The Importance of ICN Recommended Practices in Global Competition Law

Transcription

1 Concurrences Revue des droits de la concurrence Competition Law Journal Ron STERN: An in-house perspective on global competition law developments Interview l Concurrences N Ronald A. STERN ron.stern@corporate.ge.com l Vice President, General Electric

2 @ Interview 1991-Present Ronald A. STERN Vice President, General Electric Vice President (1997-present) & Senior Competition Counsel, General Electric Company, Washington, DC Partner, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC , Associate ( 76-78, 80-81), Partner ( 81-88), Hughes Hubbard & Reed, Washington, DC Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC Law Clerk to Justice Potter Stewart ( 75-76); Judge Harold Leventhal, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ( 74-75) 1974 J.D., Harvard Law School This interview was conducted by Hugh Hollman, Associate, Jones Day, Silicon Valley Office. Ron STERN: An in-house perspective on global competition law developments After Harvard law school, you clerked on the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for Judge Harold Leventhal, and then for US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, before entering private practice. At the beginning of your legal career, what led you to specializing in antitrust? I took a very lengthy and circuitous route to becoming an antitrust specialist. After I clerked for two years, I joined the small Washington office of a New York firm and began working on a variety of litigation matters often focusing on the legal grounds for dismissing claims or obtaining summary judgment. After about two years, I left to work as a Special Assistant to my first year criminal law professor who had been appointed to head the Criminal Division of the Justice Department during the Carter Administration. I returned to the law firm after about two years and continued to do civil litigation. My first major antitrust matter was in 1980 working on a team representing Showtime, which was opposing a proposed joint venture of four major motion picture companies called Premiere. At the heart of the proposed venture was an agreement among the motion picture company participants that they would not license their movies to other pay television services until nine months after they appeared on Premiere. The Antitrust Division, with support from the existing pay television services (HBO, Showtime, and The Movie Channel), succeeded in obtaining an injunction that blocked the formation of the venture. During the 1980s, I began to do an increasing amount of merger work (including the Showtime/The Movie Channel and the Alcan/Arco transactions) while continuing to handle a broad range of civil litigation matters. In 1988, a colleague and I decided to look for a new home for ourselves and many of our junior colleagues. We ended up focusing on two firms one that wanted me to be an antitrust specialist and the other that saw me as a full-time civil litigator. We decided to join the firm that wanted me to focus on antitrust so, fourteen years after graduating from law school, I finally became an antitrust specialist. In the end, several factors made the choice of antitrust a relatively easy one for me. First, Professor Areeda s antitrust course had been one of the best classes I took during law school and it provided me with a good background and sparked an early interest in antitrust. Second, in contrast to litigation, I liked the diversity of antitrust practice adding counseling, merger clearance, and investigations to litigation. Third, and most importantly, I found that I enjoyed my work on antitrust matters because it enabled me to learn the client s business and have an ongoing relationship with the client s legal and business teams. The logical next step was to become an in-house antitrust specialist where I would be able to work even more closely with those teams. At the last annual meeting of the International Competition Network ( ICN ) at The Hague, the Chairman of the ICN and head of the Office of Fair Trading, John Fingleton, announced that the membership had grown to 117 competition agencies. How do global companies like GE view the increasing growth of competition agencies worldwide, especially the possibility of multiple agency reviews of any potential transaction? What role has the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedure played in streamlining multijurisdictional merger reviews and what is left to accomplish? I believe that the adoption of competition laws by almost all countries is a positive development for businesses and consumers. Reducing cartel activities and other anticompetitive practices lowers prices and costs and expands access to markets. At the same time, the proliferation of competition laws and the increasing globalization of 1

