Laterally Reversed Fingerprints Detected in Fake Documents

Transcription

1 Case Report Laterally Reversed Fingerprints Detected in Fake Documents Carlos Magno A. Girelli Federal Police Department of Brazil Identification Group in the Espirito Santo State Abstract: Cases involving laterally reversed fingerprints have been previously reported in the literature. In general, they are detected only when the expert already has suspects and is able to analyze the latent prints substrate. This case is about the analysis of hundreds of copies of supposedly fake identity documents in which reversed fingerprints were detected, not from characteristics of the substrate, but because of the attention paid by experienced experts during all stages of their work. Some difficulties associated with the detection of laterally reversed fingerprints are discussed in terms of visual perception, contextual bias, operational procedures, automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS), and accuracy of decision making based on costs and benefits. Possible solutions for avoiding errors when dealing with probable lateral reversals are discussed: (1) applying the ACE-V methodology with blind verification and (2) in specific circumstances, performing comparisons with both direct and reversed prints and storing them in AFIS (if possible) to allow for future comparisons. Introduction Laterally reversed fingerprints are difficult to detect. Some interesting cases involving the development and examination of reversed fingerprints have been reported in the literature [1 4]. Lane et al. [1] carried out some experiments to investigate the possibility of transferring latent fingerprints deposited on a substrate to another through contact between their surfaces. They cited a case where it was speculated that suspects in a narcotics case left latent prints while sealing and stacking plastic Received July 31, 2014; accepted October 14, (1), 2015 \ 1

2 bags with drugs. The contact between the surfaces caused partial transferring of friction ridge matrix, generating a second latent print, which was a reflection of the first one. Saviano [2] also used this example while discussing the importance of examining Level 1 details in latent prints. Using ninhydrin, Kershaw [3] developed a latent print on the page of a book and then discovered that it was a reflection of the original deposited on the previous page. Czarnecki [4] presented two cases: (1) partially overlapping conjoined latent prints, showing opposite patterns of loops, developed with cyanoacrylate on a plastic bag in the region in which it was folded on itself and (2) a latent print developed with ninhydrin on a paper mailing label removed from an envelope, which led to the mistaken use of the reversed image. Later it was discovered that the original print was on the adhesive side of the label, contrary to what had been speculated before. The present case to be reported also refers to reversed fingerprints, but it exhibits some peculiarities that differentiate it from the cases mentioned above. After a description of the case and its results, there is a discussion about some possible factors involved in decision making by fingerprint experts, especially when it comes to detecting laterally reversed fingerprints. The discussion covers aspects of visual perception, contextual bias, operational procedures, use of technology such as AFIS, and accuracy of decision making based on costs and benefits involved in the identification purposes. Case Description One of the many duties of the Federal Police Department of Brazil is the suppression of crimes against federal government property. In a recent investigation of fraud against a federal bank, hundreds of copies of supposed identity documents were presented for fingerprint examination. The criminals opened bank accounts using false documents, took out loans, and disappeared without paying the money back. This crime was committed repeatedly, by different people in different locations, and it caused great damage to the public treasury. In order to open an account, a customer must present some documents to the bank. One of these documents must be a valid photo identification, such as an identity card or driver s license. The identity card shows the individual s right thumbprint, but the driver s license does not. The bank manager checks the documents submitted by the applicant, makes copies of them, 2 / 65 (1), 2015

