1 INIS-XA--013 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY XA REPORT OF THE 1995 ANNUAL MEETING OF EVES NATIONAL OFFICERS Experience and Feedback from Operation of the EVES Information Service IAEA Headquarters, Vienna October 1995 Reproduced by the IAEA Vienna, Austria, 1995 The material in this document has been supplied by the authors and has not been edited by the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility of the named authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the government(s) of the designating Member States(s). In particular, neither the IAEA nor any other organization or body sponsoring this meeting can be held responsible for any material reproduced in this document. V0»
2 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY REPORT OF THE 1995 ANNUAL MEETING OF INES NATIONAL OFFICERS Experience and Feedback from Operation of the INES Information Service IAEA Headquarters, Vienna October 1995 Reproduced by the IAEA Vienna, Austria, 1995 The material in this document has been supplied by the authors and has not been edited by the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility of the named authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the governments) of the designating Member States(s). In particular, neither the IAEA nor any other organization or body sponsoring this meeting can be held responsible for any material reproduced in this document
3 CONTENTS 1. REPORT OF THE MEETING 2. EXPERIENCE WITH THE USE OF INES IN VARIOUS MEMBER COUNTRIES: Armenia Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Czech Republic Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Japan Kazakhstan Korea, Rep. of Mexico The Netherlands Norway Romania The Russian Federation Slovak Republic Republic of South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Ukraine 3. REPORT OF THE IAEA INES CO-ORDINATOR 4. EVALUATION OF QUESTIONNAIRES ON PUBLIC COMMUNICATION, PRACTICES AND THE USE OF THE INES SCALE LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 6. LISTS OF INES NATIONAL OFFICERS AND ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 7. LIST OF MEETING PARTICIPANTS
4 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Fifty eight countries are now formally participating in the use of INES as a means of prompt communication of nuclear events. Twenty-six countries attended the TCM, including nearly all countries with major nuclear programmes. 1.2 Presentations were given by all attendees. No events above level 2 were reported in 1994/95. Participants reported that the use of the Scale was proceeding satisfactorily in their countries without major problems. In some countries, notable progress had been made in obtaining greater understanding and use of the Scale by the media and public. However, it was recognized that communication issues remain of the highest priority. 2. REVIEW AND TECHNICAL OPERATION OF THE SCALE 2.1 Analysis by the Advisory Committee suggested ratings were being applied consistently by member countries. From the events submitted to the IAEA, it was concluded that none of the ratings examined were in error by more than one level on the Scale. In particular, no event rated at level 2 on INES was judged to be underrated. There was no evidence of systematic over-rating or under-rating of events. 2.2 It was noted that explanations for ratings given on the Event Report Forms suggested that there was improved use of the procedure for rating events on the defence-in-depth criterion. This suggests that training programmes conducted over the previous twelve months are improving use and understanding of the concepts in the Manual. 2.3 Criteria for the submission of ratings to the IAEA was confirmed by the TCM (all events rated at level 2 or above; all events provoking media interest and, if desired, a selection of events which allow the operation of the Scale to be
5 2 monitored, particularly where these provide opportunities to test the operation of the Scale at its lowest levels). National Officers were encouraged to submit more events falling into the latter category, so that the Advisory Committee can give improved feedback and review general lessons on the rating of events. 2.4 Six events occurring at non-reactor sites were reviewed at the Advisory Committee. INES National Officers were particularly encouraged to submit more event reports dealing with non-reactors. 2.5 It was noted that some event reports were provisional. National Officers were requested to confirm ratings as soon as possible. 2.6 The major area for improvement in the use of the Scale remained the need to communicate events more rapidly, particularly those of media interest. 2.7 Reports from member countries showed wide variations in the number of level 1, events recorded and in the ratio between events reported under National arrangements and the number of those rated at level 1. This was not, in itself, regarded as a matter of importance or concern, but the result reemphasized the concern of the TCM that the number of events rated on the Scale should not be the subject of international comparison. The Scale was not designed to facilitate such comparisons and the TCM concluded that such comparisons are both inappropriate an meaningless.
