composition) (z1) and physical and environmental factors (z2) are introduced throughout the entire duration of game play. These factors are pre-scripted and tailored to each move during the game and are provided to the players prior to execution. These mediating variables were assigned in a manner to be progressively more challenging for the players as the game progressed. 8

9 II. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Discussion of Game Design Faculty assigned to the NWC s War Gaming Department (WGD) within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) engaged in a preliminary literature review in order to appropriately delve into C2F s area of interest. The two overarching documents that guided the development of this research project included the C2F Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Initial Draft Version 1 and the United States Navy Arctic Road Map. The CONOPS served as the primary reference for the players during game play, and was used during post-game analysis for comparing and contrasting findings of the game. Review of additional literature of historical writings on Arctic operations using student papers in the Naval War College library was also sought. As an applied research and evaluation project, a one sided, seminar style game, which incorporated elements of the operational planning process, was designed in order to focus on specific events through an inductive lens. Such a process is best suited when addressing complex operational issues including those raised in the research questions. This approach also affords the opportunity to have the experts, operators, and planners from multiple disciplines describe the operational environment in the Arctic, assesses current and future programs and systems, and identify challenges to sustaining maritime operations in the Arctic. The game empowered participants to make assessments of various conditions and factors impacting the ability to conduct sustained maritime operations. The value of this methodology is that it opened the aperture and allowed the participants to explore the issues from many angles without having the participants be constrained by any single hypothesis. This was a single continuous game whereby each move built upon previous ones. Throughout each move, players were afforded the opportunity to use previous improvements made to the CONOPS and apply them to following moves. An independent white cell reviewed and analyzed player cell derived plans to develop an insights and implications product. The White Cell was comprised of approximately thirty senior U.S. civilian and military stakeholders with extensive knowledge of current future maritime capabilities and programs, as well as representatives from several international maritime partner nations and Arctic subject matter experts from academe. The White Cell was charged with reviewing and analyzing each cell s course of action gaps, mitigating strategies, proposed solutions and CONOPS updates. During this review process, the Cell generated a PowerPoint Slide that captured their major insights and implications. White Cell members developed these inputs through the lenses of C2, Intel, FIRES, Logistics and other observations. During game 9

10 10 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report play, members of the White Cell also answered incoming requests for information (RFIs) from each of the player cells. White Cell members participated in all combined plenary sessions. In order to ground the players in a shared experience, the Fleet Arctic Operations Game began on September 13, 2011 with several background briefs covering the Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations, cold weather systems and platforms and programs, as well as U.S. and International maritime perspectives on current operations in the Arctic. Game Mechanics Following the briefing sessions, approximately 88 players were divided into five focus groups (or cells), with 56 players in each of groups A, B, C and D to examine sustained operations in the Arctic from Atlantic and Pacific coast perspectives, and 32 players in the White Cell developed strategic level insights and implications of each groups moves. A summary of the players backgrounds, including functional area of expertise, education, and years of experience is found in Appendix E of this game report. A technology demonstration of the knowledge management game tool and Multi Touch Multi User interface was presented to the players. Subsequently, players engaged in an operational domain problem framing activity to explore various factors (i.e., people, places, environment, and relationships) that maritime leaders should consider when planning or conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Definitions for each of these factors are found in Appendix F of this game report. This activity served as a mechanism to foster robust, facilitated discussion within the game cells and as the initial mission analysis phase for scenarios that would be introduced the following day. Insights from this activity can be found in section III of this report. At the conclusion of the facilitated discussion, participants completed a baseline survey and postactivity survey to capture their individual thoughts and insights (see Appendix C). Each cell populated proposed planning assumptions into the game tool, which served as an input by the Control Cell for the development of the overarching assumptions used for game play. Additionally, the control cell examined the survey data, key insights presented in plenary and critical assumptions identified by the analysis team during this activity. The control team developed injects for subsequent game moves in order to provide players a common foundation to plan from. At the beginning of each move, the cells were presented with a scenario which included the environmental conditions, tailored operational task, and strategic guidance from command authority. These scenarios (e.g., missions and environmental conditions) provided players with the opportunity to plan sustained maritime operations in the Arctic under myriad conditions which became more challenging as the game progressed. Cell A (Atlantic) was paired with Cell B (Pacific) and Cell C (Atlantic) with Cell D (Pacific). Within a move, each pair received a

11 different scenario which was additionally tailored for the geographic area for each cell. During moves, all four cells concurrently sought to develop a Course of Action which focused discussion on efforts to identify gaps, mitigating strategies, proposed solutions, and improvements to the CONOPS associated with that scenario. Players supported the development of a PowerPoint presentation which summarized the major insights derived from the group during the move. These PowerPoint slides were used as to stimulate discussion in facilitated plenary sessions. Finally, players completed a post-move survey to capture individual perspectives and opinions. At the conclusion of each move, Cells A and B, and cells C and D subsequently came together for two distinct moderated plenary discussions. During these sessions, the group leads presented the cells Course of Action and major insights regarding gaps, solutions and improvements to the CONOPS. Subsequently, a Naval War College faculty member facilitated follow-on discussions regarding key insights and themes developed by the analysis team where participants had the opportunity to compare and contrasted insights identified in their respective groups. On the final day of the game, each cell prioritized an aggregated list of mitigating strategies and proposed solutions developed by all cells over game play. Players then engaged in two distinct final combined plenary sessions. Additional player insights not readily discernable from the PowerPoint briefs were captured. Analytic Framing The overall framing for this game is a combination of qualitative grounded induction (framed through the C2F s lens of U.S. Navy presence in the Arctic) and more traditional quantitative deduction. The post-game analytic process follows a widely-used process referred to as triangulation. Current thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic tools should be employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing the credibility of the work i. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of multiple data collection techniques is triangulation. ii This approach allows us to derive the same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods. iii Much of the strength of triangulation stems from its ability to distinguish between the idiosyncratic and the representative. iv This method also allows the researcher to base inquiry in the assumptions being used [and] evaluate questions with the appropriate methodology rather than the methodology driving the evaluation. v Consistent with this approach, data streams collected during this game will incorporate a variety of research procedures into analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool follows. The overarching triangulation approach is also depicted in the figure found in this section of the DCAP. 11

12 Content Analysis: Described as a method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to describe the content of communication messages that people have previously produced vi. Content analysis involves identifying coherent and important examples and patterns in the data [and subdividing] data into coherent categories, patterns, and themes. vii For the purposes of this game, content will be binned to determine which, if any, of the focus areas presented in this DCAP are supported by player actions, comments, or control team assessment. Grounded Theory: A more detailed, methodologically sound approach to analysis than the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data. Rooted from the discipline of sociology, grounded theory directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make general statements about the phenomena they examined viii. For the purposes of this game, the DCAT will be using an inductive, theory discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or data ix The primary tool used during post game analysis to facilitate this process is Atlas.ti. Coding will consist of both selective and in-vivo techniques, based on the DCAT s review of the relevant literature and the suggested key search terms in the players own words. Data Visualization: Atlas.ti, a grounded induction coding software will be used to depict associations and relationships between disparate data. Word Clouds also were generated to capture and visually depict most frequent words derived from participants. x Ethnography: DCAT members will capture qualitative, descriptive data through observation and listening to participants within a natural setting to understand the social interactions and rational of their decisions and activities during the course of game play.. 12

13 In addition to these four primary analytic processes, Likert-based survey questions were analyzed using descriptive tools such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and variance. This allowed the DCAT to discuss the variance and player cohesion across the cells. Content Analysis Grounded Theory Descriptive Statistics Ethnography. Data Visualization Collection Approach The datasets collected and analyzed in this game are considered descriptive because they reveal the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships [and] systems xi Because 13

14 they are descriptive, the focus of the DCAT prior to presenting these datasets to the Commander, USFF is to aggregate and assess the data and clarify the information that has been gathered xii. The primary datasets that were aggregated in this game are, in priority order, (1) Player Generated insights via Game Tool, (2) Player Surveys, (3) Plenary PowerPoint slides, and (4) Ethnographic notes from cell interactions and plenary sessions (5) Web IQ inputs. A summary of the datasets and their corresponding analytic methodologies are included in Annex (F). All of the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) members involved in these collection efforts received instruction in proper data capture techniques during a pre-game bootstrap session. DCAT members were responsible for ensuring quality assurance/quality control of the datasets submitted during game play. Specifically, DCAT members ensured the following parameters were implemented for these four datasets used for post-game analysis and development of final deliverables: Formatting and standardization: Game control staff will have available standard templates for PowerPoint deliverables and data collection notes. Templates will be located in folders for each cell and move. PowerPoint slides will be completed to the same standard across all four game cells. Internal validity: Collection instruments are designed correctly to ensure that accurate conclusions can be drawn from the data. To ensure their proper use during game play, specific internal validity issues with these instruments and the information they are designed to collect were identified during the Alpha and Beta tests. External validity: Due to the inherent challenges posed by ensuring consistent, accurate measurement in games xiii, criterion validity is used to see if the results from an item or set of measures (a scale) are similar to some external standards or criteria. xiv External validity applies predominately to the baseline questions that will be asked in the individual player surveys to be captured via the Unclassified GAMENET on 13 through 16 September In order to provide quality controls on data collection xv these questions were evaluated by an internal focus group as part of the Alpha and Beta testing process, prior to being deployed in the game. Specific roles were assigned to the DCAT based upon their experience, education, and interests. The specific functions assigned to the DCAT, along with the names of those personnel designated to perform them, are as follows: 14

15 III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS Analysis of Game Moves This section provides an overview of the main themes that players derived as justifications for the activities they discussed. The analysis team explored these player-derived themes and compared them to the data from game play. Players, through an inductive reasoning process, derived a number of hypotheses or themes throughout the game and coalesced on the final day of game play. A mixed methods approach, consisting of various qualitative and quantitative techniques was utilized for triangulation purposes in order to achieve credible and reliable findings from the data collected. Game data were coded, grouped in categories, and themes were developed by the analysis team. Data included post-move surveys, group PowerPoint slides, ethnographic notes, cell game tool decisions, and Web IQ threaded discussions. Theme 1: The U.S. Navy is inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region. This assertion is due to the poor reliability of current capabilities as well as the need to develop new partnerships, ice capable platforms, infrastructure development and training. Efforts to strengthen relationships and access to specialized capabilities and information should be prioritized. Sustainability creates and maintains the conditions which allow maritime forces to carry out operations at the operational level within a sea, or ocean area, the adjacent coastal area, islands, and the airspace above in order to achieve a desired end state. Sustainability is ensured by the maintenance and acquisition of requisite capabilities and resources to carry out operations in the Arctic region. Accordingly, reliability emerged as a key enabling factor to ensure sustainability and reduce risk. Currently, U.S. Forces are characterized by an inability to reliably perform and maintain operations in the austere Arctic environment. Reliability is improved by the acquisition and development of information and capabilities made available through strong relationships in order to complete the mission and reduce the likelihood of risk. The U.S. Navy currently must seek these from external stakeholders. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the major categories and relationships that were derived from game play, which in turn, form the basis for subsequent sections under theme 1. This relationship is described in Figure 1 which shows reliability and sustainability to be linked to specialized information and capabilities which are currently enabled by strong relationships. Theme 1 depicts the major areas focused on during game play and concludes that, of the DOTMLPF-P and CONOPS recommendations described in this report, those actions connected to strengthening relationships and improving the availability of specialized information and capabilities should have the highest priority for the U.S. Navy. 15

16 Relationships and Partnerships Coordination and Collaboration Figure 1. Themes and Relationships Diagram Building maritime partnerships with Arctic countries is critical prior to planning for or responding to any emerging crisis in the region. The need for regional cooperative security agreements with international navies and coast guards was identified in order to ensure reliability and sustainment of future contingency operations. Similarly, due to budget constraints and limited capabilities and resources, an increased emphasis was on the need to leverage regional partner capacities. This cooperation and coordination focused on all countries that make up the Arctic nations or those with Arctic capabilities. Specifically, leveraging multinational maritime ice breakers, ice-capable vessels, and the need to share information related to maritime activity and the environment (e.g., weather, ice, fog, etc.) was postulated in order to develop and maintain Arctic Domain Awareness. In order to improve interoperability, leverage capabilities, and share information between services, interagency and international maritime partners in the long term, the establishment of a standing Arctic Joint Task Force or maritime coordination center was suggested. When describing characteristics of this future cooperative security model, participants drew several parallels to Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South. This model was commonly referred to as JIATF- North. It was also suggested that this model could fall under the responsibility of 16

17 Commander, U.S. Northern Command. Conversely, this model was also discussed as a supporting element to a much broader security initiative within the Arctic Council. The existing Joint Task Force (JTF) Alaska model was also highlighted as a means to facilitate cooperation and coordination among entities. However, discussions over the course of the game rapidly evolved to encompass a much broader scope of regional partnerships. The use of Arctic exchange officers on Canadian, Russian, Norwegian and Danish ships was recommended in order to build experience and corporate knowledge in the region. While player moves across the game leveraged substantial international support and coordination, players simultaneously sought to leverage and integrate all domestic resources, training, and capabilities. Due to budget constraints, capability gaps in resources, lack of subject matter expertise and operational experience, as well as the distance from homeport to theater, players asserted that the Department of Defense should consider the formulation of a Whole of Government strategy to facilitate operations in the Artic. Discussing the relevance of relationships in the Arctic, it was suggested to institutionalize relationships to leverage available assets from all potential sources; the Navy has extremely limited capability to project power in a surface maritime environment, on behalf of U.S. in the Arctic, including our own U.S. waters, regardless of the geopolitical or emergency situation. Leverage Industry Capabilities and Best Practices The United States Navy should leverage industry and commercial capabilities to aid in navigation, sustainment and replenishment at sea. Establishing relationships with regional suppliers was identified as an essential first step to better understanding the challenges and best practices for operating in the austere environment. In order to support these initiatives, the development and application of procedures and policies for non-traditional logistical support to operations is needed. One cell suggested using NAVSEA engineers to resolve integration issues between naval platforms, systems, the operating environment and industry. Initiating these concepts would provide reliability, in terms of quicker access to capabilities that are currently limited or nonexistent in the Arctic region. Limited Capabilities and Platforms Acquisition of Ice-Capable Vessels The limited availability of ice-capable platforms and fuel was a consistent theme that emerged from game play. Throughout the game, the severity of risk to mission and friendly forces was attributed to the inability to effectively sustain operations as a result of limited ice capable platforms. Accordingly, the most significant capability gap identified throughout the game was the inability to navigate in the Arctic region due to the lack of ice capable vessels. Without these 17

18 18 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report mission-capable assets, the U.S. Navy cannot sustain operations without substantial support from the U.S. Coast Guard and international partners. Accordingly, a comprehensive acquisition strategy for procuring, leasing, and retrofitting ice capable platforms is needed in order to support sustained year round operations in the Arctic. Specifically, the need to improve existing USCG ice breakers (AGBs), procure additional ice breakers for use by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, and the need to retrofit existing U.S. Navy vessels was also identified. The need to generate requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather capable and vertical lift capable aircraft as well as the acquisition of U.S. organic ice rated units to conduct work in the Arctic was highly suggested. One player noted, Because the Arctic environment is vastly different from most operating environments, the development of an acquisition strategy should be analogous to preparing platforms to operate in high temperature desert conditions. The development of an Arctic Capabilities Strategy must include educational, developmental and operational components to facilitate cooperative exercises with relevant U.S. and international stakeholders through testing of actual capabilities of a range of seasonal conditions. Lessons learned from Arctic operations would integrate into Service POMs, CCDR IPLs, and other USG resource claimant processes, as well as policy processes and priorities. The Arctic needs to be considered from both sovereignty and energy aspects, as well as other concerns. Satellite Communications (SATCOM) The reliability reach-back capabilities and robust communications is critical in the rapidly changing conditions in the Arctic. Currently, the ability to sustain communications with chain of command while operating in the Arctic is limited due to the ineffectiveness of geosynchronous satellite coverage in the Arctic Circle. The acquisition of additional satellite coverage and bandwidth, the need to generate requirements for that coverage, and the of increase global commercial and military satellite communications footprint was discussed as essential elements for obtaining access in the Arctic. Logistics and Infrastructure Development The insufficient infrastructure to facilitate logistics when attempting to sustain operations in the Arctic was heavily emphasized in the game. The United States cannot conduct sustained operations in the Arctic without a reliable fuel source. Harsh environmental and physical conditions demand special considerations in order for critical systems to function and support any shipboard or aircraft operations. In order to mitigate these challenges in the short term, the United States Navy should leverage DOD, industry and multinational logistics hubs and platforms. In the long term, the development of permanent infrastructure at the mid-point of a NWP transit capable of providing fuel to maritime assets was recommended. Additionally, the

19 19 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report strategic positioning of port facilities throughout the Arctic in order to resupply vessels in transit was highly desired. The development of doctrine for logistical support to operations in the Arctic was also highlighted throughout game play. One cell described the need to incorporate maintenance practices to include augmenting Operational Sequencing System (OSS) procedures in current doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Knowledge and Awareness There was a substantial lack of knowledge and awareness among U.S. Navy personnel of required training and capabilities that generate requisite capabilities (e.g., platforms, systems, equipment, etc.). Specifically, there was a considerable gap in awareness and knowledge among U.S. maritime operators and planners with respect to the environment (e.g., climate and wildlife). Personnel planning or deploying to the Arctic would require specialized skill sets which are not currently available in U.S. Navy training pipeline or professional military education. One player noted Encountering unpredictable sea ice conditions will present a planning challenge, of which can only be overcome by institutional awareness and responsive adaptive force packaging. With respect to environmental data, accurate and timely environmental data (e.g., hydrographic surveys, typography, and forecasting) is essential to decreasing risk to mission and friendly forces and the overall success of the mission. Particularly, one player noted, the accuracy in data related to the environment will aid planners and operators for potential missions in the region. Current hydrographic surveys being conducted were described as inadequate to safely conduct sustained Arctic operations. Players also identified the inability to understand the widely distributed and diverse group of semiaquatic marine mammals in the Arctic region. However, of all wildlife species discussed, the polar bear continuously emerged because of its dependence on sea ice, its significance to the Arctic marine ecosystem and interaction with potential visitors (e.g., maritime operators in the region). In order to achieve and manage shared awareness, foster creative thinking and explore various issues and problems related to the Arctic, the establishment of an Arctic Center of Excellence (COE) was suggested. This center would facilitate research, education and training for deployed U.S. Navy operators and other joint, interagency and international stakeholders deploying to the Arctic region. Developing, executing and maintaining this COE was discussed as a primary augment to the proposed JIATF-North concept. Specifically, there is a need to focus on the education of Arctic operations, the environment, and current and future infrastructure, capabilities, and partnerships. Training for Planners and Operators The overarching theme derived from training focused on the need to identify a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to conduct sustained cold weather operations and determine which training should be developed and maintained within the Department of the Navy.

20 Emphasis was placed on consistent coordination with USCG to identify and coordinate Arctic related training requirements. Similarly, there is also a need to develop and execute training with international partners in the region. The focus was specifically related to coordinating and leveraging training curricula and facilities of Canada, Norway, and Russia in order to garner specific tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Lastly, the USN needs to train deployed personnel in polar bear mitigation, cold weather systems and platforms, cold weather survivability, and cold weather gear. Lessons Learned Lesson learned in the form of knowledge or understanding of operations in the Arctic gained by experience through both US and international maritime stakeholders was a key requirement generated by the game. There needs to be a paradigm shift from lessons learned to lessons applied. An increased focus was placed on the limited application of lessons learned among U.S. Navy personnel from previous operations to new ones. These lessons learned were viewed as a key vehicle to improve both individual and organizational proficiency, inform planning, and risk management for a particular operation in the Arctic region. Due to the lack of knowledge and experience of U.S. Navy planning and operations in the Arctic, the USN should seek to leverage lessons learned from USCG, industry and multinational partners. There was also an overwhelmingly need to develop and institutionalize a process to capture key lessons learned regarding Arctic operations and integrate them into planning and the CONOPS. Lessons learned should be managed and disseminated through central database or forum in order to provide consistency, accuracy and timeliness of information. This information should be complementary to the CONOPS and AJP 3.1 Conversely, lessons learned were also discussed in terms of how other relevant stakeholders in the Arctic could leverage U.S. Navy lessons learned. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) was noted as an entity that could facilitate this process or be integrated into a database that captures specific lessons learned related to the Arctic. One player noted, Having a reliable and efficient central location for planners and operators to go to prepare for this environment would be invaluable. Specifically, there is a need to capture and integrate key lessons learned in the areas of logistics and refueling, local culture, existing relationships among industry and multinational partners, and how the environment impacts platforms and systems. The Arctic Submarine Lab was frequently cited as an existing forum that captures key lessons learned related to operations in the Arctic. Lastly, the proposed Arctic Center of Excellence was cited as a tool that could be maintained or integrated into a more structured formalized working group or forum in the U.S. Navy that facilities all information related to planning and operations in the Arctic (e.g., at the operational 20

21 level). This formalized group of subject matter experts would be complementary to Task Force Climate Change, which conducts strategic level analysis on matters related to the Arctic. Theme 2: As weather and climate conditions intensify (particularly the presence of ice, strong winds and fog) and as the total time and distance traveled during an operation increases, the greater the risk of both mission failure and loss of or harm to friendly forces. While this conclusion may seem rather intuitive, it is fully supported by the analysis of player responses and game play. In the Arctic, risk is increased significantly as compared to non-arctic operations due to both the austerity of available support and logistics infrastructure, characterized by great distances between operating areas and even the simplest logistics hub, and the extreme conditions caused by the Arctic environment which are unlike those that the Navy has become accustomed to in recent decades. These factors are critical to operational planners contemplating actions in the Arctic and also significant when considering priorities for the implementation of DOTMLPF-P and CONOPS recommendation made in this report. Figure 2. Factors that Impact Risk 21

22 Weather and Climate Ice and fog conditions, and to a lesser extent, precipitation and wind were identified as essential elements that adversely affect the ability to conduct maritime operations in a timely manner. There is a short window of opportunity for ice capable platforms and equipment to arrive on scene and execute the mission before conditions deteriorate. Accordingly, the response time was anticipated to be slower than in lower latitudes due to environmental extremes and lack of infrastructure. Similarly, there is a limited time window to deploy and employ units to conduct salvage operations at depths requiring saturation and cold water diving. The ice adversely impacted existing naval platforms ability to conduct long term sustained operations in the Arctic. One player noted, not only do severe ice conditions adversely impact naval platforms, but also water intake and treatment systems on board. With respect to air operations, persistent cold weather and freezing rain would severely impact rotary wing aircraft maintainability unless shipboard hangar facilities are available. Similarly, cloud cover and fog makes persistent surveillance very difficult, especially during the summer months. Due to limited ice capable vessels, players often opted to send aircraft to conduct surveillance missions in the Arctic. One player noted, I sense a certain level of complacency about operating in the Arctic with respect to the weather, ice and ocean conditions that will affect platforms, materiel and personnel. Environmental conditions should not be under-estimated. Time and Distance The large distance required to transport supplies to an area of concern greatly inhibited the ability to sustain required time on station. Similarly, the inability to refuel and conduct resupply due to inadequate infrastructure in the region presented the greatest difficulties for players. Specifically, the lack of refueling capabilities in the Arctic and long distances between refueling stations make it improbable to have a ship (small boy) transit through the Northwest Passage to San Diego. In order to maintain required time on station, sufficient lead time should be allocated when transiting long distances. Infrastructure development in the region, consistent port calls and the use of resupply vessels were discussed as primary solutions to mitigate these shortfalls. Theme 3. In order to reduce the likelihood of risk, there was an increased reliance on additional information and capabilities through partnerships with the USCG, JTF Alaska, Tribal Leaders, Industry, and Multinational Partners. Figure 3 shows that as risk increased due to extreme climatic conditions and increased operating and support distances there was a corresponding increase in the need for specialized information and capabilities. As this trend increased, the required information and capabilities became less 22

23 available in the U.S. Navy and planners were forced to solicit external stakeholders for the capabilities needed to execute their mission tasking. At the low end of the scale, these could be found inside DoD, but eventually planners needed to rely on industry, international partners, and the whole of U.S. Government. This further reiterates that sustainability in Arctic operations is significantly dependent on strong relationships with all of these entities and that mechanisms that strengthen these ties should be prioritized in future planning. It is also noteworthy that a limit beyond which sustained Arctic operations become impossible, even in the case of perfect relationships and availability to capabilities and information because it is not yet technically feasible to operate in some environments. Information Figure 3. Relationship between information and capabilities and Risk As distance and weather factors increased during the game, the more reliance on specialized information increased. Planners became more reliant on receiving (e.g., pulling) additional information pertaining to the environment, wildlife, and indigenous populations in addition to augmentation by available and capable platforms and personnel in order to develop MDA and accomplish the mission. Conversely, as these factors increased over game play, there was an increased emphasis on the importance and necessity to disseminate (i.e., push) information to the media, indigenous populace, industry and the international community in order to support 23

24 strategic communications efforts, gain access to specific locations, and broaden coordination and response efforts. Capabilities Similarly, as both distance and weather factors intensified over the game, the more specialized and less available capabilities were. Unique capability shortfalls were identified with respect to specific platforms (e.g., ice hardened vessels and ice breakers), subject matter experts (e.g., environmental, systems and platforms), logistics infrastructure (e.g., refuel and resupply) and personnel (e.g., operators trained in cold weather operations) unique to the missions encountered during the game. As additional specialized capability requirements emerged during the game, the more players realized how limited their options were. This encouraged them to focus on the value and importance of leveraging local, state, federal and multinational capabilities. Theme 4: The future application of solutions developed during the game was influenced by the frequency of operations and desired reliability of U.S. Naval forces in the Arctic. As this game was conducted at the operational level, it was understood that many of the long term solutions may prove to be too expensive or strategically unacceptable to be implemented, hence the opportunity given to players to propose shorter term mitigating strategies. Many solutions of both types are outlined in this report, but one was not favored over the other during the game because of the lack of clarity on the Arctic strategy for the U.S. If the strategic vision is that future Arctic operations are to be short-term, ad-hoc, and infrequent in nature, then the consensus was that temporary, short-term and less formal solutions would be acceptable. However, if regular deployments, frequent operations, exercises and large scale crisis response actions were envisioned, then permanent, formal and comprehensive solutions were favored. 24

25 Figure 4. The Relationship between the Types of Solutions and Frequency of Operations The more frequent or consistent an operation or mission would be conducted, the more suitable long term proposed solutions were found to be. Conversely, the less frequent or consistent an operation or mission was executed; the more mitigating strategies or short term solutions were accepted. Long term solutions tended to be more formalized and structured in nature while the majority of mitigating strategies were more informal, temporary and less structured. Additionally, permanent solutions typically were characterized by long development times and a corresponding need to begin acquisition well before the anticipated need. In the long term, the described permanent solutions would allow a quicker response time for forces and provide the requisite capabilities to respond to both an emerging crisis and regular deployment missions. Accordingly, one player noted, there needs to be a combination of near term requirement and near term solutions based on operational requirements; long term approach is able to be phased based on a solid mission analysis that drives procurement and investments. Arctic missions are becoming more likely as noted in this comment: Arctic Council SAR agreement, now in force, and its expected oil spill response agreement, would provide reason to send Navy ships up north and to engage in collaborative exercises. Additionally, it was evident in our scenarios (that) we will be ineffective with our current gaps. Further policy guidance pertaining to the USN s role and responsibilities in the Arctic was warranted in developing future short term or long term solutions. Proposed solutions are costly. 25

26 Therefore, DoD and USN leadership must assess our long term strategy and determine the priority to operate in the Arctic relative to our other missions and threat assessments. This will help clarify the investment strategy and prioritize limited resources. In summary, deliberation on this issue is driven by the need to develop an Arctic strategy and define USN missions and goals in the Arctic over the next 20 years. The decision to focus on shorter term solutions or longer term, permanent solutions depended on a strategy which would identify which type of employment would prevail. This analysis has not yet been completed. In some cases, the inevitable transition from mitigating strategies to proposed solutions was described as a phased approach that requires resiliency, patience, and a long term commitment to cooperation in the region. 26

