The Stuxnet Worm The Nexus of Cyber Security and International Policy. By George Aquila Mentor: Ming Chow

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1 The Stuxnet Worm The Nexus of Cyber Security and International Policy By George Aquila Mentor: Ming Chow 1

2 Abstract: This paper focuses on the Stuxnet worm as an example of the rising prominence of cyberwarfare and cybersecurity on the international stage, specifically with regards to how it is used by countries like the United States to undermine potential enemies. The paper explores the background of the Stuxnet worm, its technical nature, the vulnerabilities it exploited, and the fundamental issues and concerns that it has brought about with its attack. Introduction Meet the Worm In January of 2010, scientists working at the Natanz nuclear development plant in central Iran were noticing drastic and unexplained failures in the centrifuges critical to the nuclear refinement they were attempting. These centrifuges were used to spin raw uranium at high speeds, isolating the trace amounts of enriched uranium 235 from the rest of the element s raw form; the force and speed of these centrifuges requiring perfect calibration to work correctly. These scientists were confounded, all of their monitoring software for the Siemens Industrial systems they were using were telling them that everything was executing normally and without error, and yet the systems were failing, exploding due to overpressurization, or simply shutting 1 down. By mid June, after IAEA inspectors first publicized the strange occurrences happening at Natanz, analysts at a number of security companies beginning with VirusBlockAda, and including Symantec and Kaspersky Labs had confirmed the presence of a malware program on numerous different locations using Siemens software that was causing these elaborate crashes: a sophisticated, dynamic, multipurpose and adaptable worm, weighing in at half a megabyte in size, so concisely and effectively constructed that all evidence hinted at a more powerful entity 1 Clarke, Richard A, and Robert K. Knake. Cyber War: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York: HarperCollins, Print. (Stuxnet Appendix) 2

3 behind it than even a particularly skilled group of hackers. It had escaped its confines at the Natanz nuclear facility by apparently infecting the laptop of one of the engineers working there, and subsequently uploading itself on the world wide web when that engineer returned home and connected. The malware program was given the name Win32.stuxnet, derived from two files 2 found in the code (.stub and MrxNet.sys). From the moment that it was detected, security analysts around the world knew that they were witnessing something new and unique. The Stuxnet worm would change the landscape of cyberspace, and from then on there has been no going back. The following analysis will attempt to concisely examine the dynamic nature of Stuxnet, survey the technical aspects of its implementation, and address the implications that the cyber weapon carries with it. To the Community The Rise of Cyber Warfare and its Implications The importance of cyber security on an international scale is rapidly expanding faster and more dynamically than most anyone can comprehend. Many observers note that the world as a whole is not adequately keeping up with the rate at which civilization s capabilities of transmitting, intercepting and tampering with data is becoming ever more important in the day to day functionalities of our society. As the first major cyber weapon seen that was created and unleashed in a specific and targeted way, Stuxnet is the veritable ground zero of the age of digital warfare. Despite it having now been almost four years since the worm s initial discovery, Stuxnet has continued to prove a confusing puzzle that exists at a nexus between computer science, international relations, and military studies. As such it is imperative that the worm be given due attention, and that we learn from it as we move into the uncertain future of cyber conflict. 2 Zetter, Kim. How digital detectives deciphered Stuxnet, the most menacing malware in history. arstechnica.com/techpolicy/. Web. July,