3 many industries present significant challenges for companies such as GE. In the merger context, companies that are active in M&A activities need to have an expert global team that is knowledgeable about the procedural and substantive requirements of the numerous agencies with merger regimes. Inconsistencies in the review procedures, timetables, and substantive standards, along with the uncertainty that often accompanies the early years of new merger regimes, present ongoing challenges. These challenges often manifest themselves in increased costs and delay in completing the merger clearance process and, on occasion, can make it more difficult to advise whether a proposed transaction is likely to encounter opposition from one or more of the agencies reviewing the transaction. I believe that the ICN s Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures have played a very valuable role in promoting the adoption of procedural rules by both new and established competition agencies. Improvements include reducing unnecessary filings, streamling initial notification requirements, and increasing the speed of the clearance process for the vast majority of transactions that do not present any significant issues. For example, the KFTC cited the Recommended Practices as influential both in its 2003 adoption of notification thresholds that required each of the parties to the transaction to have sales of at least 3 billion won in Korea (approximately $2.7 million) and in its 2007 increase of these thresholds to 20 billion won of sales in Korea (approximately $17.8 million) for each of the parties. The Recommended Practices also have been used by competition agencies to advocate for legislative reforms to their merger regimes. This has taken place in a number of jurisdictions including Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ireland, and Portugal. The accomplishments of the ICN in this area have been documented by others. However, much work remains to be done. Some established agencies (including some that were founding members of the ICN) still fail to follow some aspects of the Recommended Practices. While the Recommended Practices have been quite valuable in helping to improve a number of the newer merger regimes prior to their taking effect, many of the newer regimes would benefit from changes that would bring their procedures more in line with the ICN Recommended Practices. GE has joined with a number of other major global companies in an organization called the Merger Streamlining Group to promote implementation of the ICN s Recommended Practices, particularly the recommendation that there be a substantial local nexus to the jurisdiction before there is a requirement to notify a merger. Former FTC Chairman, William Kovacic, has described antitrust rules worldwide as having an open-source quality as many competition agencies are adopting variations of agency and competition law models conceived in the US and Europe. But that today, measured by influence in sharing the design and content of competition policy globally, the EU is the world s most influential system 1 Is that your impression? 1 William E. Kovacic, Dominance, duopoly and oligopoly: the United States and the development of global competition policy, 13 GCR 39 (Dec. 2010), available at globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/29410/dominance-duopoly-oligopolyunited-states-development-global-competition-policy/ I am always reluctant to disagree with Former Chairman Kovacic and I acknowledge the very substantial influence of the EU, but I believe that the U.S. has been the more influential jurisdiction in shaping key substantive aspects of today s global competition systems. Certainly, in terms of the adoption of an administrative approach in which the competition authority acts as investigator and decisionmaker, the EU system prevails. In addition, the EU s influence can be seen in the nomenclature that is most widely used today by competition regimes competition law (rather than antitrust); dominance/abuse of dominance (rather than monopoly/monopolization). Indeed, to illustrate the EU s influence over nomenclature, a number of years ago I changed my title from Senior Antitrust Counsel to Senior Competition Counsel. However, on balance, I believe that the U.S. has led in many of the areas that are key to defining the core of the emerging global approach to competition law. First, and fundamentally, I believe that the U.S. has been the leader in advancing the view that the goal of competition law is to promote consumer welfare and that the focus should be on protecting competition not individual competitors or some ideal market structure. Second, in the cartel area, the U.S. has developed and refined the concept of leniency and used it to have a profound impact on the nature and level of anti-cartel enforcement activities. Competition authorities around the world have embraced the leniency approach developed in the U.S. and, increasingly, are adopting the U.S. s long-standing emphasis on criminal sanctions to deter and punish cartel violations. Third, in the merger area, the U.S. has led the way with its merger guidelines that focus on an economics-based assessment of the likely competitive effects of proposed transactions rather than employing a mechanical approach limited to market structure. The increasing use of economists and economics in merger review and in other areas of competition law also reflects the influence and leadership of the U.S. Finally, the U.S. led the effort to form the ICN, which has fostered the development of sound, consensusbased Recommended Practices by the U.S., the EU, and numerous other jurisdictions. Going forward, I am hopeful that it will be joint U.S.