27 DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies and Proposed Solutions Overview This game sought to identify gaps in the U.S. Navy s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region as well as mitigating strategies, and proposed solutions to close those gaps. This section will describe the gaps identified in the game and provide suggested mitigating strategies and solutions organized using the DOTMLPF-P construct. The reasoning behind the selection of the identified gaps, mitigation strategies and solutions will be described as well. The overall assessment produced by the game was that the U.S. Navy does not have the means to support sustained operations in the Arctic. This was due primarily to the lack of appropriate ship types to operate in or near Arctic ice, the lack of support facilities in the Arctic, and the lack of sufficient or capable logistics connectors to account for the long logistics distances and lack of facilities. As noted in Theme 1, these gaps were mitigated or closed through the use of domestic and international relationships with military and Coast Guard partners which made available information or capabilities required to support scenario missions. However, the game identified that many of these relationships and the information and capability requirements that they enable do not exist or are poorly defined, further exacerbating the materiel issues listed above. These issues and others surfaced during the game are described in the following pages. Comments in quotations are reproduced directly from comments or written survey answers provided by players during the game. Doctrine Throughout game play, several key doctrinal gaps affecting the ability to effectively plan or conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic were identified. The lack of guidance pertaining to command and control relationships among U.S. and international maritime stakeholders was most notable. This included the lack of a common understanding of the geographical boundaries, roles and responsibilities and capabilities between nations, U.S. commandant commanders and the various U.S. numbered fleets. Furthermore, the capabilities, organization and missions of partner militaries were not well understood, which made coordination a challenge. Proposed solutions to these gaps focused on additions to or creation of new doctrine. Fleet level C2 issues could be resolved through modifications to the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS as is recommended later in this report. While some C2 relationships between U.S. and international military and civilian organizations are addressed in AJP 3-1, further clarification is needed, particularly with regard to the integration of other governmental agencies (OGAs) into the CTF, particularly this includes non-military agencies from partner nations. Procedures and supporting MOUs for the integration of these various entities, to include additionally those from 27

28 non-nato partners, into a C2 organization must be more fully developed and described in AJP 3-1 or a similar document. This is clearly a long term effort, but it is necessary as a critical enabler to successful international and whole of government crisis action response. Looking further ahead, participants called for development of doctrine in support of a multinational maritime coordination center and response force in the region. Because significant sensitivities exist with regard to militarizing the Arctic, there is a need to keep the military footprint as low as possible when developing this coordination center and response force. Accordingly, this multinational doctrine must focus on information sharing and enhancing cooperation in order to achieve maritime safety and security in the Arctic. Other doctrinal shortfalls were identified in the areas of development of awareness regarding environmental and physical conditions, support to salvage and nuclear incident response in the Arctic, and management of interactions with Polar Bears and other Arctic wildlife. The group had no recollection of extreme cold weather doctrine to support tactical or operational deployment of naval forces for these scenarios. This doctrinal gap would place a high risk to accomplishing the mission and to the forces used in this scenario. Doctrinal guidance supporting a collective understanding of specific environmental and physical conditions that impact operations and a fundamental knowledge of specific capable platforms and capabilities available to perform missions in the Arctic should be developed. The retrieval of nuclear materials in the Arctic was viewed as an area that requires the development of cooperative doctrine between Arctic states in order to increase the probability of success and prevent international incidents. Finally, the game identified a need for doctrine regarding ROE and training for encountering Polar Bears and other wildlife in the Arctic. This should be accomplished by USFF in the CONOPS. These points should be added to ATP-17 as well as other USN or joint doctrine. Organization Organizational shortfalls were exposed in four areas during this game: USN and joint relationships, U.S. Whole of Government organization, structures supporting international cooperation, and structures to support military cooperation with local and regional groups. Beginning with USN and joint organization, definition and structure were found to be lacking at the operational level with regard to operational authorities, geographical responsibilities, and command relationships between U.S. Combatant Commanders, their components and numbered fleets during operations in the Artic. Recent changes to the Unified Command Plan and relative inattention to the possibility of conducting operations in the Arctic have added uncertainty to command arrangements necessary for sustained Arctic Operations. Existing C2 relationships among U.S. and international maritime forces in the Arctic are still immature, require further examination, and may not be sufficient to support timely response to missions that require an immediate USN presence. For example, a need to clarify C2 arrangements between U.S. NORTHCOM, USFF, PACFLT, and the U.S. Navy s 3 rd and 6 th Fleets was cited, focusing on 28

29 further guidance regarding the roles and responsibilities of each entity, OPCON and TACON shift points, and information sharing in the Arctic region. Early planning to identify unique or establish ad hoc relationships was identified as a mitigating strategy. Current U.S. contingency plans that may require an immediate U.S. Whole of Government and international response in the Arctic, also require further refinement. U.S. interagency structures to support operational level support to other agencies in the Arctic do not exist or are immature. On a larger scale, it was seen as likely that the Navy would be requested by another government to assist in a contingency response scenario resulting a need for rapid assimilation into a multinational task organization in which a foreign flag officer will command. Like (with) any combined operation, establishment and integration of supporting and supported relationships early on in the planning process is critical. Similarly, when operating with coalition partners in the Arctic, naval forces must have the ability to rapidly move and embark special naval units on partner nation vessels. The long-term solution proposed during the game was to establish a standing multi-national organization and supporting task force to prepare for Arctic contingencies. To test and improve this concept, multinational exercises with relevant maritime stakeholders should be conducted. In any case, clearly defined organizational relationships and access to strategic locations, resources, and capabilities would support planning of contingency operations and mitigate risk during their execution. A pre-planned response checklist using this information and access would be a valuable tool for planners in Crisis Action Cells. Similarly, lessons learned from other multinational and joint contingency operations, such as the Haiti response, should be leveraged to develop these organizational structures and documents.. Finally, coordinating with key local, state and federal entities in the scenarios presented was widely recognized as a substantial organizational gap. During this game, DoD response in support of local, state, and federal responders was described in terms of effectively setting up conditions that enable rapid ship-to-shore movement of materials in order to execute mission requirements. However, this activity depends heavily on local and regional support, which was found to be lacking. Additionally, the inability of deployed U.S. Naval forces to coordinate and interact with local indigenous populations emerged as a persistent theme during game play. Structures which support persistent engagement and communications with tribal leaders throughout planning and execution in order to gain access to remote areas, better understand the operational environment, and gain credibility and assurance with the local populace are needed. Mitigating strategies for these shortfalls centered on the use of Tribal Liaison officers for community relations and Arctic operations which are maintained by Alaska Command, USCG District 17 and JTF-Alaska. Additionally, the use of ad hoc Tribal Liaison Officers during PDSS and operations as well as the establishment of a permanent Tribal Liaison Officer at NORTHCOM would help mitigate this shortfall. 29

30 Training All players agreed that the U.S. Navy lacks the experience and knowledge base to currently operate forces in the Arctic on a year-round basis. Arctic missions require specialized skill sets which are not currently available in U.S. Navy training pipelines. Specifically cited was a lack of awareness of how to detect the percentage of ice, fog and wind and how these factors created an impact on platforms and systems. Another shortfall was the ability to navigate in Arctic waters and, in particular in austere ports. U.S. naval officers must have sufficient skill and training to con their vessels independently of assistance from tugs to enter and leave Arctic ports. In general, a lack of sufficient training for operating in the Arctic and, in particular, Arctic-unique operations was noted. Our expectation is that the USN is going to the Arctic to do something other than sit below decks and shoot missiles (most likely some kind of sea-basing). This means people are going to have to operate small craft and aircraft in extreme cold weather conditions and those connectors present the highest risk and most vulnerable points of failure. Other training deficiencies were identified in the areas of the operation of ship-to-shore connectors, the movement of heavy equipment and the loading and unloading of cargo during operations in the Arctic. The level of knowledge and awareness of NATO or allied national command authorities, available multinational and industry logistics support hubs, platforms, and points of contact was found to be inconsistent and a weakness among U.S. Navy personnel. A clear understanding of the various regulatory regimes of the sovereign states that ring the Arctic as well as the international conventions and agreements for planners and operators is essential. Accordingly, the need to develop a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to conduct sustained cold weather operations and determine which training should be developed and maintained within the Department of the Navy was identified. Future operations in the Arctic region will not be a primary Area of Operations for USN and will not demand across the board training for squadrons and ships to add Arctic training to current Training &Readiness matrices. Rather, ensure a concise NWP or training syllabus exists of surface, helicopter and fixed-wing assets for Arctic operations." This should include a certification program for personnel deploying to the Arctic. Additionally it was suggested to develop an Advanced Qualification Designator (AQD) for Arctic planning and operations. One player noted, Tracking officers and enlisted with Arctic experience through the Navy Personnel Command (NPC) data base would enable Navy leadership to rapidly identify trained and educated personnel, should a crisis require a U.S. Navy response in the Arctic. Another recommendation was to leverage Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) as an entity to train and familiarize personnel with cold weather and ice cargo movement operations. Training in the area of polar bear mitigation (e.g., requisite equipment and ROE) was emphasized throughout game play and identified as a must have for all personnel deploying to the Arctic. Finally, as noted in the 30

31 31 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report CONOPS section of this report, U.S. Navy personnel must be further trained on the specifics of crisis action response scenarios in Arctic. While the U.S. Navy does not currently have a significant resource to conduct this training, leveraging other Arctic nations capabilities was a trend that emerged in many areas including training to mitigate the lack of current capability. Training (e.g., exercises, workshops, games etc.) with other international maritime partners must be developed and executed. Specifically, the U.S. Navy should seek to conduct cooperative training using existing training curriculums and facilities of Canada, Russia, Denmark, and Norway. The U.S. Navy needs to take every opportunity to deploy ships or personnel to the Arctic. This can also be achieved by participation in Canadian and allied exercises (i.e. NANOOK, or FRONTIER) or by exchanges where sailors of all trades have an opportunity to sail on other countries' ships. Additionally, this game highlighted the interrelationship between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. Aside from leveraging assets and sharing information, players suggested the need to determine and develop Arctic related training requirements for both services. Additionally, players lacked fundamental knowledge of existing coordination constructs (e.g., JTF Alaska and Arctic Council) and responsibilities of domestic organizations (e.g., USN, USCG etc.). The primary proposal to compensate for the lack of available training among U.S. Navy personnel regarding Arctic resources for information and specialized capabilities was the establishment of an Arctic Center of Excellence. This center would serve as the focal point for all matters related to research and training for DON personnel as well as own and manage the knowledge base for conducting Arctic operations. Acknowledging the wealth of expertise that exists among the Arctic nations, this center would strive to build relationships and contacts in order to facilitate the rapid connection of a training or information resource to the command that needs it. Additionally, cooperative arrangements with civilian universities, industry, and U.S. and international military universities were also suggested. Understanding the culture of the local and tribal populaces that inhabit the Arctic was another area that U.S. Navy personnel lack awareness. Leveraging existing entities such as JTF-Alaska, D-17, and international partners in order to engage with local tribal leaders was highly encouraged. The development of long term training syllabus and courses via Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) or in resident (e.g., similar concept or augment to MSOC) in this area was also recommended. Maintaining relationships and a network of contacts with the local and indigenous population in the Arctic should be a focus of the Arctic Center of Excellence noted above, providing an exportable capability to Arctic deployers. This game also exposed a shortfall in the ability to train personnel in the conduct of environmental disasters such as oil spills, especially in the context of the Arctic. DOD lacks an inherent knowledge of how to handle man-made environmental disasters and is reliant on commercial and civilian experts and equipment. Several scenarios required U.S. Navy to

32 interact and perform logistics services for these entities. A formalized policy and education plan to facilitate this interaction was suggested. To address this shortfall in the long term, several players suggested developing internal DOD personnel with expertise in the area of environmental spills and cleanup. Additional collaboration with USCG and industry sources with oil spill containment and clean up experience and integrating key lessons learned into the CONOPS would greatly enhance USN capabilities in the long run. Additional shortfalls were identified in the areas of environmental prediction and observation and in cold-weather survivability. Resources to train ice reconnaissance teams are very limited. To mitigate this shortfall, the U.S. Navy could utilize Canadian Ice Reconnaissance resources to assist in providing ice status to augment satellite imagery or embed contracted ice observers in air detachments. In the long term, the establishment of a training regimen for ice reconnaissance and navigation teams to augment satellite imagery and train air crews as permanent ice observers was proposed. With regard to Arctic cold weather survivability training, it was suggested that all deployed personnel receive pre-deployment training on cold-weather survivability as well as the use of cold weather gear. As a mitigating strategy, the Navy should leverage industry and international partner expertise in this area, while long term solutions involved development of a standing schoolhouse to train personnel on the use of specialized equipment and facilities. Finally, it was proposed that the lack of a robust onboard repair capability creates significant risk in an austere environment such as the Arctic. If a U.S. Naval vessel would sustain a significant mechanical or electrical casualty while deployed in such a remote and austere environment, they could be in trouble. At the very least, they will likely need to come off station and return south to affect repairs. Much of our capability and expertise to effect self-repair is much degraded relative to 15 or 20 years ago. This was echoed during another scenario: A sustained operation in an austere environment far from logistics hubs requires greater self-sufficiency to maintain and repair ships, particularly hull and structural systems (especially with a persistent threat of heavy seas) than currently exists shipboard. (1) Though many ships have capable machine shops onboard, ship's company lacks needed skills and experience levels to employ equipment in the course of effecting repairs. (2) S/F has become reliant on fly-away teams for complex troubleshooting or repairs, IAW a operator vice maintainer philosophy as well as minimal manning. (3) Following repair of hull structures and systems (electrical or mechanical), as well as main propulsion, S/F in general lacks training and qualification for necessary non-destructive testing of repairs. Material Shortfalls in materiel suitable for Arctic service emerged as a primary area of focus during the game. A key finding of this game is that the U.S. Navy lacks appropriate platforms, equipment, and communications systems to conduct sustained operations in the Arctic. 32

33 Maritime Vessels The first identified shortfall is in icebreaking capacity. Single point failure is the USCG Ice Breaker HEALY was a common refrain as nearly every scenario response directed the immediate deployment of HEALY to the area of interest. In order to mitigate the lack of ice breaking capability in the near term, players relied heavily on coordination and cooperation with the USCG, industry and multinational partners. Specifically, throughout the game, these capabilities were leveraged (leased, borrowed) from both Russia and Canada. These nations proximity to the operating areas and operational experience in the region made this the most viable and practical solution. Over the long term it was suggested to develop an Arctic Acquisition Strategy to procure, lease and retrofit ice capable platforms. Beyond ice breakers, the finding that current warship designs are not robust enough to operate in even light ice which is already broken was highlighted. In other words, even when escorted by an icebreaker, transiting the NWP or other areas with more thanclim minimal ice coverage with amphibious or CRUDES platforms was deemed to be exceedingly risky. Strategic and operational planners will simply need to accept that certain areas in the Arctic remain off-limits to U.S. warships unless the commander is willing to accept risks, the ice recedes away from the area of interest, or ships are produced with additional ice strengthening. As a strategy to mitigate risk, consultation with NAVSEA engineers and naval architects was determined to be necessary to offer the commander sufficient understanding of design limitations, but the unpredictability of ice movement and environmental conditions must also be factored in. Accordingly, the need to strengthen USN hulls and procure ice breakers, ocean going salvage vessels, and tugs was a focus throughout the game. The shortfall of available and capable ocean-going dive salvage ships was area that received significant consideration during gameplay. Leasing these vessels through industry and multinational partners would mitigate this gap in the near term, while procuring additional TATF-X vessels was proposed as a long term solution. If you want Navy presence up there, we need bigger, better ports with more supplies and ice-classed ships. Ice-class ships cannot be a retrofit of existing designs. Build new ships whose parameters adhere to a simple set of rules to achieve classification. These ships are based on empirical information derived from operating ships in the Arctic environment with minimal infrastructure. This is your best option to succeed in the mission and mitigate catastrophic failure. An additional observation regarding readiness of current vessels for Arctic operations was that while most of our ships were originally designed for satisfactory performance in cold or very cold weather, maintenance of systems, particularly HVAC, is in general poor condition and most ships should have a thorough and competent assessment and some level of overhaul and refit of these systems before deployment to an Arctic environment." Amphibious ships were highlighted as especially useful for the types of missions anticipated for the Arctic. The LPD-17 has a flight deck, hanger and well deck as well as personnel and 33

34 equipment carrying capacity and medical capability. LCACs were also utilized frequently during this game as part of the amphibious capability necessary to respond to the various scenarios provided leading to much discussion on the value of retrofitting existing LCACs. A re-fit of our LCACs would work. Doing that, we can at least take some of the effort for SAR and show a continued presence. Using another approach, it was noted that the problem is so overwhelming with respect to lack of appropriate hulls and infrastructure to support larger hulls that we probably need to think more out of the box and smaller getting a smaller vessel with decent legs such as the Tuuli (Finnish Arcticized ACV) which has already been tested might just be the way to go. The lack of weather protected surface connectors in lieu of open bay small boat transfer vessels (LCUs/RHIB) which do not protect personnel from extreme weather conditions was found to be a limiting factor in mission planning. A mitigating strategy identified included the need to increase the number of trained boat crews and reduce crew rotation time intervals until such time that cold weather canopies or heated modules which can provide protection can be developed. Finally, players asserted that there is insufficient capacity of naval forces to continue current missions while adding missions, exercises and training in the Arctic with current vessel inventory. Aircraft In order to mitigate the lack of ice capable vessels and ice breaking capability in the near term, planners were forced to avoid areas where ice accretion was greatest. In these instances, air lift and air support were relied upon. A few long range Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft would be beneficial in order to utilize the scattered gravel strips in the region and operate off ship it would be great to augment this with existing VTOL (shorter range) aircraft. However, it was noted that the availability of MV-22s for 6 month deployment would be limited. To mitigate this shortfall in the near term, players suggested the use of other aircraft, such as H- 60s despite the range and lift problems attributed to this platform. A proposed solution included the need to generate requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather capable, vertical lift capable aircraft. In order to support air lift and air operations in the Arctic AOR, scenario responses highlighted the need for the development of airfields in Barrow or Prudhoe Bay to include military hangars and fuel storage, as well as roads from Fairbanks to the airfields and supply nodes. Currently, materiel to support humanitarian relief operations must be drawn from disparate locations and bases, which in turn increases the response time for the required equipment and supplies to arrive on scene. Using airlift capabilities to fly in equipment, personnel, and supplies to a staging area may decrease the response time to a humanitarian relief event. Utilizing materiel from outside 34

35 organizations (state of Alaska, FEMA, etc.) to compensate for unavailable or prohibitively distant USN assets was also suggested. As a final comment, the challenges associated with operating aircraft in the Arctic were highlighted. Aircraft in these conditions are inherently more dangerous to operate than ships, even in good weather. Sustained helicopter and landing craft operations in these conditions, with all-purpose craft, not specifically designed to operate in these conditions, are going to be very hazardous for the people and the aircraft." Given the harsh physical and environmental conditions in the region and lack of capable maritime vessels, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and distributing resources would be highly applicable and valuable to supporting operations. Equipment The U.S. Navy does not outfit ships with PPE rated for Arctic conditions. The availability of cold weather equipment and gear for ships and crew rapidly deploying to the Arctic was highlighted as major materiel gap. To mitigate this shortfall in the near term, a pack-up kit in fleet concentration area ready for transfer to ships deploying on short notice to the Arctic was suggested. Test and evaluation processes for Arctic weather gear and AEL requirements must be established. Procurement of cold weather gear and the development of a ready service locker of Arctic equipment that is available for unit deploying to the Arctic were also suggested. Interestingly, one player noted, At Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, there is a rotating pool of gear available for expeditionary operations. You can check out flak jackets, helmets, etc. Same concept should be applied to cold weather gear. The limited frequency of use of this equipment led players to leverage multinational and industry partners in order to acquire information about best practices for this equipment and for a ready resource for emergency equipage availability. Communications Consistent and reliable communications was identified as another area that lacks sufficient capabilities. Short-term use of multiple communication methods and accepting reduced bandwidth were identified as a mitigating strategy. The acquisition of additional polar orbiting satellites for enhanced communication capabilities was identified as a long term solution. The ability to conduct satellite surveillance using High Resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar was another substantial shortfall identified in the game. Purchasing additional high resolution SAR imagery through commercial companies or using aircraft as remote sensing platforms was suggested as a mitigating strategy. The acquisition of additional U.S. satellites for SAR and IR imagery was proposed as a longer term solution. 35

36 Support to Environmental Disaster Response A lack of knowledge pertaining to oil spill dispersion trajectories under the ice and below the sea surface was identified. In the near term, players suggested the need to leverage industry and academia while investment in R&D for developing oil dispersion models was proposed as a long term solution. Leadership and Education The need for strong support from U.S. political leadership for conducting operations in the Arctic was consistently noted throughout the game despite an observed lack of attentiveness and understanding among senior U.S. military and civilian leadership on the consequences and risks associated with the myriad capability gaps identified in this game. The small cadre of military leaders with significant Arctic knowledge and experience must continue to inform their civilian counterparts and political leadership on the risks and opportunities of sustained operations of U.S. maritime forces in the Arctic. Leadership must have the awareness to balance risk to mission and forces with the costs of capabilities required to mitigate that risk. The U.S. Navy needs to have a clearer mandate on what the expected Naval missions will be; increased education for policy makers with which to better adjudge risk in the Arctic and determine what costs they are willing to take on in order to increase USN presence. Additionally, the game identified a general deficiency of knowledge among senior U.S. Navy leadership regarding cold weather systems and platforms, climatic conditions, and C2 relationships in the Arctic. Integrating these topics in both junior and senior officer leadership courses (JPME I & II) as well as the Senior Enlisted Academy was suggested. The Navy needs to include Arctic education in CAPSTONE courses, summary of this education to senior staffs, and Fleet Commander Support for additional T-class ships, native language speakers, and icebreakers. This would provide knowledge and capability to support increased operations in the Arctic in the next 30 years. Personnel Insights regarding key personnel gaps, mitigating strategies and proposed solutions have been integrated within the training, leadership and education categories of this section of the report. Facilities The austerity of the infrastructure available to support maritime operations in the Arctic and the great distances from available support facilities to the actual operating area had a tremendous impact planning scenario responses and assessing the risks associated with those plans. As was previously noted, distance and time required for forces to arrive on scene decreased mission success and the lack of logistics facilities exacerbated this problem. Numerous gaps in logistics 36

37 37 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report infrastructure in the region were identified and the ability to support sustained maritime operations without reliance on extended logistics lines to ports outside the Arctic was questioned. Additionally, the lack of airports within close proximity to operating areas presented severe challenges in conducting resupply and air drops of supplies and resources to the local populace, during HA/DR missions, or to deployed forces. A mitigating strategy proposed during the game was to use sister service Air transport into Nome from Elmendorf and leveraging private and commercial airfields. Another aspect of these facilities shortfalls was related to the importance of engagement with the local communities in the Arctic. A fixed base in the Arctic is needed to maintain continuous communications and build relationships with indigenous and regional populations and leadership. Another conclusion specified that in order to be able to conduct operations for any extended period of time, logistics support from local authorities, industry and multinational partners is required. Leveraging logistics facilities in Canada, Iceland, Greenland and Norway as well as using Thule, Halifax, Nuuk and St. Johns were discussed primarily as mitigating strategies. The development of permanent logistics infrastructure, Joint FOB s, as well as A-PODs and S-PODs were cited as potential long term solutions. Specifically, infrastructure upgrades at Thule, GL, Barrow, Ft. Wainright and Nanisivik to support refueling and resupply were identified as key changes. Thule Air Force Base in the North Star Bay (e.g., Baffin Bay) was discussed as a location that can provide logistical support in the summer months. Conversely, Resolute was noted as a small community that is often blocked by ice even in the summer. U.S. support for infrastructure development at Nanisivik was discussed as an example of the complexities related to relying on non-u.s. Arctic facilities. Nanisivik was described as a mining facility with a pier for loading ore and has historically never been a full-featured port but has the potential to be refurbished and used for naval resupply. However, Nanisivik is not yet established, and once it is, it will only be for fuel. In the end, Nanisivik Naval Facility is intended partially to emphasize Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. U.S. involvement might entail resolution or mitigation of the U.S.-Canadian sovereignty dispute over the status of Canadian internal waters and international strait in the Northwest Passage region. However, U.S. resources could meaningfully enhance the development of the facility and Canada might be persuaded on that basis. Policy A lack of policy guidance regarding coordination and collaboration with multinational military forces (e.g., Canada, Denmark, Norway, Greenland, Finland and Russia) in support of Arctic operations was a prominent concern throughout game play. Specifically, the importance of Russian and U.S. relations and the need to develop U.S. policy towards working with Russian

38 maritime forces in the Arctic in the form of MOUs, bi-lateral and multilateral agreements in support of future cooperation and collaboration was emphasized. The primary areas identified to facilitate this include: participation in joint multinational exercises and the sharing of training, logistics facilities, and information. Efforts to mitigate short term crisis responses (e.g. environmental spill, natural disaster etc.) were noted as the most likely mission areas for cooperation. Additionally the lack of guidance regarding U.S. and Canadian C2 arrangements in the Arctic region was significant. Given the scenarios encountered during the game, the U.S. and Canada should have identified a need to trade off responsibilities between each other in various operating areas and missions encountered and shared by both nations. Within this construct the importance of identifying and respecting the boundaries of authority and jurisdiction for Arctic operations. The establishment of clear boundaries within which combined operations could be conducted under Canadian leadership and authority (e.g., specifically between Resolute and Sachs Harbor) was suggested. In the long term, players suggested developing a bilateral or multilateral agreement or policy similar to the Maritime Operations Threat Response (MOTR) process to guide decisions on lead agencies for Arctic operations. A recurring theme was the significant lack of guidance pertaining to how U.S. maritime forces (e.g., USN and USCG) are integrated into a U.S. Whole of Government response effort in the Arctic. Concerns were cited regarding the uncertainty of On Scene Commander Expeditionary Politics when conducting salvage operations close to other nation s territorial waters and the need for a specifically whole of government integration. A need to Identify processes to request support from foreign governments and other U.S. Government Agencies from a whole of government approach. was also cited. Emphasizing the importance of an integrated national approach to HA/DR or other crisis response missions, it was claimed that Whole of Government (e.g., emphasized by Canada and a topic in the U.S.) or Whole of Governments should be more readily acceptable to the Navy and DoD." Other comments highlighted the uncertainties perceived in the policy guidance regarding lead agencies for various events, or the accessibility of other government assets in the case of a crisis. We need to have an indication that direction on the military response to a maritime domestic event such as this oil spill will come from U.S. NORTHCOM. This lack of policy guidance also includes the other military services, JTF-Alaska, and local, state and federal agencies as well as NGO s and the commercial sector. Furthermore, There are many capabilities to sustain operations in the Arctic, but they are underutilized due to the lack of guidance and requirements to properly focus and integrate the capabilities in such a way as to inform decision makers and policy development. Additional policy recommendations centered on the resolution of policy gaps regarding environmental protection and other factors related to interacting with the natural state of the Arctic. One issue identified was the need for ROE for mitigation of Polar Bears and other wildlife. Another related concept was that maritime forces need to be given policy guidance to 38

39 govern how strict environmental regulations in large portions of the navigable Arctic can be addressed. Sensitivity to environmental regulations in the Arctic is far greater than we experience anywhere else and if our policy to comply with or ignore is an afterthought decision we will lose the jury of the public. We need to decide what we will do and then deliberately plan the solutions and strategic communications to support or mitigate that. Thus, strategic communications needs to be at the forefront of planning operations to understand how our presence looks from the other side, one player said. This realization throughout the game encouraged the identification of the need for further policy related to the discharge of waste and disposal of trash from ships in the region. However, it is noteworthy that a policy for USN to abide by all HN and international regulations will prevent putting most ships in the AOR. 39