3 and stores the copies in the bank s files. Unfortunately, the manager has no effective means to verify the authenticity of the documents and the information provided by the supposed account holder. The vulnerability of identification documents of Brazilian citizens is a subject of intense debate in the country. Some proposals to correct this problem have already been made, but they have not been implemented yet. Once fraud is detected, the police will pursue investigations based on the copies of the documents presented by the criminal to the bank. Because they are just copies, it is not possible to conduct forensic examinations on the substrates to verify their authenticity. Usually, the documents are forged and the copies of the photos, even when they are visible, cannot lead to the immediate identification of the suspects, given the lack of databases based on photos and automated face recognition systems. Thus, the only remaining forensic materials available to the investigators are the fingerprints that are in the copies of the identity cards. Each isolated incident was a single crime that would normally be investigated independently. However, because of the similarity in the modus operandi of these crimes and the fact that the victim was the same federal bank, all of them were investigated together. Therefore, all documents (copies) were bundled together and sent to the Identification Group of Federal Police Department in the State of Espirito Santo for fingerprint examination. The hundreds of fingerprints were initially compared to each other, resulting in several matches. They were then subjected to an AFIS search, which resulted in more matches with latent prints from other unsolved criminal cases stored in the system. The AFIS search also led to the identification of some suspects. The long and exhausting work of the experts seemed to have ended with satisfactory results: satisfactory, but incomplete. The examiners concluded, based upon their experience and their attention to details, that the regular use of AFIS was not enough to solve the cases. Based on the analysis of Level 1 details [5] in all fingerprints assessed, the similarity between the ridge flows and shapes of some cores attracted the attention of the experts. As a result, they found out that some fingerprints were lateral reversals of others. Figure 1 shows two laterally reversed fingerprints detected in copies of different documents, and Figure 2 illustrates the results of one examination. 65 (1), 2015 \ 3

4 Figure 1 Laterally reversed fingerprints found in copies of different documents. Figure 2 Comparison of reversed fingerprints present in copies of fake identity documents. 4 / 65 (1), 2015

5 At first, it was not possible to verify whether the substrates were fake because the analyzed samples were copies. Forgeries were deduced from the matching fingerprints present in documents on behalf of distinct persons. The presence of laterally reversed fingerprints in different documents also indicated additional forgeries, because only one of the fingerprints could be present in a genuine document, obtained by the regular touch of the finger on the target (substrate or live scan). The other fingerprint requires an operation of reflection of the first one. When the reflection arises from the partial transferring of friction ridge matrix by the contact between surfaces, the mirrored latent prints usually show damage (e.g., they are smudged, distorted, or overlapped). This was not observed in the present case. The high quality of the analyzed fingerprints, characteristic of exemplars, suggested that the reversals were produced by the possible use of some technological resource such as imaging software. Among the suspects identified by fingerprints, one was arrested. Equipment for document forging, such as color laser printers, special papers, and inks, were seized in his house. He confessed that he manufactured false documents and sold them. His biggest mistake was to use his own fingerprint on some of the documents that he produced. The source of the forged documents was shut down, and the persons who presented those forgeries to the bank are gradually being identified and arrested by the law enforcement authorities. Discussion Before discussing specific aspects of the reported case, it is necessary to present some concepts and results of research about visual perception, contextual bias, operational procedures, use of technology such as AFIS, and accuracy of decision making based on costs and benefits. The expertise of adults in recognizing faces is associated with configural processing, which considers not just the shapes of individual features, but also the relationships among them [6]. This ability arises after years of experience in differentiating among upright faces. In contrast, adults expert skill in recognizing inverted faces is surprisingly poor. The Thatcher effect is a classic example that illustrates how upside-down faces are hard to recognize because of facial expression loss [7]. In general, changes in the orientation of objects can cause confusion. There 65 (1), 2015 \ 5