6 3. PROGRESS WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN USE OF THE SCALE The TCM recorded its thanks to the Advisory Committee for the substantial work carried out during the last year. 3.2 The document "Clarification of Issues Raised" had been produced, drawing together amendments to the Manual and guidance produced at the request of National Officers. It was noted that the Manual remains the primary reference document, but INES Officers should note factual corrections contained within the clarification document. Advice contained within the document should also be noted and can be used to help rate events. Its appropriate use, however, is a matter for National Officers. It was not anticipated that further additional clarification will be produced by the Advisory Committee. However, the Committee will continue to respond to questions submitted by National Officers and circulate responses wherever this is regarded as helpful. 3.3 A draft computerized rating system has been provided as requested at the last TCM. This has proved useful to the users of the Scale. National Officers were invited to feedback comments and propose further short-term improvements to the system as soon as possible, but no later than the end of A new version would then be produced and circulated. 3.4 The Advisory Committee have produced model material linking initiators and safety function for some reactor types. National Officers were invited to produce material specific to the designs in their own country. 3.5 Results of the questionnaire on communication policies and practices were reviewed. Special consideration of the topic was also given in most National presentations. It was agreed that more analysis should be carried out of the questionnaire results by Ms. Gerster Marin on behalf of the Advisory Committee. Members who had not responded to the questionnaire were invited to do so before the end of the year. Results of the preliminary
7 4 analysis are attached to this report. 3.6 An extensive discussion was held regarding simplification of the rating process and possible amendments to the User's Manual. It was strongly emphasized in this discussion that there is no intention to change the basic INES Scale; there is, however, merit in considering ways in which procedures for rating under defence in-depth might be simplified. The work carried out by the Advisory Committee was presented and it was noted that useful progress had been made. Establishing a rigorous approach to defence in-depth was recognized as a very significant achievement of the INES programme and in carrying out modifications to the procedure it was agreed that the existing three levels of defence in-depth should be retained including the philosophy underpinning the approach (e.g. relativities between levels). Furthermore amendments should not lead to substantial change to the rating of previously rated events. An amended Manual, if adopted, should remain technically defensible and be complete without the need for supplementary material. Reservations were also expressed about the need for new material to be compatible as far as possible with the training already given. Some countries have invested significant resource in explaining the concepts used. 3.7 However, on balance, it was agreed that the Advisory Committee should work to develop a new Manual based on their recent work but taking account of the issues raised in paragraph 3.6. It was proposed that the new document should contain three basic sections. The first would provide an overview of the philosophy, the general technical approach underlying the Scale and attempt to unify the reactor and non reactor material. This should also be suitable to meet the need for improved communication with professionals and technical journalists discussed below. The second section should provide the rating methodology based on the on-site and off-site criteria. This would not be changed from the present version. The final section should deal with defence in-depth, employing, if possible, the simplified methodology currently under development supplemented by examples to illustrate the approach. The
8 5 revised document will be circulated and discussed at the 1996 TCM. Meanwhile the current Manual and procedure for rating events under the defence in-depth criterion will remain unchanged. 4. PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 4.1 Although progress had been made, developing an improved appreciation and greater use of the Scale remained a primary objective. 4.2 A requirement was identified for a technical description of the Scale simpler than the User's Manual. This is expected to be the same document as that proposed for incorporation in the User's Manual (see paragraph 3.7). 4.3 In addition, it was considered important to develop further material to explain the Scale to the general public and non-specialist journalists. A simple leaflet and/or video would be investigated in conjunction with IAEA public communications experts. Wherever possible, in developing this material (and that referred to in paragraph 4.2), the views of representatives of the media would be sought. The material should be endorsed by the IAEA, but reflect the national context. It was agreed that this work should be carried out by a new group, including representatives of the TCM, led initially by the INES TCM Chairman. 5. NON-REACTOR TRIAL 5.1 At the 1994 TCM, it was agreed that subject to satisfactory progress, formal adoption should be recommended by the 1995 TCM. 5.2 No major difficulties have been encountered in the use of the non-reactor part of the Scale. However, feedback from the trial had not been as great as anticipated.
9 6 5.3 On balance, however, it was agreed that sufficient confidence in the approach now existed to warrant an end of trial use and to invite participating countries formally to adopt the non-reactor part of the Scale. 5.4 The Secretariat agreed to determine the most appropriate means to initiate this. Member countries would determine when they wished to adopt this part of the Scale and should decide which types of installations would participate.
