1 Reply To: 2200 HOLLYWOOD, BLVD., HOLLYWOOD, FL Office Fax Robert J. Bates, Esq. C o u n s e l or a t Law Member Fl. & N.J. Bar N. COLLIER BLVD. MARCO ISLAND, FL Office ROBERT J. BATES, ESQ. CURRICULUM VITAE Admission to Practice PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALS Florida State Courts New Jersey State Courts Federal District Court For The District Of New Jersey Federal District Court For The Southern District Of New York Federal District Court For The Eastern District Of New York United States Tax Court United States Supreme Court Numerous others on a pro hac vice basis. Professional Associations Bergen County Bar Association Broward County Bar Association New Jersey Bar 1981 Florida Bar Association 1992 Florida Bar Sections Administrative Law Section Criminal Law Section Government Lawyer Section Labor and Employment Law Section City County and Local Government Law Section Trial Lawyers Section 1
2 EMPLOYMENT Director of the Office of Professional Standards For the City of Fort Lauderdale (OPS) September 27, 2004 through August 2011 OPS reduced City labor related expenses by more than 85% saving the City of Fort Lauderdale $21,000, During this time, OPS handled more than 500 matters principally arising from the 2600 employees. Common examples of the matters included ethical violations, assaults, theft, discrimination, expressions of hate, harassment, and special investigations, including that of the police chief, as well as those resulting in referrals to local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Self Employed Attorney Started June 1981 Self Employed 1983 through the 2005 phase out period Florida Office, 2000 until North Collier Boulevard Marco Island, Florida NJ Office, Fairview Avenue Westwood, N.J. Westwood Public Defender Previous service for approximately 2 years Appointed by the Mayor of Westwood, NJ to provide Criminal Defense for local indigent clients. Adjunct Professor of Business Law 08/82 to 12/85 Ramapo College of New Jersey School Of Business Administration Mahwah, N.J. PRIOR LIFE EXPERIENCES President and Trustee Park Ridge Board of Education Park Ridge, New Jersey Elected to serve as Trustee for a seven member School Board. Leadership roles included serving as President and Chief Negotiator for Collective Bargaining Agreements. Structural Iron Worker Field work from Continuous Dues Paying Through Today Local 361 New York 2
3 International Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers Remain a Union Member Today Duties included iron working, rigging, welding, burning and fitting of iron in the New York City high steel environment. Dockbuilder Permit Work Local 1456 Dock Builders New York, New York Duties included pile driving, underpinning, shoring and carpentry. Laborer May Local 731 International Associations of Laborers 57th Street New York, New York Duties included general laboring and excavating. Pace University School Of Law White Plains, N.Y. Juris Doctor 1981 Rutgers University Graduate School of Labor Studies Labor Studies Center New Brunswick, N.J Ramapo College Mahwah, N.J. B.A. American Studies 1977 Structural Ironworker's Apprentice Program 3 year study EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL AWARD National Endowment For The Humanities Scholarship Recipient City University of New York Graduate School New York, N.Y. Summer 1978 Selected as one of fifteen from a national pool of applicants to participate in a stipended study of labor history in the summer of RJB:slf 3
4 ROBERT J. BATES Biographical Narrative Robert J. Bates, attorney, is the former Director of the Office of Professional Standards for the City of Fort Lauderdale having served in that Directorship from September 2004 until August During his tenure, the office handled more than 400 cases, including complaints of ethical violations, theft, discrimination, harassment, and special investigations including referrals to law enforcement and the State Attorney s Office. The efforts of his tenure saved the City of Fort Lauderdale over 21 million dollars of labor related expenses. See the spreadsheets produced by the risk management department describing the efforts and savings in labor related expenses. History Mr. Bates spent years working structural high steel in the New York Metropolitan area while simultaneously attending a three year Iron Worker Apprentice Studies Program at night, and studying for his B.A. at Ramapo College N.J., on weekends. Thereafter he attended night classes at Rutgers University Labor Education Center and was one of fifteen people selected from a national pool of candidates to receive the prestigious National Endowment for the Humanities Scholarship in 1978 for additional studies at City University of New York. Mr. Bates completed his education in June 1981 at Pace University School of Law, located in White Plains, New York. Mr. Bates is professionally persistent, focused and driven. From 1983 to September 2004, he maintained his litigation based practice which included criminal, civil rights, constitutional and labor related matters. He regularly appeared before
5 Federal, Florida and New Jersey courts. A representative example of his work is the trial and exhaustion of appeals resulting in the seminal N.J. Supreme Court opinion cited as State v Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227 (2001). This matter concerned the suppression of blood evidence obtained from a DWI suspect with blood alcohol reading of 0.288, more than three times the legal limit. The opinion and Shepard s citations are included. In another employment related matter, he successfully defended a municipal maintenance worker accused of exposing himself on two occasions, groping women on other occasions and generally being vulgar. After weeks of trial, the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their case against his client even though his client had the benefit of the municipal insurance coverage. See articles included. The municipality however, remained in the case and was eventually burdened by a judgment and plaintiff s counsel fees. Through today, Mr. Bates has continued his interest in criminal law and labor and employment issues, and has maintained his membership in the Structural Iron Workers Union, New York Local 361.