6 are several studies about the effects of images rotations and reversals on the observer s brain [8 12]. Busey and Vanderkolk [13] performed experiments to detect evidence of configural processing in fingerprint experts. The tests were given to experts and novices, and the results provided evidence for configural processing when experts view fingerprints. The improved identification performance of the experts can be explained in terms of the strategies and visual skills possibly developed during training and practice (perceptual learning), as well as by the following of standard procedures such as the ACE-V methodology [5]. The analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification (ACE-V) process is a well-known method for latent print examination and has been adopted in many countries and by respected entities such as the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) [5]. The analysis stage leads to the determination of suitability for comparison. The comparison and evaluation stages result in one of three outcomes: individualization, exclusion, or inconclusive. The verification stage requires the independent application of the ACE process... by a subsequent examiner to either support or refute the conclusions of the original examiner [5]. This can be done in a blind mode, in which the verifier does not know the initial examiner s decision. SWGFAST requires verification for individualization decisions, but verification is optional for exclusion or inconclusive decisions. Champod et al. [14] suggest that a systematic blind verification is not necessary during most routine examinations, because over 90% of identifications are generally not problematic and blind verification is time consuming and it unnecessarily drains significant personnel resources. Ulery et al. [15] performed a large-scale study of the accuracy and reliability of latent print examiners decisions, concluding, independent examination of the same comparisons by different participants (analogous to blind verification) was found to detect all false positive errors and the majority of false negative errors in their study. According to these authors, Policymakers will need to consider tradeoffs between the financial and societal costs and benefits of additional verifications. In a typical fingerprint matching process, the expert usually places the two fingerprints with the fingertips facing up and makes eye movements in search of matching features. The ACE-V methodology utilizes a qualitative and quantitative assessment of three levels of details [5]. When the print is of poor quality 6 / 65 (1), 2015

7 or represents only part of the entire fingerprint (something common for latent prints recovered from crime scenes), the presence of focal points, such as deltas and cores, may help the expert to reorient the fingerprint in order to perform the comparison, solving the rotation problem. Computational research has brought to the field efficient algorithms to recognize and orient fingerprints [16]. Usually, AFIS systems work within tolerance ranges for orientation angles, size variations, and small distortions. It is also common that the system makes available optional tools to set a complete 360 rotational search for unoriented latent prints or to reverse the images to work with the laterally reversed latent prints. Obviously, the unavailability of an AFIS system and the absence of focal points make the task harder. The use of AFIS represents a partnership between humans and technology for fingerprint examination in forensic science [17]. The cognitive distribution between them will depend on some factors such as quality of the fingerprints, purposes of the examination, and so forth. Identification of latent prints for criminal purposes requires human intervention in almost all stages and, above all, in decision making. Comparison of tenprints or exemplars for civilian purposes permits a lights-out process, in which the AFIS itself determines whether there is a match, after a predefined threshold is reached. AFIS is a database that is capable of storing fingerprints (and other ridge skin impressions) and uses an algorithm to compare them. In general, the existing minutiae in the fingerprints are assigned and their positions and directions are recorded in the system. Comparisons are made based on this minutiae map associated with each fingerprint. Modern processors enable fast and efficient searches of fingerprints in a database containing millions of records of tenprints and latent prints. At the end of the search, AFIS shows a list of candidates sorted according to a score interpreted by the system as a measure of similarity with the fingerprint being examined. Although the numerical value of the score presented by AFIS is not conclusive about the matching, it provides useful information for estimating relative probabilities [18]. AFIS specifications vary by manufacturer, but in general, there are many tools available in the system to assist the operator to achieve his results. Basically, these tools can be divided into two groups: (1) filters that can be used to restrict the search to a particular group of fingerprints within the whole database and (2) image-editing tools that allow the expert to reduce the 65 (1), 2015 \ 7

8 noise and thus increase the quantity and quality of minutiae marked for use in comparisons. One can realize that there is a conflict between response time (group 1) and reliability of the results (group 2). The cost-benefit ratio depends on the aims of the comparison and availability of resources. As an example, validation of identity to access a restricted area involving fingerprints collected in situ can (and should) be performed in lights-out mode, providing instant results. Any error, even if unlikely, will not cause significant damage. A completely different situation occurs with latent prints from criminal cases. The role of the expert is necessary in almost all steps: in the analysis and selection of prints, acquisition and editing of selected images, assignment and codification of minutiae, analysis and comparison with the candidates presented by the system, and finally decision making. The priority is to get reliable results, even if this requires longer response times. Errors can bring serious implications. Meagher et. al [19] discussed some possible scenarios for latent print processing in lights-out mode on AFIS. They proposed some tiers in which the activities performed by the experts were gradually replaced by automatic processing in AFIS, changing the cognitive distribution between human and technology. According to these authors, a complete understanding of the processes from latent print detection to expert testimony in courts is essential in order to fully analyze the costs and benefits and to identify any associated risks of the various scenarios presented. Although some AFIS tasks can be pre-programmed to run automatically, the examination of latent prints requires special attention because its results may have serious implications, affecting the life and freedom of people. Each crime scene has particular characteristics relating to the events that occurred. Likewise, each latent print has a history of the events related to the crime scene and characteristics of the surfaces and methods of development applied. There is no single process to consider all the factors involved, and constant decision making is needed when processing latent prints. In this sense, it does not seem reasonable to perform a latent print comparison in a lights-out mode. AFIS must be rationally used by the expert as a tool to optimize his or her original task. Each latent print has some peculiarities, such as noise, that require different processing and variable thresholds to be adopted. 8 / 65 (1), 2015

