Secure Mediation of Join Queries by Processing Ciphertexts


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1 Secure Mediation of Join Queries by Processing Ciphertexts Joachim Biskup, Christian Tsatedem and Lena Wiese Germany SECOBAP 07 Marmara Hotel, Istanbul April 20, /23
2 Overview Introduction and Problem Statement Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching Comparison Conclusion 2/23
3 Introduction: Mediation Basic mediation system A client directs a global query to a mediator Mediator gathers data by sending partial queries to datasources Mediator constructs a global result out of the partial results and sends it back to the client. Client global query global result Mediator partial query 1 partial result 1 partial query n partial result n Source 1.. Source n 3/23
4 Introduction: Secure Mediation Secure mediation with the Multimedia Mediator (MMM) system Altenschmidt/Biskup/Flegel/Karabulut, 2003 Confederations of clients, mediators and datasources (flexible: contract based, shortterm,...) Aims: Anonymity of clients and confidentiality of data 4/23
5 Introduction: Secure Mediation MMM Protocol Preparatory phase: Client acquires credentials (public key & properties) and identity certificates (public key & identity) Request phase: 1. Client sends global query with appropriate credentials to mediator 2. Mediator forwards credentials with partial queries to datasources 3. Datasources execute access control based on client s properties 4. Datasources execute partial queries to get partial results Delivery phase: 1. Datasources encrypt partial results 2. Mediator computes encrypted global result and returns it to client 5/23
6 Introduction: Secure Mediation id k Certification Authority p k pub p: properties id: client s identity k : client s public key pub pub Client p k pub global query q encr. global result scheme SQL2 Algebra Mediator process encrypted R i p k pub partial query q 1 partial result R 1 scheme p k pub Source 1 partial query qn Source n partial result Rn scheme.. 6/23
7 Problem Statement: Delivery Phase How can the mediator compute a global result if it is not eligible to access the data in the partial results? Previous solution: mobile code (Biskup/Sprick/Wiese, 2005) Mediator constructs executable that computes the global result Client executes mobile code on decrypted partial results New solution: computation on encrypted data Delivery phase: 1. Datasources encrypt partial results with appropriate encryption scheme 2. Mediator computes encrypted global result from encrypted partial results 3. Client decrypts global result (according to encryption scheme) 7/23
8 Notation One client, one mediator, two datasources S 1 and S 2 Global query q: JOIN over two partial queries Partial queries q 1 over relation R 1 and q 2 over relation R 2 Single, common attribute ( join attribute ) A join Client q="select * from R1, R2 where R1.Ajoin=R2.Ajoin" Mediator q 1 ="select * from R1" Source 1 R1(...,Ajoin,...) q 2 ="select * from R2" Source 2 R2(...,Ajoin,...) 8/23
9 Overview Introduction and Problem Statement Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching Comparison Conclusion 9/23
10 Encryption Scheme 1: DAS Model Database As a Service (Hacıgümüş et al., 2002) Data owner outsources data to service provider in encrypted format Partitioning of attribute domains ( bucketization ) One distinct index value for each partition of a domain One query executed on index values at service provider site (server query: superset of exact result) Second query executed on data owner site (client query: exact result) 10/23
11 Encryption Scheme 1: DAS Model Delivery Phase based on Database As a Service Datasources encrypt partial results Datasources define partitions ( buckets ) and index values of join attribute Client constructs server query for mediator Mediator executes server query on encrypted partial results ( encrypted superset of global result) Client decrypts mediator s result and executes client query ( global result) client query Client partitions & index values k pub server query superset of global result DAS Mediator partial result R DAS 1 Source 1 R1(...,Ajoin,...) Source 2 partial result R 2 R2(...,Ajoin,...) DAS 11/23
12 Overview Introduction and Problem Statement Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching Comparison Conclusion 12/23
13 Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Commutative encryption function f e (as in Agrawal et al., 2003) Polynomialtime computable function (with key e) such that: 1. [Commutativity] For all keys e 1 and e 2 : f e1 f e2 = f e2 f e1 2. [Bijectivity] Each f e is a bijection 3. [Invertibility] The inverse fe 1 is polynomialtime computable given e 4. [Secrecy] Distributions of x, f e (x), y, f e (y) and x, f e (x), y, z are indistinguishable Property 4 indispensable for security proofs Use hash values of original inputs to ensure randomness (random oracle model) 13/23
