A Model of Financial Crises
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1 A Model of Financial Crises Coordination Failure due to Bad Assets Keiichiro Kobayashi Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) Septempber 16, 2009 Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 1 / 32
2 Motivation (1/2) How can we understand the current financial crisis? Severe (and possibly persistent) recessions following the collapse of huge asset-price bubbles Facts: The Great Depression (1930s) in Japan The current global crisis Enormous volumes of bad assets Nonperforming loans (1990s in Japan), Toxic securities (Current crisis) Freezing of asset transactions Sharp contraction in aggregate output Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 2 / 32
3 Motivation (2/2) Findings in neoclassical studies on the great depressions in the 20th century Productivity (TFP) decline has been a key driving force in: The Great Depression (Cole and Ohanian 1999; Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 2007; Kehoe and Prescott 2002) The 1990s in Japan (Hayashi and Prescott 2002; Kobayashi and Inaba 2007) Labor-wedge deterioration has been a key driving force in: The Great Depression (Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 2007; Mulligan 2002) The 1990s in Japan (Kobayashi and Inaba 2007) The usual business cycles (Shimer 2009) We need a model of financial crisis that can explain Labor-wedge deteriorations Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 3 / 32
4 Labor Wedge (1/2) Labor wedge is a market distortion expressed as an (imaginary) labor income tax. The neoclassical growth model Consumer max β t U(c t, 1 l t ), Firm t=0 subject to c t + k t+1 (1 δ)k t r k t k t + (1 τ t )w t l t, max π t = A t k α t l 1 α t r k t k t w t l t. The labor wedge 1 τ t is measured by 1 τ t = U l /U c (1 α)a t (k t /l t ) = MRS α MPL. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 4 / 32
5 The U.S. Labor Wedge (1990Q1-2009Q2) U.S. Labor Wedge ( ) I 190-IV 191-I 192-I 193-I 193-IV 194-I 195-I 196-I 196-IV 197-I 198-I 19-I 19-IV 20-I 201-I 202-I 202-IV 203-I 204-I 205-I 205-IV 206-I 207-I 208-I 208-IV Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 5 / 32
6 The U.S. Labor Wedge (1964Q1-2009Q2) U.S. Labor Wedge ( ) I 1965-IV 1967-I 1969-I 1971-I 1972-IV 1974-I 1976-I 1978-I 1979-IV 1981-I 1983-I 1985-I 1986-IV 198-I 190-I 192-I 193-IV 195-I 197-I 19-I 20-IV 202-I 204-I 206-I 207-IV Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 6 / 32
7 Labor Wedge (2/2) Usual explanations for countercyclical movements in the labor wedge Labor and consumption taxes Time-varying disutility of work Bargaining power of the labor union Search frictions in the labor market Our hypothesis: Financial constraints may affect the labor wedge. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 7 / 32
8 Hypothesis: This Paper Corporate bonds (or loan assets) are traded in the interbank market. The emergence of bad assets and asymmetric information causes freezing in asset trading among banks. (The Market for Lemons) Market freezing constrains the availability of bank loans as working capital for productive firms, causing a deterioration of the labor wedge. Features of the model: Enormous volume of bad assets Freezing of asset transactions (Beaudry and Lahiri 2009; Diamond and Rajan 2009) Output declines (Beaudry and Lahiri 2009) Labor wedge deterioration Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 8 / 32
9 Baseline A Neoclassical Growth Model Consumer Firm max β t U(c t, 1 l t ), t=0 Equilibrium conditions subject to c t + i t r k t k t + w t l t + π t, k t+1 = (1 δ)k t + i t. max π t = A t K α t L 1 α t r k t K t w t L t. K t = k t, L t = l t, c t + k t+1 (1 δ)k t = A t k α t l 1 α t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 9 / 32