-EU/multi-jurisdictional efforts via the ICN and other influential international bodies (such as the OECD) that will foster increased convergence around sound competition law principles and processes. The US and EU just celebrated 20 years of the US-EU bilateral competition cooperation agreement by issuing revised Best Practices in Cooperation in Merger Investigations. You have been involved in a broad range of international competition law matters for GE, not least of which was the GE-Honeywell merger, which was cleared in the US but blocked by the EC in In retrospect, what did the experience illustrate for you and what are your views on US-EU cooperation? How do you think it could be improved? The GE-Honeywell experience illustrated several points that I believe I understood at the time: (1) big, headline-generating transactions are different; (2) in the era before the emergence of the high tech industry, media and aviation transactions were among the most likely to receive intense scrutiny; (3) competitors played a more important role in merger review 2

4 in the EC than in the U.S.; and (4) having an ongoing, cooperative working relationship at all levels of a competition authority prior to a major transaction or investigation is important. In terms of U.S. EC cooperation, one of the unfortunate aspects of GE-Honeywell was the timing of the transaction. The deal was announced just before the 2000 presidential election in the U.S. and the review took place during the transition to a new Administration. As a result, there was no Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division until June 14, 2001 after the U.S. completed its review of the transaction and the same day that the parties submitted their final set of undertakings to the European Commission. There was thus no opportunity for the senior leadership at the Division and the Commission to have developed a strong personal relationship of trust, mutual respect and a shared commitment to avoiding conflicting outcomes on global mergers. In addition, although the staffs of the two authorities had extensive discussions about the case, my sense was that they also lacked a close relationship. Indeed, when I attended the first ICN annual conference in Naples in September 2002, I was struck by the apparent lack of familiarity among the agency officials who attended. I have witnessed a dramatic change over the last ten years ongoing cooperation both through the ICN and as a result of extensive bilateral efforts have led to much closer personal and working relationships at all levels of the U.S. agencies and the EC. The track record of cooperation since the GE/Honeywell decision in 2001 is both impressive and reassuring. One key potential impediment to cooperation in the merger area is the rather stark difference in process and timing resulting from the front loaded EU system and the back loaded U.S. system. The strong incentives to offer Phase I undertakings to avoid a Phase II review in the EU and the tight timetables for the Commission s review of such undertakings further complicates efforts to cooperate and coordinate the U.S. and EU reviews. The agencies have taken an important step in acknowledging these issues and offering helpful suggestions in Revised Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations issued last October. While I believe that the parties to proposed transactions have an important role to play in assisting and facilitating cooperation between the U.S. and EU (and any other authorities reviewing a global transaction), a critical element in making the process work is the self-confidence and transparency of the case teams in the reviewing jurisdictions. Equally important is the willingness of the senior officials to adjust their normal internal review processes to be prepared to coordinate with other authorities at critical junctures of the review process. Arguably trans-atlantic differences between the EU and US, perhaps including the GE-Honeywell merger experience, led to the founding of the ICN for which you are a nongovernmental advisor. What is your view of the network, what useful work do you think it has done, and what areas would you like the ICN to focus on in future? In particular, what do you think the roles of non-governmental advisors should be in future? As I have noted in prior answers, I believe that the ICN has played a very positive role. The ICN has helped create a closer knit global competition community that works better because of the creation of a shared vision of best practices and an ongoing, cooperative effort to promote that vision. In addition to this very important relationship-building role, the ICN has made significant progress toward convergence through its most important work product its development of several sets of Recommended Practices. In the future, I would like to see the ICN: (1) tackle the development of Recommended Practices in the more difficult area of unilateral conduct; (2) address due process issues in agency investigations and proceedings, taking up a subject that the OECD has been working on recently; and (3) become more active in promoting the implementation of the ICN s existing Recommended Practices. While meaningful progress has been made in significant part because of the ICN s efforts, much remains to be done 2. Non-governmental Advisors ( NGAs ) have played an important role in the work of the ICN from the beginning. While there se@emed to be some uncertainty at the outset about the participation of NGAs in certain working groups and portions of the annual conferences, those issues appear to have been resolved in favor of inclusion of NGAs in virtually all aspects of the ICN s activities. The ICN, of course, is led by its member agencies but it has welcomed input from NGAs and is seeking to broaden the base of NGAs to reflect better the range and diversity of the member agencies. I believe that NGAs will continue to assist the member agencies in the work of the ICN and to be active in utilizing the ICN s Recommended Practices and other work product to promote ongoing improvements to competition regimes around the world. Key global players are beginning to actively enforce antitrust laws: China s competition laws are now about 4 years old, provisions of India s competition law dealing with mergers went into effect in June last year, and Brazil, just revamped their competition law, moving to a pre-merger notification system. Do you believe these new antitrust regimes are in line with international standards and best practices? How are you and GE meeting the standards and requirements these new antitrust regimes impose, especially in emerging economies around the globe? I believe that the ICN s Recommended Practices have had a positive effect on the development of the merger regimes in China, India, and Brazil. However, as one would expect with new (or newly revised) regimes, there remain areas where each of these regimes could be improved through the implementation of certain of the ICN s Recommended Practices. For example, Brazil recently took several very positive steps in its new law, including the elimination of market share thresholds and the adoption of two-party local nexus thresholds based on turnover in Brazil. Since the new legislation appears to look to the entire Brazilian turnover of the seller rather than just the Brazilian turnover attributable to the entity or assets that the seller is transferring to the buyer in the proposed transaction, it will be important for 2 For more detail on the ICN s accomplishments and the need for continued work on implementation, see my essay and those of the many other contributors in The International Competition Network at Ten: Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations (Paul Lugard, editor, 2011). 3

5 CADE to take steps to address this departure from the ICN Recommended Practices through implementing regulations that CADE is expected to publish in draft for public comment in March India faced the challenge of a voluntary merger system that was transformed into a mandatory regime without making many of the required changes in the legislation to adapt the regime to international best practices. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the Competition Commission of India took extensive steps, after seeking input from the Indian bar and business community as well as the global competition community, to develop a world-class merger regime prior to making its merger review system effective in June The various exemptions adopted by the CCI and the target exemption issued by the Ministry added important refinements that incorporated many of the ICN s Recommended Practices. Some of the decisions taken by the CCI during the initial months of the Indian regime, however, have raised questions as to whether certain of the regulations were being implemented in a manner consistent with the ICN Recommended Practices. The CCI recently responded to concerns by clarifying regulations addressing internal reorganizations. Given the uncertainty that has arisen, the Indian regime would benefit both from further clarification of the regulatory exemptions and from clarification or revision of the target exemption to make sure that it applies to all forms of combinations and that it follows the ICN s Recommended Practices by only counting the assets and turnover that the seller is transferring to the buyer in the proposed transaction. In China, despite the efforts of the Ministry of Commerce ( MOFCOM ) to expedite its review of proposed transactions, many reviews go into Phase 2 even if they do not present significant competition issues. As a result, the regime often does not meet the ICN Recommended Practices for merger review time periods. GE works closely with outside counsel around the globe to understand and comply with the requirements of both longstanding and recent merger regimes. As I noted in a prior answer, GE is also active in promoting implementation of the ICN Recommended Practices because implementation will foster convergence on sound merger review requirements, saving valuable time and resources for both the agencies involved and the parties to M&A transactions. Of course, in addition to these merger process issues, it will be critical that the substantive standards employed by newer competition authorities