40 Updates to Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report This section provides an overview of the main themes that the players identified for improving the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS. The analysis team utilized a grounded theory approach whereby themes were identified through a process of constant comparison and then tested throughout the data. Moreover, the relevance of the themes was determined by linking the themes to the Navy s Arctic Road Map and Arctic Maritime Response Force Concept of Operations. This method attempts to explore both documents and inform leaders of the major challenges and solutions players encountered when planning sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Comments in quotations are reproduced directly from comments or written survey answers provided by players during the game. Structural Changes and Overview Overall, the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS was identified to be a valuable tool to support sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. However, the Atlantic Coast centric approach to the Arctic and focus on war fighting missions and missions with long planning opportunities of the CONOPS was inadequate to meet the most likely missions specified in the Arctic Roadmap. Accordingly, it should be modified to support operations in both of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets as well as a wider range of operations to include crisis action planning and crisis response. Given that the original CONOPS was developed by COMSECONDFLT, its Atlantic focus is natural. But, discussions during the game made clear that what works in one region cannot be automatically applied in other regions. Entering the Arctic from the Pacific has a number of significant differences to include changes to C2 procedures to account for interactions between EUCOM, NORTHCOM and PACOM or USFF, PACFLT and the various numbered fleets, the presence of sovereign U.S. territory in the form of Alaska, the corresponding reduction in the criticality of international partnerships, and finally, the existing organization and networking of USCG District 17 and JTF Alaska. For the CONOPS to be broadly accepted and implemented, these factors must be taken into account. A common comment was: Change the CONOPS to reflect the bias to more of operating in the U.S. Arctic vice the Atlantic Arctic. Other discussions emphasized that likely missions and scenarios that would require a DOD response consisting of emergent tasking/crisis action planning in the Arctic. Suggestions included adding information and planning tools on crisis action planning for emergency contingencies, better aligning the document with the Arctic Roadmap. The CONOPS requires a careful review of the missions and what the U.S. Navy shall, should, or could do in the Arctic. Additionally, the original CONOPS seemed to be written for combat or transit vice sustained operations. There is a need for more comprehensive vignettes outlining basic considerations for crisis response for man-made natural disasters. For example, add an oil spill vignette in CONOPS to include decontamination of equipment, personnel (as per industry), and PPE. 40

41 41 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report Include procedures on special Arctic restrictions, or resources/references for these special procedures. Correspondingly, it was found that the CONOPS was inconsistent in its guidance regarding missions for an AMRF or sustained operations in the Arctic. The scope of missions listed in the CONOPS appeared to be focused predominantly on war-fighting instead of the more likely scenarios of DOD support and response to emergent contingencies. The original document concentrated on deliberate planning and timelines, and less on crisis action planning (CAP). During the game, courses of action were repeatedly developed that required many assets and services to be deployed and activated on an accelerated basis instead of the months of lead time assumed in the existing CONOPS. To correct this, a crisis action planning section for emergency contingencies should be added into the CONOPS. An abbreviated planning process associated with a crisis action planning timeline similar to the Global Fleet Station (GFS) planning timeline used as an example in the original CONOPS was suggested. The Office of Response and Restoration (NOAA) provides comprehensive information on responding to a natural resource crisis which could serve as a framework. Additionally, the CONOPS should include more CAP vignettes, such as the disaster response, oil spill, or Homeland Security scenarios developed for this game. Many of the CONOPS changes recommended by game participants pertained to subjects that were already largely addressed in the original document. However, it was believed that the subject matter was inconsistently written, not intuitively organized or needed additional amplification. Organizing the information to more closely align with joint planning doctrine and amplifying pertinent information would improve the CONOPS. For example, in the Planning and Execution section, reorganizing topics by joint operational function would help planners to fully integrate the CONOPS into their plans. Finally, players cautioned against too many additions to the CONOPS. Keep the CONOPS operational and put tactical elements into the ATP; there was a tendency not to make full use of other publication formats (Shipboard pubs and guidance (Cold Weather Bills, deployment guidance), AT/FP, and ONI assessments; reference to these would help keep the CONOPS focused on its intended use. Suggested revisions to the CONOPS should be crosschecked with existing doctrine or publications to prevent duplication; referring to and referencing the location where the needed information could be found would be sufficient. Command and Control The Arctic region is characterized by unique AOR boundaries as well as unique, ill-defined or newly established organizational relationships at and between all levels of command. This creates situations where planners do not fully understand command relationships or where all interactions are based on different ad hoc relationships. A contributing factor to this problem is

42 42 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report that Arctic Maritime Response Force C2 procedures are not adequately addressed in the CONOPS. The CONOPS should address the unusual nature of C2 in the Arctic, specifically in resolving AOR overlaps and boundaries as well as unique and unusual command interactions (such as COMTHIRDFLT operating in the NAVEUR/EUCOM AORs). Other updates should include descriptions of relationships between USFF and PACFLT, LANTAREA and PACAREA, and Canada s JTF-North. The CONOPS should include a chapter or an appendix illustrating and defining existing C2 relationships and authorities which would provide a standardized reference for routine transit or contingency mission planning. Finally, the process of refining the CONOPS should also support refinement of the C2 relationships in the region, and, as such, should be a fully collaborative process with all levels of command represented. Another area of improvement identified is in the CONOPS description of communications. This was not examined in great detail during the game due to classification restrictions, but it was noted that the inclusion of a standard or strawman communications plan would be beneficial to planners and operators. This is especially valuable because unique communications systems are required for Arctic sustainability which are not part of communications packages in other AORs. This includes leveraging commercial or partner systems which may require system modifications and which may come with limitations with regard to bandwidth or ability to carry classified information. This communications plan should address the Arctic communications limitations, specifically the SATCOM footprint, and the corresponding impact to command and control. A recurring theme in the game was that C2 and command relationships in the Arctic region must be clearly resolved and articulated early in the planning process. The seams in coalition C2, CCDR and numbered fleet boundaries, and in partnerships and roles between interagency organizations, federal-state, and government and non-governmental agencies discussed above create significant additional effort for a planning staff. The CONOPS should highlight this factor and call for staffs to begin C2 planning as early as possible, perhaps with the development of preplanned C2 and communications packages for use in the event of a crisis. Partnerships and Relationship Building Throughout the game, the need to conduct operations in the Arctic in a cooperative manner due to limitations in any one nation's capabilities was emphasized. The CONOPS should include guidance on standing relationships with Arctic partners as well as the procedures for starting an ad hoc relationship in support of a crisis response operation. Strong maritime partnerships are critical to the ability to operate in the Arctic. Most Arctic nations are also members of NATO and an appendix with data on NATO procedures should be included in the CONOPS to facilitate the rapid establishment of C2 in the event of a crisis. The CONOPS needs to expand and emphasize the potential need for international cooperation to conduct Arctic operations along with detailed policy guidelines on C2 relationships. The process of requesting support from Arctic nation and partners, specifically Canada, Norway, and the Kingdom of Denmark,

43 43 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report must be provided in an annex along with liaison points of contact (POC) information. Players even went so far as to recommend that a standing task force for multi-national operations should be established with Arctic nations to address standard C2 relationships (OPCON/TACON, etc.). It is strongly recommended that the CONOPS provide guidance on using subject matter experts (SME) as liaison officers to involved organizations including local communities. As with all operations, strategic communications are important. Due to the sensitive nature of operating in the Arctic, it is imperative that commanders get the strategic communication right and that it is consistent. The U.S. Navy wants to send the correct message of why the military is operating in the Arctic. In line with this approach, it was recommended to delete CONOPS sections focused on war fighting. Further, guidance is required on conducting military operations that requires the use of lethal fires that prevent adversaries from scuttling ships that conduct illegal activities. The cumulative effects of these instances would adversely impact the ecologically sensitive Arctic region and send a negative message to Arctic partners. It was also recognized that the nature of maritime operations would always be influenced by "whose Arctic" the operations would be occurring within. Significant geographical, meteorological, geopolitical, and infrastructure differences exist between the Arctic sub-regions. For example, from the U.S. perspective, the presence of Alaska greatly changes the character of Arctic operations when compared to other sub-regions. In almost every other case, a strong relationship with the nearest Arctic nation to the planned operating area is essential to the sustainment of forces and the cooperative response to the planned operation by interested neighbors. Numerous interested parties beyond the five Arctic Nations were also described. These included U.S. and coalition forces, interagency organization and other government agencies (OGAs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the local population. Prior to and during operations in the Arctic, planners and operators must understand all of these entities and the CONOPS should include descriptions of key stakeholders, their interest areas, and their capabilities. Additionally, these entities could be the key to a variety of specialized Arctic assets which exist and may be utilized, but staffs may not be aware of their capabilities or even their existence. Planners should consider that a partner, NGO, or civilian industry organization may have better capabilities to execute certain missions or tasks. It was recommended that the CONOPS include an Annex addressing liaison points of contact for Arctic partner nations and actors (NGOs, IGOs, contractors, etc.) The CONOPS should provide guidance on the procedure to solicit support from U.S. government agencies given the engagement nature of many Arctic missions. CONOPS changes must include descriptions of multiple U.S. government agencies and capabilities that have a stake in the Arctic such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Maritime

44 Operational Threat Response Plan should be considered as one process to facilitate the U.S. Whole of Government response to Arctic issues/responses. The listing of the Arctic s key leaders and their primary points of contact from the various organizations and indigenous people as well as an understanding of their interrelationships must be understood to support PDSS efforts. There is a requirement to successfully engage with Arctic region native populations that requires support from several entities that already have established relationships such as the U.S. Coast Guard (District -17), other Arctic nations (Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Russia), and JTF-N in order to have a greater chance of understanding and cooperation. The environmental sensitivities associated with operating in the Arctic with ships required to adhere to the leave no trace principle requires the development of specific guidance and procedures associated with sustained maritime operations in this area. As noted elsewhere in this report, the U.S. Navy needs to determine a policy with regard to compliance to the various environmental and operating regulations that exist in large portions of the navigable Arctic for both forces operating today and those currently being developed and procured. This policy should be included in the CONOPS. In support of this policy, the CONOPS should include information on special Arctic restrictions with listed resources and references as well as guidance on how to adhere to the environmental & wildlife considerations/ regulations of the Arctic coastal state. Additionally, include a section that provides guidance and procedures for the discharge of various types of waste and the need to hold/store waste for extended periods. Other suggested solutions include the option of discharging waste to other ships for further transport for proper disposal. Movement and Maneuver Throughout the game it was noted that harsh and variable environmental conditions and large distances will likely create uncertainty in planning, timeliness and timing, and can create conditions which exceed current operational capabilities. This uncertainty should be understood and taken into account when planning. To reduce this uncertainty, an appendix with a GO/NO GO criteria chart of ice operations (Air, Surface, and Subsurface operations) was suggested. Arctic winter SMEs should be consulted on developing go/no-go criteria, assessing system limitations, etc. if we are considering winter operations in the Arctic. The CONOPS should identify the environmental (ship) threshold beyond which we are really standing into danger. Kind of like the limits we establish on aircraft and landing craft operations. We know what risk we are taking based on established limits and calculations. Then we determine if we can do it. Guidance must be provided that clearly defines the length of time or thresholds a ship which is not ice rated or designed for Arctic operations can safely remain in the Arctic to inform planners and operators that there is also no defined amount of ice that non hardened ship can operate in. 44

45 45 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report It was recognized that no chart could be comprehensive, but that a quick reference guide would be necessary given the lack of Arctic experience and knowledge resident in the force. A recurring theme throughout the game was that the U.S. Navy s ability to operate in the Arctic under a wide variety of ice and weather conditions is limited and operators must understand the design limitations of aircraft and surface warships. Shipboard design challenges include material limitations associated with hull construction, various shipboard equipment limitations due to Arctic conditions frequently exceeding design limits (sub-zero weather environments), and propulsion and auxiliary equipment designs that do not incorporate measures that prevent sea chests from becoming blocked by sea ice. The CONOPS section covering U.S. Navy platform selection criteria should be prioritized and is missing key factors such as sustainability and ice (capability) that best support mission accomplishment. Planners need a table that lists the ice capabilities of all major classes of USN/USCG/USNS/MSC/MARAD ships. This table should contain the major plus and minus of each class (i.e. a DDG has exposed screws and bow mounted sonar prone to ice damage. It was also suggested that the CONOPS should add an appendix explaining Ship Ice Ratings to highlight capabilities and limitations. Modification and expansion are also required in the existing Platform Section (CONOPS p. 24) to include information on ice breaker and salvage vessels and alternative resource options such as leasing assets from Arctic nations or private industry (see also the discussion on U.S. Navy Contracting procedures later in this report). Similarly, there needs to be a section on the challenges of operating the airborne assets that provide logistical support and intelligence gathering in terms of the acceptable risk level associated with extreme cold weather, visibility, maintenance support, and transient basing. Players were often surprised by unforeseen limitations in aircraft capabilities that were unknown to the operators, but were well known to engineers or acquisition personnel. In the case of smaller vessels, several aspects of Arctic operations create unique circumstances with regard to ship-to-shore movement and surface connector operations. These include typical shoreline and bottom characteristics, varying ice composition, and reduced exposure times for vessel crew which prompted a suggestion that procedure to mitigate the impact of these factors be included in the CONOPS. Also required is amplifying guidance for cold weather impacts to personnel similar to what is contained in USCG/CAN/KoD publications (Safe stay time charts etc.). The inclusion of cold weather operations information (or reference to the appropriate document) specifically tailored for surface connectors such as LCAC, LCUs, and other U.S. Navy craft would benefit planners and operators. The CONOPS should reflect the requirement for all units to make accommodations for cold weather operations. Details for these changes are spread throughout numerous technical manuals and the like, but should be assembled and summarized into a reference guide or checklist. Examples include requirements to change lubrication or modify operating procedures for cold or

46 46 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report icy weather. The inclusion of a list technical references that provide the detailed maintenance practices required to operation critical equipment in the Arctic/extreme cold weather was suggested. Because of the specific requirements associated with Arctic operations and the rarity of actual Arctic deployments, it was recommended that the CONOPS establish a structure to preselect units to serve as the AMRF either on a planned or crisis action basis. A squadron or specific hulls need to be identified for AMRF instead of using the entire fleet as a pool for Arctic response. This smaller pool of units would be the focus for the training and materiel solutions outlined elsewhere in this report. This was recommended as a way to mitigate the risk of Arctic operations. These deployed assets are self-sufficient for operating in austere, remote environments where potential is much higher for damage to ship's systems and equipment than in normal operating environments. (And you are much farther from help than we have grown accustomed to.) For example, in the case of ice navigation, there are specific training requirements and materiel solutions that would need to be implemented for potential Arctic deployers. Instead of spreading these across the fleet, identifying a smaller pool of units would be more cost-effective. In any case, the CONOPS needs to provide detailed guidance to ships operating in various sea ice conditions placing emphasis on ice navigation and the associated risks of operating in sea ice laden waters given current ship designs. The CONOPS should include a comprehensive description of sea ice navigation issues given the fleet s responsibility to man, train, and equip U.S. Navy ships to navigate around or avoid the ice, or provide an ice breaking capability if we intend to operate in areas constantly covered with ice. Suggested references include the Canadian Coast Guard web site and search the Ice Navigation Guide. Also look at the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention act for guidance on ship/ice operations. Finally, the CONOPS should outline training standards and certification requirements for ice navigation personnel, both resident within the crew or hired for a specific voyage. Logistics Arctic infrastructure is austere and extended logistics chains are vital to operating in the Arctic. Due to this, logistics must be planned well in advance. Ports in the region maintain minimal onhand stores and the long-lead times required to order and deliver fuel or materiel to the region can quickly place a fleet logistics planner in extremis and severely limit the options available to planners and commanders. Additionally, economy of effort is a key to success as whatever forces are operating in the Arctic must be supported from outside. Logistics operations in the Arctic present several unique scenarios and conditions. The CONOPS should present a strawman logistics plan or an overview of logistics plans for operations in the various regions of the Arctic which should be maintained at the fleet level. As part of this, the

47 CONOPS should contain an annex that provides a comprehensive listing of Arctic APODs and SPODs with detailed information on each site s capabilities to include the type of available logistic support for U.S. military forces. This annex should also contain information on the preferred lines of communication for each likely operating area in the Arctic. As these lines of communication will be very long, planners must always keep the availability of CLF ships in mind, as they can be a limiting factor. Additionally, the CONOPS should provide planners with enough information to successfully explore pre-configured logistics packages to support small salvage ships when Combat Logistic Force (CLF) support is not available. Due to the lack of Arctic shore infrastructure and the potential to quickly strain shore side resources, the knowledge of shore side capabilities is just as important to planning as knowledge of maritime capabilities. Because of the lack of shore infrastructure, the CONOPS should address procedures to pre-position logistics assets in preparation for planned or crisis action deployments. Finally, logistics is an area in the original draft CONOPS document that is characterized by deliberate planning and long planning horizons. This should be modified to address crisis situations more thoroughly. The CONOPS should include crisis action vignettes/scenarios that reflect the difficulty of operating so far from existing logistics hubs in bad weather. Another related issue is that ship husbandry contracts must typically be arranged 6-8 months in advance in order to permit materiel, supplies and fuel to be delivered prior to the ship s arrival. The CONOPS should address this need and explore methods to expedite arrangements for husbandry in the case of a crisis. Related to this, the issue of Arctic operations requiring long lead times for logistical support coordination and the importance of using PDSS visits for overall coordination was highlighted. There is the potential for circumstances to delay and thus extend timelines associated with crisis and emergent contingencies. It was suggested that PDSS for ports or airfields likely to be utilized in crisis response operations should be regularly visited and their PDSS information updated to reduce delays in deploying into the Arctic. In support of this, a list of military and USCG installations and associated seaport and airfield information needs to be provided in an easy to use reference list that provides basic capability information. The CONOPS should provide detailed guidance on emergency procedures such as a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) that requires prior coordination. Guidance is required on emergency medical capabilities and the medical compliment necessary to medically support the force in this remote region. This should include information on embarked medical forces not normally required during International Contingency Operations (ICO) due to Arctic conditions and the need to embark earlier in the operation due to extended distances between operating areas and suitable APODs. U.S. Navy forces do not normally operate in the Arctic and these units must be supported by equipment pack up kits (PUK) that can be quickly transported to the deploying unit during a crisis response situation. These kits contain PPE and other cold weather support items not 47

48 48 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report normally carried onboard naval units. The CONOPS should define the composition of the PUKs, the procedures for transferring them to deploying units and the responsible organizations for maintaining them. Players called for a revamping the entire section on materiel concerns associated with clothing requirements (CONOPS pages 31-33) and a comprehensive PPE list with AELs appropriate for Arctic weather conditions. Additionally, the CONOPS should direct fleet logistics planners to work with the Navy Supply System to identify and procure appropriate specialized equipment (see above discussion regarding Pack Up Kits (PUK)). As a last point on this subject, alternative fuel considerations and associated guidance need to be included in the CONOPS. For example, tasks and plans developed during the game had elements that required the use of unleaded gasoline (MOGAS) which is carried in very limited quantities on U.S. Navy ships. U.S. Navy ships may be requested to stow and support various operations that require the use of MOGAS. Similarly, alternative lubricants suitable for cold weather operations may be required and should be identified for possible inclusion in the PUK. A positive factor for Arctic logistics is the large and increasing industry and exploration presence in the Arctic. Planners should attempt to leverage industry capabilities such as ice hardened designed ships that are already positioned in the Arctic and operated by an experienced workforce. The most capable and readily available assets may already be in the AOR but are privately owned. The CONOPS should be updated to leverage commercial solutions in areas such as communications, logistics, and specialized vessels such as dive support, salvage, towing, or logistics support. The CONOPS needs to outline an approved procedure or identify the contracting authority to lease ice hardened vessels that are capable of salvage, tug operations, and ice breaking activities. The most critical update of the CONOPS will be to take the CONOPS from a transient type focus to more of long-term sustained operation focus. This will include thorough examination of the logistics requirements. Additionally, given the Arctic has a vast supply of natural resources a focus should be on our interaction with industry and making sure our equipment/systems can interface with theirs. Finally, because of the need to self-support logistically, adhere to environmental restrictions, and to retrograde any material brought into the Arctic, it was determined that planners should strive for as small a footprint as possible. Specifically, each operation should be completed with as few ships, aircraft, and personnel as possible. The CONOPS should emphasize that planners must minimize the operational human footprint in order to reduce required logistical support and retrograde requirements while limiting the environmental impact of the operation. Knowledge and Training Arctic operations will likely require tailored pre-deployment training and access to in-depth information and analysis on a broad range of topics. These include environmental protection, relations with local and indigenous peoples, operating with coalition partners, fundamental shiphandling, and understanding meteorological conditions.

49 Some relief to this challenge was proposed by those who described disparate nodes of Arctic expertise and called for the CONOPS to include a catalog of them in support of planning activities. The CONOPS needs to provide better information concerning already existing Arctic centers of expertise concerning ice and weather forecasting. Secondly the CONOPS needs to provide a better understanding of existing Navy and Coast Guard facilities and Command and Control of other Arctic Nations in order to facilitate planning for Arctic Operations. Add an Appendix / Annex with resources for key Arctic elements such as the National Ice Center, International Ice Patrol, FNMOC, etc. Players identified that a Center of Excellence should be developed to maintain and coordinate all of these relationships, noting that it could be a very small staff element which focused on Arctic relationships, non-navy capabilities and issues. Were such a Center of Excellence to be developed at the Fleet level, its organization and functions should be described in the CONOPS. There needs to be clearer guidance to utilize and leverage the U.S. Navy s Lesson Learned database and personnel. The lack of U.S. Navy Arctic corporate knowledge, ice capable assets, and Arctic experience has created a vast knowledge gap which could be closed by the capture of numerous lessons learned in the Navy s Lessons Learned database. The lessons learned must also incorporate lessons learned from academia, partner nations, industry and this database needs to reflect real world experiences in the Arctic environment from a broad group of experts (international, national, and academia.). These insights should be incorporated into the CONOPS. The CONOPS should direct all levels of command to use the Navy Lessons Learned process to seek out knowledge from the broadly available non-navy expertise and to feed this knowledge back into the lessons learned system. The CONOPS should also include a mechanism for regular review of lessons learned and revision of the CONOPS itself. There are numerous Arctic-specific areas where specialized training is needed to support safe, sustained operations. The CONOPS should describe and define crew training standards for ships or aircrew deploying to the Arctic. Because this remains a rare event, these standards would not need to be maintained for all ships, but only for the selected few likely to operate there. This description should include Navy or non-navy sources for required training in support of both deliberate or crisis action timelines. The organizations (organic or DOD contracted) providing this training would have the subject matter expertise to prepare units to operate in the Arctic. In a similar vein to the ice navigation training mentioned in the Movement and Maneuver section of this chapter, a need for U.S. Navy training implementation on ice familiarization and identification training for shipboard personnel was repeatedly identified, METOC detachments, and air surveillance personnel to perform ice recognition, monitoring, identification and prediction duties. The CONOPS should outline non-navy sources for this expertise in support of crisis response as well as training standards to include guidance on the level of ice navigation training required before operating in the Arctic. 49

50 Another specialized skill in support of sustaining Arctic operations is linguistics. It was recommended that the CONOPS clearly define the need for embarked linguist support in the various regions of the Arctic. This section should also specify the languages needed for various regions as well as sources for non-navy expertise in these fields. An embarked linguistic capability enhances the ability to quickly interact with other Arctic nations or indigenous groups to ensure timely coordination. Planners and operators supporting Arctic operations need to know a common language. The CONOPS should include a section of terms and definitions associated with the Arctic environment and associated operations to ensure clarity of understanding. An example of a common misunderstanding is the definition of ice-free conditions. It should be clear when and in what conditions the operation is expected to be conducted. Similarly, the CONOPS should have a regularly updated appendix containing links to databases and a listing of publications that supports U.S. Navy units in preparing for and conducting operations in the Arctic environment. If an Arctic Center of Excellence were to be established, then this section should be maintained in collaboration with it. Another useful addition to the CONOPS would be a strawman Arctic ISR plan. This could serve both as the starting point for actual operational plans and as an example to educate planners on the unique aspects of and resources available for Arctic ISR. This plan would support various CONOPS missions such as Maritime Domain Awareness, oil recovery efforts, and HA/DR operations. The CONOPS should cover in greater detail, a plan to do sustained ISR as a combined effort with international partners. This pertains to collection on ice coverage, changing weather conditions, oil dispersion, etc. The plan should address proper positioning of limited ISR resources and the possibility of combining ISR efforts with international partners using Thule AFB as a coordination node. Important considerations for planners and operators preparing to send forces into the Arctic are the sensitivities associated with disturbing indigenous wildlife while operating in the Arctic. Wildlife migrations take place at sea, on land, and in the air. Operations in this environment should not normally adversely impact wildlife and the indigenous people who live and depend on these food sources. A comprehensive Arctic marine mammal/wildlife guide of historic hunting grounds as well as contact listings to determine the latest information on the current hunting ground locations is a prerequisite to Arctic operations. Either this information or reliable references which can be used to obtain it should be incorporated into the CONOPS. Arctic deployers must also be prepared to deal with the dangers of indigenous wildlife such as polar bears. Specialized Force Protection training, policy, rules of engagement and procedures to protect forces from this wildlife should be included in the CONOPS. It was suggested that planners coordinate with indigenous populations and First Nation Rangers for local expertise and as a force protection security resource. 50

51 A complete understanding of the characteristics of the Arctic environment needs to be available in a CONOPS appendix providing detailed oceanographic information, seasonal ice conditions, and weather data to support extended Arctic operations. This appendix should address the corresponding assumption of risk as it pertains to intelligence preparation of the environment. This is especially important in terms of operating in the vicinity of Arctic ice. Arctic ice conditions are dynamic and the addition of an ice appendix containing guidance and information such as ship ice rating matrix with associated capabilities, ice navigation information, and procedures for operating in sea ice would provide the necessary resources supporting operations in the Arctic environment. The ice appendix would provide Arctic seasonal information, various types of sea ice characteristics, reference links, and a listing of organizations providing weather forecasting, oceanographic, and hydrographic information. Example organizations include the National/Navy Ice Center for ice remote sensing and ice charts, and Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) for numerical weather and ice forecasts. 51

52 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS In focusing on the specific gaps that limit sustained operations in the Arctic region, players sought to identify specific recommendations that USFF should consider when planning or conducting operations in the Arctic. The following recommendations are characterized by their potential for immediate impact at the operational level and the feasibility of near-term implementation. The major DOTMLPF-P actions USFF should develop and implement are: establish USFF Arctic Working Group; update CONOPS and applicable doctrine to reflect game insights; deploy to the Arctic; build domestic and international relationships; develop and manage lessons learned database; and pursue identified areas for further research. These are summarized here with details provided earlier in the report. Establish USFF Arctic Working Group or Arctic Center of Excellence Develop a permanent working group within USFF to manage and facilitate all maritime planning and operations associated with the Arctic. The core of this group would be a small group with the primary duty of establishing and maintaining a corporate knowledge of Arctic matters. This entity s primary focus would be to create resources to rapidly identify and consult with U.S. and international entities in order to improve operational readiness for U.S. Naval forces and personnel. This would serve as a necessary first step toward establishing a permanent liaison entity with other U.S. and international Arctic stakeholders. Specifically, this entity would be responsible for: coordinating and conducting research projects, workshops and seminars; collaborating with Navy, Joint, interagency, and industry as well as multinational stakeholders at the operational level; integrating lessons learned into applicable doctrine; coordinating with Task Force Climate Change; managing and disseminating all information pertaining to the Arctic at the operational level; tracking U.S. Navy Arctic expertise and experience; and ensuring the Navy is adequately manned, trained and equipped for Arctic operations. Other roles would include managing networking with indigenous communities in the Arctic and leverage similar efforts performed by USCG District 17, Canada s JTF North, JTF-Alaska or the like. In the case of Arctic deployments or exercises, this group would push fundamental required information to the force and then respond to pull requests as needed, acting as a research support activity for deployed forces. Finally, this group would be responsible for revising the CONOPS. It is recommended that this group serve as the support hub for all U.S. Navy Arctic activities until such time that Arctic deployments or exercises become much more common than they are today. 52

53 Update CONOPS to Reflect Game Insights This should be executed by the Arctic Working Group discussed above and should include all operational level stakeholders (NAVEUR, PACFLT, C3F, C6F) with participation by NORTHCOM, EUCOM and PACOM. Deploy to the Arctic During game play, it was repeatedly suggested that The best way to gain expertise and experience in the region is to deploy forces to the Arctic. Accordingly, USFF should periodically deploy a ship to the Arctic for a sustained period to gather lessons learned and conduct COMREL with indigenous population. Coordination with USCG and multinational forces to conduct refueling and resupply should also be considered during deployment. Build Relationships Working to improve cooperation with multinational partners (e.g., Canada, Russia, Demark, Norway and Greenland) in the areas of information sharing, training and platform acquisition should be a priority. This should include efforts to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements with these nations in order to leverage capacities, resources and information. In order to foster long term partnerships with relevant multinational maritime forces and develop operational experience in the Arctic, USFF should position Arctic exchange officers on Canadian, Russian, Norwegian and Danish ships as feasible. Additionally, regular and frequent exercises should also be conducted among Arctic nations maritime forces in order to explore interoperability challenges and capability deficiencies. Similarly, USFF should spearhead efforts to build relationships within the U.S. Navy (PACFLT, NAVEUR) and across the U.S. government in order to build standing procedures, organizational structures and mutual trust. Using the Arctic Center of Excellence described above, USFF should develop and maintain a contact list of all domestic (e.g., Navy, joint, interagency, and industry) and international (e.g., all Arctic states maritime forces and Arctic Council) Arctic. Within each of these respective commands, indicate the commands roles, responsibilities and capabilities pertaining to Arctic planning and operations. Develop and Manage Lessons Learned Database Coordination with Navy, joint, interagency and industry as well as international maritime partners in order to garner specific lessons learned regarding Arctic planning and operations should expand. This should be integrated with other lessons learned using the Navy Lessons Learned Database. Finally, applicable U.S. Navy lessons learned regarding operations in the Arctic should be made available to other domestic and intentional Arctic stakeholders. 53