9 Even when using efficient technological resources such as AFIS and following appropriate standard operating procedures such as the ACE-V methodology, errors still occur [20]. Dror and Charlton [21] classify errors into three categories: (1) human errors (intentional, negligent, or competency); (2) instrumentation errors (failure and breakdown of equipment); and (3) nonspecific fundamental errors (limitations inherent to the nature of the human cognition process and also from the inaccuracy of the instruments). Error rates and the influence of contextual bias on decision making in forensic sciences have been studied in the last decade. Dealing specifically with fingerprint identification, Evett and Williams [22] suggested that there was a bias when examiners were presented with the latent and the known prints simultaneously. After the misidentification of a latent print in the 2004 Madrid bombing [23], the research in this direction became more intense. Dror et al. [24] examined the question of consistency during the analysis stage of latent marks. These researchers found out that the presence of a target comparison print affects the results, although this stage of the ACE-V methodology seems to be more objective and robust than other stages. Schiffer and Champod [25] also carried out research about the influence of observational biases at the analysis stage of fingerprint examination. Unlike the conclusions of previous authors, the results indicated, no effect of the stimuli used to induce observational biases has been observed [25]. One possible explanation for these unexpected results is the employment of a formal guideline, reducing the risk of drifting in the analysis stage, which is considered to be of a less decisional nature. It is also possible to see in their paper [25, Graph 2] that there are small differences between groups A and B. Perhaps with some changes in the experiments, those differences could be accentuated and the bias effect would become appreciable. The tests were applied to forensic science students before and after they followed specific training in fingermark individualization. The effect of training was observed in the form of an increase of minutiae annotated and a higher consensus between participants [25]. This better performance that is due to expertise is in agreement with Busey and Vanderkolk s results [13] and was also verified by Langenburg [26], as a result of a study concerning statistical analysis of the ACE-V methodology in its analysis stage. 65 (1), 2015 \ 9

10 Langenburg et al. [27] tested for potential contextual bias effects during the verification stage on novices and experts when conducting fingerprint comparisons. The bias effects were stronger for novice participants. Experts were more resistant to bias suggestions towards individualization and less so to suggestions towards inconclusive results and exclusion decisions. Dror et al. [28] re-presented fingerprints taken from real criminal cases to the same examiners who had previously made positive identifications of suspects, but this time, the examiners were provided with biasing contextual information, suggesting that they were nonmatches. Most of the experts made inconsistent decisions, leading the authors to conclude that fingerprint experts are vulnerable to biasing information. A subsequent similar study, also including past exclusion decisions, was conducted by Dror and Charlton [21]. The results indicated inconsistent decisions again, especially in past individualization decisions. According to these authors, It seems that the threshold to make a decision of exclusion is lower than that to make a decision of individualization. [21], in agreement with the results of Langenburg et al. [27] Also, according to Dror and Charlton, the psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities are most pronounced in the difficult cases [21], although they can also occur in simpler ones. They suggested, contextual information is not the only factor that may affect fingerprint experts [21]. Changes in decisions that were context-free were observed and may indicate that expert decisions can be inconsistent with time, reflecting changes in decision thresholds or changes of the decision strategy itself [21]. The research described above converges in the sense that experts can be biased by contextual information. The bias effect seems to be more intense during complex comparisons, especially when the quality of latent prints decreases and the number of minutiae approaches the standard threshold adopted. In such cases, the experts tend to be conservative in their decision making, something that is evidenced by the greater number of inconclusive and exclusion decisions compared to individualization. A general goal of these studies is to examine the objective and subjective elements involved in the human identification by fingerprints. The scientific basis for the use of fingerprints as robust evidence in courts requires a preponderance of objectivity over subjectivity, in order to avoid errors like that in the Mayfield case [23]. Recent work by Kellman et al. [29] 10 / 65 (1), 2015