14 Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Delivery Phase based on twoparty protocol for join (Agrawal et al., 2003) 1. Tuples with same join attribute value are encrypted with client s key 2. Join attribute values are hashed: h(a) 3. S 1 has key e 1 and encrypts hashes: f e1 (h(a)) / S 2 has key e 2 : f e2 (h(a )) 4. Exchange and second encryption gives f e2 (f e1 (h(a))) and f e1 (f e2 (h(a ))) 5. Mediator checks if f e2 (f e1 (h(a))) = f e1 (f e2 (h(a ))) Client h(a) e1 e2 global result k pub? = h(a ) e2 e1 Mediator R 1 k pub R 2 k pub h(a ) e2 e1 h(a ) e2 h(a) e1 h(a) e1 e2 Source 1 R1(...,Ajoin,...) Source 2 R2(...,Ajoin,...) 14/23
15 Overview Introduction and Problem Statement Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching Comparison Conclusion 15/23
16 Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption Additively homomorphic encryption function E (as in Freedman et al., 2004) Semantically secure public key encryption function such that: 1. Given two ciphertexts E(a) and E(b), there is a way to efficiently compute E(a + b). 2. Given a constant γ and a ciphertext E(a), there is a way to efficiently compute E(γ a). For a polynomial P (x) = n k=0 c k x k, given only encryptions E(c k ) of the coefficients and cleartext input value a (such that b = P (a)), one can efficiently compute E(b) = E(P (a)) = E( n k=0 c k a k ) For a constant value γ and payload data p ( means concatenation) one can efficiently compute E(γ P (a) + (a p)) = E(γ n k=0 c k a k + (a p)) Note: Evaluation on root value a yields E(a p), else random value 16/23
17 Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption Delivery Phase based on Private Matching protocol for intersection (Freedman et al., 2004) 1. Client s k pub is public key of homomorphic encryption scheme 2. Each datasource has polynomial with join attribute values as roots (P 1 and P 2 ) 3. Mediator exchanges encrypted coefficients 4. Each datasource evaluates encrypted polynomial on cleartext join attribute values plus tuples as payload data 5. Client decrypts data and finds either random values or matching tuples Client R 1 homom. R 2 homom. Mediator R 1 homom. R 2 homom. P2 k pub P1 k pub Source 1 R1(...,Ajoin,...) Source 2 R2(...,Ajoin,...) 17/23
18 Overview Introduction and Problem Statement Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching Comparison Conclusion 18/23
19 Comparison Assumptions Cryptographic strength of encryption schemes as stated by security proofs in original articles Cryptographic models are respected (random oracle model, large domains,...) Datasources include only those data records in partial results for which access permissions could be established (based on client s credentials) 19/23
20 Comparison Client s extra knowledge DatabaseAsaService: client retrieves superset of global result (extra data records) and partitions and index tables Commutative Encryption: no extra knowledge (client just retrieves exact global result) Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching: client knows number of different join attribute values with each datasource 20/23
21 Comparison Mediator s extra knowledge All three Delivery Phase protocols: confidentiality ensured (data records are encrypted such that only the client can decrypt them) DatabaseAsaService: mediator learns sizes of partial results and size of server query result (upper bound of size of global result); partition sizes and domain sizes maybe crucial (tradeoff confidentiality/efficiency) Commutative Encryption: mediator learns number of join attribute values with each datasource and size of intersection (lower bound of size of global result) Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching: mediator learns number of join attribute values with each datasource 21/23
22 Overview Introduction and Problem Statement Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching Comparison Conclusion 22/23
23 Conclusion Secure mediation with ciphertext processing Confidentiality of transmitted data Anonymity of client Reduced need for trust in the mediator (in comparison to mobile code) Reduced workload for client (in comparison to mobile code) 23/23
24 Appendix Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching i/x
25 Encryption Scheme 1: DAS Model Delivery Phase based on Database As a Service (Hacıgümüş et al., 2002) 1. Each database S i partitions active domain of join attribute dom active (R i.a join ) and assigns each partition an index value in an index table IT able Ri.A join. R 1 :... R 1.A join index table for R 1 : IT able R1.A join [100, 150) 1 [150, 200] 2 R 2 :... R 2.A join index table for R 2 : IT able R2.A join [100, 200) 11 [200, 300] S i encrypts R i rowwise (with client s keys) and adds column for index R1 S.t S R1 S.A S join R2 S.t S R2 S.A S join R1 S : R2 S : ii/x