6 OPS was created on 1/21/2003 to handle a broad range of claims. The EEO Division of HR handled some of the types of claims now handled by OPS. Latimer Report 11/01/2001 ESP (Early Settlement Program) Developed 11/05/2004 (See below) 07/21/2006 OPS is assigned admin. responsibility for the complex litigation concerning the ADA Consent Decree. For the first time the City achieves tremendous success in defending the Federal Court action. On 08/21/2006 OPS was asked t o preserve or improve the City Flood Hazard Rating. Fema acknowledged the improved status on 10/02/2008 and provided a plaque. Fema Project, 8/21/2006 til 10/01/ Employees Employees The early settlement program results in the majority of major matters being voluntarily settled without resorting to arbitration and other costly proceedings. The process achieves deterrence goals while preserving work place cohesion and employee self image.
8 777 A.2d 301 Page 1 (Cite as: ) Supreme Court of New Jersey. STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard A. RAVOTTO, Defendant-Appellant. Argued May 1, Decided July 26, After his suppression motion was denied, defendant entered conditional guilty plea in the Edgewater Municipal Court to charge of driving while under influence (DUI). Defendant appealed. The Superior Court, Law Division, Bergen County, ordered suppression of blood evidence taken from defendant, and state appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed and remanded, 333 N.J.Super. 247, 755 A.2d 602. On certification, the Supreme Court, Verniero, J., held that; (1) police used unreasonable force in obtaining defendant's blood sample, and (2) independent source doctrine did not apply. Appellate Division's decision reversed and remanded. LaVecchia, J., issued dissenting opinion in which Poritz, C.J., joined. West Headnotes  Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures 349I In General 349k36 Circumstances Affecting Validity of Warrantless Search, in General 349k36.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases A search or an arrest by the police must be reasonable, measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures 349I In General 349k24 k. Necessity of and Preference for Warrant, and Exceptions in General. Most Cited Cases Prior to conducting a search, the police must obtain a warrant from a judicial officer unless the search falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures 349I In General 349k24 k. Necessity of and Preference for Warrant, and Exceptions in General. Most Cited Cases Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures 349VI Judicial Review or Determination 349k192 Presumptions and Burden of Proof 349k192.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases There is a constitutional preference for a warrant, issued by a neutral judicial officer, supported by probable cause; thus, the burden is on the government to prove the exceptional nature of the circumstances that exempts it from the warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures 349I In General 349k13 What Constitutes Search or Seizure 349k14 k. Taking Samples of Blood, or Other Physical Specimens; Handwriting Exemplars. Most Cited Cases The state's taking of blood from a suspect constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.  Arrest 35 68(2) 35 Arrest 35II On Criminal Charges 35k68 Mode of Making Arrest 35k68(2) k. Use of Force. Most Cited Cases With or without a warrant, the police may not use 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
9 777 A.2d 301 Page 2 (Cite as: ) unreasonable force to perform a search or seizure of a person. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Arrest 35 68(2) 35 Arrest 35II On Criminal Charges 35k68 Mode of Making Arrest 35k68(2) k. Use of Force. Most Cited Cases The reasonableness inquiry with respect to a claim that the police used unreasonable force to perform a search or seizure of a person is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Arrest 35 68(2) 35 Arrest 35II On Criminal Charges 35k68 Mode of Making Arrest 35k68(2) k. Use of Force. Most Cited Cases Courts employ a balancing test to determine whether the use of force to perform a search or seizure of a person in a given case is reasonable; the proper application of this test requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Arrest 35 68(2) 35 Arrest 35II On Criminal Charges 35k68 Mode of Making Arrest 35k68(2) k. Use of Force. Most Cited Cases An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force in performing a search or seizure of a person; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.  Arrest 35 68(2) 35 Arrest 35II On Criminal Charges 35k68 Mode of Making Arrest 35k68(2) k. Use of Force. Most Cited Cases Force used by police to extract defendant's blood in hospital emergency room was unreasonable under totality of circumstances; defendant was terrified of needles and voiced his strong objection to procedures used on him, he shouted and flailed as nurse drew his blood, several persons, including police, and mechanical restraints were needed to hold defendant down, charge against defendant, i.e., driving while under influence (DUI), was quasi-criminal rather than criminal in nature, and even without blood test police had strong case against defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Arrest Arrest 35II On Criminal Charges 35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without Warrant 35k63.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases A suspect's reaction to law enforcement officials is part of the fact pattern considered by a reviewing court when it determines whether police behavior in performing a search or seizure of a person was objectively reasonable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Arrest 35 68(2) 35 Arrest 35II On Criminal Charges 35k68 Mode of Making Arrest 35k68(2) k. Use of Force. Most Cited Cases In reviewing a claim that the police used unreasonable force to perform a search or seizure of a person, the Supreme Court considers the offense that was under investigation as part of the totality of the circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Criminal Law (3) 110 Criminal Law 110XVII Evidence 110XVII(I) Competency in General 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