54 Areas for Future Research This section summarizes various areas for further study that may be useful to Commander, USFF or other Arctic stakeholders through follow-on gaming or other research methods. These insights may be useful to USFF as it seeks to improve the AMRF CONOPS and complete Arctic Road Map tasking. The insights discussed in this report result from an inductive reasoning approach and do not test a conclusive set of hypothetical actions that could be executed in a different context for instance, in the real world or even in other scenarios. However, the capability gaps, mitigating strategies and proposed solutions developed by experts with a significant understanding of the region and functional areas were broad in nature and are intended only to indirectly inform Navy decisions regarding sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region. This makes follow-on research efforts important to gaining a comprehensive understanding of Arctic maritime operations. U.S. Navy Doctrine and Strategy Explore existing U.S. Naval strategy and its applicability to the Arctic region. Players asserted myriad conditions and factors that are unique to the Arctic environment, which in turn, substantially impact relationships, capabilities and information at the operational and tactical levels. Leveraging the CS-21 refresher in 2012 would be an ideal forum to explore, how, if at all, Arctic operations should be integrated for strategic consideration. One player noted, It may seem a retro move back to the Blue Nose Navy but we do need to update and re-think our old doctrine for the area and then put it into practice in a way that allows us to evaluate and edit as needed. Just jumping to the conclusion that it is just colder but still Navy is not a safe or really effective way to approach this. Everything from cold water deck work to well deck operations, flight ops and engineering must be carefully evaluated against our current state of technology on ships. Relationships Explore challenges and proposed collaborative solutions to sharing information (e.g., environmental information) among Arctic nations maritime forces in order to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness. At a minimum, the challenges explored should include legal, policy, cultural, and technical restrictions. Specific efforts in support of proposed collaborative solutions should include: cooperative strategies and structures, supporting capabilities in an information sharing system, and the specific information required to support national objectives. Similarly, the integration or fusion and analysis of environmental information specific to the Arctic region should also be considered within this research path. Explore Command, Control, and Communications relationships among U.S. (Navy, Joint, and Interagency) and international maritime partners (e.g., all Arctic states) in the Arctic. These 54

55 relationships should be explored under various climatic conditions and seasons, missions or operations (e.g., crisis or scheduled deployment), and geographical locations in the Arctic region. Specific, gaps, seams, overlaps as well as supported and supporting relationships should be also examined. Subsequently, further research should be conducted to explore the characteristics, attributes, and responsibilities as well as the missions and organizational structure of a potential Joint, Interagency Arctic Task Force comprised of U.S. and international stakeholders in the Arctic region (e.g., JIATF North model proposed during gameplay). Explore the sharing of operational data when coordinating and collaborating among relevant U.S. and international Arctic stakeholders during operations in the Arctic (e.g., both crisis and scheduled deployments). Specifically, examine information sharing processes and real-time data transfer for rapid access and translation into operational and research products, and structures required to facilitate coordination among stakeholders both at sea and ashore. The sharing of information should be explored through three lenses: pre-operations, during operations, and post-operations. Explore the integration of information (e.g., lessons learned) pertaining to Arctic operations among relevant stakeholders in order to prepare Navy planners and operators for Arctic operations. Elements of this study should include: operational requirements, categorization of information, impediments to information sharing, and data standardization criteria. Some U.S. based elements that can be leveraged include, Office of Naval Research, Navy Research Lab, USACE Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab, Naval Post Graduate School, Naval War College, and the Arctic Submarine Lab. More importantly, lessons learned from commercial industry and multinational civilian and military organizations should also be incorporated in this study. Capabilities At the unclassified level, explore the capabilities and limitations of all domestic and international Arctic stakeholders in order to establish a baseline understanding of capable and available platforms, systems, and personnel in the region. Capability areas of focus should include national space based assets, operating in high altitude regions, ice breakers and ice hardened vessels, training and logistics facilities, and existing relationships among the local populace and tribal leaders. This study would also specifically generate lessons learned from multinational partners regarding the effects of cold weather conditions on maritime forces equipment, platforms, and aircraft as well as communication systems. Based on the reliability and frequency of U.S. Naval forces in the Arctic, the U.S. Navy should conduct a feasibility study to explore the costs and benefits of platform acquisition. Specifically, compare purchasing or leasing of ice breakers and ice capable vessels from industry 55

56 and international partners, hardening existing U.S. Navy vessels (LCACs), and developing a new futuristic ship designed to meet emerging requirements in the region. Science & Technology Explore alternative ways to employ capabilities (e.g., Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Security and HADR) in the Arctic through the development and application of technological solutions (satellites, sensors, etc.) vice a "Man on the Ice." More specifically, explore the use of sensors and sensor systems to improve observational programs, including the use of UUVs, UAVs, acoustic navigation and communications. Logistics Explore new and innovative ways to conduct resupply and refueling in the Arctic. Focus on finding a reliable, cost efficient and effective fuel source through domestic or international channels in order to refuel U.S. navy vessels during transit in the Arctic region. Specific areas of research should include viable and reliable options for refueling and replenishment at sea, as well as the use or development of shore infrastructure. The U.S. Navy should leverage existing DoD research initiatives that explore expeditionary power and logistics (including waste management) in the Arctic. Environment Explore new processes, relationships, and systems to improving weather and ice forecast modeling in the Arctic region. Specific areas of further research should include factors and processes that drive the retreat of the sea ice cover, atmospheric circulation, wildlife patterns, surface radiation balance, ocean circulation and mixing, and waves and swell in ice. Having a better understanding of the myriad environmental considerations that impact operations (e.g., indigenous hunting grounds and marine mammals (noise, migratory patterns) in the Arctic will better prepare U.S. Navy planners and operators. Collaboration with U.S. and international civilian universities, industry, and government organizations was highly encouraged. 56

57 APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report Appendix A Summary of Game Moves and Scenarios Appendix B Final Plenary - Group Outbriefs Appendix C Survey Questionnaire Appendix D Game Schedule Appendix E Game Participants and Demographics Appendix F Limitations of Game Design and Analysis Appendix G Definition of Terms Appendix H Data Collection Roles and Assignments 57

58 Appendix A Summary of Game Moves and Scenarios This section summarizes players actions (e.g., what the players did and said) during each move of the game. Four independent player cells encountered sixteen diverse scenarios over two days of game play. Content Analysis was performed using game data from the cell based game tool, ethnographic notes, and cell PowerPoint slides. Player derived insights in the section are reflected in the following categories: Course of Action and Risk Assessment; Updates to CONOPS; DOTMLPF-P Gaps, Mitigating Strategies, and Proposed Solutions; White Cell Insights. The scenarios provided encountered for each cell during each move of game play are also presented in this section. Player inputs are reported as stated in the game and have not been evaluated for correctness, adherence to doctrine or internal consistency. MOVE 1 Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 1 - Forward Presence/ Deterrence Mission - MDA Deployment 58

59 Today is September 14, You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting CTF-20. In advance of the many Navy Arctic initiatives scheduled for 2013, U.S. NORTHCOM has directed a two-month Maritime Domain Awareness exercise, entitled, Operation Blinding Snowstorm to be conducted August to October This exercise is to be conducted in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian Navies. This mission is to take place in Baffin Bay and the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents Seas. CTF-20 is tasked with conducting maritime surveillance activities with assigned forces and is designated as the supported command. Additionally, forces shall conduct engagement visits to designated ports and villages. Minimum force deployment is to be one rotary and one fixed wing aircraft as well as one surface vessel. The intent of this exercise is to improve USN ability to attain Arctic Domain Awareness and understanding of the ability to sustain operations in the Arctic environment while building partnerships and relationships in the region. Environmental Conditions: Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Wind s Wave Height Meters Precip Hrs of Dayligh t Ice Accretion Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceiling % < 2 nm & 600 ft Baffin Bay 12-Sep 26-56F -3to13C 34-40F 1to4C 0-5 Calm- 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain Minimal if any Davis Strait 12-Sep 22-52F -6to11C 34-40F 1to4C 0-5 Calm -20 kts 0-9 Freezing Spray to Rain 13.5 Minimal if any Denmark Strait 12-Sep 25-55F -4to13C 33-39F 1to4C 0-7 Calm - 30 kts 0-15 Freezing Spray to Rain 13.5 Minimal if any Norwegian Sea 12-Sep 35-65F 2to18C 42-48F 6to9C 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-13 Rain None Mission: CTF-20 will deploy a tailored Arctic Maritime Response Force to conduct a 2 month Maritime Domain Awareness patrol 15 Aug - 15 Oct 2012 in the designated MDA operating 59

60 60 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report areas (1-4) in order to exercise MDA capabilities, forge domestic and international partnerships and demonstrate a continuous U.S. military forward presence. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Demonstrate and improve USN capability to operate in the Arctic. Method: Identify, deploy and sustain maritime assets in Baffin Bay and the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents Seas. Patrol each designated area for a minimum of 12 days. Engagement visits will be conducted in the following locations: Iqaluit, CN, and Nuuk, GL. USNORTHCOM and USFF have granted CTF-20 DIRLAUTH for coordination with USCG and the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian navies. End State: Arctic Maritime Response Force has successfully deployed and been sustained for a 2 month operation. USN understanding of Arctic operations and the Arctic environment has been improved. Domestic and international partnerships in the region have been improved. TASKS: 1) Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2) Identify required surface and air forces to conduct and sustain maritime surveillance activities in specified MDA operating areas from 15 AUG to 15 OCT. Patrol each area for a minimum of 12 days. 3) Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and engagement. 4) Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports: a. Iqaluit, CN (N W ) b. Nuuk, GL (N64 11 W ) i. All engagement port calls shall include a visit and briefing for visited community ashore and a tour for community leaders aboard at least one surface ship. Local media representatives are also to be actively encouraged to attend surface ship tours. 5) Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Denmark, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Canada to support all aspects of completing this mission.

61 Constraints: Coordinate with Canadian, Danish and Norwegian forces, local petroleum industry and U.S. Government representatives. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in the Arctic region. Respect all territorial seas. Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The cell chose a COA that deployed a self-sufficient Arctic Maritime Reponses Force (AMRF) consisting of USN and USCG, embarked surface craft and aviation detachments, land based P- 3s, and support from Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish navies. Forces conducted a 2 month Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) patrol in designated MDA operating areas 1-4 in order to exercise MDA capabilities, forge domestic and international partnerships and demonstrate continuous U.S. military forward presence. Due to the limited availability of icebreaking platforms, the USN vessels deployed focused on operating in ice free areas. Ship to shore operations with organic aircraft or landing craft facilitated engagement visits with local communities. Player discussions regarding Command and Control (C2) identified the need to establish relationships between the USN, USCG and Canada, as well as Greenland, Norway, and NATO for airspace and water space management. Movement and Maneuver (M/M) and logistic issues centered on the time and distance concern due to the vast distances between MDA operating areas 1-4 and associated community relations visits. The players minimized the risk of not accomplishing the entire mission by developing a patrol area sequencing plan that leveraged on major regional supply centers to augment the deployed task force s organic resupply capabilities. The cell determined that surface patrol information gathering supplemented with land based air assets would achieve the requisite MDA understanding of the Arctic region. In the area of logistics, the cell identified locations of APODs/SPODs for emergent needs as well as coordinating access to a NATO fuel depot in Iceland which served as a resupply point for a USNS T-AKE that logistically supported the AMRF. Intel discussions focused on understanding the native hunting ground areas. 61

62 Fires discussions focused on coordinating port visits, conducting community relations projects, and meeting with local authorities. Updates to CONOPS Cell 1 identified a significant C2 change concerning the process of requesting support from foreign governments and other U.S. government agencies given the engagement nature of the mission. The cell determined that the CONOPS requires a C2 appendix for the AMRF detailing international C2 relationships and command structures with Canada, Denmark, and Norway while operating in areas which are historically associated with NATO. Recommended Intelligence and Movement and Maneuver changes include articulation of historic hunting grounds as well as contact listings to determine the latest information on the current hunting ground locations. Due to the lack of USN corporate knowledge of Arctic operations, emphasis should be given to updating the Navy Lessons Learned database with new lessons from experience in the Arctic. Regarding logistics, the cell suggested the CONOPS discuss access to the NATO fuel depot in Iceland. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions The C2 gap identified during this move focused on the lack of understanding regarding NATO procedures and the NATO/AMRF relationship. A mitigating solution suggested inclusion of the training of AMRF deployers on NATO operational areas, cold weather operations, and providing a primary contact list. A proposed solution includes training deployers by incorporating NATO pre-deployment preparations into standard preoverseas movement (POM) checklists. The Intel gap focused on the use of the Navy s Lesson Learned System and suggested that it is not entirely understood and therefore underutilized. The mitigating strategy included the training of Arctic deplorers who are operating in a high risk environment so that these valuable lessons can be recorded properly. The proposed solution is to mandate the use of the USN s Lesson Learned System into the CONOPS. White Cell Insights C2 insights focused on relationships and coordination between U.S. and international maritime forces. USNORTHCOM permitted the task force DIRLAUTH with Norway and KoD vice going through USEUCOM. The task force relationship focused only on USNORTHCOM but there is also a need to coordinate/liaise with C6F. The task force 62

63 needed to establish a relationship therefore coordinated MDA operations with MCC Atlantic/JTF Atlantic while operating in the MDA 1 OPAREA (e.g., in the vicinity of Canada and Greenland). NATO/Northwood coordination may not be required but coordination with NATO countries is advised. There is a need to establish relationships with Arctic nation assigned Defense Attachés (DATTs) through USEUCOM. Some coordination with Russia and other Arctic nations is desirable. These C2 insights have implications that require cross-ccdr coordination. To reduce the potential friction with Russia, the White Cell suggested informing the Russians of our intentions during this scenario. Movement and Maneuver insights highlighted the accessibility challenges of the operating areas due to sea ice during the timeframe given in the scenario. Fires highlighted the need to interface with the Arctic Council to facilitate and encourage political dialogue. Logistics efforts focused on the need to plan emerging requirements. Requirements regarding logistical support and equipment must be identified for Arctic operations. Intelligence insights included the need to identify opportunities to work with Russian forces with the understanding that this would be a confidence building effort with the Russian Fleet. The need for robust meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support services and products during the planning process is a critical support prerequisite. The activities taking place in the MDA OPAREAS such as commercial operations (fishing, industry) and regional information (weather, iceberg movements) gathering along with associated reporting requirements must be better shared across these entities to increase MDA. Both public affairs (PAO) and Intelligence Specialist (IS) detachments should be onboard the task force while operating in the Arctic. Strategic communications liaison efforts are required to inform applicable nations of U.S. intentions while operating in the Arctic. 63

64 Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 2 Forward Presence/Deterrence Mission - MDA Deployment Today is September 14, You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting COMTHIRDFLT. In advance of the many Navy Arctic initiatives scheduled for 2013, U.S. NORTHCOM has directed a 2 month (minimum of 1 rotary and 1 fixed wing aircraft as well as 1 surface platform vessel) Maritime Domain Awareness exercise, entitled, Operation Blinding Snowstorm to be conducted August to October This exercise is to be conducted in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Canadian Navy. This mission is to take place in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas. COMTHIRDFLT is tasked with conducting maritime surveillance activities with assigned forces and is designated as the supported command. Additionally, forces shall conduct engagement visits to designated ports and villages. Minimum force deployment is to be one rotary and one fixed wing aircraft as well as one surface vessel. The intent of this exercise is to 64

65 improve USN ability to attain Arctic Domain Awareness and understanding of the ability to sustain operations in the Arctic environment while building partnerships and relationships in the region. Environmental Conditions: Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea State 0-9 Winds Wave Height Meters Precip Hrs of Daylight Ice Accretion Visibility % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Beaufort Sea 12-Sep 15-45F -9to7C 27-33F -3to1C 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 14 Minimal if any Bering Sea 12-Sep 30-60F -1to16C 40-46F 4to8C 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-13 Rain 13 None Chukchi Sea 12-Sep 15-45F -9to7C 23-29F -5to- 2C 0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 14 Moderate Mission: C3F will deploy a tailored Arctic Maritime Response Force to conduct a 2 month Maritime Domain Awareness patrol 15 Aug - 15 Oct 2012 in the designated MDA operating areas (1-4) in order to exercise MDA capabilities, forge domestic and international partnerships and demonstrate a continuous U.S. military forward presence. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Demonstrate and improve USN capability to operate in the Arctic. Method: Identify, deploy and sustain maritime assets in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas. Patrol each designated area for a minimum of 12 days. Engagement visits will be conducted in the following locations: Sachs Harbor, CN, and Barrow, AK. USNORTHCOM and USFF have granted COMTHIRDFLT DIRLAUTH for coordination with USCG and Canadian Navy. 65

66 66 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report End State: Arctic Maritime Response Force has successfully deployed and been sustained for a 2 month operation. USN understanding of Arctic operations and the Arctic environment has been improved. Domestic and international partnerships in the region have been improved. TASKS: 1) Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2) Identify required surface and air forces to conduct and sustain maritime surveillance activities in specified MDA operating areas from 15 AUG to 15 OCT. Patrol each area for a minimum of 12 days. 3) Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and engagement. 4) Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports: o Sachs Harbor, CN (N71 59 W ) o Barrow, AK (N71 17 W ) All engagement port calls shall include a visit and briefing for visited community ashore and a tour for community leaders aboard at least one surface ship. Local media representatives are also to be actively encouraged to attend surface ship tours. 5) Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Russia and Canada to support all aspects of completing this mission. Constraints: Coordinate with Canadian forces, local petroleum industry and U.S. Government representatives. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in the Arctic region. Respect all territorial seas. Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment

67 Cell 2 planned a two month MDA patrol to four MDA operating areas in order to exercise MDA capabilities, demonstrate forward presence in the Arctic region, and conduct engagement visits domestically and internationally. The COA divided the responsibilities among Canadian and U.S. forces utilizing assets of the USN, USCG, and Canadian Maritime Forces to accomplish the mission within the allotted timeframe. C2 required the Task Force to report to USNORTHCOM, informing USEUCOM on message traffic. The MPRA was TACON to CTF 30 for both U.S. and Canadian forces. The task force employed the assistance of tribal liaison officers during community relations visits. Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) was given between USCG District 17 and the Russian Border Guard. Intel efforts focused on community relations (COMREL) projects and the appropriate scope and supply needs, conducting pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS), and coordinate with USCG District 17 on whale migrations, current indigenous peoples hunting areas, and other issues that are potentially sensitive. Movement and Maneuver actions identified time frames associated with COMREL visits, refueling operations and port visits of the task force surface forces, and the shore basing of MPRA and Helicopter assets that support MPA operations. Logistics actions identified APOD (Barrow) and SPOD (Dutch Harbor) and required logistic ships to support the operation. Fires included a strategic communications plan for the operation focusing on humanitarian assistance, native engagement, Arctic MDA, and scientific research. Force Protection efforts centered on cold weather training including procuring personal protective equipment (PPE) and cold weather equipment modifications procedures involving operation and maintenance. Updates to CONOPS Intelligence CONOPS changes centered on the need to develop an array of documents, publications, and databases that prepares and supports Arctic operations to include operational information such as a complete list of SPODs and APODs, various regional conditions distances, climatic conditions, and key regional and international points of contacts (POCs), and local indigenous leaders. Movement and Maneuver CONOPS changes focused on the USN s ability to operate in the Arctic under a wide variety of ice and weather conditions and to understand the design limitations of USN ships operating in this environment. Information regarding 67

68 opportunities to leverage ice capable assets from industry that are already positioned in the Arctic and supported by an experienced workforce would provide requisite situational awareness of resident Arctic based industry capabilities. Sourcing information on remotely operated vehicles in order to enhance wreckage location would have been vital for the successful accomplishment of the scenario mission. Logistic CONOPS changes included the need for a comprehensive listing of APOD/SPOD information and the capabilities of these sites to support the development of a logistical support plan. With sustainment of USN forces operating in the Arctic requiring significant lead times in terms of years, a crisis response or emergent contingencies would require organic logistical support. A logistical support plan for long term sustained operations and crisis response situations must be included in the CONOPS. The Navy Supply System must support Arctic operations by intensifying efforts to identify materials and equipment necessary to operate successfully in the Arctic. Examples include various equipment lubricants and PPE. Identified Fires CONOPS changes were associated with medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) procedures and the necessary coordination required with the other Arctic nations to include veterinarian support. Lastly, players suggested all CONOPS changes associated with Arctic missions listed in the CONOPS should be validated or revised by USNORTHCOM and USEUCOM. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions C2 gaps included satellite communications ability to establish high latitude communications which could be resolved by having additional satellite coverage. Ice breaker and ice hardened ship shortfalls in the U.S. inventory and the unavailability of industry assets require coordination with other Arctic countries (Canada, Finland, Norway, Russia, and Denmark) for leasing their assets as a mitigation strategy. The proposed solution is to build an organic capability. There is a lack of coordination between the U.S. and Russian navies. The mitigating solution suggested was that USCG District 17 act as a liaison with the Russian Border Guard and expand this coordination effort to include both navies. The proposed solution is to establish a long term maritime partnership between U.S. and Russian maritime forces through cooperative agreements. Coordination with local villages requires enhanced efforts minimizing the potential for negative engagement experiences. Creating a task force Tribal Liaison Officer billet for PDSS and COMREL projects is the mitigating strategy with establishment of a Tribal Liaison Officer billet at USNORTHCOM as the proposed solution. 68

69 An Intelligence gap focused on the need for persistent coordination for planning this MDA mission. One example discussed by the group centered on the lack of survey information of the operating areas. The mitigating strategy required close coordination with USCG District 17. The proposed solution centered on the creation of a USN detachment that is permanently stationed in the region to develop detailed operations information in coordination with the various regional organizations. The Movement and Maneuver gap focused on the lack of combat logistic force ship availability while in an area where pierside refueling was not available. The mitigating solution recommended the use of prepositioned refueling barges while the proposed solution suggested the development of port facilities in the Arctic to resupply surface forces. The Force Protection gap centered on the need to establish a tribal liaison officer to initiate close ties with local tribal communities, enhance cultural awareness, and communication efforts. Closing this gap centered on leverage upon the knowledge base of the local industry and the suggestion to develop a web-based software training program. White Cell Insights C2 insights included the need for USNORTHCOM/USEUCOM to submit a request for forces (RFF) for OPCON of THIRD Fleet forces from USPACOM. This implies that more coordination is required between USNORTHCOM and USPACOM on a case by case basis. The AMRF needs to establish a C2 link with USCG District 17. There are questions on how NORAD MDA and JTF Alaska responsibilities fit into this organization with the implication that the USCG has responsibility to both NORAD and JTF Alaska. Movement and Maneuver discussions centered on the idea that there are more appropriate USN platforms to use for this mission such as an LPD with embarked LCAC, despite a CG being a more robust C2 platform. Though accessibility might be hampered by ice conditions, the platforms with the greatest flexibility in this environment are amphibious platforms. Logistics actions raised a question on why the cell chose Barrow as the primary APOD. Amphibious ships provide better medical services due to the enhanced medical capabilities which may facilitate engagement opportunities with the indigenous people. Amphibious ships also have unique design features that include embarked accommodations and large well decks with LCACs which enable access to unimproved ports. 69

70 Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 3 Power Projection Mission Strategic Repositioning of Forces Exercise Today is 01 January USFF has directed CTF-20 to reposition an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and one DDG from Norfolk, VA to San Diego, CA via the Arctic. The route will transit via the Northwest Passage (NWP) as a proof of concept exercise with a departure date of 28 August You are a CTF-20 led operational planning group tasked to plan this exercise. Make comprehensive preparations and coordinate numerous tasks associated with the transit of a task force of several warships through the NWP and document the operational shortfalls and gaps associated with this transit. 70

71 Environmental Conditions: Time of year: September. Location Date (+/- 15 days ) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea State 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibil ity % 5nm & 1000ft Ceiling % < 2 nm & 600 ft NWP (East to West) 12- Sep 10-40F - 12to4C 22-28F -6to-2C 0-5 Calm -20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 14.5 Moderate Commander s Mission: On order from USFF, CTF 20 will conduct a transit from Norfolk, VA to San Diego, CA via the NWP in cooperation with the Canadian Government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and coordination with various U.S. government agencies in order to conduct a proof of concept repositioning of naval forces and identify operational limitations, capability gaps, and document deployment lessons learned. Provide required support for embarked media and Arctic researchers throughout this exercise. Conduct four specified engagement port visits to foster partnerships and examine any differences in ship to shore processes in the Arctic environment. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Execute a proof of concept movement exercise by making requisite preparations and reposition naval warships from Norfolk, VA to San Diego, CA in order to exercise the capability of transiting through the Arctic region via the NWP to identify shipboard, personnel, and procedural limitations. Method: Conduct robust pre-deployment preparations and associated coordination with the Canadian government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and various U.S. government agencies that have stakes in the Arctic. Identify desired liaison efforts with private organization such as industry and the indigenous population that are located along the transit route. Conduct four port visits and emphasis partnerships and transparency with local Arctic leaders. Leverage embarked media personnel when coordinating with Arctic community based media representatives. Make requests to USFF for specialized training, logistic support, and initiating liaison efforts outside the Department of the Navy. 71

72 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife 72 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report End State: This proof of concept exercise is considered complete upon task force arrival at Naval Base San Diego, CA. Tasks: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2. Determine composition of surface forces required to conduct assigned mission. 3. Conduct transit and associated engagement visits. 4. Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and engagement. 5. Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports: o Iqaluit, CN (N W ) o Nuuk, GL (N64 11 W ) o Sachs Harbor, CN (N71 59 W ) o Barrow, AK (N71 17 W ) All engagement port calls shall include a visit and briefing for visited community ashore and a tour for community leaders aboard at least one surface ship. Local media representatives are also to be actively encouraged to attend surface ship tours. 6. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with other U.S. government agencies and the governments of Greenland, Denmark, Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 1. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support as required Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities

73 Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment Cell 3 s COA centered on conducting a proof of concept transit that repositioned U.S. surface forces from the East Coast to West Coast through the Northwest Passage (NWP). They sought to minimize risk to USN ships and personnel by choosing to transit during a time with the least amount of ice coverage. Transiting units were tasked to capture shipboard, personnel, and procedural limitations as well as conduct engagement visits with four coastal towns. The task force consisted of a DDG and an Amphibious Ready Group (LHD, LPD, and LSD) with ice breaker escort. Embarked units include a PHIBRON staff, TACRON element, PAO detachment, surface craft (LCAC/LCU) and aviation (rotary wing aircraft). The players viewed this force repositioning transit as a high risk mission with the associated high probability of mission failure. The predominant topics discussed included proper crew training and preparation, USN ship design limitations, shipboard systems and various equipment limitations, reliability of communications, lack of infrastructure providing support in the Arctic region, the needed support from the Canadian liaison officials, and ice breaker escort. Player discussions highlighted numerous limitations while operating in an Arctic environment that would result in significant degradation of operational capability. Challenges identified centered on equipment failures and human factors which would degrade the operational effectiveness. C2 relationships focused on conducting this proof of concept of repositioning of USN forces as a combined operation with Canadian forces. Intelligence identified the need to have airborne ice reconnaissance assets to support ice avoidance measures and guide surface ships safely through the sea ice. Movement and Maneuver discussions stressed the importance of ice pilots especially with non-hardened hulled ships transiting through the NWP. The players suggested a USN surface ship and ice breaker ratio of 1:1 due to the large number and size of the USN units transiting at once. Logistics focused on refueling operations due to the lack of refueling opportunities in the Arctic. All USN ships refueled in St. Johns/Halifax and again at Thule AFB. A prepositioned ice class tanker was suggested in order to provide fuel as far north as feasible based on the ice conditions. Force Protection concentrated on local community visits using a Canadian Ranger Patrol liaison official. 73