10 Our Model Our model builds on the neoclassical growth model. Real model. Outside money is introduced as the bank reserves. The key market friction is asymmetric information between banks: Banks hold corporate bonds. The banks need money for additional short-term lending; To raise money, banks need to sell the corporate bonds to other banks. Firms need money (or media of exchange) to pay wages because of anonymity in the (labor) market. If bad assets are present in the market, banks cannot distinguish between good bonds and bad assets on other banks balance sheets. (Information asymmetry) No banks buy bonds from other banks if they believe bad assets are in the market. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 10 / 32
11 Market Structure (1/3) A one-sector economy with consumers, firms and banks. At the beginning of the period t: Consumers hold bank deposits (dt ). Firms hold capital (kt ). Banks hold corporate bonds (bt ) and cash reserves (m t ) injected by the government. d t = b t + m t, b t = k t. No asymmetric information between the firm and the lending bank. (Asymmetric information exists between banks.) Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 11 / 32
12 Market Structure (2/3) At the end of the period t, b t and d t earn interest at the market rate: b t = (1 + r t )b t, d t = (1 + r t )d t, m t = (1 + r m t )m t. where r m t m t is the government injection. Monetary Policy (financed by a lump-sum tax, g t ) The government sets the money supply mt. The government sets the rate of injection r m t such that banks demand for reserve (m t ) equals the money supply: m t = m t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 12 / 32
13 Market Structure (3/3) During the period t, the Labor market and the Goods market open sequentially. Labor Market (Anonymous market, cash payment is required) Firms want to borrow w t l t from banks at interest rate x t. (x t may be 0.) Banks need w t l t units of (real) money. Banks sell b t (at the price of 1 + r t ) to other banks to raise money. Banks are subject to w t l t m t + (1 + r t )b t. Firms pay w t l t in cash. Consumers then deposit w t l t in banks immediately. Goods Market (Walrasian market, cash is not necessary) Firms produce the consumption goods, y t = A t kt αl1 α Firms sell c t to consumers and install k t+1, by issuing bonds, b t+1 = k t+1. t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 13 / 32
14 Normal Equilibrium (1/2) No bad assets on the bank balance sheets. Banks can sell b t in exchange for (1 + r t )b t units of money in the interbank market. (Because there is no risk of default.) Banks are subject to the asset-in-advance (AIA) constraint: s t m t + (1 + r t )b t. The AIA constraint is slack, because b t = k t In equilibrium x t = 0, s t = w t l t, r m t = r t. The equilibrium is identical to the baseline neoclassical growth model. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 14 / 32
15 Consumer Normal Equilibrium (2/2) max t=0 β t U(c t, 1 l t ), subject to c t + d t+1 (1 + r t )d t + w t l t g t. Firm max V(k t ) = π t r t V(k t+1 ), subject to b t+1 = k t+1. where π t = A t k α t l1 α t + (1 δ)k t k t+1 (1 + x t )w t l t (1 + r t )b t + b t+1, Bank (Note {r t m t } t=0 is injected by the government.) max V b (m t ) = π b t r t V(m t+1 ), where π b t = (1 + r t )(b t + m t d t ) b t+1 m t+1 + d t+1 + x t s t, subject to b t+1 + m t+1 d t+1, s t m t + (1 + r t )b t. (Asset-in-Advance) Equilibrium s t = w t l t, m t = m t, and g t = r t m t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 15 / 32
16 Financial Crisis Thus far we have showed: If bt is exchanged for money in the interbank market, the model reduces to the baseline neoclassical growth model. We model a financial crisis as a time when b t is not accepted in the interbank market. The following assumptions are necessary: Assumptions Emergence of bad assets, n. Asymmetric Information. Banks cannot tell the good assets, bt, from the bad assets, n. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 16 / 32
17 Bad Assets (1/2) What is the bad asset, n? One unit of bad asset is paper (looks like a corporate bond) that is promised in exchange for one unit of goods at the end of the current period. The issuer of the bad asset is nonexistent. The real value of the bad asset is 0. n units of the bad asset is endowed to all banks randomly at the beginning of period 0, when the financial crisis breaks out. Bank i is endowed with n i. n i may be different from n j for i j. 1 n 0 idi = n. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 17 / 32