11 demonstrates advances in this direction. They developed a methodology to quantify the level of difficulty of comparisons and to estimate error rates by measuring image features. Making mistakes is inherent to the nature of human cognition. No matter how well trained the expert is or how well the technology used by him or her works, the possibility of making errors does exist. A thorough understanding of the phenomena involved in the fingerprint identification activity may contribute to the improvement of techniques and technologies and thus enable the creation of procedures to reduce the probability of errors. The implementation of these procedures will depend on the balance between the societal costs of errors and inappropriate decisions, and the operational costs of detection [15]. In the words of Charlton [30], It is futile to develop tools and technology that can help minimize the effects of bias in law enforcement if the cost of those tools becomes prohibitive. Returning to the case report in question, the experts were biased by the contextual information, but in a positive way. The fraudulent nature of the crimes attracted the attention of the experts to details of the fingerprints, because there was the possibility that those fingerprints were manipulated during the process of forging the documents. Also preponderant was the fact that all of the documents were gathered and examined by the same experts. If they had been analyzed separately at different times or by different experts, reversals probably would not have been detected. Another important detail is the fact that the laterally reversed prints were whorl patterns, with reasonable lateral symmetry. If they had been loops, they would probably not have been detected, because the reversal would have changed the primary classification of the fingerprint. The perceptual learning cited by Busey and Vanderkolk [13], which leads to expertise, also promotes errors among the experts, as per Wertheim et al. [31]: if the latent print is a left-slant loop pattern and the exemplar bears a right-slant loop pattern, it is highly unlikely that a participant with even minimal training and experience would effect such an individualization. The expression was used within a specific context, referring to a likely clerical error committed in the experiment carried out by those authors, but demonstrates how difficult it is to detect laterally reversed fingerprints following routine operational procedures. This usual practice among experts results from the need to optimize searches for fingerprint identification, where Fingerprint classification is crucial to reduce the processing time in a large-scale database. 65 (1), 2015 \ 11

12 [32] During examination, one of the first steps is to exclude fingerprints based on their classification. This is a common risk assumed by examiners when they search for a fingerprint in a large list of candidates such as the database of an AFIS system [17]. Laterally reversed fingerprints are difficult to detect. Errors in decision making when comparing fingerprints with their own reversals can be classified as those of the third category proposed by Dror and Charlton [21], because sometimes errors are almost inevitable, even with human expertise and technology working well. In general, the regular search in AFIS is not sufficient to ensure a reversal s detection. In the case of latent prints from criminal cases, the examination deserves special attention, and it is necessary to have standard procedures for dealing with specific situations where reversals are more likely. The elucidation of the authorship of crimes by means of the identification of reversed fingerprints should not depend on luck or a sum of coincidences. One possible alternative to prevent human error in this sense, in addition to the best practices recommended by the NIST Human Factors report [33], is to establish standard operational procedures [34] containing welldefined criteria of how to proceed in specific situations with a real possibility of occurrence of reversals. The addition of such standard procedures requires further research in this field. The inclusion of matching from lateral reversals to experiments such as those of Busey and Vanderkolk [13], Langenburg et al. [27], and Wertheim et al. [31] could provide valuable information to better understand the difficulties associated with the human perception of laterally reversed fingerprints. Simulations involving the handling of substrates, such as those of real cases described in the introduction, can also generate useful information to address the issue. After deposition, development, and assessment of the latent prints, the ratio between the total number of reversals and direct prints could be calculated, thus estimating mean incidence rates of reversals for different situations. Although there are some parameters to be considered, this could be a first step towards providing scientific support to evaluate costs and benefits when establishing new search procedures considering lateral reversals. It is possible that there are nondetected reversals currently stored in the AFIS systems. They could be identified if all fingerprints of the database were reversed and re-processed. The enormous operational cost to realize this can be compared 12 / 65 (1), 2015