4 Although the worm itself is notable for a wide variety of reasons which will herein be discussed, perhaps the most important takeaway will be neither the technical examination of its inner workings, nor the commentary on its policy implications, but rather a combined perspective of both, the kind of which will become more and more necessary as these issues come to the fore over the next decade. The Background on its Development It is no secret that for a number of years the United States and its allies have been attempting, by any means necessary, to stop the nation of Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities with which it could potentially manufacture weapons of mass destruction. By mid 2009 or even earlier, the United States had added cyberwarfare to the list of these means in an 3 effort to shut down Iran s nuclear program. It is now widely accepted that the U.S, in conjunction with the nation of Israel, was specifically involved in the testing and development of the worm. From a strategic perspective, following a variety of attempts to dismantle Iran s nuclear program, the use of cyber warfare was a logical means through which the United States could achieve its goal. Part of the effectiveness of the worm lies in its ability to remain undetected, as well as its complex nature as a multifaceted piece of malware that serves multiple purposes. This dynamic attack bundled into one program has many implications for international cyber warfare, showing that it may be more effective and useful to carry out attacks with burrowed software of this nature rather than attempt a classic remote assault on a system that is being actively monitored. This covert option, packed all of the necessary and effective punch while keeping the victim unaware and the attacker utterly shrouded in mystery. 3 Sanger, David E. Confront and Conceal: Obama s Secret War and the Surprising Use of American Power. New York: RandomHouse, Print. 4

5 Applications What it is The Stuxnet worm is a highly specialized, highly targeted malware program which attacks a specific type of Siemens industrial system. The worm was first transmitted through a portable USB, which was introduced either by an unknowing third party or an intentional infiltrator whose aim was to connect the original infected drive. It was approximately half a megabyte in size, and could move quickly through any windows system due to its promiscuous behavior and its ability to gain administrator accesses through elevation of privilege exploits., as well as in some cases over local area network transfers Like any classic computer worm, Stuxnet differentiates itself from a virus in the way that it does not need a host file to burrow into and propagate itself. It stands as an individual program which, though hidden, is represented as a grouping of files which, as will be later examined, is initially present on a disk and can move on its own to a newly connected drive and through a number of other ways as well. Stuxnet is, at its core, a rootkit. Upon download onto a drive, the worm installs itself as a basic driver with authentic certification, and renders itself invisible to detection as it begins to execute its function. It is extremely specific in what it targets; downloading it onto your own personal computer would do nothing besides allow for its propagation to a set maximum of three other targetable systems, and, assuming the you are not connected to Siemens industrial software, would remain dormant. An attack would be executed as soon as the worm was able to detect the presence of a PLC (Programme Logic Controller), specifically any Simatic WinCC Step7 software, a SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system interface through 4 which the industrial systems of nuclear facilities are controlled. 4 Clarke, Richard A, and Robert K. Knake. Cyber War: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York: HarperCollins, Print. (Stuxnet Appendix) 5

6 The Idiosyncrasies Not your Average Worm Stuxnet is unlike most other pieces of malware because, as previously mentioned, it was highly specific in what it targets. It is unique in that it is both a rootkit as well as a PLC, a digital program that can be used to control and monitor industrial systems, precisely like the centrifuges that it was designed to target. In addition to altering the function of these systems, the worm is able to relay messages to the infected system s controller, informing the observer that all system components are functioning correctly, which is partially why it took so long for anyone to recognize the presence of the malware from the initial moment of infection. Perhaps most impressive of all, Stuxnet holds within its programming the ability to relay information that it can pick up from the infected system back to the original point of control as soon as outside connection is established. Once in contact with any outward connected network, the worm communicates its progress and information back to a command origin by transmitting an encrypted http request to one of two seemingly innocuous urls. It can also receive further instructions from its command and control, which can transmit requests to call functions already present in the worm, or send and load new instruction sets with updated additional functions.this is a key point in the revolutionizing nature of the cyber weapon: not only is it able to interrupt and destroy functionality of a target, it also acts as highly advanced spyware. This functionality also grants the worm a limited but effective command and control ability, letting it mutate on command. During its time in the wild, Stuxnet was updated three different times by its command origin, yielding three different 5 versions that were able to adapt and evolve. Unlike most malware, Stuxnet was also unique in that it did not used a forged driver certificate; it used a legitimately real, stolen certification from two Taiwanese hardware 5 Stuxnet 0.5: Command and Control Capabilities. symantec.com/connect/blogs. Web. February