18 Bad Assets (2/2) Information asymmetry on bad asset, n. Banks know that n on their own balance sheets are the bad assets. Banks cannot distinguish other banks holdings of bad assets (n) from the good assets (b t ). Only after a bank buys paper in the interbank market does the bank know whether the paper is n or b t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 18 / 32
19 Conditions for Bad Asset Revelation The cost, γ n, is required to reveal the bad assets. (γ n is the dead weight loss.) Once γ n is paid (by consumers or banks), all agents become able to distinguish n from b t costlessly. Banks can dispose of n only after revelation. Banks are endowed with ni at t = 0. If they don t pay γ ni, they must hold n i at t = 1, 2, 3,. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 19 / 32
20 Coordination Failure Market for Lemons In the interbank market, banks who want money are sure to offer the bad asset, n, for sale. Anticipating this, (other) banks that can buy assets never accept b t, because b t and n are indistinguishable for the buying banks. The value of bt becomes 0 in the interbank market. bt cannot be traded in the interbank market. (The market freezes.) Banks have no incentive to pay γ n (network externality): Suppose Bank i reveals ni by paying γ n i ; but other banks do not. Banks know that bad assets still exist in the interbank market. They don t know who has them and who doesn t (asymmetric information). Banks still refuse to buy bt. Bank i cannot sell bt in the interbank market. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 20 / 32
21 Consumer Crisis Equilibrium (1/3) max t=0 β t U(c t, 1 l t ), subject to c t + d t+1 (1 + r t )d t + w t l t g t. Firm max V(k t ) = π t r t V(k t+1 ), subject to b t+1 = k t+1. where π t = A t k α t l1 α t + (1 δ)k t k t+1 (1 + x t )w t l t (1 + r t )b t + b t+1, Bank (Note {rt mm t} t=0 is injected exogenously.) max V b (m t ) = π b t r t V(m t+1 ), where π b t = (1 + r t )(b t d t ) + (1 + r m t )m t b t+1 m t+1 + d t+1 + x t s t, subject to b t+1 + m t+1 d t+1, s t m t + 0 b t. (Asset-in-Advance) Equilibrium s t = w t l t, r t = r m t + x t, and m t = m t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 21 / 32
22 Reduced form Consumer Crisis Equilibrium (2/3) max β t U(c t, 1 l t ), t=0 subject to c t + k t+1 (1 δ)k t r k t k t + w t l t g t. Firm max At k α t l1 α t r k t k t (1 + x t )w t l t. Equilibrium condition (Bank) w t l t = m t. mt is injected exogenously by the government. x t is the interest rate of intra-period loans. (x t = 0 if the AIA constraint is slack.) Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 22 / 32
23 Crisis Equilibrium (3/3) Dynamics c t + k t+1 (1 δ)k t = A t kt α lt 1 α, (1) w t l t = m t, where w t = U l t /U c t, (2) U l t = (1 α)a t(k t /l t ) α, (3) U c t 1 + x t U c t = βu c t+1 { αat+1 (l t+1 /k t+1 ) 1 α + 1 δ }. (4) Labor wedge 1 τ t : 1 τ t = U l /U c (1 α)a t (k t /l t ) α = x t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 23 / 32
24 Steady States We assume U(c t, 1 l t ) = ln c t + ϕ ln(1 l t ) and m t = m. Baseline Case without Bad Assets l = l(k ) = [α 1 A 1 (β δ)]k, (5) c = c(k ) = [α 1 (β δ) δ]k, (6) ( ) c(k α ) αa 1 α = (1 α)a. (7) ϕ{1 l(k )} β δ Crisis Case with Bad Assets l c = l(k c ) = [α 1 A 1 (β δ)]k c, (8) c c = c(k c ) = [α 1 (β δ) δ]k c, (9) c(k c )l(k c ) = m, ϕ{1 l(k c )} (10) c(k c ) ϕ{1 l(k c )} = 1 (1 α)a 1 + xc ( αa β δ ) α 1 α. (11) Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 24 / 32
25 Comparison of Steady States Quantities Labor wedge 1 τ c = c c < c, l c < l, k c < k x c < 1 (= 1 τ ). Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 25 / 32
26 The Mechanism at Work The emergence of bad assets causes asymmetric information. (Can t distinguish bad assets from good assets) Asymmetric information freeze interbank asset trading. As a result, the amount of money available for working capital loans is constrained. (Coordination failure) Coordination failure causes a structural change (from a nonbinding to a binding AIA constraint). Output and the labor wedge persistently deteriorate. No proper incentive exists for private agents to reveal private information about the bad assets (or to remove the bad assets). Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 26 / 32