10 TABLE OF INES NATIONAL OFFICERS RECOMMENDATIONS
11 1995 ANNUAL MEETING OF INES NATIONAL OFFICERS RECOMMENDATIONS NO. INES NATIONAL OFFICERS INES ADVISORY COMMITTEE INES IAEA CO- ORDINATOR ACTION TO BE TAKEN DEADLINE 1 X To feedback comments on the INES computerized rating procedures and propose further short term improvements by end X New version of INESAR to be produced and circulated 3 X X To produce material specific to designs in the Member States for initiators vs. safety functions 4 X Mrs. Gerster-Martin to carry out further analysis of the questionnaire 5 X National Officers who have not responded to the questionnaire to submit answers by end X Continue simplification of rating process. Revised document for circulation + disc TCM 7 X To develop further material to explain the Scale to general public (simple leaflet and/or video) CS April X Formal adoption of non-reactor part
12 PRESENTATIONS OF THE INES NATIONAL OFFICERS
14 Dear Ladies and Gentlemen! Armenia has begun its work in INES frame in September 1995 and is making first steps in this field. We have no experience yet but we hope that our future cooperation with this International Organisation will render us such an opportunity. The only Nuclear Power Plant of WWER-440 type in Armenia is planned to startup in November All possible events and incidents will be classified by the INES scale and transferred according the existing rules. We hope that on the next INES Technical Committee Meeting we can do more detailed report. Thank you for attention.
16 O/Ref. ICM9510A.DOC Class. XG.IA.00 1/5 NUCLEAR INES TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MEETING Annual Meeting of the INES National Officers Vienna, October 1995 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF INES IN BELGIUM COMMUNICATION POLICY IN BELGIUM 1. History Belgium is in the nuclear field since the early 1950 and is operating nuclear power plants as well as other nuclear installations for more than 20 years. Having recognised the importance of a common language within the nuclear world to communicate with the media, Belgium participated actively to the development and the improvement of INES for nuclear power plants since 1989, and also to the development of an extension of INES to other nuclear installations. The scale was officially implemented for nuclear power plants on a trial basis the 22nd of June 1990 during a press release by the Minister of Labour and Employment and the secretary of State for Environment It was preceded by a period of training of the various organisations involved. All those elements were presented in detail during previous IAEA International meeting on Experience with the Use of INES. During 1992 and 1993, the implementation of INES for non NPP's was not yet officially in application. It has however been accepted to use INES for some incidents in non NPP installations on a "voluntary" basis and to evaluate the difficulties of applicability. In the meantime, the Authorities and the INES national officer met to define the scope of application of the extension of INES to non reactors. It was decided to apply the extension of INES to all the "Class-1" (highest radioactive inventory) installations in Belgium. NOTEAVMDOT KWINWOFIDUNTEHUNESUCM9510A.DOC -12/ :05
17 O/Ref. ICM9510A.DOC Class. XG.IA.00 2/5 N U C L E A R The plants approached are: The research centre of Mol The Institute for Radio-elements (Fleurus) FBFC Belgoprocess IRMM (CEC) University of Ghent In September 1993, a first information meeting took place between the Authorities, the involved non-npp utilities and the INES National Officer. A first presentation of the INES extension was made at that moment. It was agreed to apply INES officially on a trial basis for non NPPs and according to a procedure identical to the one applied for NPPs. It is planned to have further meetings with the participation of specific inspection organisations. The trial period is still ongoing. It was also agreed that, for training and development purpose, the utilities should send their manual or procedures for application of INES to the National Officer, and that this one will disseminate the non-npp event received through the INES-net when appropriate. 2. Communication organisation 2.1 Organisation of the rating The following organisation, initially set up for NPP's in order to rate nuclear events, is now applied with slight modifications to all facilities involved. It involves the Authorities (Ministries in charge of the nuclear safety), the utilities, the inspectorate, and the INES National Officer, which belongs to the inspectorate. The organisation was defined in a convention between the parties. The procedure described in that convention is updated when found necessary to take into account the experience of utilisation and the end of the trial periods. It is given hereafter. On the other hand, the implementation of the new user's manual or the additional guidelines required additional training of the individuals having to rate events. This was performed independently in the various organisations involved. In particular, the procedures of the utility has been updated and recycling lectures were given. The same has been done for the inspectorate. The training process put the emphasis on the new aspects covered by the revised manual. Further training is planned when deemed necessary 2.2 Rating Procedure The revised procedure applied in order to decide of the level of an event in nuclear installations of class 1 (including nuclear power plants) takes into account the specific situation and responsibilities in Belgium: 1. Events impacting nuclear safety in a nuclear installation are rated on INES according to the process described hereafter. NOTEAVN.DOT l.\winworduhtemnesvicms510a.d0c -