10 777 A.2d 301 Page 3 (Cite as: ) 110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained 110k394.1 In General 110k394.1(3) k. Effect of Illegal Conduct on Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases Independent source doctrine did not apply in prosecution for driving while under influence (DUI) to allow introduction of blood test results that were obtained in hospital as result of unconstitutional use of force, despite claim that police ultimately would have obtained defendant's test results, free of any constitutional taint, from hospital itself; that hospital staff would have taken blood test absent police request was unclear, and even if hospital had required its own blood samples for diagnostic purposes, once state assisted in forced taking of those samples it could no longer acquire them under independent source doctrine. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7.  Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures 349I In General 349k13 What Constitutes Search or Seizure 349k14 k. Taking Samples of Blood, or Other Physical Specimens; Handwriting Exemplars. Most Cited Cases State's taking of blood without warrant and against defendant's will constituted search and antecedent seizure of defendant's person within meaning of search-and-seizure jurisprudence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 1, par. 7. **303 *231 Ronald K. Chen, argued the cause for appellant, (Mr. Chen, Robert J. Bates, Westwood, and J.C. Salyer, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Mr. Chen, Mr. Bates and Mr. Salyer, on the briefs). Susan W. Sciacca, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause, for respondent, (William H. Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney). Linda K. Danielson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause, for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey, (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. This case implicates defendant's right to be free of unreasonable searches under the federal and State Constitutions. The police arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated. Thereafter, they transported defendant to a hospital where an officer requested that medical personnel take samples of his blood to test for drug and alcohol content. Over defendant's strenuous objections, his legs and his left arm were strapped to a table, and several persons, including two police officers, held him down as a nurse drew eight vials of blood. The Law Division disallowed the use of that evidence on constitutional grounds. On leave to appeal granted to the State, the Appellate Division reversed, finding no constitutional violation. We disagree. We hold that under the totality of **304 the circumstances the police used unreasonable force in obtaining defendant's blood sample. In view of that holding, we conclude that the Law Division properly suppressed defendant's blood alcohol content level as evidence of intoxication. I. Except as noted, the facts are clearly set forth in the record. In the early morning hours of January 18, 1997, defendant Richard Ravotto consumed alcohol at a friend's house. At about six *232 o'clock that morning, an Edgewater police officer discovered that defendant had overturned his car in a one-car accident. Officer Steven Kochis found defendant lying in the back of his car, which was entangled in a chain-link fence. The officer asked defendant if he was all right and whether anyone else was in the car. Defendant responded that he was all right and that he was alone. When an ambulance arrived, however, defendant said, Hurry up. Hurry up. There's three of us in here. When defendant came out of the car, he said, Ha, ha, I was only kidding. Another officer, Edmond Sullivan, arrived at the scene. Both officers smelled a strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. Although he appeared disheveled, defendant had no visible injuries. As a precaution, the police tried to get defendant onto a backboard so he could be taken to a hospital in the ambulance. Defendant refused medical treatment, insisting that he was not injured. Believing such treatment was in defendant's best interests, the police and other emergency workers forced defendant onto the backboard 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
11 777 A.2d 301 Page 4 (Cite as: ) and prepared to transport him to nearby Englewood Hospital. Defendant vigorously resisted those efforts. Suspecting that defendant was under the influence of alcohol, Officer Kochis instructed Officer Sullivan to accompany defendant to the hospital and obtain a blood sample from him. Before departing the scene, the police placed defendant under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Defendant continued to struggle against the restraints of the backboard on the way to the hospital. Once there, defendant tried to punch an attending physician who attempted to take his blood pressure. Shortly after arriving at the hospital, Officer Sullivan requested that medical personnel take a blood sample from defendant to test for drug and alcohol content. The officer did not obtain a warrant authorizing the taking of the sample. Before the hospital could take the blood, a police blood kit had to be delivered from police headquarters. Officer Sullivan waited an hour to receive the blood kit, then provided it to a registered nurse who took the sample. At no time did the officer offer defendant a Breathalyzer test *233 as an alternative method of testing for alcohol content levels. To obtain defendant's blood, Officer Sullivan and hospital personnel had to restrain defendant. Defendant's legs and his left arm were strapped to a table, and several