26 3. S i sends encrypted partial result and encrypted index table to the mediator: R S i, encrypt(it able Ri.A join ), where encrypt is encryption with client s keys 4. Mediator forwards index tables to client 5. Client decrypts index tables and constructs: a. Server query q S (selects tuples from overlapping partitions in partial results) R C := q S (R S 1, R S 2 ) = σ Cond S (R S 1 R S 2 ) where Cond S = (R S 1.A S join = 1 R S 2.A S join = 11 R S 1.A S join = 2 R S 2.A S join = 11 R S 1.A S join = 2 R S 2.A S join = 12) IT able R1.A join : [100, 150) 1 [150, 200] 2 IT able R2.A join : [100, 200) 11 [200, 300] 12 b. Client query q C (postprocesses mediator s result to find correct join tuples) q C (decrypt(r C )) = σ (R1.A join =R 2.A join )(decrypt(r C )) 6. Client sends server query q S to mediator iii/x
27 7. Mediator executes q S on encrypted partial results; returns R C to client R C : R1 S.t S R1 S.A S join R2 S.t S R2 S.A S join Client decrypts R C and executes client query q C global result R:... R 1.A join... R 2.A join iv/x
28 Appendix Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching v/x
29 Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Delivery Phase based on twoparty protocol for join (Agrawal et al., 2003) 1. Datasource S i generates key e i for commutative encryption function f S i encrypts hash values of join attribute values (ideal hash function h) R 1 : R 1.A 1 R 1.A join α 10 β 10 γ 15 encrypted hash values: f e1 (h(10)), f e1 (h(15)) R 2 : R 2.A 1 R 2.A join δ 12 ɛ 15 ζ S i builds tuple sets for same join attribute value: T up 1 (10) = { α, 10, β, 10 } T up 1 (15) = { γ, 15 } T up i (a) := {t R i t[a join ] = a} encrypted hash values: f e2 (h(12)), f e2 (h(15)) T up 2 (12) = { δ, 12 } T up 2 (15) = { ɛ, 15, ζ, 15 } S i encrypts them with client s keys to ciphertexts encrypt(t up i (a)) vi/x
30 3. S i sends set of messages M i := { f ei (h(a)), encrypt(t up i (a)) } to mediator M 1 := { f e1 (h(10)), encrypt(t up 1 (10)), f e1 (h(15)), encrypt(t up 1 (15)) } M 2 := { f e2 (h(12)), encrypt(t up 2 (12)), f e2 (h(15)), encrypt(t up 2 (15)) } 4. Mediator exchanges message sets (sends M 1 to S 2 and M 2 to S 1 ) 5. For each f e2 (h(a)), encrypt(t up 2 (a)) from S 2 : S 1 computes f e1 (f e2 (h(a))), encrypt(t up 2 (a)) and sends it to the mediator 6. For each f e1 (h(a)), encrypt(t up 1 (a)) from S 2 : S 2 computes f e2 (f e1 (h(a))), encrypt(t up 1 (a)) and sends it to the mediator 7. Mediator looks for messages with identical first component f e1 (f e2 (h(a))) = f e2 (f e1 (h(a))) (bijectivity and commutativity properties of f) and sends result messages encrypt(t up 1 (a)), encrypt(t up 2 (a)) to the client 8. Client decrypts result messages with his private keys and constructs result tuples R 1.A 1 R 1.A join R 2.A 1 R 2.A join T up 1 (15) = { γ, 15 } T up 2 (15) = { ɛ, 15, ζ, 15 } R: γ 15 ɛ 15 γ 15 ζ 15 vii/x
31 Appendix Encryption Scheme 1: DatabaseAsaService Encryption Scheme 2: Commutative Encryption Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption/Private Matching viii/x
32 Encryption Scheme 3: Homomorphic Encryption Delivery Phase based on Private Matching protocol for intersection (Freedman et al., 2004) 1. Assumption: Client has one public key for homomorphic encryption scheme E 2. S 1 forms a polynomial whose roots are the join attribute values a 1,..., a n : P 1 (x) := (a 1 x) (a 2 x)... (a n x) = n k=0 c k x k S 1 encrypts coefficients using client s key and sends all E(c k ) to mediator 3. S 2 forms a polynomial whose roots are the join attribute values a 1,..., a m: P 2 (x) := (a 1 x) (a 2 x)... (a m x) = m l=0 d l x l S 2 encrypts coefficients using client s key and sends all E(d l ) to mediator 4. Mediator exchanges coefficients (E(d l ) to S 1 and E(c k ) to S 2 ) ix/x
33 5. S 1 evaluates polynomial P 2 on its cleartext join attribute values a 1,..., a n : e k := E(r k P 2 (a k ) + (a k T up 1 (a k ))) (r k is a fresh random number and T up 1 (a k ) is set of tuples with join attribute value a k ) S 1 returns all e k values to mediator 6. S 2 evaluates polynomial P 1 on its cleartext join attribute values a 1,..., a m: S 2 returns all e l values to mediator e l := E(r l P 1 (a l) + (a l T up 2 (a l))) 7. Mediator forwards all e k and e l values to client 8. Client decrypts them to either a random value, a value (a k T up 1 (a k )) or a value (a l T up 2 (a l)) For values (a k T up 1 (a k )) and (a l T up 2 (a l)) where a k = a l, the tuples are joined in the global result x/x
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