18 O/Ref. ICM9510A.DOC Class. XG.IA.00 3/5 NUCLEAR 2. The utility evaluates the level. For levels 1 or above, he notifies the Authorities (Ministries) usually after discussions with the inspection organisations. A verification of the completeness and of the correctness of the events to be notified is performed by the inspection body during its routine inspections. This leads to a special report from the inspection organisation to the authorities by the end of the month of September each year. 3. For the rating, the utility takes contact with the Authorities, describing the event and proposing a rating. The proposal has to be approved by the Authorities before any official press release. The ministries may wish to have the advise of the inspectorate Organisation in charge of the regulatory nuclear safety inspection in the plant 4. The events rated at level 1 or above must lead to a press release by the utility mentioning INES and its 7 levels. A possibility exists for provisional rating and for additions on the actual character or not of initiators. Copies are sent to the involved ministries, the inspectorate and the INES National Officer, who received also the rating justification. 5. For events rated at level 2 or above, the INES National Officer sent an ERF to the IAEA, after discussion with the utility and approval of the involved ministries. 6. The INES rating and reporting does not relieve the utility of its other reporting duties. 2.3 Communication policy in Belgium Contacts with the public As it appears from the above-mentioned rating procedures, the present policy of the Belgian Authorities is not to inform the Public systematically themselves. They leave the routine information of the public to the utilities, keeping perhaps for themselves very specific or important situations or announcements (application of INES for instance). Nevertheless the INES is felt as a useful tool in order to improve the perception of the public of events in nuclear facilities. Even if the attention of the public is sometimes attracted by events which, without the systematic press release of levels one or above, would not have been published, the general reaction of newspapers and public on low level events is a lack of interest Besides the contradictory argumentation on the severity of an event has practically disappeared since the introduction of INES. This justifies that, as mentioned above, Belgium has been and still is very active in the development of the scale. At the early stages of the scale, a leaflet was devised to explain to the media and the public the structure of the scale and its meaning Basis of the rating In Belgium, there are few events or situations where a utility is complied to report officially and formally to the Authorities or inspectorate. In practice, due to the quasi-constant presence of an inspector on site and to the reasonable relationship between inspectors and utilities, the inspection organisation is aware of all the significant (and sometimes not significant) events on site. NOTEAVN.DOT - IAW1NWORCNNTER0NESUCM9510A.DOC. 12/1OS5-11:05
19 Class. XG.IA.00 4/5 NUCLEAR The INES rating is therefore not based upon the formally reported events, but on the set of informally known events. This precludes any statistical analysis on the fraction events rated at a given level. Unit B82 s Dl/2 m 3. Rated events Since the last meeting of the INES national officers, events in the Belgian NPP's and in a nuclear fuel cycle or research facilities have been rated on INES. A few events were rated below scale. The other ones are mentioned in the following table. " % BP ^ '.. MB T2, ' Date' - 21/03/95 22/03/95 22/03/95 17/04/95 16/05/95 10/06/95 27/06/95 04/07/95 07/09/95 Tide ' During cleaning of storage channel for irradiated fuel, a flexible pipe cracked. A slight amount of radioactive water came out through the cable penetration. Non respect of TS due to inadvertent unavailability of both battery trains (maintenance) A procedural error during the pressure release of the primary circuit lead to an air contamination of the reactor building Uncontrolled partial (stopping function) loss of the ventilation function in the reactor building due to maintenance activities. Fire in an dismantling cell due to inflammation of plastic bags containing waste with saltpetre Safety injection initiation due to non correct application of a start-up procedure. Following a human error, a leak of radioactive iodium occurred in a Mo99-production cell. Non respect of test periodicity in TS for 4 channels Non respect of TS due to late test of a neutron flux instrumentation. level l Concerning the NPP's, events of level 1 are mainly due to non respect of the technical specifications or of procedures, as a result of violations by various members of the personnel. The events in non reactor facilities results mainly for a deficiency in safety culture (non respect of procedures). 4. Difficulties in the use of INES For non-npps, the use of INES is still recent More events have been reported than in the past. Those events as well as the non reactor event from international sources are disseminated for training purposes. NOTEAVN.DOT IMMNWORWNTEHUN6SUCM8510A.OOC - 12/1QV5-11:05
20 O/Ref. ICM9510A.DOC Class. XG.IA.00 5/5 NUCLEAR For NPPs, the technical aspects of the rating of NPP events on INES does not lead to real problems. The use of additional factors remains a subject of discussions, as it is sometimes a way used by the utilities to "punish" those who have made a mistake. As, in the past, examples existed of unresolved discordance's in opinions between utility and inspectorate, the ministries have asked the inspection organisations to report annually (besides the quarterly reports to their official supervision committee) on events where they think an incorrect rating had been proposed by the utility. In 1995, only one events seemed to be classified as level 1 instead of below scale for a dubious "deficiency in safety culture". Non reactor facilities sometimes feel that the publication of all events of level one or above is destroying their image in the public, partly because they assimilates those facilities with NPPs (for which the public suspicion is higher). As previously, the Belgian regulatory organisations have put the priority of solving correctly safety problems at the appropriate inspection level. Difficulties in the INES rating are dealt with rapidly at an appropriate management level, but only after that urgent corrective actions have been taken. NOTEAVN.0OT - UWIWVOfi[NWTEFWNESUCMe510A.DOC. 12/1CW* 11:05
22 BRAZILIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE 1995 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INES NATIONAL OFFICERS by Ayrton Caubit CNEN - Brazil + Events communicated to the EVES Information System The last event communicated to the INESIS was in March 1993 reporting the Fuel Rod Failure detected by reactor coolant activity greater than limiting conditions for operations. Angra I NPP was in a long outage period from March 1993 to December All licensee reports are sent to the Regulatory Body and the preliminary INES rate are reviewed by CNEN. address (Bitnet): + Feedback on the use of the INES rating procedures (computer software). The Angra I NPP data to the INESAR software is under preparation to be built in as input necessary to start using the computarized INES procedure to asses the severity of degradations of defence in-depth.