persons, including Officer Sullivan and the officer who delivered the blood kit, held him down. The record is undisputed that defendant screamed and struggled to free himself as the nurse drew his blood. Defendant later testified that he had said repeatedly, I'm afraid of needles. I have no problem giving you a Breathalyzer sample if that's what you want but do not take my blood. He claimed that a childhood accident had made him afraid of needles. Defendant also testified that he had felt as though he were being raped as the blood was taken. The nurse took eight vials of blood, four for use by the police and four for the hospital's diagnostic purposes. The record **305 does not clearly indicate whether the hospital would have extracted defendant's blood absent police involvement. Defendant was kept in restraints for about six hours after the blood samples were taken, and then discharged. Defendant received no other treatment while he was at the hospital. Defendant was charged with violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, which sets forth the penalties for driving while intoxicated. A related measure, New Jersey's implied consent statute, provides that drivers licensed in this State shall be deemed to have given their consent to the taking of breath samples for the purposes of making chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in [their] blood[.] N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a). The statute prohibits the police from using force in administering such tests, stating that [n]o chemical test, provided in this section, or specimen relating thereto, may be made or taken forcibly and against physical resistance thereto by the defendant. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). A driver's failure to submit to a lawfully requested test results in the loss of driving privileges for an extended period. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Although the implied consent statute pertains solely to *234 breath tests and thus is not applicable, State v. Woomer, 196 N.J.Super. 583, 586, 483 A.2d 837 (App.Div.1984), we have described it here to provide a context for our disposition. Defendant moved before the municipal court to suppress the results of the blood test, which revealed a blood alcohol content of percent (nearly three times the legal limit). The court denied defendant's motion, holding that the police were under no obligation to give him the option of taking a Breathalyzer test. The court also concluded that the police did not have to obtain a search warrant to extract the blood because of the evanescent nature of that evidence. The court found nothing improper about the use of force by the police in taking blood from defendant. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to driving while intoxicated and appealed the denial of his suppression motion to the Law Division. The Law Division reversed the municipal court, holding that the police should have obtained at least a telephonic warrant authorizing the blood sample. The court then entered a not guilty plea on defendant's behalf and remanded the case to the municipal court for trial. The State moved for leave to appeal before the Appellate Division, which granted the State's motion and reversed the Law Division's determination. State v. Ravotto, 333 N.J.Super. 247, 755 A.2d 602 (App.Div.2000). The Appellate Division noted that the rules established by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), permit blood to be taken over the opposition of a suspect in certain in Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
12 777 A.2d 301 Page 5 (Cite as: ) stances. Ravotto, supra, 333 N.J.Super. at 254, 755 A.2d 602. The panel cited other authority, including State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970), in which this Court held that the defendant's failure to consent to a breath test did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Ravotto, supra, 333 N.J.Super. at 254, 755 A.2d 602. The panel also cited Woomer, supra, 196 N.J.Super. at 587, 483 A.2d 837, in which the Appellate Division approved a police officer's threat of force to *235 obtain a blood sample from an intoxicated driver. Ravotto, supra, 333 N.J.Super. at 255, 755 A.2d 602. Reasoning from those cases, the Appellate Division concluded that a motor vehicle driver arrested for driving under the influence has no legal right to refuse chemical testing and the police are not required to obtain his or her consent. **306 Further, such a driver can be restrained in order to extract a blood sample. Id. at , 755 A.2d 602. In view of defendant's accident and the evanescent nature of blood alcohol levels, the panel concluded that the police acted reasonably in transporting defendant to the hospital and ordering a blood test. The court also held that the police officer was not required to seek a telephonic search warrant simply because there was a time lag at the hospital during which he waited for the blood kit. Id. at 256, 755 A.2d 602. This Court granted defendant's petition for certification. 165 N.J. 677, 762 A.2d 657 (2000). We also granted the motion of the Attorney General for leave to appear as amicus curiae. (For convenience, we will refer to the State and the Attorney General collectively as the State.) We now reverse. II. A.  Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, a search or an arrest by the police must be reasonable, measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1996); State v. Stelzner, 257 N.J.Super. 219, 229, 608 A.2d 386 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 396, 614 A.2d 619 (1992). Prior to conducting a search, the police must obtain a warrant from a judicial officer unless the search falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. *236Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, , 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1731, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 935 (1967); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 37, 573 A.2d 1376 (1990).  