74 Updates to CONOPS The cell posited that operating in an Arctic environment requires a reliable C2 structure centered on multi-national partners, specifically Canada and Kingdom of Denmark, which addresses standard OPCON/TACON relationships. Intelligence CONOPS changes focused on operating U.S. Navy ships safely in the Arctic environment by using airborne ice reconnaissance assets to identify safe transit routes in a region experiencing dynamic weather conditions. An understanding of this airborne capability, the logistically support and planning of Arctic intelligence requirements also lacks sufficient guidance. Logistic CONOPS changes focused on the Arctic s inherent lack of fueling facilities thereby requiring the development of a logistical plan that properly supports a sustained USN operational presence in this region. Force Protection CONOPS changes highlighted the lack of USN ice hardened ships thus heavily relying on ice hardened escort ships (ice breakers). The design limitations of USN ships operating in ice laden Arctic waters requires guidance on ice hardened escort vessel ratios to non-hardened combatants in various ice conditions. The associated training deficiency is ice navigation training. Specific guidance on ice navigation training requirements should also be included in the CONOPS. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions Identified USN gaps include the need for a standing coalition task force, trained airborne ice reconnaissance teams, and fuel sustainment while operating in the Arctic. The C2 gap identified the need of a standing task force to organize coalition forces operating in the Arctic. To mitigate this challenge, the cell suggested the use of a C2 architecture centered on Nanook and Frontier Sentinel exercises. The proposed solution is a combined military task force comprised of Arctic countries. An Intelligence gap identified is the lack of resources to train ice reconnaissance teams. A U.S. ice reconnaissance mitigation strategy would utilize Canadian based reconnaissance resources to augment satellite imagery. The permanent solution is to establish a U.S. reconnaissance training regimen to augment satellite imagery capabilities. The Logistics gap highlighted the need for Arctic region fuel resources, which in turn, resulted in sustainment issues - especially for smaller combatant ships such as destroyers. 74

75 A short term solution suggested included tanker support at the furthest transit point that is free of ice in the Baffin Bay and Bering Sea regions. The proposed solution is the development of a port facility at the midpoint of the NWP transit route. White Cell Insights Regarding C2, the White Cell challenged the OPCON shift location between SECOND and THIRD Fleets. The players created a CTF for this scenario which may not be required since existing C2 entities are adequate. Regarding the need for a 1 to 1 ratio of an ice breaker to non-ice hardened platform, the White Cell noted that this 1:1 ratio would require that 4 icebreakers be dedicated to this mission which they considered to be unrealistic. Additionally, with regard to Movement and Maneuver, there are limitations of operating in ice behind ice breakers. Some USN ships are wider than the ice breakers that would be escorting them. Unexpected ice conditions, could pose a greater risk of damage to ships. Replenishment at Sea (RAS) operations are not feasible in icing conditions in the NWP. Planning a RAS evolution in that region would require that the Naval Surface Warfare Center Center of Excellence located in Port Hueneme, CA be consulted. Planning for actual ice conditions is virtually impossible. Hydrographic survey teams can conduct research along the proposed transit route. The implication resulting from this move is that this mission is not feasible given the use of non-ice hardened vessels. This mission may require the substitution of the vessels directed in the scenario with a more appropriate vessel in order to accomplish the task. 75

76 Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 4 Power Projection Mission Strategic Repositioning of Forces Exercise Today is 01 January USFF has directed C3F to reposition an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and one DDG from San Diego, CA to Norfolk, VA via the Arctic. The route will transit via the Northwest Passage (NWP) as a proof of concept exercise with a departure date of 28 August You are a C3F led operational planning group tasked to plan this exercise. Make comprehensive preparations and coordinate numerous tasks associated with the transit of a task force of several warships through the NWP and document the operational shortfalls and gaps associated with this transit. Environmental Conditions: Time of year: September. 76

77 Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea State 0-9 Winds Wave Height Meters Precip Hrs of Daylight Ice Accretion Visibility % 5nm & 1000ft Ceiling % < 2 nm & 600 ft NWP (West to East) 12-Sep 10-40F - 12to4C 22-28F -6to-2C 0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 14.5 Moderate Commander s Mission: On order from USFF, C3F will conduct a transit from San Diego, CA to Norfolk, VA via the NWP in cooperation with the Canadian Government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and coordination with various U.S. government agencies in order to conduct a proof of concept repositioning of naval forces and identify operational limitations, capability gaps, and document deployment lessons learned. Provide required support for embarked media and Arctic researchers throughout this exercise. Conduct four specified engagement port visits to foster partnerships and examine any differences in ship to shore processes in the Arctic environment. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Execute a proof of concept movement exercise by making requisite preparations and reposition naval warships from San Diego, CA to Norfolk, VA in order to exercise the capability of transiting through the Arctic region via the NWP to identify shipboard, personnel, and procedural limitations. Method: Conduct robust pre-deployment preparations and associated coordination with the Canadian government, the Kingdom of Denmark, and various U.S. government agencies that have stakes in the Arctic. Identify desired liaison efforts with private organization such as industry and the indigenous population that are located along the transit route. Conduct four port visits and emphasis partnerships and transparency with local Arctic leaders. Leverage embarked media personnel when coordinating with Arctic community based media representatives. Make requests to USFF for specialized training, logistic support, and initiating liaison efforts outside the Department of the Navy. End State: This proof of concept exercise is considered complete upon task force arrival at Naval Base Norfolk, VA. Tasks: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 77

78 2. Determine composition of surface forces required to conduct assigned mission. 3. Conduct transit and associated engagement visits. 4. Determine required embarked forces to support transit, operations, training and engagement. 5. Determine requirements to conduct engagement visits to the following ports: o Iqaluit, CN (N W ) o Nuuk, GL (N64 11 W ) o Sachs Harbor, CN (N71 59 W ) o Barrow, AK (N71 17 W ) All engagement port calls shall include a visit and briefing for visited community ashore and a tour for community leaders aboard at least one surface ship. Local media representatives are also to be actively encouraged to attend surface ship tours. 6. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with other U.S. government agencies and the governments of Greenland, Denmark, Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 1. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support as required Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The cell explored a proof of concept repositioning of naval forces from the West Coast to the East Coast via the NWP. The COA had the task force depart San Diego to transit through the 78

79 Arctic NWP when there is the least amount of ice along the transit route. The cell chooses to conduct this mission in cooperation with Canadian and Kingdom of Denmark (KoD) governments and various U.S. government agencies. The task group consisted of a DDG and an ARG (LHD, LPD, and LSD) with an embarked ACE consisting of only rotary wing aircraft to take advantage of self-resupply and Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities. Pre-deployment preparations included polar bear training, equipment and ship modifications, as well as embarked Arctic researchers. The task force supported embarked media, conducted four port visit engagements to foster partnerships, and captured lessons learned. The cell experienced several C2 challenges during this move. While it was decided that the deployment route was entirely in the NORTHCOM AOR, OPCON would shift from C3F to C2F after Nuuk, GL. Additionally, close coordination was required with C6F for force protection and liaison events while in port at Nuuk, GL since KoD is in C6F s Area of Responsibility (AOR). Communication issues were considered, and generally unresolved, regarding the availability of satellites and bandwidth. Intelligence requirements suggested the need to be more familiar with marine mammal routes, activities of wildlife including polar bears, special METOC support for weather forecasting, cultural awareness training, and obtaining the most updated nautical charts. Movement and Maneuver identified the need for ice pilots, ice navigation training, and PDSS coordination. Logistic requirements include ice breaker escort, underway replenishment tanker and resupply support, cold weather gear issue, and embarkation of non-organic personnel (media, research, NGOs, OGAs) and equipment support. Force Protection identified the need for cold weather training prior to deployment and coordination for security protection of personnel ashore. Fires identified the need to provide shipboard tours if desired by the local by the local Arctic community during visits. Updates to CONOPS Recommended C2 CONOPS updates included additional information contained in annexes. Suggested annexes included a Unified Command Plan (UCP) map, a clarified OPCON authority for command and control procedures, Liaison Points of Contact (POC) for Arctic Partner Nations and regional actors such as NGOs and IGOs, and a POC listing for standing commands such as JTF-Alaska (U.S.) and JTF-North (CAN). Players suggested the establishment of a standing communications plan including recommended resources necessary to accomplish the plan. 79

80 Suggested Intelligence CONOPS updates identified the need for a comprehensive Arctic marine mammal/wildlife and environmental guide including associated regulations of the Arctic coastal nation. Additional detail for METOC support (p.19) must include weather conditions, ice analysis, and recommended transit diverts. Movement and Maneuver updates were suggested to require the inclusion of guidance for the utilization of ice pilots and to outline certification requirements for ice pilot navigation. Logistic CONOPS updates highlighted the need to modify the Platform Section (p. 24) to include information on ice breaker and salvage vessels and alternative resource options to lease these assets from Arctic nations such as Canada or private industry. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions C2 gaps were related to unreliable, inconsistent communications in the Arctic due to the inexistence of standard networks. Mitigating strategies include using alternative networks and compression techniques for communicating and downloading imagery. A Proposed solution is to acquire additional satellite coverage and requisite throughput or bandwidth. Intelligence gaps identified outdated hydrographic survey data. A suggested mitigating strategy was to embark Navy METOC hydrography teams to provide safe navigation support. The proposed solution is to coordinate with Arctic communities to conduct accurate hydrographic surveys. An identified Movement and Maneuver was in regard to ice pilot navigation and training. The suggested mitigating strategy is to utilize existing training while the proposed solution is to establish an integrated ice Common Operating Picture (COP) for display on the bridge of Navy ships. Regarding logistics the cell identified the lack of organic ice breaker capability. The mitigating strategy suggested was requested support from other Arctic nations while the proposed solution is to build either a USCG or Military Sealift Command (MSC) ice breaker capability or get a MSC time chartered ice breaker capability. White Cell Insights C2 insights suggested one command maintains OPCON throughout the Arctic transit rather than two. USPACOM needs to be involved during this operation. High tech methods of communication may be impeded at these latitudes but HF radio is still available with bandwidth issues remaining critical for timely imagery downloads. 80

81 Logistic efforts for contracted support and services may need to be in place up to 6 months prior to the start of operations. Arctic facilities may not exist to support this mission but the indigenous population might be able to provide assistance based on previous arrangements. These efforts can strengthen local relationships and build trust over time. Other white cell observations mentioned the need to develop a plan to deal with the buildup of ice on the ship superstructures in consultation with NAVSEA engineers. 81

82 MOVE 2 Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 5 - Search and Recovery of a Sunken Suspect Vessel A merchant vessel assessed to be carrying several persons of interest and possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components transited the Straits of Gibraltar (STROG) and was assessed to be bound for an unspecified port in Asia via the Northwest Passage. The vessel and persons of interest are associated with a large multi-national terrorist organization (Rebellion Liberation Front) based in North Africa. While being tracked by national surveillance assets, the vessel track stopped abruptly in international waters 30 miles east of Coburg Island, at the mouth of Jones Sound. An EPIRB signal transmitted briefly from that location. A Canadian CP-140 flying from Thule AB discovered flotsam scattered throughout the water and ice floes approximately 40 miles offshore. There was no sign of survivors or rafts. USFF has directed CTF-20 with Canadian concurrence to be the lead agency to locate and survey the wreck, recover human remains, information, and any suspected WMD material for further analysis. Time of year: 01 September 2012 Environmental Conditions: 82

83 Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea State 0-9 Winds Wave Height Meters Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibil ity % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Baffin Bay (76N W) 12-Sep 11-41F -12to5C 25-31F -4to- 1C 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 15 Moderate Commander s Mission: CTF-20 will conduct operations to locate, investigate and recover suspicious materials as appropriate from sunken vessel suspected of carrying WMD components in order to facilitate further intelligence analysis and exploitation. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Deploy Arctic MRF in order to secure the wreckage site, prevent non-participating parties from accessing ship wreckage and recover any WMD materials. Method: Deploy forces, interagency, and supporting Canadian and KoD forces, locate, recover, and transport WMD to a location determined by USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM authorizes CTF-20 / USFF DIRLAUTH for U.S. to Canada and KoD military coordination. Location and recovery of debris should be completed ASAP of receipt of this tasking. Recover as much evidence as feasible given environmental conditions. Map extent of wreckage field on ocean floor in order to support follow-on investigation. Coordinate closely with Canadian forces. The U.S. Navy is the lead agency with other agencies supporting. Make requests for other agency support through USFF for coordination. End State: Sunken vessel has been located, inspected for WMD components and human remains, and if possible, retrieved for further analysis. TASKS: 1) Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2) Deploy forces to search for sunken vessel. 3) Maintain oversight and security of site. 83

84 4) Conduct recovery operations to retrieve WMD components, human remains, material for analysis. 5) Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station Norfolk. 6) Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 7) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Denmark to support all aspects of completing this mission. Constraints (Must do): 1. Establish a Combined C2 structure with participating nations 2. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support and berthing Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Intelligence: WMD material suspected to be radiological in nature and is potentially a biological hazard. Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment Cell 1 s COA deployed the AMRF along with Canadian forces to the vicinity of Coburg Island, Baffin Bay to locate, secure, survey, and salvage possible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materials from the sunken merchant Vessel of Interest (VOI). Transport recovered items to Norfolk, VA and coordinate with Canadian and KoD officials. The cell developed a two phased mission. Phase 1 encompassed identifying the sunken vessel location, securing the site area, and conducting a survey using primarily foreign assets. Due to the expansion of the sea ice and the time required to conduct recovery operations as winter approached, phase 2 would likely take place after the winter ice receded allowing the task force to conduct salvage and recovery operations. C2 focused on establishing the senior Canadian Afloat Officer as the On-Scene Commander (Officer in Tactical Command), reporting to CTF-20 in accordance with AJP 3.1 guidelines. 84

85 Intelligence focused on weather and ice data forecasts, requesting information on indigenous people, and sunken vessel information such as ship blueprints and other pertinent ship information. Movement and Maneuver emphasized the need for international cooperation based on the lack of U.S. ice capable assets as well as the delay associated with U.S. assets transiting to the scene. The lack of USN ice hardened ships, cold weather experience, and training in Arctic conditions resulted in the heavy reliance on Canadian and Danish units to provide the bulk of the support thus highlighting the significant risk to the USN forces. Logistic efforts centered on establishing Nuuk as a brief stops for fuel (BSF) site and Thule AFB as the APOD/SPOD. Fires efforts involved locating and securing the area of the sunken VOI and salvage materials based on the limitations of the weather and ice conditions. Force Protection measures focused on the need for adequate PPE and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) PPE due to the efforts to recover the WMD materials. Updates to CONOPS During this scenario, the cell identified that the CONOPS should include guidance on how to solicit support from foreign governments and pertinent U.S. government agencies. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions C2 gaps identified concerns centered on Expeditionary Politics specific to whole of government integration in support of salvage operations that take place close to territorial seas of another nation. A concept similar to the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) does not exist between governments, and specifically for Arctic operations. The mitigation strategy is to continue efforts associated with joint exercises that expand the use and integration of foreign and domestic agencies and maritime forces. The Intelligence gap identified focused on the lack of oceanographic data such as bathymetry, ocean conditions, and other sub surface factors (examples include information on currents and contours) in the Arctic. These insights were specific to the Baffin Bay area. The mitigating strategy suggested the use of embarked METOC experts combined with a reach-back capability to ensure the accessibility of all available information. The proposed solution mandated deployed units to conduct surveys and mapping efforts as well as to provide this information to NAVO would help improve the database information. 85

86 Movement and Maneuver gap centered on Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) which was posited to be limited onboard USN units and insufficient to conduct sustained Arctic operations. The mitigating strategy is to procure commercially available products from major commercial suppliers. The proposed solution is to direct the USN supply system to establish a cold weather gear center for units deploying to the Arctic. White Cell Insights C2 insights stressed the use of strategic communications to maintain continuity of effort during this scenario. CTF-20 is the supporting command to RCN/JTF-N or MCC-E. These types of missions require maintaining a list of relevant POCs. Implications included consideration of forming a CJTF for this mission since this is a Canadian led operation due to the search location. The immediate recovery timeline may not be necessary and extended due to the changing Arctic environment. Movement and Maneuver aspects of this move centered on the tandem support with RCN or a Canadian icebreaker along with other RCN or Canadian support assets positioned in Halifax that can reach the location of the task force quickly. Consideration should be given to employ a submarine with embarked SOF for location and detection support. Logistic aspects focused on the ability to scrutinize every asset that is sent north due to the sustainment and resupply challenges. The requirement to conduct recovery efforts and subsequent storage of recovered items may exceed the capability of the Arctic SPOD/APOD. Arctic SPOD/APOD capabilities and limitations must be fully understood. Intelligence aspects focused on liaising with the Grise Fjord native population in order to solicit information and desired support concerning this incident. The incident site is both a crime scene and a recovery operation which requires interagency coordination including U.S. and Canadian criminal investigative services. 86

87 Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 6 - Search and Recovery of a Sunken Suspect Vessel A merchant vessel originating from North Korea was assessed to be carrying several persons of interest and possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components. It had just transited the Sea of Japan and the Bering Strait and was believed to be bound for an unspecified port in northern Europe via the NSR. The vessel and persons of interest are associated with a large multi-national terrorist organization (Rebellion Liberation Front) and was assumed to be in good communications with the organization s leadership at their headquarters in Northern Africa. While being tracked by National Surveillance assets, the vessel track stopped abruptly in international waters 473 nm northwest of Point Barrow 24-hours ago, in the East Siberian Chukchi Sea. An EPIRB signal transmitted briefly from that location. Sinking has been confirmed by national assets. There was no sign of survivors or rafts. Fleet Forces Command has responded to a RFF from EUCOM and has directed C3F to be the lead agency to locate and survey the wreck, and recover human remains, information, and any suspected WMD material for further analysis. USN and USCG had been working cooperatively in tracking the vessel. The USCG will continue to support as required. The U.S. State Department reports that the Russian Federation is aware of the sinking and will have an observation vessel on scene, but will not participate in recovery operations. Time of year: 01 September

88 Environmental Conditions: Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Sta te 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibil ity % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Chuchki Sea (73.5N E) 12-Sep 15-45F -9to7C 23-29F -5to Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 14 Moderate Commander s Mission: C3F will conduct operations to locate, investigate and recover suspicious materials as appropriate from sunken vessel suspected of carrying WMD components in order to facilitate further intelligence analysis and exploitation. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Deploy Arctic MRF in order to secure the suspected wreckage site, prevent nonparticipating parties from accessing ship wreckage and recover human remains, information, and WMD materiel. Method: Deploy forces, interagency, and supporting local forces, locate, recover, and transport WMD to a location determined by USFF. C3F has DIRLAUTH for interagency coordination. Location and recovery of debris should be completed ASAP of receipt of this tasking. Recover as much evidence as feasible given environmental conditions. Coordinate closely with interagency and local authorities. U.S. Navy is the lead agency with other agencies supporting. Make requests for other agency support to USFF for coordination. End State: Sunken vessel has been located, inspected for WMD components and human remains, and if possible, retrieved for further analysis. TASKS: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2. Deploy forces to search for sunken vessel. 3. Maintain oversight and security of site. 88

89 4. Conduct recovery operations to retrieve WMD components, human remains, material for analysis. 5. Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station San Diego. 6. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. Constraints (Must do): 1. Establish a Combined C2 structure with participating nations 2. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support and berthing Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Intelligence Estimate: WMD material suspected to be radiological in nature and is potentially a biological hazard. Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The cell deployed a task force to locate, investigate, and recover suspicious materials from a North Korean VOI which sank northwest of Point Barrow while attempting to make an Arctic sea passage. The VOI is suspected of carrying WMD components. The cell s concept of operations immediately deployed the polar ice breaker USCGC Healy to initially secure the site and to act as a C2 platform until relieved by USN forces. Required support elements included contracted commercial ocean tug and salvage vessels, various military units such as diving teams, OGAs such as Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) scientists, various USCG assets, and Canadian ice breaker support. USCGC Healy has limited security features and the cell players determined additional security would be provided by USAF assets. C2 identified the requirement to keep local populations including the area s native village apprised of the recovery operations through existing Tribal Liaison Officers. The task force s C2 node is an LPD with CHINFO personnel disseminating reports as necessary. OPCON and TACOM were to SIXTH Fleet/ USEUCOM. 89

90 Intelligence efforts focused on establishing the LPD as the MDA center disseminating information to Russian counterparts via imbedded Russian linguists. Information flow focused on communications and intelligence updates, weather and ice information, and the status of ongoing operations. Movement and Maneuver efforts focused on identifying and movement of the required mix of military, commercial, and Arctic country assets required to support the recovery operations. Logistics identified Nome, Alaska as the logistic support center due to its proximity to the incident site and the ability to support APOD and SPOD activities. Navy combat logistic ships would resupply the task force as required. Fires focused on using USAF assets to provide additional security as the task force arrived in the vicinity of the incident site. Cell planners noted that the Navy Supply System must support Arctic operations by identifying materials and equipment necessary to operate successfully in the Arctic. Examples include various equipment lubricants and PPE. Force Protection issues centered on a secure diving area envelope, security associated with land based logistic support efforts, and safety concerns associated with indigenous wildlife, as well as marine mammal migrations that could potentially occur in the incident area. Updates to CONOPS Suggested CONOPS changes were provided in Intelligence, Movement & Maneuver, and Fires categories. The CONOPS change in Intelligence focused on the need to have Russian linguist embarked to facilitate interactions. An embarked linguistic capability enhances the ability to quickly interact with other Arctic nations in this often harsh environment. Movement and Maneuver changes suggested that commercial vessels operating in the Arctic are ice hardened and typically capable of salvage, tug operations, and, potentially, ice breaking activities. The CONOPS needs to outline an approved procedure or identify the contracting authority to lease these types of assets. The CONOPS needs to be updated to include an abbreviated planning time line associated with a crisis action planning timeline similar to the Global Fleet Station (GFS) planning timeline. 90

91 Suggested Fires CONOPS changes should include contingency operations associated with oil spill releases into the sensitive Arctic environment. Security issues center on protecting personnel from indigenous wildlife by including Rules of Engagement (ROE) guidance and security of land base support forces at APODs and SPODs. Interagency coordination concerning WMD instances must have associated guidelines with POCs. The group suggested rewriting the draft CONOPS to amplify details associated with broader changes previously identified, specifically in the areas of training (where they suggested the inclusion of a Russian-trained linguist and polar bear hazing training), as well as some wording clarification with regard to operations in icefree conditions. The overarching theme of the Cell 2 discussions focused on CONOPS changes involving the development of an Arctic knowledge organization. This information should include the weather and ice conditions in the region, distance challenges, and key Arctic, international, regional, and indigenous leaders, as well as how all of these disparate groups work together on issues they encounter. As with the previous scenario, players reemphasized the issue of Arctic operations requiring long lead times for logistical support coordination and the importance of using PDSS visits for overall coordination. There is the potential for circumstances to delay or extend timelines and the CONOPS should reflect that uncertainty in planning or suggest a methodology for dealing with crises or emergent contingencies. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions The most significant gap identified focused on the lack of icebreaker support due to a single ageing USCG ice breaker. The mitigating solution suggested involved leasing ice breakers from Canada, Russia or the commercial sector while the proposed solution focused on the procurement of additional ice breakers. The lack of available and capable ocean going tugs and salvage vessels were also identified. Leasing these vessels from Canada, Russia or the commercial sector was suggested as a short term solution, while the procumbent of these platforms was recommended as a long term solution. As operations in an Arctic environment expand, the gap in knowledge and training of cold weather and ice operations continues to exist. This gap can be mitigated by web-based training. Participants also recognized that a proposed solution requires the development of an institutional training program that establishes the requisite cold weather environmental knowledge associated with Arctic operations doctrine (NWP). Force Protection focused on the indigenous wildlife with the proposed solution centered on training security forces using approved ROE. 91

92 White Cell Insights C2 insights focused on coordination between appropriate organizations during this operation. The AMRF must coordinate with USEUCOM in addition to JTF-AK and USNORTHCOM since the subject area for this scenario is in USEUCOM s AOR. USCG District 17 must coordinate, keep informed, and reinforce the good working relationship with the Russian FSB. The task force must coordinate with commercial interest (Shell Oil) that could provide additional support. The appropriate lead agency for this recovery effort could be USCG District 17 with the implication being that there may be a strategic communications advantage in having the USCG out front leading this effort. Movement and Maneuver focused on using appropriately trained personnel to conduct recovery operations with the understanding that sea ice and weather conditions are volatile in September at the incident location. Fires insights questioned the degree of overtness and covertness associated with this mission. The USN should consider having representation from the company owning the sunken merchant vessel. Intelligence observations focused on Russia s potential high level interest in this mission and the need to better understand their interest throughout this recovery effort. 92

93 Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 7 Surveillance and Boarding of a Suspect Vessel in the Northwest Passage It is August 24. You are the crisis action planning cell for CTF-20. A merchant vessel assessed to be carrying several persons of interest and possible WMD components has just transited the STROG and is assessed to be bound for an unspecified port in Asia via the Northwest Passage. The vessel and persons of interest are associated with a large multi-national terrorist organization (Rebellion Liberation Front) and is assumed to be in good communications with the organization s leadership at their headquarters. In order to prevent premature disclosure of planned and pending actions against this group s leadership and headquarters facilities, tracking of the vessel must be covert and the boarding must be delayed until after these actions are completed. Intent is to execute the boarding within 72 hours after this separate action is complete. However, in order to prevent transfer of the personnel or materials to other shipping after the vessel has entered more heavily travelled shipping lanes, the boarding must be 93

94 completed before the vessel reaches 167 deg W (anticipated to be 23 Sep). The suspect vessel has transited the NWP in previous years. Environmental Conditions: Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Sta te 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Northwest Passage (NWP) (East to West) 12-Sep 10-40F -12to4C 22-28F -5to Calm-20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 14.5 Moderate Mission: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force ASAP IOT maintain surveillance and, when directed, board within 72 hours the suspected arms and terrorist transport vessel transiting from Europe to Asia via the NWP. Purpose: Prevent suspect vessel from delivering suspected WMD components while taking persons of interest into custody and recovering WMD components for further analysis. Covert posture is a priority in order to ensure that other operations against the RLF are not compromised. Method: Deploy forces and coordinate with joint, interagency and combined organizations as needed to maintain covert surveillance with 6 hour max time between revisits. Position forces to conduct VBSS within 72 hours after being directed by higher authority. Boarding is to be conducted by USCG LEDET personnel augmented by RCMP and ship s company. Vessel will be tracked by other means to a point (62 26N W) at the southern end of Labrador Sea at which time CTF-20 will assume responsibility for tracking and being prepared to board the vessel. CTF-20 is supported commander until all duties are handed over to COMTHIRDFLT at a point to be jointly determined by CTF-20 and COMTHIRDFLT, at which time COMTHIRDFLT will become the supported commander. End State: Target vessel is tracked covertly until Arctic-MRF is directed to conduct boarding. Vessel is detained, persons of interest are in custody and the vessel is relocated to a U.S. port as conditions warrant. Tasks: 94

95 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 95 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report 2. Identify required surveillance assets to covertly identify and then maintain surveillance with 6 hrs max gap between revisits. 3. Identify required forces to conduct boarding within 72 hours of direction or in any case before vessel reaches 167 deg W as coordinated with C3F. 4. Coordinate handover of surveillance and boarding duties to C3F. 5. Arrange for embarkation of LEDET and RCMP units. 6. BPT detain vessel and tow to U.S. Port. 7. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 8. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Demark to support all aspects of completing this mission. Constraints: Vessel must be boarded prior to crossing the 167 deg W longitude line. Boarding or disclosure of surveillance must be delayed until directed (after the operation against the RLF headquarters and leadership cell is complete). Coordinate with Canadian and Danish forces. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in Arctic waters. Respect all territorial seas. Restraints: Do not disclose surveillance or intent to board to target vessel until directed. Do not interfere with the indigenous population. Resources: DDG, CG (1 H-60), DDG (1 H-60), LPD (2 MV-22), LSD, and LCS (1 MH-60R) returning from BALTOPS are within 3-day transit of planned handover point. All vessels were replenished on 22 Aug. Other Assets may be requested via RFF to USFF. LEDET currently located in Portsmouth VA. RCMP unit currently located in Ottawa. Intelligence estimate: The vessel is lightly armed (personal weapons). It has good communications with the terrorist organization s headquarters. The suspect vessel is known to have made the NWP transit in 2 of 3 previous years. Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The cell s COA outlined a 4 phased operation that supported the Canadian RCMP and USCG in conducting covert surveillance of a VOI possibly carrying WMD components for a large multinational terrorist organization. The phases were surveillance, pre-position forces, conduct