7 6 companies, JMicron Technology and Realtek Semiconductor Corps. The headquarters of these two companies are physically in close proximity to each other, within the same industrial park, and security restrictions on their servers seem to imply that someone may have physically 7 entered their facilities and stolen the certification. This elaborate heist hints at the advanced nature of the creators of the worm, as a ordinary hacker would have most likely lacked the means and incentive to steal from established and relatively secure hardware companies. Additionally, the worm contained one very interesting piece of code; what is referred to as 8 a poison pill routine, a process in which the worm and all of its variations would delete themselves on the hard coded date of June 24th, This protocol was clearly established to both cover the tracks of the worm as well as avoid potential spillage and continued infection should the worm manage to escape onto the internet, which consequently it did shortly after its initial infection. Applications Exploits What is so remarkable about the approach that Stuxnet took in using the exploits it had available to it was the multi step layering of its attributes. The use of the real and authentic stolen driver certificates, its man in the middle attack approach, the burrowing and undetectable nature of the rootkit, and the extensive use of zero day exploits made the Stuxnet attack virtually undetectable, leaving its inflicted damage as the only evidence that it existed at all., as well as in some cases over local area network transfers While the most highly advanced and well developed malware can sometimes take advantage of a zero day vulnerability, Stuxnet takes advantage of an unprecedented four major 6 Murchu, Liam O. Stuxnet: A possible attack scenario. zdnet.com/blog/security. Web. October Matrosov, Aleksandr, Eugene Rodionov, David Harley, and Juraj Malcho. "Stuxnet Under the Microscope" (PDF). Web. September Cherry, Steven. Sons of Stuxnet. spectrum.ieee.org. Web. December

8 exploits. This, along with the poison pill routine, further contribute to the idea that the worm was developed by an entity with a specific goal in mind and not simply by a random hacker, as most hackers would find zero day vulnerabilities too valuable to use multiple in a single piece of malware. The most notable, and well known of the zero day vulnerabilities that Stuxnet took advantage of was the Microsoft Windows Shortcut 'LNK/PIF' Files Automatic File Execution Vulnerability (BID 41732) an exploit in the.lnk shell extension used in windows explorer of Microsoft Windows, activated whenever an explorer runs a function that scans a disk for initial 9 read. Due a flaw in the original and unpatched design of windows explorer, any program that is 10 able to display icons in the explorer is also able to execute code. An infected removable disk, contains only two simple.dll files (dynamic linked libraries, the Microsoft Windows variations of Unix.so files) that are disguised with.tmp extensions. Upon the insertion of the disk, the first.dll file (only 25 kb in size) is loaded via the.lnk extension exploit. Used in conjunction with several APIs found on the Windows OS, this first.dll file serves to keep the other files hidden as well as load the much larger (500 kb) secondary.dll file which carries out code installation. Another notable exploit that Stuxnet was able to take advantage of was the Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 43073), which allows for the remote execution of code on another network computer. This attack functions by sending a print request to an uninfected computer, specifically targeting the Printer Spooler Service, which acts as a kind of queue for backups of printer requests. Rather than sending directions for a print request, Stuxnet would send the same files that it would use in the.lnk exploit as a payload which, in tandem with another elevation of privilege exploit, it would use to copy itself 9 Zetter, Kim. How digital detectives deciphered Stuxnet, the most menacing malware in history. arstechnica.com/techpolicy/. Web. July, Murchu, Liam O. W32.Stuxnet Installation Details. symantec.com/connect/blogs. Web. July