As we have stated in other settings, there is a constitutional preference for a warrant, issued by a neutral judicial officer, supported by probable cause. State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 670, 751 A.2d 92 (2000). Accordingly, the burden is on the government to prove the exceptional nature of the circumstances that exempts it from the warrant requirement. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413 (1970); State v. Henry, 133 N.J. 104, 110, 627 A.2d 125, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 984, 114 S.Ct. 486, 126 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993). The State's taking of blood from a suspect constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 767, 86 S.Ct. at 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d at 918.  With or without a warrant, the police may not use unreasonable force to perform a search or seizure of a person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). [T]he reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 456. See also Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir.1999) (emphasizing that under Graham, reasonableness should be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances' ).  More specifically, Graham instructs courts to employ a balancing test to determine whether the use of force in a given case is reasonable. The Supreme Court explained that the proper application [of the balancing test] requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is **307 actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. [ Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 455.] 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
13 777 A.2d 301 Page 6 (Cite as: ) *237 Because the test is an objective one, [a]n officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 456. B. Against the backdrop of those general principles, Schmerber stands as the seminal case involving the forced extraction of blood from an accused. In Schmerber, the defendant and a companion had been drinking at a California tavern. Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 759, 86 S.Ct. at 1829, 16 L.Ed.2d at 912. They drove from the establishment around midnight in the defendant's car, which then skidded and struck a tree. Ibid. Both the defendant and his companion were taken to a hospital for treatment of their injuries, after which the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 758, 86 S.Ct. at 1829, 16 L.Ed.2d at 913. The police directed hospital personnel to take a blood sample to test the defendant's blood alcohol level, and the defendant apparently submitted to the test but did not consent to it. Id. at , 86 S.Ct. at 1829, 16 L.Ed.2d at The defendant was convicted of drunk driving and appealed on several grounds, including that the blood test violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. In rejecting the defendant's claims, the Supreme Court framed the issues this way: [T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police were justified in requiring [the defendant] to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. [ Id. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d at 918.] Within that analytical framework, the Court concluded that the defendant's intoxicated appearance (his watery, bloodshot eyes and the smell of liquor on his breath) provided probable cause for the arrest. *238Id. at , 86 S.Ct. at , 16 L.Ed.2d at It also found that because blood alcohol levels diminish rapidly, the police had acted reasonably in taking a sample of the defendant's blood after they had arrested him. Id. at , 86 S.Ct. at , 16 L.Ed.2d at 920. The Court further found that because it was minimally intrusive and highly accurate, the defendant's blood test was a reasonable measure of blood alcohol content. Id. at 771, 86 S.Ct. at 1836, 16 L.Ed.2d at 920. Particularly pertinent to this case, the Court suggested that compulsory blood tests may not be permissible in all circumstances. In that regard, the Court noted that the defendant was not one of the few who on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple might prefer some other means of testing, such as the Breathalyzer test [the defendant] refused... We need not decide whether such wishes would have to be respected. Ibid. The Court concluded that the defendant's blood test, performed by a physician in a hospital environment and without the use of force, had been performed in accordance with medically acceptable practices. Ibid. **308 The closest analogue to Schmerber in our State jurisprudence is State v. Macuk. In that case, the police arrested the defendant after he drove his car off a road and into a ditch. Macuk, supra, 57 N.J. at 5, 268 A.2d 1. The defendant admitted that he had been drinking, and the police noticed that the defendant was swaying as he stood and slurring his speech. Ibid. At the police station, the police asked the defendant for breath samples, and he readily consented. Id. at 6-7, 268 A.2d 1. The breath test revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.18 percent, which exceeded the 0.15 percent limit in effect at that time. Id. at 7, 268 A.2d 1. The defendant was convicted of drunk driving. On appeal the defendant argued that before administering the breath test, the police should have informed him of the privilege against self-incrimination as required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Macuk, supra, 57 N.J. at 5, 268 A.2d 1. The Court rejected that claim. Analyzing *239 New Jersey's implied consent statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, and the applicable case law, the Court stated: 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY EDWARD A. JEREJIAN BERGEN COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER JUDGE HACKENSACK, NJ 07601 Telephone: (201) 527-2610 Fax Number: (201) 371-1109 Joseph M. Mark Counsellor at Law 200 John Street
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