96 opposed boarding, and detain personnel/relocate the vessel. In the scenario, the VOI transited from the Labrador Sea though Baffin Bay and the Northwest Passage and into the Bering Sea heading to an unspecified port in Asia. The coalition force was prepared to conduct an opposed boarding within 72 hours of the execution order to prevent the suspect vessel from delivering weapons of mass destruction. This discussion centered on command relationships, ISR assets, pre-positioned assets, and the ability to provide emergency medical support. C2 efforts attempted to minimize the risks associated with this operation by coordinating efforts between Canadian and U.S. forces to ensure the highest probability of mission accomplishment. C2 focused on the VOI transit route that is geographically divided between U.S. and Canadian forces for operational lead. The lead organization is based on the jurisdictional waters where the VOI is located at the time of the takedown operation. Hand over between C2F and C3F forces took place at Sachs Harbor, CN. Intelligence deployed covert ISR resources to include satellite imagery, airborne reconnaissance, and open source information sharing. Movement and Maneuver geographically divided the VOI transit route along jurisdictional lines with Canadian forces leading the activities within the NWP and the U.S. forces leading the efforts within the Baffin Bay and Beaufort Sea areas. This division developed due to the sensitivity associated with the territorial claims of the NWP waters by Canada. Logistics identified the need for additional emergency medical capabilities to supplement the Fleet Surgical Teams resident onboard the LPDs located in Baffin Bay and the Bering Sea to reduce the risk of the visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations. Force sustainment was provided through the prepositioning of air and sea based assets. Fires identified the risk associated with a VOI VBSS operation and the potential shipboard damage due to the VBSS actions or the intentional scuttling of the ship by terrorist forces. Force Protection focused on pre-positioned airborne assets to implement an organic security umbrella. Updates to CONOPS C2 focused on the jurisdictional sensitivities between Canada and the U.S. highlighted by the scenario location of the VBSS operation. This scenario required close coordination between Canadian and U.S. forces due to jurisdictional issues related to Canadian territorial claims in the NWP and surrounding islands of northern Canada. This issue requires amplifying guidance in the CONOPS to support operations in this region of the 96

97 Arctic. During this scenario, Canadian forces were supported for a boarding in Canadian claimed territorial waters. C3F is the supported commander if the takedown occurs west of Sachs Harbor and C2F is the supported commander if the takedown occurs prior to the VOI entering the NWP. Intelligence CONOPS changes identified the need for a standing plan for sustained ISR which includes proper positioning of limited ISR resources and combine efforts with international partners using Thule AFB as a coordination node. Movement and Maneuver CONOPS changes focused on ensuring deployers had access to U.S. policy regarding the legal status of waters in the NWP. Logistic CONOPS changes highlighted the unique Arctic environmental conditions, the lack of available logistic resources over this expansive area, and the proper prepositioning of logistic support assets in order to minimize risk to these supporting forces. Another Logistic CONOPS change suggested additional guidance is sought on emergency medical capabilities and the transportation of casualties out of the Arctic. Jurisdictional issues were the focal point of the cell discussions. Fires CONOPS changes need to address the use of lethal fires and the prevention of adversaries from scuttling ships that conduct illegal activities. The cumulative effects of these instances would adversely impact the ecologically sensitive Arctic region. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions A significant C2 gap identified is the lack of a defined relationship or bilateral agreement between Canada and the U.S. on operational level issues. To mitigate this gap, the relationship between U.S. and Canada needs to be outlined in the CONOPS in order to ensure continuity over the range of potential Arctic operations. The proposed solution is to exercise existing joint Canada and U.S. doctrine that is used and taking place in waters to the south such as Exercise FRONTIER SENTINEL, to the higher latitudes of the Arctic. An Intelligence gap focused on the lack of adequate ISR assets and capabilities. The mitigating strategy is to concentrate ISR assets along geographical chokepoints while the long term solution requires an increase of ISR assets combined with enhancing ISR basing facilities at Thule AFB and Barrow Island. A logistic gap identified is the lack of robust medical facilities in the Arctic. The mitigating strategy requires surface units embarked with sufficient and properly trained medical staff and supporting equipment to conduct emergency medical care. This may be limited on DDG and CG type vessels. 97

98 White Cell Insights Regarding C2, the cell identified the potential use of DoD SOF assets which can be deployed as a backup to USCG for the opposed boarding. Movement and Maneuver discussions focused on Canadian forces conducting the capture of the VOI if it took place within Canadian waters. It is recommended that the boarding team be located on an icebreaker. Logistic discussions identified the need to have both medical and customs teams on hand to assess personnel onboard the VOI. The environmental consideration associated with the suspect vessel (VOI) must be continually assessed throughout the various phases of the operation. After VBSS, there are limitations on what port locations the VOI may be taken. Intelligence insights centered on the covert tracking and coordination effort required to conduct a successful operation. The plan requires the availability of covert collection assets along with the support of the Canadian tracking systems, which may be sufficient to track the VOI. The classification of the operation may impede data sharing. However, sharing of classified and unclassified data with the appropriate agencies is based on the need to know. The VOI with suspected WMD components could possibly change the scope of the mission to a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) type framework. 98

99 Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 8 Surveillance and Boarding of a Suspect Vessel in the Northwest Passage It is August 24. You are the crisis action planning cell for COMTHIRDFLT. A merchant vessel assessed to be carrying several persons of interest and possible WMD components has just transited the STROG and is assessed to be bound for an unspecified port in Asia via the Northwest Passage. The vessel and persons of interest are associated with a large multi-national terrorist organization (Rebellion Liberation Front) and is assumed to be in good communications with the organization s leadership at their headquarters. In order to prevent premature disclosure of planned and pending actions against this group s leadership and headquarters facilities, tracking of the vessel must be covert and the boarding must be delayed until after these actions are completed. Intent is to execute the boarding within 72 hours after this separate action is complete. However, in order to prevent transfer of the personnel or materials to other shipping after the vessel has entered more heavily travelled shipping lanes, the boarding must be completed before the vessel reaches 167 deg W (anticipated to be 23 Sep). 99

100 Environmental Conditions: Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft NWP (West to East) 12-Sep 10-40F -12to4C 22-28F -5to Calm-20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 14.5 Moderate Mission: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force ASAP IOT maintain surveillance and, when directed, board within 72 hours the suspected arms and terrorist transport vessel transiting from Europe to Asia via the NWP. Purpose: Prevent suspect vessel from delivering suspected WMD components while taking persons of interest into custody and recovering WMD components for further analysis. Covert posture is a priority in order to ensure that other operations against the RLF are not compromised. Method: Deploy forces and coordinate with joint, interagency and combined organizations as needed to maintain covert surveillance with 6 hour max time between revisits. Position forces to be in position to conduct VBSS within 72 hours after being directed by higher authority. Boarding is to be conducted by USCG LEDET personnel augmented by RCMP and ship s company. Vessel will be tracked by CTF-20 assets to a handover point to be jointly determined by CTF-20 and COMTHIRDFLT inside the Northwest Passage. CTF-20 is supported commander until all duties are handed over to COMTHIRDFLT, at which time COMTHIRDFLT will become the supported commander. End State: Target vessel is tracked covertly until Arctic-MRF is directed to conduct boarding. Vessel may be detained and relocated to a U.S. port as conditions warrant. Tasks: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2. Identify required surveillance assets to covertly identify and then maintain surveillance with 6 hrs max gap between revisits. 100

101 101 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report 3. Identify required forces to conduct boarding within 72 hours of direction or in any case before vessel reaches 167 deg W as coordinated with CTF Coordinate handover of surveillance and boarding duties with CTF Arrange for embarkation of LEDET and RCMP units. 6. BPT detain vessel and tow to U.S. Port. 7. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 8. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Demark to support all aspects of completing this mission. Constraints (Must do): Vessel must be boarded prior to crossing the 167 deg W longitude line. Boarding or disclosure of surveillance must be delayed until directed (after the operation against the RLF headquarters and leadership cell is complete). Coordinate with Canadian and Danish forces. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in Arctic waters. Respect all territorial seas. Restraints (Can t do): Do not disclose surveillance or intent to board to target vessel until directed. Do not interfere with the indigenous population. Resources: Determine appropriate force package using available assets. Assets may be requested via RFF to USFF. LEDET currently located in Seattle WA. RCMP unit currently located in Vancouver BC. Intelligence estimate: The vessel is lightly armed (personal weapons). It has good communications with the terrorist organization s headquarters. The suspect vessel is known to have made the NWP transit in 2 of 3 previous years. Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The overall concept for Cell 4 centered on deploying an AMRF from the West Coast to maintain covert surveillance and eventual conduct a boarding or takedown of a merchant vessel associated with a multinational terrorist organization suspected of carrying WMD components. Close coordination between the East and West Coast AMRFs were required as the VIO transited from Baffin Bay through the NWP towards the Bearing Sea. Sachs Harbor is the geographical transfer point between the West and East coast AMRFs to transfer lead responsibility between U.S. forces. The cell developed a three-phase COA: 1) position forces in the vicinity of Sachs Harbor; 2) maintain covert tracking of terrorist vessel at intervals no greater than 6 hours; and 3)

102 conduct non-compliant boarding of the terrorist s vessel. Boarding will be conducted within 72 hours of direction from higher authority. The AMRF required the assets of subsurface, aviation, and surface forces in addition to boarding team and WMD assets. Activities were closely coordinated with Canadian authorities and USCG, who was the lead U.S. entity for this mission. C2 required each task force to exchange LNOs to develop a common communication plan between the CTFs, facilitate the OPCON shift between CTFs in the vicinity of Sachs Harbor, and facilitate the integration with international forces. Intelligence requirements included specialized WMD forces, relevant data on the terrorist transport, weapons, personnel, and cargo. Coordination with Canada and Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command (NMAWC) is required to establish MDA in the vicinity of the terrorist vessel. Additional support is required from national ISR assets and standing up an ISR Fusion Cell and with both CTF personnel for single ISR collection plan. Movement and Maneuver force requirements include a submarine, DDG, LHD w/ ACE and elements of a MEU(SOC), tanker support, MPA, and a multi-agency boarding teams for VBSS. The issue was brought up whether U.S. Law Enforcement alone could board vessel, or coordinate with coalition forces. Logistics required WMD specific gear, transport of additional WMD expertise as needed, and the needed underway replenishment (UNREP) support for both task forces. Fires supported the information operations (IO) campaign to control information, provided disabling fire on the terrorist vessel, and the boarding team prepared to conduct an opposed VBSS. Force Protection centered on a consequence management plan for contingency operations, determine supplemental ROE based on the potential threat, provide proper WMD detection equipment and PPE for the boarding team, and identify a holding area for captured terrorists. Updates to CONOPS Recommended CONOPS changes included the development of a section on aviation challenges and resources such as cold weather, visibility, support services, and transient basing. Another suggestion focused on a dedicated section development under Force Protection that includes information on embarked medical forces not normally required during International Contingency Operations (ICO) due to Arctic conditions and tyranny of distance. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions 102

103 An Intelligence gap identified the lack of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Imagery Satellites to see through Arctic cloud layer. The mitigating strategy is to lease or purchase commercial SAR imagery to supplement Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) picture. The proposed solution is to acquire more SAR imagery sensors that will ensure persistent Arctic coverage. White Cell Insights Movement and Maneuver discussions centered on the issue of using the proper force mix that takes into consideration the economy of force associated with this operation. The white cell felt the force identified by the player cell was potentially comprised of too many assets. It was also suggested that there is a chance of Russian intervention of the VOI due to the vessel s track. Additionally, the cell focused on the ramifications associated with the supply support in and surrounding the NWP. The White Cell posited that the east coast USN has more experience in the Arctic than their west coasts counterparts. The VOI takedown would most likely be accomplished by east coast forces and led by Canadian forces. If the mission is geographically located on the west coast, USCG would most likely lead this effort. Intelligence insights reinforced the need for METOC information that provides critical information for use during all phases of the operation from planning through execution. Another asset available for DoD use includes Canadian SAR imagery that can be dedicated to support this mission. An implication resulting from this move is there may not be an ISR gap as identified in Cell 4, Move 2 C2 gaps. 103

104 MOVE 3 Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 9 Resupply Mission U.S. Navy Ice Camp in Arctic (Northeast) Today is March 1, You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting CTF-20. USFF has been tasked to form TF Arctic Venture which will support an ice camp which has been established in the Greenland Sea northwest of Longyearben, Svalbard Island (Norway) and approximately 164 nm SE of Nordostrundingen Point, Greenland. The camp s purpose is to research the surface and atmospheric conditions at that location. This ice camp is projected to remain active for one year beginning 20 October CTF-20 has been directed by USFF to lead TF Arctic Venture and to provide year-round sustainment support and personnel transport as required. The Kingdom of Denmark (KoD), and the governments of Norway and Canada have been informed and are aware of U.S. activities. The ice camp is tied to a specific geographic location on the sea bottom and may require sea basing repositioning monthly due to movement of pack ice away from area of interest. Shelters are not land portable and must be airlifted to 104

105 reposition. Resupply will be required monthly. Most cargo and materials required for standup and sustainment are transportable by MV-22 or MH-53 type aircraft. Environmental Conditions: Time of year: Year Round. Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Greenland Sea (76.4N W) 13-Mar -1 to 28F -18to-2C 23-29F -5to Calm - 25 kts 0-10 Freezing Spray to Rain 11 Moderate Greenland Sea (76.4N W) 19-Jun 18-48F -8to9C 28-34F -2to1C 0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 24 Minimal if any Greenland Sea (76.4N W) 12-Sep 17-47F -8to8C 27-33F -3to1 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-10 Freezing Spray to Rain 14.5 Minimal if any Greenland Sea (76.4N W) 19-Dec 0-30F -18to F -5to Calm - 30 kts 0-15 Freezing Spray to Rain 0 Moderate Commander s Mission: CTF-20 will deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as TF Arctic Venture which will conduct sustainment support operations for the Ice Camp IOT support research activities from 20 October 2012 through 20 October Commander s Intent: Purpose: Sustain and support the ice camp in order to permit successful accomplishment of its mission. 105

106 Method: Using the Arctic Maritime Response Force, support the Greenland Sea Ice Camp and ongoing research activities at the Ice Camp. In the event that ice can no longer support a camp, provide naval surface platform as base of operations. TF commander shall make requests for other agency support to USFF for coordination. End State: Ice Camp successfully sustained throughout the designated period. TASKS: 1) Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2) Identify composition of required MRF to support Greenland Sea Ice Camp. 3) Deploy forces to conduct monthly resupply and repositioning as required. 4) BPT sea base all ice camp activities when ice stationing is no longer feasible. 5) Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada, Iceland and Kingdom of Denmark to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 1. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support as required Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment Cell 3 s COA deployed Task Force Arctic Venture to conduct monthly resupply operations to support Arctic Ice Camp in the vicinity of Longyearben, Svalbard Island, Norway from October 2012 until October As required, maritime forces were tasked with repositioning of the ice camp. The task force comprised of a USN amphibious ship with surface craft and organic helicopter assets, a NSF ice breaker, and a P-3 detachment. 106

107 Intelligence issues focused on the need for weather and ice data information from various sources such as the National Ice Center, the use of modeling to forecast ice and weather conditions, and the use of P-3s with embarked ice observers to minimize the operational risk to the ice camp. These activities would help planners and deployed personnel better understand the environmental conditions and determine if movement of the ice camp was necessary in order to properly support this mission. Regarding C2, the cell focused on the need to plan and establish relationships with KoD, Iceland, and Norway to support M &M aspects of the operation. Specifically this relationship centered on APOD and SPOD support from these nations, a prerequisite in properly supporting ice camp operations over an extended time period. Force protection issues concentrated on properly training and equipping the ice camp members in support of potential wildlife engagement (e.g., polar bears). Updates to CONOPS CONOP changes focused on several environmental factors that impacted maritime forces ability to operate on sea ice for an extended time frame. Force Protection from Arctic wildlife such as polar bears requires procedural guidance and Rules of Engagement. Understanding the characteristics of the Arctic environment needs to be available in an appendix providing detailed oceanographic information, ice conditions, and weather data to support extended Arctic operations. Weather and ice experts would augment USN task forces or be available to train and certify USN units conducting Arctic operations. Coordination with foreign governments requires policy guidelines on C2 relationships and structures. USCG ice breaker (AGB) support is required as well as inclusion of ship ice rating information in an appendix. The inclusion of cold weather operations information associated specifically for surface connectors such as LCAC, LCUs, and other U.S. Navy craft would benefit the planners and operators. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions Significant gaps identified were related to Arctic weather and ice awareness while operating in this austere environment. USN units tasked to operate in Arctic weather and associated ice conditions lack resident knowledge associated with operating in these cold weather areas. The mitigating strategy is to augment USN units by embarking weather 107

108 and ice experts. The proposed solution is to develop the requisite training pipelines, add resources and references to the CONOPS and leverage reach back capabilities. Weather and ice resource awareness of available metrological information can be mitigated by making educating and training planners and operators on available resources. The proposed solution is to add an appendix to the CONOPS on Arctic meteorological information. Additionally, USN aircraft lack embedded ice observers that are certified as air crew. A mitigating strategy is to embark a limited number of ice observers to train and deploy on aircraft. The proposed solution to train air crews as ice observers. Other gaps discussed by cell players focused on operating on sea ice in an ice camp, coexisting with the indigenous wildlife, and shipboard operations in ice laden waters. Ice camps operations are complex with great changes taking place to the physical environment over the course of a year. The evolution of repositioning an ice camp is an event not experienced by the players. The proposed solution suggested included the use of the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) to train deploying units on ice cargo movement operations. Operating on the ice requires guidelines on coexisting with wildlife such as polar bears. A mitigation strategy is train deployers on polar bear ROE with a proposed solution centered on incorporating guidance and procedures into doctrine. U.S. ice breaker resources are extremely limited but are necessary to on non-ice hardened USN ships. The mitigation strategies is to contract ice breaker and hardened hull ships assets or permanently resolve this gap by building or acquiring organic ice breakers. White Cell Insights C2 insights focused on this operation taking place within the USEUCOM AOR with EUCOM/NAVEUR leading the effort vice USFFC as provided in the scenario. USFF would continue to provide support personnel. C2 and Fires identified the need for consultation and involvement with the Arctic Council concerning the ice camp operations specifically concerning sustainment and resource issues. Movement and Maneuver insights identified that the ice drift is too great to maintain an ice camp in this geographic location for an extended amount of time. Suggested alternative is to use prepositioned ships (MPS) as opposed to a ground based camp. Other vessels types might be needed to maintain the sea camp. For comparison purposes, Norwegian bases have better infrastructure for Arctic operations. 108

109 Intelligence focused on the critical support requirements for long-term METOC support and the requirement to deploy a mobile environmental team during the entire ice camp operation. Force Protection efforts focused on the need for an ice camp bailout contingency plan in the event conditions required evacuation from the camp site. 109

110 Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 10 Resupply Mission U.S. Navy Ice Camp in Arctic (Northwest) Today is November 1, You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting C3F. USFF has been tasked to form TF Arctic Venture which will support a research ice camp which has been established 420 nm northwest of Barrow, Alaska in the Chukchi Sea. The camp s purpose is to research the surface and atmospheric conditions at that location. This ice camp is projected to remain active from Jun 15 until 1 November. C3F has been tasked by USFF to lead TF Arctic Venture and to provide sustainment support and personnel transport as required. The Canadian and Russian governments have been informed and are aware of U.S. activities. The ice camp is tied to a specific geographic location on the sea bottom and may require sea basing or repositioning monthly due to movement of pack ice away from area of interest. Resupply will be required monthly. Most cargo and materials required for standup and sustainment are transportable by V-22, MH-53 or SH-46 type aircraft. 110

111 Environmental Conditions: Time of year: 15 June to 01 November Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wa ve Hei ght Me ters Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Chuchki Sea (76.4N W) 15-Jun 17-47F -8to8C 26-32F -3to0C 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 24 Minimal if any Chuchki Sea (76.4N W) 12-Sep 0-30F -18to-1C 20-26F -7to Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain Moderate Chuchki Sea (76.4N W) 1-Nov -12 to 18F -24to-7C 0-6F -17to-14C 0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 2 Moderate Ice Conditions: Up to 10/10 coverage. Ice becomes progressively more contiguous as you go farther North. Commander s Mission: COMTHIRDFLT will deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as TF Arctic Venture which will conduct sustainment support operations for the Ice Camp IOT support research activities from 15 June through 1 November Commander s Intent: Purpose: Sustain and support the ice camp in order to permit successful accomplishment of its mission. Method: Using the Arctic Maritime Response Force, support the Greenland Sea Ice Camp and ongoing research activities at the Ice Camp. In the event that ice can no longer support a camp, 111

112 provide naval surface platform as base of operations. TF commander shall make requests for other agency support to USFF for coordination. End State: Ice Camp successfully sustained throughout the designated period. TASKS: 1) Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2) Identify composition of required MRF to support Ice Camp. 3) Deploy forces to conduct monthly resupply and repositioning as required. 4) BPT sea base all ice camp activities when ice stationing is no longer feasible. 5) Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 6) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 1. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support as required Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The mission is to conduct a sustainment operation for a research focused Arctic Ice Camp located northwest of Barrow, Alaska in the Chukchi Sea from 15 June 2011 to 1 November The concept developed comprised the USCGC Healy and a LPD 17 with embarked MV 22s to conduct land or air drop resupply support. C2 efforts highlighted potential limitations of reliable communications and focused on leveraging best practices used by the local commercial industry. The task force would chop to USNORTHCOM during the timeframe of this mission. PDSS efforts focused on Dutch Harbor, Eielson, and Barrow, the locations of SPODs and APODs. 112

113 Intelligence focused on the use of organic intelligence and aviation assets for indications & warnings and ice reconnaissance. Movement and Maneuver identified USCGC Healy as the primary support platform acting as a base of operations at the site of the ice camp, with an LPD 17 class ship with an embarked MV-22s strategically positioned between the ice camp and Nome, Alaska, except when re-supplying at Dutch Harbor. This ensures the ability to provide additional logistical and air support while allowing it to stay a safe distance from sea ice. Logistics identified some APODs (Eielson, Barrow, and Dutch Harbor) and an SPOD (Dutch Harbor). Fires aspects of the sustainment operation focused on emergency egress of the ice station personnel due to shifting ice conditions or a MEDEVAC situation. Facilitating the visit of Alaskan VIP s and U.S. Congressional representatives was also anticipated during this move. A strategic communications plan would support national and international audiences. Force protection issues focused on the capability needed for ice camp personnel to protect themselves from the indigenous wildlife. To mitigate this obstacle, the cell suggested personnel receive requisite training and associated cold weather equipment as well as lease accommodations in Barrow for weather and related emergencies for ice camp personnel. Updates to CONOPS This scenario highlighted the need to train METOC and Air Surveillance personnel on ice identification and reconnaissance. Movement and Maneuver focused on the persistent issue of leave no trace and the associated environmental sensitivities requiring the development of procedures associated with sustained maritime operations in the Arctic region. This emphasized an effort to operate with the smallest possible human footprint that requires less logistics support for this and similar missions. USN platform selection criteria need to be prioritized with focus on shipboard factors such as sustainability and ice compatibility. A list of military and USCG installations and associated aviation information needs to be provided in an easy to use reference list which includes reference listings providing additional detailed information. 113

114 Logistic CONOPS changes focused on revamping the entire section on materiel concerns associated with clothing requirements (CONOPS pages 31-33) and list with AELs the complete PPE listing appropriate for Arctic weather conditions. The cell agreed that the CONOPS emphasized Atlantic Coast operations, war fighting missions, and missions with long planning opportunities. The players stated the emphasis on these three issues were unrealistic and not aligned with likely scenarios that would require a DoD response to emerging conditions. The cell suggested the deletion of CONOPS sections associated with war fighting language and replacing it with additional information on crisis action planning for emergency contingencies. This modification would better align the document with the most likely missions. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions Due to the time and distance and amount of ice coverage in this scenario the following gaps related to ice hazards were identified: ability to conduct ice-reconnaissance, trained METOC personnel, the limited availability of icebreaking ships, and the USN s platform and doctrine shortcomings with regard to ice capable vessels. Additionally, the USN possesses only a theoretical knowledge of the fleet s Arctic limitations and the cell proposed a series of exercises to understand the USN s actual capability and refine the true Arctic gaps and shortcomings of its fleet. Logistic gaps center on the Arctic s lack of robust port infrastructure to support USN ships. The mitigating strategy is to lease Arctic port facilities if available with the proposed solution to construct an Arctic Forward Operating Base that provides complete basing support for sustained maritime operations. Movement and Maneuver gaps included the lack of ice capable USN ships. The cell suggested that USN vessel incapable opening in ice should navigate in waters that are ice free. The proposed solution is to develop an acquisition strategy that procures, leases, and retrofits ice capable platforms that have heavy lift capability, rotary wing supportable, and cold weather capable attributes. Additionally, the cell focused on the limited availability of the single USCG ice breaker. This would require leasing available ice breakers from international partners or industry. To eliminate U.S. dependence from leasing ice breakers, the cell suggested the long term procurement of an ice hardened fleet to include ice breakers. Another important asset identified in Arctic operations included the rotary wing aircrafts embarked onboard USN ships. Rotary wing assets must be able to perform in cold weather environments for extended periods. 114

115 Range and lift issues may occur depending on the distance taking into account that USN ships must remain clear of ice hazards during periods of expanded ice coverage. The proposed solution focused on having ice capable platforms with rotary wing support features that would enhance the operational flexibility of the task force. White Cell Insights Regarding C2, the cell identified that operational activities remain in USNORTHCOM s AOR with the primary support bases identified as Wainwright, AK and Eielson AFB, AK. Logistics discussions focused on establishing fuel and MX requirements at the ice camp with air resupply efforts being the better choice over sea supply. Kotzebue airport may be a support base option. Operating in an Arctic environment requires the operator s complete understanding of the engineering and design limitations for both aircraft and ships. Logistics issues focused on the persistent requirement to closely coordinate with the local coastal communities and the local mayor to minimize disruptions. Regarding Fires, the cell discussed the need to understand Russian maritime activities that might complement the sustainment of operations. The White Cell s implications focused on enhancing relationships, particularly with Russia. This also provides an opportunity for VIP and DV visits to interface with DoD elements in the Arctic. Intelligence aspects identified that the melting ice might preclude setting up the camp at this time of year. Force Protection focused on shipboard equipment and the adverse impact caused by the extreme environmental conditions and associated icing experienced during the operation. The extended hours of darkness may impede or limit the operational activities. 115

116 Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 11 Military Assistance Mission Support to Oil Spill Response in Baffin Bay (Northeast) Hydrocarbon exploration and transportation has continued to expand in Canada s Baffin Bay. A Panama flagged oil tanker owned and operated by the U.S. energy company OILCO was enroute from the Beaufort Sea to a New Jersey oil refinery when it lost steering during a gale and ran soft aground in shallow waters adjacent to Bylot Island, CN. The ship s icebreaker escort detached one day earlier to escort vessels on a westbound transit and is more than two days away and committed to continuing its westbound escort transit. Oil has been reported leaking from the grounded tanker and is located ashore, in the surrounding waters, and on sea ice. The current weather conditions are expected to continue for another day before abating. There are no other vessels in the vicinity of the grounded vessel to provide immediate assistance. Three salvage tugs with divers contracted by the grounded vessel s owner are enroute with a five day ETA. Accompanying the three salvage tugs is a small oil tanker needed to perform oil 116

117 bunkering operations from the grounded oil tanker. OILCO has oil spill response vessels and equipment prepositioned in the Beaufort Sea which are unavailable. They have contracted with companies that drill oil in Greenland which will provide six small vessels currently located in Nuuk. These vessels are capable of surface oil skimming operations, but cannot transit on their own, require logistic support and crew berthing while on station. These vessels must be carried or escorted by a mother ship. Canada has assumed the overall lead in coordination for the spill containment, clean up, and salvage efforts. The Canadian Coast Guard is sending two Coast Guard vessels which include an ice breaker to direct local operations and assist in cleanup efforts; the ETA is four days. Having exhausted existing capabilities, the Canadian Government requests berthing, logistic support, and transportation for cleanup crew who are working to clean up the oil that washes ashore. Environmental Conditions: Time of year: 1 Sept Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceiling % < 2 nm & 600 ft Baffin Bay (73.5N- 077W) 12-Sep 26-56F -3to13C 34-40F 1 to 4C 0-5 Calm-20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain Minimal if any Commander s Mission: ASAP, CTF SPILL RESPONSE supports Canadian forces and government agencies, their Canadian contracted companies, the Kingdom of Denmark, and other stakeholder organizations in providing support to the oil containment response operations in the vicinity of Bylot Island, Canada in order to minimize the harmful effects to the environment and indigenous populations by providing required logistical support to the oil spill cleanup efforts. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as soon as possible in order to provide required logistic support and associated C2 to Canadian forces, participating Canadian 117

118 118 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report government organizations, and assisting commercial industries supporting the oil response cleanup effort. Method: Our supporting efforts concerning the oil spill response efforts are focused on logistical support to the oil containment and cleanup operations for a three month period commencing upon arrival at the oil spill scene near Bylot Island, Canada. U.S. forces shall serve as the platform that transports needed oil containment and spill cleanup equipment into theater and subsequent support of all oil containment and cleanup operations. CTF shall provide fuel, food, shelter, oil containment equipment, and ship to shore transportation resources during the operation to the Canadian forces, involved Canadian government agencies, and associated contracted industries. The U.S. Navy is a supporting agency for U.S. government support efforts. Make requests for other U.S. agency support to USFFC for follow-on coordination. End State: Operational support requirements are complete when either of the following two situations occurs first: 1) three months have elapsed and relieving Navy forces have conducted an on station turnover of duties or 2) the oil leak has been stopped, the Canadian led oil cleanup efforts are progressing without the required assistance of the U.S. Navy. Tasks: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2. Identify composition of required Maritime Response Force to support response. 3. Enable movement of contracted oil skimmer vessels from Nuuk to the scene, to include any required logistical support. 4. Provide hotel and medical services to designated personnel (maximum 300 persons) associated with the oil containment and cleanup operations. 5. Provide ship connector transportation support to the multiple cleanup sites via surface (LCAC, LCU, and small boat assets) and aerial (helicopter) means for a maximum of 300 personnel employed in oil containment and cleanup operations. 6. Support C2 functions for the lead and associated oil spill response organizations. 7. Act as a platform for media efforts to support the timely dissemination of news reports via all media modes. 8. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 9. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission.