13 to performing blind verification in 100% of cases. Although this allows more reliable results, the benefits may not justify the costs. However, this work could be done only for latent prints derived from cases in which lateral reversals are most likely. This could not only lead to the identification of suspects in those real cases, but also support research with statistical data about incidence rate of lateral reversals. One suggestion to increase the detection of lateral reversals in special situations is to perform those comparisons with both direct and reversed prints and store them in AFIS (if possible) to allow for eventual future identifications. Some examples of special cases where lateral reversals can occur are (1) cases involving fake documents, (2) latent prints recovered from substrates in which the reversal could occur by the contact and ridge skin matrix transfer, such as folded plastic bags or stacked packages, and (3) photographs of latent prints from transparent substrates without indication of the surface on which it was developed. In such cases, the potential benefits seem to justify the operational costs. Furthermore, based on best practices suggested to reduce human error in fingerprint analysis [15, 33, 35], the application of ACE-V methodology with blind verification is also recommended for such cases. Conclusion The cases of reversed prints mentioned in other works referred to developments on various substrates using different developers. The existence of suspects and the circumstances involved led the experts to find the reversals, after thorough analysis of the possible dynamics that originated the latent prints. In this case, we could not rely on the dynamics involved in the creation of latent prints because there were no developments, but only comparison examinations on copies of documents. The identification of reversed fingerprints was due to the (positive) contextual biasing and examination of all documents by the same experts, who used their expertise and attention during all stages of the work. The default configurations of the AFIS used by the Federal Police Department of Brazil do not automatically consider the possibility of reversals. AFIS has a tool that allows for the reversed latent prints, but its use is optional. This is probably because the history of reversals had not justified, so far, the 65 (1), 2015 \ 13

14 inclusion of this routine in standard processing, which would mean an increase in workload and in response times. Further research on laterally reversed fingerprints is necessary to provide scientific support for editing new standard operational procedures regarding the issue. Until this happens, one suggestion is to apply differential treatment for latent prints originating from cases where the nature of the substrate and the circumstances indicate the possibility of lateral reversals. In such cases, both the original print and its lateral reversal (generated in AFIS or any image editing software) should be compared with the exemplars and should remain stored in AFIS (if possible) for future comparisons. In addition, the application of the ACE-V methodology with blind verification is highly recommended. It is believed that the potential benefits from positive identifications of lateral reversals generated by criminals justify the increase in workload and response time resulting from the implementation of this procedure. Acknowledgment The author would like to thank Paulo Alves and Danilo Fonseca for help with the language, as well as the anonymous reviewers for the valuable comments that have made this case report worthy of publication. For further information, please contact: References Carlos Magno A. Girelli MJ - Departamento de Policia Federal Superintendencia Regional no Espirito Santo Grupo de Identificacao Av. Vale do Rio Doce, 01, Sao Torquato Vila Velha - ES, Brazil girelli.cmag@dpf.gov.br 1. Lane, P. A.; Hilborn, M.; Guidry, S.; Richard, C. E. Serendipity and Super Glue: Development of Laterally Reversed, Transferred Latent Prints. J. For. Ident. 1988, 38 (6), Saviano, J. The Significance of Using Level 1 Detail in Latent Print Examinations. J. For. Ident. 2003, 53 (2), Kershaw, M. H. Laterally Reversed. J. For. Ident. 2000, 50 (2), / 65 (1), 2015

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