in both merger and conduct matters conform broadly to international standards. A variety of international organizations (including the ICN and OECD) have made contributions to increasing convergence on consensus-based substantive standards. These efforts have built upon and complemented work by individual competition authorities on substantive guidelines and guidance documents. The UK is evaluating the possibility of consolidating the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading. Labeled as the bonfire of the quangos, the UK government justified its suggestions as a way to cut duplication in government functions. Recently, France merged its competition agencies into a single Autorite de la Concurrence and under Brazil s new competition law, the former triangular institutional system is being merged into one agency, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence ( CADE ). What are your views on this trend towards streamlining agencies and their functions, and do you think similar logic may justify a merger of the antitrust responsibilities of the DOJ and FTC? I believe that I am among a large group of competition practitioners who believe that it would be more efficient to have one U.S. antitrust agency. This would avoid a number of issues, including periodic merger clearance disputes that delay merger reviews as well as the potential for divergent policies to be pursued by agencies with overlapping authority. I also think that there are obvious real world impediments that would need to be overcome in order to create a single U.S. competition authority but that, if those impediments could be overcome, the U.S. would then be in a better position to advocate changes to ameliorate some of the problems created by multiple competition authorities in other jurisdictions. Working together, the DOJ and FTC released the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in August In your comments on the draft Guidelines 3, you seemed critical of the uses of any form of presumptions, especially the possibility that upward pricing pressure or the UPP test may establish a presumption that particular transactions raise competitive concerns. Now that the final Guidelines have been around for more than a year, do you still have the same concerns? Do you have any other concerns with the Guidelines implementation? As I understand the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, they do not create a presumption that a proposed merger is anticompetitive based on a specified upward pricing pressure ( UPP ) level. Instead, the assessment of UPP in Section 6.1 of the Guidelines appears to be a tool that is used by the agencies in evaluating the potential for significant anticompetitive unilateral effects from the proposed transaction. I continue to believe that it would have been preferable for the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines to have avoided presumptions based on market shares measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHIs ). I believe that the removal of these presumptions would have furthered one of the stated purposes for the 2010 Guidelines to better reflect the agencies actual practices by eliminating the divergence between the text of the Guidelines and their actual application by the agencies. Even with the upward revision in the HHI levels in the 2010 Guidelines, numerous transactions with HHIs well in excess of the presumption levels have been cleared by the agencies. My assumption is that this will continue to be the case both for the HHI presumption and for any transactions in which sufficient data are available to construct an economic model to attempt to 3 Comments of Ronald A. Stern and Mark D. Whitener To the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice For the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project (Nov. 9, 2009), available at horizontalmergerguides/ pdf. 4

6 quantify unilateral price effects, because the core of merger analysis will continue to be a comprehensive assessment of the likely competitive effects of the transaction. Concentration (HHI) and UPP levels should only be treated as part of the analysis rather than creating presumptions of likely significant anticompetitive effects. This approach involving a comprehensive assessment of factors affecting the determination of whether a merger is likely to harm competition significantly is embodied in the ICN s Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis that the U.S. agencies took a leading role in developing and that they, and the many other ICN member agencies, have endorsed 4. In sum, while I would have preferred that the new Guidelines removed the presumptions based on HHI levels, I agree with the assessment of Acting AAG Pozen in her review of the experience of the Division under the new Guidelines on their one year anniversary the agencies have continued to apply traditional merger analysis techniques to its merger reviews and the new Guidelines have not resulted in significant changes in their approach to assessing proposed transactions 5. You have previously expressed concerns about the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 6 and have remarked that the Supreme Court should reconsider