27 Caveat If firms hold sufficient money (m f t ) in advance, the model reduces to the usual Cash-in-Advance model. Under the following assumptions, it is shown that t, m f t = 0 even if firms are allowed to hold cash. Assumptions The initial value of m f is zero: m f 0 = 0. f Firms cannot hoard bank borrowings as internal reserves (m t ). No portion of b t+1 can be held as m f t+1. bt+1 = k t+1 for all t. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 27 / 32
28 Policy Implications (1/2) The revelation of bad assets, n, restores the market for b t. (Welfare improves if γ n is not excessive.) Banks should once again become confident that there are no more bad assets in the market. Assumption: Banks know the total amount of n in the market. Revelation of all n in the market is necessary and sufficient. Banks have no incentive to reveal n. Intervention by the government may be justified: Stringent asset evaluations ( stress test ), which should be done repeatedly Government purchases of the bad assets Reintroduction of stringent accounting rules for banks Policy scheme for recapitalization (or temporary nationalization) of banks Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 28 / 32
29 Policy Implications (2/2) Macroeconomic policy and bad asset removal: Their goals may be the same, i.e., relaxing the financial constraints (AIA constraint) in the market. Fiscal Policy In the morning, give banks (or firms) a subsidy in the form of cash, m g t. Impose a tax on consumers, τt, at night, where τ t = m g t. The Ricardian equivalence holds; fiscal policy is still welfare improving because it relaxes the AIA constraint: w t l t m t + m g t. Monetary Policy g Lend m t to banks in the morning and collect it at night. This policy also relaxes the AIA constraint. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 29 / 32
30 Business Cycles Productivity changes can be driven by the freezing of the asset market (due to bad-asset externality). Financial constraints on intermediate goods can appear as TFP changes (Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan 2007). The constraints may change as asset trading freezes or unfreezes. Trading of a certain asset class freezes (due to bad-asset externality) = Productivity and the labor wedge deteriorate. (Recession) Trading of a certain asset class unfreezes = Productivity and the labor wedge improve. (Boom) Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 30 / 32
31 Future research Introduction of a fiat currency and nominal variables. Introduction of production technology of payment services (or inside money). Business cycle accounting for the US economy in Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 31 / 32
32 References Beaudry and Lahiri Risk Allocation, Debt Fueled Expansion and Financial Crisis. NBER Working Paper Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan Business Cycle Accounting. Econometrica. Cole and Ohanian The Great Depression in the United States from a neoclassical perspective. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. Diamond and Rajan Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze. NBER Working Paper Hayashi and Prescott The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade. Review of Economic Dynamics. Kehoe and Prescott Great Depressions of the 20th Century. Review of Economic Dynamics. Kobayashi and Inaba Business Cycle Accounting for the Japanese Economy. Japan and the World Economy. Casey Mulligan A Dual Method of Evaluating Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium Models with Market Frictions. NBER Working Paper Robert Shimer Convergence of Macroeconomics: The Labor Wedge. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. Keiichiro Kobayashi (2009) Crises and Banks 2009/09/16 32 / 32
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