119 Intelligence Estimate: The grounded ship s crew is working to contain any leakage to the best of their capability. Greenland based oil exploration activities have been notified of grounding and asked to provide mutual assistance if requested. Constraints (Must do): Integrate with Canadian and Danish forces, collaborate with local petroleum industry, and U.S. Government representatives, and sortie ships to the grounding location ASAP upon notification. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in the Baffin Bay and adjacent Canadian waters, and respect territorial seas. Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The cell developed a 4 phase oil spill response COA that deployed forces to Bylot Island, established a sea base, provided logistical, medical and C2 support, and returned to the U.S. upon completion of assigned duties. The sea base units consisted of amphibious ships (LHD and LPD) with an embarked PHIBRON staff, rotary wing assets, and surface connectors (LCUs, LCACs, and RHIBs). ISR assets supported environmental reconnaissance support that provided ice formation and oil dispersion information. C2 efforts established a standing coalition task force structure with military to military communications for coordinating with civilian elements of the operation. Intelligence efforts focused on continuous ice formation assessments, oil dispersion information, and developing weather forecast. Movement and Maneuver was physically constrained by the movement of ice and the approaching seasonal ice coverage expansion, which in turn, limited the time frame of the operation. Logistic efforts identified the need for certified Arctic PPE and the need to have additional certified boat crews to operate the craft due to the limited exposure times. A logistics node at Thule AFB provided air line of communication. Fires focused on the timely dissemination of the USN centric strategic communications plan concerning international support. 119

120 Force Protection centered on safe stay times in the extreme weather conditions for boat crew members similar to what is contained in USCG, Canadian, and Kingdom of Denmark publications. The players identified several risks during the oil spill response operation. Risk discussions centered on personnel exposure (safe stay times) to the Arctic weather while providing ship connector transportation support (LCAC, LCU, RHIB) to multiple oil clean-up sites. Sea base operations during this time of year focused on the expanding ice coverage that shortened the operational time at the incident location. Sea ice poses a substantial challenge to USN and associated connector platforms that are not designed to operate in the Arctic environment. Updates to CONOPS The players emphasized the need for several Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS changes identified during this oil spill response scenario. C2 CONOPS changes identified the lack of a standing task force for multi-national operations involving Arctic nations that can address standard OPCON/TACON relationships. Intelligence CONOP changes included amplification on environmental reconnaissance using ISR assets and sustained ISR operations out of Thule AFB in conjunction with our Arctic coalition partners. This would provide the detail information required concerning ice coverage, changing weather conditions, and in this specific scenario, oil dispersion rates. Maneuver and Maneuver CONOPS changes identified the need for guidance, amplifying procedures, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) addressing ship maneuvering in various Arctic ice and weather conditions. Logistic CONOPS changes to support sustained operations in the Arctic require a detailed annex for logistics nodes and preferred lines of communication. Force Protection CONOPS changes require amplifying guidance on personnel working in the Arctic environment similar to what is contained in USCG, Canadian, and KoD publications. (Safe stay time charts based on temperature/wind chill). Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions A C2 gap identified focused on the lack of a C2 standing task force to organize coalition forces operating in the Arctic. The mitigation solution is to utilize a C2 architecture centered on Exercise NANOOK as a baseline C2 military coalition structure. The 120

121 proposed solution is the establishment a combined military standing task force to liaise between Arctic countries at the strategic and operational levels. Movement and Maneuver gaps include Navy ship design, various USN connector designs, and personal protective gear. The lack of USN ships with ice hardened hulls limits the Navy s operational capability in an Arctic environment. Additionally, the CONOPS needs to provide information on USN ship design specifications along with the associated limitations for operating in Arctic waters to enhance operational awareness. The mitigating strategy is for USN ships to yield to any developing ice thus limiting operations to ice free areas as a function of season (May-October). The proposed solution is to build ice class ships that provide access of USN warships to ice laden waters. An integral part of the sea base operations are the various connector vessels (LCUs, LCACs RHIBs) that are not designed to adequately protect personnel and equipment against the extreme Arctic weather conditions. The mitigating solution for this issue is to increase the number of trained boat crews assigned to each craft in order to reduce rotation time intervals for exposed personnel. The permanent solution is for NAVSEA to develop cold weather canopies or other suitable accessories for RHIBs, LCUs, and any other connector that increases stay times thereby supporting operations that rely on connector operations in the Arctic. USN personnel gear does not have AELs for ease of ordering nor does it outfit ships with gear rated for Arctic conditions. A temporary solution is to develop, test, and evaluate cold weather gear and maintain an Arctic pack-up kit (PUK) that is Arctic weather certified. This PUK would be available for tasked units prior to their emergency sortie (usually within 48 hours). White Cell Insights C2 insights identified the Canadian Coast Guard as the lead organization for this mission with support from the RCN since the Canadian Coast Guard is highly trained for this type of event. C2 operations would be shore based at Resolute Bay versus the afloat option since Resolute Bay is already established and known as a C2 entity. Movement and Maneuver for this scenario focused on sending all available icebreakers to the incident scene. Seabasing may not be favorable or advantageous due to weather and time required to be on scene taking into account the expansion of the sea ice and the response time of USN LPDs. Concerning ice capable ships, MSC/MARAD have more capable ships. The Fires aspect noted that Russia would not be involved in this scenario. 121

122 Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 12- Military Assistance Mission Support to Oil Platform Spill Response in the Chukchi Sea (NW) Today is June 1, You are a multi-organizational planning team supporting C3F. Hydrocarbon exploration and transportation has continued to expand into Chukchi Sea after approval to drill for oil was permitted in Initial wells had recently started full production when a casualty occurred on an OILCO owned OPLAT operating in the vicinity of Barrow, AK. Oil has been reported leaking from OPLAT and OILCO has coordinated with the oil industry and associated contractors to mobilize in order to respond to and control the magnitude of the oil spill. The U.S. Coast Guard has assumed the overall lead for U.S. Government activities to support OILCO s efforts toward spill containment and cleanup operations. Examples of U.S. agencies involved include FEMA, USEPA, and NOAA. Having exhausted existing capabilities, the USCG requests U.S. Navy assistance in providing logistic support in terms of berthing, feeding, 122

123 and transporting personnel who are working to contain and clean up the oil that is in the surrounding waters and that has washed up on multiple sites along the adjacent ice flows. Additionally, OILCO has contracted with companies that drill oil off Alaska to provide six small vessels which are located in Barrow, Alaska. These vessels are capable of surface oil skimming operations, but cannot transit on their own, require logistic support and crew berthing while on station. These vessels must be carried or escorted by a mother ship. USFF has tasked C3F to form TF SPILL RESPONSE as the USN contribution to the USG effort in this crisis. Environmental Conditions: Time of year: 01 June Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretio n Visibil ity % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Chuchki Sea (73.5N E) 15-Jun 17-47F -8to8C 26-32F -3 to 0C 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 24 Minimal if any Commander s Mission: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force as TF SPILL RESPONSE as soon as possible in supports of the U.S. Coast Guard as the lead U.S. government agency and other supporting U.S. government agencies, oil industry and contracted company efforts as well as other stakeholder organizations in providing support to the oil containment and cleanup operations taking place 110 NM offshore of Point Barrow, AK in order to minimize the harmful effects to the environment. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Provide required logistic support and associated C2 to the U.S. Coast Guard, participating U.S. government agencies, and private industry efforts associated with the oil spill containment and cleanup effort located offshore Point Barrow, AK. 123

124 124 Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report Method: Deploy the Arctic Maritime Response Force in order to provide logistical support to the oil containment and cleanup operations for a three month period commencing upon arrival at the oil spill scene offshore of Point Barrow, AK. U.S. forces shall transport needed oil containment and spill cleanup equipment into theater and subsequent support of all oil containment and cleanup operations. Support efforts provided by the Canadian and Russian governments associated with the oil spill incident. End State: Operational support requirements are complete when either of the following two situations occurs first: 1) three months have elapsed and relieving Navy forces have conducted an on station turnover of duties or 2) the oil leak has been stopped, the U.S. Coast Guard led oil cleanup efforts are progressing without the required assistance of the U.S. Navy. Tasks: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2. Identify composition of required Maritime Response Force to support response. 3. Enable movement of contracted oil skimmer vessels from Barrow, AK to the scene, to include any required logistical support. 4. Provide hotel and medical services to designated personnel (maximum 300 persons) associated with the oil containment and cleanup operations. 5. Provide ship connector transportation support to the multiple cleanup sites via surface (LCAC, LCU, and small boat assets) and aerial (helicopter) means for a maximum of 300 personnel employed in oil containment and cleanup operations. 6. Support C2 functions for the lead and associated oil spill response organizations. 7. Act as a platform for media efforts to support the timely dissemination of news reports via all media modes. 8. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 9. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Russian and Canadian governments have been notified and asked to assists in the oil containment and cleanup efforts. Constraints (Must do): Coordinate with U.S. Coast Guard and other U.S. Government representatives, the local petroleum industry as well as Canadian and Russian government

125 representatives as applicable. Comply with all applicable environmental regulations while operating in the Arctic region. Respect all territorial seas. Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment Cell 4 s overall concept had the USN supporting the USCG led oversight of the oil spill clean-up efforts located north of Point Barrow, AK. The COA deployed Task Force Spill Response (TFSR) composed of one LPD and one LHD (with aviation support) for a period not less than 90 days to support this oil spill operation. The logistic support focused efforts centered on providing medical, berthing, and transport for up to 300 personnel associated with the oil containment and cleanup operations. USN platforms provided the primary support for C2 functions during the oil spill response effort. C3F maintains OPCON with USCG maintaining TACON. C2 actions included the need for LNOs to Task Force Spill Response (TFSR) from Russia, Canada, and Alaska state agencies to inform and coordinate efforts as necessary during this spill incident. Intelligence needs included the acquisition of oil spill trajectory calculations using modeling to keep USN ships out of the spill area and embarking of a METOC team with ice experts for environmental support and ship navigation. Movement and Maneuver activities included the use of organic assets to support air traffic control efforts in the incident area. U.S. Navy platforms supported embarked oil company efforts to control the oil leak and spill containment efforts. Logistics activities included the need for extensive support requirements including waste disposal, PPE decontamination for boat crews, and establishing the Lines of Communication (LOC) at sea, ashore and from the air to replenish and support the seabase. Ice breaker support was required in the vicinity of Point Barrow, AK. Additional support to embarked detachments (e.g., METOC, public affairs, small boat units (LCAC and LCU), medical, ice pilots, Mobile Diving Support Unit (MDSU), SUPSALV, Interpreters, environmental specialists, combat camera, and cultural specialists). 125

126 Force Protection identified the need to arrange for First Nation Rangers to provide protection against indigenous wildlife. USN personnel must be trained on oil awareness training. Updates to CONOPS Recommended CONOPS changes need to include C2 amplification within the Organization section (p.4) on embarked command staff, JTF staff, specialized observers, and other embarked personnel. The CONOPS should include a section discussing the standing Arctic capabilities such as JTF Alaska and, JTF-North (Canada). Intelligence identified the need for oil spill information that provides decontamination procedures for equipment and personnel PPE. The Office of Response and Restoration (NOAA) provides comprehensive information on responding to a natural resource crisis. The CONOPS should include information on special Arctic restrictions with listed resources/references. Suggested Logistics CONOPS updates include the development of a section that provides rules on the discharge of waste due to the unique environmental considerations and the potential need to hold/store waste for extended periods. Several players also commented that the CONOPS seemed to be written for transit vice sustained operations Alternative fuel considerations and associated guidance need to be included in CONOPS such as supporting efforts that require automotive gasoline (MOGAS) which is carried in very limited quantities on USN ships. USN ships may be requested to stow equipment for and support various operations that require the use of MOGAS. Force Protection CONOPS modification identified the need to use First Nation Rangers for local expertise and as a security resource. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions The major gap identified in this COA focused on the inability to track oil spill dispersion in subsurface conditions in the Arctic basin. The mitigating strategy is to improve oil dispersion modeling by relying on industry and academia. The proposed solution is to invest Research, development, Testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds to develop subsurface oil dispersion models. White Cell Insights Logistic insights focused on coordinating with civilians workers supporting the cleanup efforts, the oil companies that have robust capabilities to clean up the spill, and Canadian 126

127 resources that are available for clean up through MOUs or MOAs. Arrangements must be made concerning waste removal efforts from the cleanup site. Intelligence efforts focused on receiving accurate data on ice drift and currents at the incident site as well as keeping indigenous people informed as well as including them in the cleanup effort. Russia should be kept involved and informed of the status of the OPLAT and cleanup operations. Force Protection centered on the oil spill cleanup operations. Oil cleanup efforts should utilize fishing fleet and a conscious effort to properly manage and control volunteer oil cleanup crews. The necessity of meeting with the media to provide them updated incident reports is a key function during this operation. 127

128 MOVE 4 Cell #1 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 13 Search and Recovery of a Crashed C-17 (Northeast) An Air Force C-17 aircraft was transporting nuclear weapons on a routine flight through the Arctic to a Midwestern U.S. Air Force Base. When in the vicinity of Baffin Island in Northern Canada the aircraft transmitted a mayday call reporting an onboard fire and then disappeared off RADAR. A Canadian CP-140 Aurora flying from Thule AB discovered some small pieces of wreckage scattered throughout the ice approximately 180NM east of Iqaluit, CN. There was no sign of survivors or rafts. A Canadian Forces CC-130 is expected in the area today to continue search for survivors and collect information on extent of wreckage field. Canada and Denmark have agreed to support U.S. efforts to retrieve the lost weapons by providing ports and airports for logistic support bases and ice capable ships as available. Time of year: June 10 th 128

129 Ice Conditions: Ice becomes progressively more contiguous as you go farther north. Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceiling % < 2 nm & 600 ft Baffin Bay (62.7N W) 19-Jun 20-50F - 7to10C 28-34F -2to1C 0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 20 Minimal if any Commander s Mission: Commander FFC will conduct nuclear incident response operations to secure the incident site, recover nuclear weapons, and recover service members remains, support investigations, and oversee site remediation. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Deploy maritime forces as part of the Incident Response Force (IRF) and Response Task Force (RTF) in order to secure the mishap site, prevent non-participating parties from accessing aircraft wreckage or nuclear weapons, and recover nuclear weapons, U.S. service member s remains and aircraft wreckage. Method: Using the Arctic MRF, interagency, and supporting Canadian & Danish forces, recover nuclear weapons and transport to location determined by U.S. Air Force. USNORTHCOM authorizes IRF Commander DIRLAUTH for U.S. to participating nation military coordination. Recovery of weapons should be completed within 30 days of receipt of this tasking. Recover remains of U.S. service members lost in incident. Recover as much of aircraft as feasible given environmental conditions. Map extent of wreckage field on ocean floor in order to support follow-on investigation. Draft an environmental impact statement for eventual release and coordination with Canadian Forces upon approval from higher authority. Coordinate closely with Canadian forces to ensure minimal impact to local Inuit population. The CTF-20 is assigned as lead with other agencies supporting. Make requests for other agency support to USNORTHCOM via USFF for coordination. End State: This mission is considered complete when the nuclear weapons have been recovered and are in U.S. Air Force custody, missing service member have been recovered and transported to CONUS and aircraft wreckage has been recovered to the best extent feasible considering 129

130 environmental conditions. The IRF Commander will retain lead until the higher authority passes Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) responsibilities to another U.S. government agency. Tasks: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2. Deploy forces to search for aircraft wreckage. 3. Maintain oversight and security of site. 4. Conduct recovery operations to retrieve weapons, human remains, and debris for analysis. 5. Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station Norfolk. 6. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Denmark to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 1. Establish a Combined C2 structure with participating nations 2. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support and berthing Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Definition of Terms: Incident Response Force (IRF). A tailored force dispatched from the closest military installation by the Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense, through the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO), National Military Command Center (NMCC), immediately upon notification of a nuclear weapon incident or other nuclear or radiological incident to establish security and mitigate immediate effects of the incident. 130

131 Response Task Force (RTF). A Military Department-specific DoD response force led by a flag officer and appropriately staffed, trained, and equipped to coordinate all actions necessary to respond to a nuclear weapon incident, whether on or off DoD installations. The specific purpose of the RTF is to direct DoD consequence management activities at a U.S. nuclear weapon incident site. Geographic CCDRs assume operational control of RTFs at an appropriate time in the response as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment This move focused on deploying, securing, retrieving, and transporting the remaining material of a U.S. Air Force C-17 carrying nuclear weapons that crashed off the southern coast of Baffin Island. The COA deployed maritime forces as part of the Incident Response Force and Response Task Force in order to secure the mishap site, present non-participating parties from accessing aircraft wreckage or nuclear weapons, and recover nuclear weapons, U.S. service member s remains, and aircraft wreckage and return them to Norfolk, VA. Significant forces were deployed to the crash scene consisting of assets from the USN, USCG, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and Canada and KoD forces. These forces included ice capable ships such as ice breakers and an ice patrol vessels. This scenario required extensive C2 efforts in coordinating with various agencies of the U.S. government and other Arctic nations to support USN recovery efforts. Intel aspects included the need for up to date and accurate weather and ice forecast that were critical information in operating salvage operations in this challenged environment. This information supported M & M of forces conducting the recovery operation from the initial response that secured the crash area to completion of the salvage mission. Logistic efforts centered on identification of SPODs and APODs and logistic ships to provide sustained support during operations in the incident area. Fires centered on locating and surveying the wreckage site utilizing air and surface assets from the U.S. and Arctic nations. Force protection measures included HAZMAT considerations and wildlife control. Updates to CONOPS During this scenario, the cell identified CONOPS changes that centered along operating in adverse weather and various ice conditions. Arctic ice conditions are dynamic and the addition of an ice appendix containing information such as ship ice rating matrix with associated capabilities, ice navigation information, and procedures for operating in sea ice would provide 131

132 the necessary resources concerning Arctic operations. An ice appendix would provide Arctic seasonal information, reference organizations providing oceanographic and hydrographic information along with points of contacts, and a polar bear mitigation strategy that includes an ROE. An additional appendix providing detailed guidance and policy references on C2 relationships with Arctic countries would also be useful. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions The predominant gaps identified were associated with operating in an environment dominated by ice and extreme weather conditions. Arctic weather and ice knowledge and the resources available were not fully understood. Meteorological training for planners and operators or the embarkation of ice experts to augment the staff would ensure the proper weather and ice considerations are understood prior to and during the operation. Proposed solutions included adding an appendix listing available Arctic weather and ice resources and developing the appropriate USN Arctic training pipelines. The ice hazard associated with operating in this environment requires a mitigation strategy that leverages the use of other nation s ice breakers and ice hardened vessel fleet to support sustained operations. The proposed solution to this shortage of capability is to procure organic ice breakers and ice hardened vessels. Lastly, as identified in previous moves, the need for ROE pertaining to wildlife was also desired. White Cell Insights White cell insights and implications were not generated for this scenario due to time constraints and competing deliverables. 132

133 Cell #2 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 14 Search and Recovery of a Crashed C-17 (Northwest) An Air Force C-17 aircraft was transporting nuclear weapons on a routine flight through the Arctic to a U.S. Air Force Base. When in the vicinity of Beaufort Sea northeast of Prudhoe Bay, AK and Banks Island in the Inuvik Region, Northwest Territories, CN the aircraft transmitted a mayday call reporting an onboard fire and then disappeared off RADAR. A USCG C-130 flying from Kodiak, AK discovered some small pieces of wreckage scattered throughout the ice east of Banks Island. There was no sign of survivors or rafts. A Canadian Forces C-130 is expected in the area today to further search for survivors and collect information on extent of wreckage field. Canada has agreed to support U.S. efforts to retrieve the lost weapons by providing ports and airports for logistic support bases and ice capable ships as available. Time of year: July-August 133

134 Ice Conditions: 4 / 10 Ice coverage. Ice becomes progressively more contiguous as you go farther north and west. Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretio n Visibilit y % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Beaufort Sea (72N- 128W) 31-Jul 25-55F -4to-1C 25-31F -4to Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Freezing Spray to Rain 24 Minimal if any Commander s Mission: Commander FFC/C3F will conduct nuclear incident response operations to secure the incident site, recover nuclear weapons, and recover servicemen s remains, support investigations, and oversee site remediation. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Deploy maritime forces as the Incident Response Force (IRF) and Response Task Force (RTF) in order to secure the mishap site, prevent non-participating parties from accessing aircraft wreckage or nuclear weapons, and recover nuclear weapons, U.S. servicemen s remains and aircraft wreckage. Method: Using the Arctic MRF, interagency, and supporting Canadian forces, recover nuclear weapons and transport to Naval Station Bremerton. USNORTHCOM authorizes IRF Commander DIRLAUTH for U.S. to Canada military coordination. Recovery of weapons should be completed within 30 days of receipt of this tasking. Recover remains of U.S. servicemen lost in incident. Recover as much of aircraft as feasible given environmental conditions. Map extent of wreckage field on ocean floor in order to support follow-on investigation. Draft an environmental impact statement for eventual release and coordination with Canadian Forces upon approval from higher authority. Coordinate closely with Canadian forces to ensure minimal impact to local Inuit population. C3F is the supported commander with other agencies supporting. Make requests for other agency support to USNORTHCOM via USFF for coordination. 134

135 End State: This mission is considered complete when the nuclear weapons have been recovered and are in U.S. Air Force custody, missing servicemen have been recovered and transported back to CONUS and aircraft wreckage has been recovered to the best extent feasible considering environmental conditions. The IRF Commander will retain lead until the higher authority passes Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) responsibilities to another U.S. government agency. Tasks: 8. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 9. Deploy forces to search for aircraft wreckage. 10. Maintain oversight and security of site. 11. Conduct recovery operations to retrieve weapons, human remains, and debris for analysis. 12. Transport and transfer collected material to authorities at Naval Station Bremerton. 13. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 14. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 2. Establish a Combined C2 structure with participating nations 3. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support and berthing Restraints (Can t do): 3. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 4. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Definition of Terms: Incident Response Force (IRF). A tailored force dispatched from the closest military installation by the Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense, through the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO), National Military Command Center (NMCC), immediately upon notification of a nuclear weapon incident or other 135

136 nuclear or radiological incident to establish security and mitigate immediate effects of the incident. Response Task Force (RTF). A Military Department-specific DoD response force led by a flag officer and appropriately staffed, trained, and equipped to coordinate all actions necessary to respond to a nuclear weapon incident, whether on or off DoD installations. The specific purpose of the RTF is to direct DoD consequence management activities at a U.S. nuclear weapon incident site. Geographic CCDRs assume operational control of RTFs at an appropriate time in the response as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment The mission is to conduct a nuclear incident response operation to secure the incident site, recover nuclear weapons and servicemen s remains, support the investigations, and oversee the remediation of the site. Initial response conducted in accordance with DoD Publication Initial actions deployed USAF PJs in cooperation with Canadian Rangers out of Sachs Harbor to secure the area of ice closest to the crash and any debris or personnel on the sea ice. Concern centered on the wreckage location which is in close proximity to the edge of the continental shelf, indicating that the wreckage could be in a water depth between 150 and 3,000 feet. The DDG would transport the recovered nuclear weapon from the incident site to a prearranged site for transfer. C2 focused on coordination between the JTF and the Canadians, other government agencies, USNORTHCOM, and commercial assets leased to support the recovery efforts. Intelligence activities included the need to gain MDA in the vicinity of the incident site. Specifically, a USN DDG would maintain MDA, Air Traffic Control Canada would establish a no fly zone, U.S. national assets would support operations as required, and USN submarines in the area are tasked to assist in locating the wreckage. Movement and Maneuver activities included the establishment of a sea base in the vicinity of the wreckage site. The sortie of forces included USN ships, USCG units, Canadian assets, leased commercial vessels to support recovery operations, various detachments such as a field hospital, and fixed and rotary wing assets. Logistics identified APODs and SPODs with Sachs Harbor as the FOB. Fires focused on establishing a Joint Information Center at Elmendorf AFB. Liaison efforts focused on coordination with the officials and indigenous people at Sachs Harbor to minimize impact of operations to the local population. 136

137 Force Protection efforts focused on security efforts associated with the operational support functions residing at Sachs Harbor. Updates to CONOPS In previous scenarios as well as during this move, several CONOPS changes players identified earlier in the game were revisited. There is a persistent theme associated with the need for USN training implementation on ice familiarity for METOC and air surveillance personnel. The concept of leave no trace in this environmentally sensitive region drives a desire to operate with the smallest possible footprint. A crisis action planning section for emergency contingencies needs to be included in the CONOPS due to the greater likelihood of an occurrence. Due to the tyranny of distances and extreme weather challenges, it is better to move assets and hold short while you wait for orders. Lastly, the CONOPS should identify which Navy platforms are most capable of operating in the Arctic and a prioritization of their use for Arctic operations. C2 changes included expanding the liaison efforts during international Arctic operations using Arctic subject matter experts as LNOs. Intelligence CONOPS changes must reflect the establishment of USFFC and the roles of USCG PACAREA and CN JTF-North. Movement and Maneuver CONOPS changes included revamping the lists associated with Naval Missions, Naval Aviation Missions, Surface Warfare Missions, and Subsurface Missions to reflect the missions DoD is most likely to support vice the war fighting missions. Fires CONOPS changes focused on the value of seeking knowledge of the area from the indigenous people, industry operating in this region, and the Arctic nations. DoD presence in the Arctic requires a dedicated strategic messaging resources such as public affairs to respond to worst-case reactions and build the theme of international cooperation for Arctic operations. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions The most significant gap identified during this move focused on doctrinal, training, and equipment impediments to operating in this environment. Accordingly, to address these shortfalls properly training, equipping, and supporting personnel along with the requisite doctrinal development are long term practical and essential solutions. 137

138 Due to extreme weather conditions (e.g., ice coverage) coupled with the USN s lack of understanding of and the ability to operate in this scenario, a stable, long term logistics support and infrastructure is required. The limited support infrastructure (Movement and Maneuver) is a common restraint throughout the vast Arctic region. This poses significant operational and logistical challenges that can be resolved through the development of a Forward Operating Base. Many logistic challenges are unique to the Arctic environment. This requires the special development of doctrine and training to accomplish the outside the box logistics needed in this region. Intelligence gaps focused on limited Remote Operating Vehicles (ROVs) and other needed ISR Arctic assets. The mitigating strategy is to lease industry or Canadian assets or leverage other industry capabilities to assist in accomplishing portions of the mission. White Cell Insights White cell insights and implications were not generated due to time constraints and competing deliverables. 138