the doctrine. Is that still your view? Do you think the doctrine is inappropriate regardless of the industry, including high-tech industries where network effects are profound? In my February 2007 presentation as part of the FTC and DOJ Hearings on Single-Firm Conduct, I endorsed the view expressed by my colleague, Mark Whitener, in his July 18, 2006 statement during the same Section 2 Hearings namely that the U.S. agencies should promote clarity by adopting the position that an unconditional, unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor does not constitute exclusionary conduct and therefore does not provide a basis for a Section 2 claim. I also endorsed the position taken by the United States and the FTC as amici curiae in their brief to the Supreme Court the Trinko case. The Government s position was that Section 2 requires exclusionary conduct and that the essential facilities doctrine has properly been heavily criticized because it does not provide an independent basis for imposing Section 2 liability which must always rest on a finding of exclusionary conduct 7. I took, and still take, the position that unilateral, unconditional refusals to deal should not be viewed as exclusionary conduct and that an approach that treats a refusal to continue to deal as exclusionary is highly problematic 4 ICN Recommended Practice for Merger Analysis, available at international_relations/icn/kyoto-materials/pdf/merger_wg_1.pdf 5 Sharis A. Pozen, Developments at the Antitrust Division and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines One year Late (Nov. 17, 2011), available at public/speeches/ pdf. 6 Ron Stern, Presentation to Federal Trade Commission and DOJ on Single-Firm Conduct, 9 (Feb. 13, 2007), available at docs/ htm. 7 Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, at 22 (May 23, 2003), available at because it simply incentivizes firms not to begin dealing in the first place which may reduce the returns on investment in innovation and harm consumers. I did not suggest that the Supreme Court reconsider the Essential Facilities Doctrine but rather noted that the doctrine has been questioned by the Court. As the Government s amicus brief in Trinko noted, the Court has never adopted the essential facilities doctrine in a Section 2 case 8. I also agree with the numerous critics of the Essential Facilities Doctrine that competition authorities and courts are ill-equipped to act as regulators deciding the price and terms on which the owners of such facilities are to be required to deal with their competitors. During the FTC/DOJ hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, you advocated for clear rules and guidance for business. The DOJ issued then withdrew the resulting Section 2 report. When Christine Varney withdrew the report, she suggested that the reason for the withdrawal was a shift in philosophy. 9 If changes in philosophy can lead to a completely new set of rules, how do you think business should navigate the waters of antitrust policy and compliance? I joined the then Assistant Attorney General ( AAG ) Barnett in underscoring the need for and benefits of clear, administrable and objective rules that both allow businesses to assess the legality of a practice before acting and enable enforcers and courts to judge challenged conduct predictably and correctly 10 and agreed with the then FTC Chairman Majoras regarding the importance of the promulgation of practical and straightforward standards that enable firms to avoid engaging in unlawful conduct, with minimal transaction costs 11.Those considerations provided further support for my view that unconditional, unilateral refusals to deal with competitors should be treated as per se lawful. Businesses should be able to rely on existing guidance from competition authorities and courts in implementing commercial initiatives without fear that they will face investigations and treble damage actions if there is a shift in philosophy. Of course, AAG Varney took the view that the September 2008 Section 2 Report represented a departure from tried and true case law and Supreme Court precedent 12 so that, in essence, the shift in philosophy was what was being withdrawn. I take comfort in what I believe to be a fairly broad consensus within the competition community in the U.S. (and in many other jurisdictions) so that there are unlikely to be a whole new set of rules adopted whenever 8 Idem. 9 Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at 10 Thomas O. Barnett, The Gales of Creative Destruction: the Need for Clear and Objective Standards for Enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Statement (June 20, 2006) at 16-17, available at 11 Deborah Platt Majoras, The Consumer Reigns: Using Section 2 to Ensure a Competitive Kingdom, Statement (June 20, 2006) at 10, available at sectiontwohearings/docs/majoris-statement.pdf. 12 Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law, DOJ Press Release (May 11, 2009) at 1, available at releases/2009/ htm. 5