9 11 remotely onto uninfected drives. These were the two exploits that Stuxnet primarily used to copy itself to different locations dynamically, regardless of whether or not the currently infected system was indeed a targeted Siemens interface. Additionally, Stuxnet would automatically scan for network shares and is equipped with a concise but effective password cracker so that it can propagate itself across 12 local network systems with weak passwords, the likes of which are common on closed loop networks. Conclusion: The Takeaways and the Future of Cyber Warfare Stuxnet did far more than simply slow down the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. As the first major specifically targeted cyber weapon, it has fulfilled what many since the beginning of the 21st century have been anticipating, the first strike of what will most likely come to dominate the future of conflicts and wars between nations. Stuxnet was a highly specific weapon, and certainly not the last of its kind. Since late 2010, the code for the Stuxnet bug has become publicly available on the internet, and has without doubt served as a template for other similar cyber weapons including the infamous Flame counterpart to Stuxnet. A year after 13 Stuxnet s discovery, an extremely similar worm appeared which was given the name Duqu. Though less direct and damaging than Stuxnet, Duqu used almost all of the same backbone code, and had an extremely similar method of propagation. Unlike Stuxnet, Duqu was aimed almost completely at reconaissance and intelligence gathering, proving extremely effective in this regard. For many in the fields of international relations and global security policy, the advent of 11 Murchu, Liam O. Stuxnet using three additional zero day vulnerabilities. symantec.com/connect/blogs. Web. September Shearer, Jarrad. W32.Stuxnet (Writeup). symantec.com/security_response. Web. February, Cherry, Steven. Sons of Stuxnet. spectrum.ieee.org. Web. December

10 cyber warfare is a puzzle whose surface has yet to even be scratched. The implications of what a certain kind of attack should illicit when carried out by one country against the other is anyone s guess. What s more, the source creators of Duqu and similar malware based on Stuxnet still remain unknown, with more and more of the original source code of these bugs becoming more and more available. The implication here is that in a future of Cyber conflict, the blueprints of powerful weaponry would no longer be stored in top secret CIA vaults, but rather on the publicly open repositories of Github. The United States Department of Defense named cyberspace a new domain of defense only as recently as 2011 and characterizes cyber action as an emerging instrument of power. International regulation and law is only now just starting to address cyber warfare in its scope of understanding, with a great step having been taken in the publication of the Tallinn Manual as 14 recently as March of This initial established policy on international cyber security will hopefully lay down foundations and precedent for resolving and perhaps preventing cyber conflicts. Certainly this field brings with it new threats and new incentives for innovation, but its rapid development will require more and more attention. This behooves people who exist at the intersection of technical expertise and policy experience to step into the challenging nexus of cyber security, so that the world can move into a more secure future. 14 Tallinn Manual. ccdcoe.org. Web. March

11 References 1. Clarke, Richard A, and Robert K. Knake. Cyber War: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York: HarperCollins, Print. (Stuxnet Appendix) 2. Langner, Ralph. To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet s Creators Tried to Achieve. (PDF) The Langner Group. Web. November content/uploads/2013/11/to kill a centrifuge.pdf 3. Sanger, David E. Confront and Conceal: Obama s Secret War and the Surprising Use of American Power. New York: RandomHouse, Print. 4. Matrosov, Aleksandr, Eugene Rodionov, David Harley, and Juraj Malcho. "Stuxnet Under the Microscope" (PDF). Web. September papers/stuxnet_under_the_microscope.pdf 5. Shearer, Jarrad. W32.Stuxnet (Writeup). symantec.com/security_response. Web. February, Murchu, Liam O. Stuxnet: A possible attack scenario. zdnet.com/blog/security. Web. October a possible attack scenario/ Zetter, Kim. How digital detectives deciphered Stuxnet, the most menacing malware in history. arstechnica.com. July, policy/2011/07/how digital detectives deciphered stuxnet the most men acing malware in history/ 8. Cherry, Steven. Sons of Stuxnet. spectrum.ieee.org. Web. December of stuxnet 9. Murchu, Liam O. W32.Stuxnet Installation Details. symantec.com/connect/blogs. Web. July installation details 10. Murchu, Liam O. Stuxnet using three additional zero day vulnerabilities. symantec.com/connect/blogs. Web. September using three additional zero day vulnerabilities 11. Stuxnet 0.5: Command and Control Capabilities. symantec.com/connect/blogs. Web. February command and control capabilities 12. Tallinn Manual. ccdcoe.org. Web. March

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