139 Cell #3 (Atlantic Ocean): Scenario 15 HADR Following Earthquake/Tsunami in Arctic (Northeast) Spitsbergen You are a member of the CTF-20 Crisis Action Team directed by USFF to provide disaster relief in response to a large underwater earthquake which originated approximately 125nm due west of the island of Spitsbergen (part of the archipelago of Svalbard). This underwater earthquake had a magnitude of 8.1 (Ms) and created a tsunami which coupled with the earthquake and its associated aftershocks affected all infrastructure on Spitsbergen; all services within the tsunami strike zone are considered out of service at this time. The tsunami damage was magnified by the funneling effect of the fjord increasing the wave height significantly (over 100 ). The archipelago of Svalbard falls under Norwegian rule. All four permanent settlements located on Spitsbergen (Longyearbyen, Barentsburg, Sveagruva and Ny-Ålesund) were affected. 139

140 Ny-Ålesund Longyearbyen Barentsburg Sveagruva The town of Longyearbyen runs along a valley southwest - northeast down to the body of water known as the Isfjorden and has a population of approximately 2,000 personnel. It is also home to the University Centre in Svalbard. Approximately 500 students and staff from 25 different countries attend the university which is located adjacent to the fjord. 140

141 Airport Longyearbyen University The portion of the airport runway which was built on top of landfill/permafrost has been washed away; 2/3 (4900 ) of the runway remains in an unknown surface/subsurface condition fouled by large ice, boulders and other debris. Piers in Longyearbyen sustained heavy damage. The road from airport to town was washed away as well. Power for the town is out and lighting capability is nil. Survivors have moved up valley to higher ground on the outskirts of town, however, there is not enough permanent shelter there for all the evacuees. The town of Barentsburg (22nm West of Longyearbyen) has a population of approximately 500 Russian and Ukrainian citizens. Russia maintains a consulate here. Details of casualties are not complete and reports have been unreliable through diplomatic channels. 141

142 Barentsburg N Piers The settlement at Ny-Ålesund (125nm NW of Longyearbyen) with a population of approximately 30 personnel, escaped significant damage except for the airport (3000 ) which received ice damage much in line with Longyearbyen s airport. Some damage occurred to the pier as well. No casualties were reported. Sveagruva, a coal mine boom town with a population of 300 workers (25nm SE of Longyearbyen), also escaped significant damage. The only services available at Sveagruva are a 3000 gravel runway. The U.S. will assist Norway in providing Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) services to the affected people of Spitsbergen. Additionally the Russian settlement on the island may have been affected necessitating the need to potentially coordinate with the Russian government and its associated recovery efforts. The lead U.S. organization is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with primary support from the Department of Defense (DoD). Expect the Norwegian government agencies to be the primary first responders. Their main mission at this stage will be to assess the overall damage, air drop food and temporary shelter/supplies, provide limited first-aid and triage and conduct Search and Rescue Ops. 142

143 CTF-20 forces will assist upon arrival by providing sea based logistics and manpower to support rescue and repair operations in the communities in Spitsbergen. The intent is to provide a more robust local base from which to conduct the mission. CTF-20 has been directed to sortie with additional medical personnel and means to construct semi-permanent shelters ashore for a minimum of 2 months. Time of year: December (no useful daylight from 26 October through 16 February). Also of note: While the western approach to Spitsbergen remains fairly accessible at this time of year, ice coverage and thickness are growing at a rapid pace. Environmental Conditions: Time of year: 01 Dec Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Sta te 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Precip Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibil ity % 5nm & 1000ft Ceilin g % < 2 nm & 600 ft Spitsbergen (78N-011E) 19-Dec 1-31F -17to-1C 28-34F -2to1C 0-6 Calm - 25 kts 0-10 Freezing Spray to Rain 0 Moderate Commander s Mission: ASAP, CTF TSUNAMI (Arctic Maritime Response Force) will conduct HA/DR operations in support of USAID, the Norwegian and possibly the Russian governments in coordination with other agencies to facilitate the distribution and restoration of basic human services, provide medical support, and conduct critical engineering operations in order to alleviate overall human suffering. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Alleviate overall human suffering through the distribution and restoration of medical support, basic human services, while conducting critical engineering operations. Method: Deploy maritime forces in order to establish local sea base(s) off Spitsbergen. Deploy appropriate units ashore in order to support overall relief mission as required. Serve as primary provider of sea based berthing for aid workers and displaced residents and act as coordinator for all ship to shore aviation activities. 143

144 Endstate: The mission is considered complete when stable conditions in shelter, services, transportation and resupply lines of communication have been established and the Norwegian (and/or Russian) government no longer requires CTF TSUNAMI assistance. Tasks: 1) Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships. 2) Identify required forces to conduct assigned HA/DR operations. 3) Deploy TF Tsunami to support HA/DR operations off the western coast of Spitsbergen. 4) Upon arrival assist with the initial response efforts in close coordination with the Norwegian government, USAID and other agencies. 5) Deploy appropriate units ashore to effect the following: a. Clear and repair all runway and tarmac surfaces. b. Sufficiently repair one pier to support offload of relief supplies. c. Provide MEDEVAC and local medical services. d. Provide semi-permanent shelter. e. Provide temporary power services. f. Provide transportation services for relief workers to remote sites. 6) Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 7) Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 1. Establish a Combined C2 structure with participating nations 2. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support and berthing Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 144

145 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife Seismicity Map North Atlantic Ocean Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report Source: Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment 145

146 The players selected a COA that deployed a task force to provide assistance to the population of the Svalbard archipelago that experienced a devastating tsunami. The task force assisted in distributing relief supplies and restoring basic human services, providing medical support, and conducting critical engineering operations in support of USAID led HA/DR efforts in Spitsbergen. The task force developed a 5 phase operation that deployed the forces, established a sea base, recovered and evacuated personnel, repaired facilities and community infrastructure, and redeployed to homeport. Movement and maneuver considerations established a sea base that could be positioned either in close proximity to Spitsbergen to support HA/DR efforts or half way between Norway and Spitsbergen to support lily pad operations. Command and Control supported HA/DR efforts while operating in a seabase optimized for VHF/UHF LOS non-encrypted communications. Intelligence focused on airborne reconnaissance assets that determined the most effective seabase location based on sea ice conditions. Force Protection considerations required continuous assessment since the sea base operated in one of the most severe Arctic weather seasons (December), thus requiring very special expertise in determining the risk. The risks associated with this extreme Arctic operation posed significant challenges to personnel and equipment (maintenance challenges to critical shipboard and aircraft systems). Logistic focused on the ability to conduct sea based relief operations for the inhabitants of Spitsbergen while assessing risk operations under extreme weather and ice conditions. Fires focused on disseminating the information on the HA/DR efforts provided by the USN. Updates to CONOPS Suggested CONOPS changes centered on the need to operate in the most extreme Arctic weather conditions. C2 CONOPS changes should address Arctic communications limitations, specifically SATCOM footprint and the corresponding impact to command and control. Intelligence CONOPS changes focused on guidance associated with airborne reconnaissance operations, the desire to support year round operations, and the acceptable risk level associated with extreme cold weather airborne operations. 146

147 Logistics CONOPS changes identified the need for Arctic and extreme cold weather subject matter expertise in order to operate equipment on or outside the limits of equipment specifications. Force Protection CONOPS changes identified the inclusion of a list of technical references that specifically address the detailed maintenance practices required to operate equipment in extreme cold weather. Sustained year round operations in the Arctic must be fully understood with information available on correlated risk assessments for shipboard equipment operations. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions Gaps encountered during this scenario were satellite communications, Arctic training, and cold weather equipment operating procedures. A C2 gap centered on C2 limitations with sea base units needed to operate in close proximity to maximize LOS communications capability. This was due to the limitations of satellite availability in high latitudes. The proposed solution is to increase global commercial and military SATCOM footprint that permits SATCOM access in the Arctic to the standard available at lower latitudes. Logistics gaps focused on the prerequisites to operate in the Arctic which requires specific training in various fields. A mitigation strategy is to leverage other DoD training facilities or contracting civilian/government subject matter experts. The proposed solution is to develop a comprehensive list of training prerequisites and create these training programs in order to support sustained cold weather operations. Force Protection gaps identified the lack of maintenance practices, guidance on tactical and technical maintenance requirements for operating in the Arctic. Systems are not typically tested during the acquisition phase in harsh conditions like those encountered in the Arctic. The mitigating strategy is to identify cold weather specifications and procedures by coordinating with the SYSCOMs to determine various system limitations for dissemination. The proposed solution is to implement a permanent training program and Operating Sequencing System (OSS) procedures that incorporate cold weather maintenance practices during Arctic operations. White Cell Insights C2 insights focused on the U.S. Ambassador s actions that require him to declare a state of emergency that would activate USAID s Office of Military Affairs (OMA). The task force would be OPCON to USEUCOM. The inclusion of a CONOPS capabilities annex would be 147

148 helpful to operators involved in this relief effort. M & M insights centered on using units that have been trained or have recently conducted some operations in the Arctic. 148

149 Cell #4 (Pacific Ocean): Scenario 16 HADR Mission Following Earthquake/Tsunami in Arctic (Northwest) Point Hope Chukchi Sea Kotzebue Russia Wales Alaska You are a member of the C3F Crisis Action Team directed by USFF to provide disaster relief in response to a large underwater earthquake (7.8 Ms) which originated approximately 75 nm due west of Kotzebue, Alaska. The resulting tsunami hit nearly all land areas inside Kotzebue Sound while smaller wave effects hit the coastal areas of Alaska from the Bering Strait (Wales) north to Point Hope. The total population for this region is approximately 7,200. All infrastructure within the tsunami strike zone is considered out of service at this time. The most severely damaged area is the Kotzebue Sound region. The overall estimated wave height was 30 feet, with a 45 foot wave observed at Kotzebue (population 3,200). Additionally, large car-sized chunks of ice were thrown ashore, destroying much of the infrastructure in the town of Kotzebue. Ralph Wein Memorial Airport (PAOT) is completely unusable due to the ice and debris fouling the runway with associated damage to the runway surface (washouts and large potholes). The control tower and field radios have been destroyed as well. The next largest (and undamaged) airport capable of sustained operations of the magnitude needed to support the recovery effort is in Nome, Alaska 159 nm to the SE. There is no other access into the town other than by water. The town s fuel farm which was located on the 149

150 beachfront was severely battered and much of the superstructure has washed away and thus added a large fuel & oil spill condition not only in the surrounding water but across the much of the Kotzebue peninsula. The majority of dwellings (especially ones closer to the beach) suffered the same fate. Limited refuge is available in town; the town s primary shelter was the local school system s group of buildings, but their close proximity to the beach has rendered them untenable. The local hospital (4 blocks off the shore) is intact, but filled to capacity, incapable of handling the anticipated second-order disease surge and operating on limited generator power. School Buildings Fuel Farm Kotzebue Hospital Control Tower & Radios FEMA is the lead agency. Along with the U.S. Coast Guard and State of Alaska agencies they will be the primary first responders. Their main mission at this stage will be to assess the overall damage, air drop food and temporary shelter/supplies, provide limited first-aid and triage and conduct Search and Rescue Ops. C3F forces will assist upon arrival by providing sea based logistics and manpower to support rescue and repair operations in coastal communities of the western Alaska coast. The intent is to provide a more robust local base from which to conduct the mission. C3F has been directed to sortie with additional medical personnel and means to construct semi-permanent shelters ashore for a minimum of 2 months. 150

151 Time of year: June Environmental Conditions: Location Date (+/- 15 days) Air Temp F/C Sea Surf. Temp Sea Stat e 0-9 Winds Wave Heigh t Meter s Preci p Hrs of Daylig ht Ice Accretion Visibility % 5nm & 1000ft Ceiling % < 2 nm & 600 ft Kotzbue Sound (67N- 165W) 19-Jun 31-61F -1to6C 28-35F -2to2C 0-5 Calm - 20 kts 0-5 Rain 24 None Commander s Mission: ASAP, CTF TSUNAMI (Arctic Maritime Response Force) will conduct HA/DR operations in support of FEMA and in coordination with other agencies to facilitate the distribution and restoration of basic human services, provide medical support, and conduct critical engineering operations in order to alleviate overall human suffering. Commander s Intent: Purpose: Alleviate overall human suffering and prevent further loss of life through the distribution and restoration of medical support, basic human services, while conducting critical engineering operations. Method: Deploy Arctic Maritime Response Forces in order to establish local sea base(s) within the Chukchi Sea area of operations between Wales and Point Hope. Upon establishment of sea base(s) deploy appropriate units ashore in order to support overall relief mission as required. End state: The mission is considered complete when stable conditions in shelter, services, transportation and resupply lines of communication have been established and FEMA no longer requires CTF TSUNAMI assistance. Tasks: 1. Determine OPCON authorities and command relationships including National Incident Management System (NIMS) integration. 151

152 2. Identify required forces to conduct assigned HA/DR operations. Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report 3. Deploy TF Tsunami to support HA/DR operations in the Chukchi Sea AOO between Wales and Point Hope. 4. Upon arrival assist with the initial response efforts in close coordination with FEMA, USCG and State of Alaska agencies. 5. Deploy appropriate units ashore to effect the following: a. Clear and repair all runway and prepared aircraft parking surfaces. b. Sufficiently repair one pier to support offload of relief supplies. c. Provide MEDEVAC and local medical services. d. Provide semi-permanent shelter. e. Provide temporary power services. f. Provide transportation services for relief workers to remote sites. 6. Determine logistics nodes and connectors sufficient to sustain mission and arrange for same. 7. Identify coordination and liaison requirements with the governments of Canada and Russia to support all aspects of completing this mission. 8. Establish C2, security and logistics architecture. 9. Establish stable conditions in shelter, services, transportation and resupply lines of communication. 10. As needed/requested, assist in containment and/or collection of fuel and oil HAZMAT IVO of Kotzebue. Provide appropriate PPE support to units ashore. Intelligence Estimate: Threat environment is current real world conditions. Constraints (Must do): 1. Establish a Combined C2 structure with participating nations 2. Provide CHINFO approved media representatives logistical support and berthing Restraints (Can t do): 1. Avoid undue interruption of indigenous population activities 2. Avoid undue interaction with Arctic terrestrial and marine wildlife 152

153 Summary of Move Course of Action (COA) & Risk Assessment Cell 4 s COA deployed CTF TSUNAMI (Arctic Maritime Response Force) to support FEMA s efforts in conducting HA/DR operations in the vicinity of Kotzebue, AK. CTF TSUNAMI was composed of a CVN (C2/helicopters), an ARG (MV-22/helicopters), a USN hospital ship, tanker support ships, and a Seabee construction battalion. USN units would deploy as soon as possible to Kotzebue Peninsula to provide sea-based logistic support to the Kotzebue Peninsula area that included medical services, build temporary shelters for displaced citizens, infrastructure repair, waste cleanup, and rebuilding the pier facility and airfield runways. C2 issues focused on the need for coordination between existing commands and assets (JTF Alaska, USCG, National Guard, Air National Guard, and NORTHCOM) and newly formed commands such as CTF TSUNAMI in addition to coordinating with civilian agencies (FEMA, Red Cross, NGOs, IGOs, and the governments of Canada and Russia) under the National Incident Management System (NIMS). During this move, there was a lack of knowledge pertaining to the C2 structure in support of FEMA as the lead agency overseeing the coordination through NIMS. The cell decided to place C3F as the JFMCC under CTF TSUNAMI thereby relieving the group from describing the actual C2 plan. Intelligence activities focused on the need for continuous seismic monitoring for follow on seismic activity, the requirement for the National Ice Center (NIC) to conduct surveillance of current ice conditions in the vicinity of Kotzebue, and for a Hydro Survey Team to resurvey approaches to the impacted coastal area. A Seabee unit would deploy via air as a SLRP (site liaison recon party) to conduct an initial engineering survey prior to the arrival of the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB). Movement and Maneuver actions included support from the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) even though their utility may be limited, MSC support for replenishment (food and POL), and heavy lift coordination with Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) for potential delivery of supplies to Nome for further transport to the disaster area. Logistics requirements include medical and casualty support, waste containment and collection support, heavy equipment support, ice breaker support, and coordination with local authorities (non-disaster area) for acquisition of essential humanitarian supplies. Bottled and potable water would be air-dropped for a short term solution, while a reverse osmosis purification unit (ROPU) would be brought for long term support to the affected population. 153

154 Force Protection would coordinate and augment local authorities to conduct security activities ashore. Fires identified the need to have public affairs coverage supported by combat camera to highlight the military support effort during this natural disaster. Updates to CONOPS C2 recommended CONOPS changes to include a brief description of NIMS and the standing Arctic JTF capabilities (i.e., JTF Alaska and Canadian equivalent). Intelligence changes focused on including a description of with capabilities provided by the National Ice Center (NIC). Movement and Maneuver changes include adding a section on MPF capabilities. Logistic changes centered on the ship to shore movement of various types of landing craft with supplies and the shoreline contour challenges that are prevalent for many types of U.S. Navy craft. Gaps, Mitigating Strategies & Proposed Solutions No additional gaps were identified in this move. White Cell Insights C2 discussed that JTF Alaska is in place under USNORTHCOM. Alaska has the capability to operate independently in these types of situations for some time. There is a need to consider the Russian capabilities in supporting this disaster relief mission. A capabilities annex would be helpful to operators involved in this scenario. Movement and Maneuver issues discussed include the lack of agreements in place with Russia and Canada supporting these types of efforts. Additionally, oil companies operating in these surrounding areas also have significant capabilities. Logistics discussions highlighted the ability to expedite contracting system efforts, which in turn, will expedite the HA/DR recovery efforts. 154

155 Appendix B - Final Plenary Prioritized Solutions Final Brief - Cell 1 Top 5 Solutions and Why #1 Solution: Establish Combined Joint Alliance with Arctic States Leverage Regional Partner Capabilities Exercises Capabilities (ships, satellites, cultural awareness) Environmental knowledge (Solution #s 27/33/34/29/35/16/36) Justification for Priority Status: Affords access and capabilities quickly that we don t possess organically. CNO Direction provided in Arctic Roadmap #2 Solution: Smarter Logistics Solutions Establish relationships with regional suppliers Leverage commercial capabilities Exercise procedures/policies for non-traditional logistics (Solution #s 1/31/3/13/25/11/17) Justification for Priority Status: Affords access and capabilities quickly that are limited in the Arctic #3 Solution: Procure/Lease/Retrofit Ice Capable Assets Heavy Icebreakers Ice Rated ships Leverage NAVSEA engineering know how (operating limits in ice) (Solution #s 9/6/19/10/5/18/12/30) Justification for Priority Status: Expands mission and capabilities. Reduces reliance on non-organic resources Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report #4 Solution: Observing, Understanding and Forecasting in the Arctic Knowledge of available resources and how to access data from those centers of excellence. Ice Understanding Surveys Bottom Topography Polar Bears/ Marine Mammal awareness (Solution #s 22/8/26/21/24) Justification for Priority Status: 155

156 Navy access to Arctic Environmental Data is lacking Accurate environmental factors dictates mission success #5 Solution: Training Determine and develop Arctic related training requirements within USN/USCG Update Navy Arctic NWP Update Arctic CONOPS Improve deployer use of Navy Lessons Learned program Develop & execute training with external partners (Solution #s 2/14/7/15/23/37/32/4) Justification for Priority Status: Navy Arctic experience has atrophied 156

157 Final Brief - Cell 2 Top 5 Solutions and Why #1 Solution: Arctic Naval Platforms: (#9, (10, 18, 20)) Develop Acquisition Strategy (procure, lease, retrofit, etc.) for ice capable platforms Generate requirement for heavy lift, cold-weather capable, vertical lift capable Increased use of Arctic will require increased air lift and ice capable ships Acquire US organic ice-rated units for work in the Arctic Justification for Priority Status: Without mission-capable assets USN cannot sustain operations year-round without significant support from USCG and other partners #2 Solution: Communications (# 5) Acquire additional satellite coverage and requisite throughput bandwidth Generate requirements for additional satellite coverage Increase global commercial and Mil SATCOM footprint that permits SATCOM access in the Arctic comparable to lower latitudes Justification for Priority Status: Ability to sustain communication with chain of command, National Command Authority while operating in the Arctic #3 Solution: Logistics (# 3, 13, 31, 1) Build permanent infrastructure at the mid-point of northern transit capable of providing fuel to maritime assets Establish FOB in support of Arctic operations Build port facilities in/near Arctic that can resupply surface ships Develop Arctic logistics doctrine Justification for Priority Status: There is insufficient infrastructure for logistics to maintain sustained operations #4 Solution: Ice Breakers (# 6, 19) Acquire additional and better equipped USCG AGBs Procure additional US icebreaker 157

158 Justification for Priority Status: Availability of US ice breaker year-round #5 Solution Arctic Knowledge (# 14, 2, 30, 22, 7, 15, 12, 31) Increase education of Arctic operations, infrastructure, and environment, e.g.: Identify a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to conduct sustained cold weather operations Determine which training should be developed and maintained with DoN Justification for Priority Status: USN needs proficiency needed to plan and operate in the Arctic 158

159 Final Brief - Cell 3 Top 5 Solutions and Why #1 Solution: Build permanent fuel infrastructure at the mid-point of northern transit which is capable of providing fuel to maritime assets Justification for Priority Status: U.S. cannot conduct sustained operations in the Arctic without a permanent and reliable fuel source #2 Solution: Identify a comprehensive list of training prerequisites in order to conduct sustained cold weather operations; determine which training should be developed and maintained within DoN Justification for Priority Status: The Arctic mission requires specialized skill sets which are not currently available in U.S. Navy training pipeline; No Arctic deployment certification program #3 Solution: Develop an acquisition strategy for ice capable platforms; generate requirements for heavy lift, cold-weather capability, vertical lift capability in Arctic; Acquire U.S. organic ice rated units for work in Arctic Justification for Priority Status: Arctic environment is vastly different from most operating environments; acquisition strategy should be analogous to preparing platforms to operate in high temperature desert conditions #4 Solution: Need to establish a standing combined task force in order to liaise between Arctic countries at the strategic and operational level Justification for Priority Status: Building maritime partnerships with Arctic countries are important to have established prior to crisis action response due to austere & vast operating environment with limited resources #5 Solution: Incorporate maintenance practices to include augmenting Operational Sequencing System (OSS) procedures that support conducting sustained operations in the Arctic Justification for Priority Status: Harsh environmental conditions demand special considerations in order for critical systems to function in support of shipboard/aircraft operations 159

160 Final Brief - Cell 4 Top 5 Solutions and Why #1 Solution: (5) Acquire additional satellite coverage/throughput/ bandwidth Fleet Arctic Operations Game Report Justification for Priority Status: Due to our reliance on reach-back capabilities, communications are critical in the rapidly changing conditions of the Arctic. Geosynchronous satellites are ineffective in the Arctic circle. #2 Solution: (8, 26) Conduct accurate hydrographic surveys Include in NAVO databases Justification for Priority Status: Current surveys are inadequate to safely conduct sustained Arctic operations. Combined due to similar/redundant solutions #3 Solution: (2, 14, 24) Establish US Arctic Center of Excellence Training and education Resource development Justification for Priority Status: It s essential to research existing assets and understand required training and capabilities and generate required material acquisition. An organization to own and manage the knowledge base for conducting Arctic operations needs to be developed. (These proposed solutions were similar enough to combine.) #4 Solution: (6, 9, 10, 19) Increase maritime Arctic operational capability Ice breakers Ice classed hulls Justification for Priority Status: Comprehensive acquisition strategy to support sustained Arctic operations to include ice breakers, ice classed hulls and supporting equipment #5 Solution: (27, 33, 34) Establish standing Arctic Joint Task Force, maritime coordination center or organization within NORTHCOM among Arctic partners IOT improve facilitate leveraging capabilities and interoperability between service, interagency and international partners (e.g., JIATF-South) 160

161 Justification for Priority Status: Better prepare for and conduct Arctic contingency operations by improving expertise, building enduring relationships and sharing information. 161

162 Appendix C - Survey Questionnaires Post Move Player Survey (Move 1-4) The purpose of this survey is to provide timely and candid feedback regarding your individual thoughts regarding your cell's actions during this move of the game. This information will be evaluated in post-game analysis. Your responses will greatly assist Commander, Second Fleet in his efforts to identify DOTMLPF-P gaps, mitigating strategies, and long-term solutions that impact the ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. Please be assured that your responses will be held in the strictest confidence. 1. Please indicate your cell a. Cell 1 b. Cell 2 c. Cell 3 d. Cell 4 2. During this move, please describe the most significant environmental or physical factors that impact the ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. 3. Please select the level of risk of mission failure associated with your cell's Course of Action. (10-9 = Catastrophic: High potential for mission failure and unacceptable collateral damage. 8-6 = Critical: Some potential for mission failure and significant collateral damage. 5-3 = Marginal: Degraded mission accomplishment and some collateral damage 2-1 = Negligible: Little or no adverse impact on mission accomplishment and collateral damage) a. 10 b. 9 c. 8 d. 7 e. 6 f. 5 g. 4 h

163 i. 2 j Please select the level of risk of harm to Friendly Forces associated with your Cell's Course of Action. (10-9 = Catastrophic: High potential for death or permanent disability, loss of major critical system or equipment, major property or facility damage, and unacceptable collateral damage. 8-6 = Critical: Significant potential for degraded readiness and extensive damage of equipment, systems, property or the environment. 5-3 = Marginal: Degraded ability to unit readiness and minor damage to equipment, systems, property or the environment. Injury or illness of personnel. 2-1 = Negligible: Minimal first aid or minor medical treatment. Slight equipment or system damage, but fully functional and serviceable. Little or no property or environmental damage.) a. 10 b. 9 c. 8 d. 7 e. 6 f. 5 g. 4 h. 3 i. 2 j During this move, please select the DOTMLPF-P area that characterizes the most significant gap to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. (For the purposes of this game, GAP is defined as the inability to achieve a desired effect or perform a set of tasks under the conditions provided during game play due to no existing real world capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability, or the need to replace an existing capability. These gaps should be viewed through the perspectives of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).) a. Doctrine b. Organization 163

164 c. Training d. Material e. Leadership and Education f. Personnel g. Facilities h. Policy 6. Based on your response to question 5 above, please describe the most significant GAP to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. (For the purposes of this game, gap is defined as the inability to achieve a desired effect or perform a set of tasks under the conditions provided during game play due to no existing real world capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability, or the need to replace an existing capability. These gaps should be viewed through the perspectives of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)). 7. During this move, please describe the most significant MITIGATING STRATEGY that supports sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. (For the purposes of this game, mitigating strategy is defined as any activity designed to provide short term relief or support to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.) 8. During this move, please describe the most significant PROPOSED SOLUTION that supports sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.( For the purposes of this game, proposed solution is defined as any activity designed to provide long term relief or support to conducting sustained maritime operations in the Arctic.) 9. Please describe the most critical update to the Arctic Maritime Response Force CONOPS that you encountered during this move. 164

165 Appendix D Game Schedule 165

166 Appendix E Game Participants and Demographics The 88 players who participated in the Fleet Arctic Operations Game consisted primarily of mid to senior level naval officers, civilian government officials and industry experts. While majority of the players represented U.S. civilian and government organizations, representatives from several partner nations also contributed (Canada 6, Norway 2, Germany, Denmark, and Finland 1). All participants had sufficient knowledge and experience to draw upon when developing a potential course of action or anticipating challenges that may limit the U.S. Navy s ability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic. The players were selected based on their specialized knowledge of the Arctic region and cold weather systems and platforms. The design team sought a broad range of backgrounds and viewpoints for game play. More than half of the players in the White Cell came from industry, academia and civilian government while players in the Atlantic and Pacific player cells consisted primarily of military and civilian government and industry. The demographic statistics included in this section of the Game Report are based on self-reported responses from the players garnered during the baseline survey administered prior to the start of Move 1. Overall, players in the game reported to have a moderately high level of experience in their respective fields. The 88 players averaged more than 20 years of experience in the three categories of organizations shown in figure 1.0. Figure 1.1 Players Average Years Experince The overall education level for Fleet Arctic Operations Game participants was moderately high relative to other games conducted at the Naval War College, with more than ½ of the players possessing a minimum of a master s degree in a relevant field, including 9 percent holding an earned doctorate (PhD, EdD, etc.) and 1 percent possessing a law degree (juris doctorate). Educational attainment by the players is summarized in figure