7 there is a change in Administration or a shift in enforcement priorities. In addition, in the Section 2 area, the relatively stable view of when a firm is to be treated as a monopolist insulates most businesses from facing serious practical issues if there is a change in approach to the assessment of a particular type of exclusionary conduct. The main source of uncertainty in the U.S. is Section 5 of the FTC Act and its occasional use by the Commission to reach conduct found to constitute unfair methods of competition that would not otherwise violate well-established antitrust law requirements. The more difficult issues are presented by new regimes with laws that employ concepts such as collective dominance and abusive pricing that exist in the laws of some established competition regimes but have not been used by those regimes to limit the unilateral conduct of large, successful firms. On a personal level, how have you seen the nature of your practice change over time and what future challenges are you preparing to face? By far the most significant change in the nature of my practice has been the increasing globalization of competition law and the simultaneous globalization of GE s businesses. One of the key attractions of the offer to become GE s antitrust counsel in 1991 was the opportunity for a U.S. antitrust specialist to learn about other competition regimes. In 1991, I was thinking in terms of a handful of foreign merger regimes and competition laws primarily those of the EU, UK, Germany, Canada, and Japan. In the last 20+ years, there has not only been an explosion in the number of jurisdictions with competition laws but the globalization of GE s businesses has greatly increased the size and scope of GE s activities in many jurisdictions around the world. Because of the extraterritorial reach of most competition laws, the rapid expansion of GE s businesses, and the mobility of its senior managers, there is an increasing need to counsel to a global rather than a U.S. standard. I believe that the future challenges will evolve from these twin aspects of globalization, requiring both ongoing policy efforts to promote convergence and the development of a team of GE lawyers and outside counsel able to monitor and address changes in legal requirements and enforcement priorities that will continue to arise even if reasonable progress is made on convergence. 6

8 Concurrences est une revue trimestrielle couvrant l ensemble des questions de droits de l Union européenne et interne de la concurrence. Les analyses de fond sont effectuées sous forme d articles doctrinaux, de notes de synthèse ou de tableaux jurisprudentiels. L actualité jurisprudentielle et législative est couverte par onze chroniques thématiques. Concurrences Editorial Jacques Attali, Elie Cohen, Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Ian Forrester, Thierry Fossier, Eleanor Fox, Laurence Idot, Frédéric Jenny, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, Hubert Legal, Claude Lucas de Leyssac, Mario Monti, Christine Varney, Bo Vesterdorf, Louis Vogel, Denis Waelbroeck... Interview Sir Christopher Bellamy, Dr. Ulf Böge, Nadia Calvino, Thierry Dahan, John Fingleton, Frédéric Jenny, William Kovacic, Neelie Kroes, Christine Lagarde, Doug Melamed, Mario Monti, Viviane Reding, Robert Saint-Esteben, Sheridan Scott, Christine Varney... Tendances Jacques Barrot, Jean-François Bellis, Murielle Chagny, Claire Chambolle, Luc Chatel, John Connor, Dominique de Gramont, Damien Géradin, Christophe Lemaire, Ioannis Lianos, Pierre Moscovici, Jorge Padilla, Emil Paulis, Joëlle Simon, Richard Whish... Doctrines Guy Canivet, Emmanuel Combe, Thierry Dahan, Luc Gyselen, Daniel Fasquelle, Barry Hawk, Laurence Idot, Frédéric Jenny, Bruno Lasserre, Anne Perrot, Nicolas Petit, Catherine Prieto, Patrick Rey, Didier Théophile, Joseph Vogel... Pratiques Tableaux jurisprudentiels : Bilan de la pratique des engagements, Droit pénal et concurrence, Legal privilege, Cartel Profiles in the EU... Horizons Allemagne, Belgique, Canada, Chine, Hong-Kong, India, Japon, Luxembourg, Suisse, Sweden, USA... Droit et économie Emmanuel Combe, Philippe Choné, Laurent Flochel, Frédéric Jenny, François Lévêque Penelope Papandropoulos, Anne Perrot, Etienne Pfister, Francesco Rosati, David Sevy, David Spector... Chroniques ENTENTES Michel Debroux Nathalie Jalabert-Doury Cyril Sarrazin PRATIQUES UNILATÉRALES Frédéric Marty Anne-Lise Sibony Anne Wachsmann PRATIQUES RESTRICTIVES ET CONCURRENCE DÉLOYALE Muriel Chagny, Mireille Dany Jean-Louis Fourgoux, Rodolphe Mesa Marie-Claude Mitchell, Laurent Roberval DISTRIBUTION Nicolas Ereseo, Dominique Ferré Didier Ferrié CONCENTRATIONS Dominique Berlin, Jean-Mathieu Cot, Jacques Gunther David Hull, David Tayar AIDES D ÉTAT Jean-Yves Chérot Jacques Derenne Bruno Stromsky PROCÉDURES Pascal Cardonnel Alexandre Lacresse Christophe Lemaire RÉGULATIONS Hubert Delzangles Emmanuel Guillaume Francesco Martucci Jean-Paul Tran Thiet SECTEUR PUBLIC Bertrand du Marais Stéphane Rodrigues Jean-Philippe Kovar JURISPRUDENCES EUROPÉENNES ET ÉTRANGÈRES Jean-Christophe Roda, Florian Bien Silvia Pietrini POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE Frédérique Daudret John François Souty Stéphanie Yon Revue des revues Christelle Adjémian, Emmanuel Frot Alain Ronzano, Bastien Thomas Bibliographie Institut de recherche en droit international et européen de la Sorbonne (IREDIES)

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