23 + National communication policy INES communication policies and practices are considered in the 1995/1999 CNEN Work Plan. The establishment of an action plan to further enhance effectiveness of the INES Information System in the country is regarded as a strategic point of CNEN's presidency. A programm for communicating with the public for routinely informations during non-emergency events is being under development. Within this context is programmed a specific course about INES to the midia, at the beginning of 1996.
24 THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE (INES) EVENT RATING FORM (ERF) to be sent to: IAEA. WAGR*MERSTRASSE 6. P.O. BOX 100, A-1400 VIENNA. AUSTRIA TELEX: CABLE: INATOM VIENNA. FACSIMILE: , TELEPHONE: seas EVENT TITLE RATING FVML COUNTRY FUEL ROD FAILURE DETECTED BY MAXIMUM REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY THAN OPERATING LIMITS RATING DATE BRAZIL our OF BELOW SCALEfo FACILITY NAME ONfiCAU ANGRA-1 SAFETY ATTRIBUTE FACILITY TYPE EVENT DATE MARCH OEOR. DEFENCE M4EPTH OH&TEtPACT OFF«rTEMPACT PWR-WESTINCHOUSE ASPECTS OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PUBLIC: YES NO ACCIDENT O INCIDENT Q DEVIATION D RADIOACTIVE RELEASES OFF-SITE RADIOACTIVE RELEASES ON-SFTE WORKERS INJURED BY RADIATION WORKERS INJURED PHYSICALLY PLANT SAFETY IS UNDER CONTROL THE EVENT REPORTED IS A DISCOVERY OF A DEFICIENCY BY ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE A PRESS RELEASE WAS MADE (IF YES, PLEASE ATTACH IT) D a a o Q D G3 B a SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:* flnprfl-1 had hppn pyppn'pnring some rnds Ipakagp-. sincp 4 month's ago, with primary water coolant activity indicating some percentage of Tech. Specification limits. In , dnr-ing a normal nppration at 50% ratpd powpr a routine surveillance of foprtnr rnniant ar+ivity HofprfpH \/a1iipg groatpr than thp rf)rrpt:pnnfipnt. limiting rnnrtitinn<; for nppratinn. Arcording to required actions the plant was imediateiv shutdown following normal procedures. Preliminary estimatives pointed out that around 100 fuel rods had failed. The U t i l i t y is preparing defueiinq the core and investigating the causes. fta«;^t; fr>>~ ratinn i-t)o oypirf» IN Tx/pnt without an initiator ( a^ ppr Tahip 1 H o\ <-afp'ty fiinrtinn rhaiipnnprf rrnrfininn thp radinartivp tnat.prial. <;y«:tpm npprahiiity (harrier " pa<;<;ive) :1P^<; than minimum reouv red bv OL&C. 4) Then safety function availability: Adequate. Rate selected: 1 CONTACT PERSON FOR FURTHER INFORMATION NAME ADDRESS PHONE FAX IAERCTO A. VINHAS ri AS ATTACK AOOC110NA1. MFOAUMION OH JUSTFCATOH OF THE EWBfT MTMa AND OFROULTES B400UKTBED. F REL. DE fltiuidfides DO FONE 0P DftTft & HORP1 DURftCflO TX/RX MODO PftG. RESULT. MflR 30 09:05 00/50 TX OK
26 International Atomic Energy Agency Annual Meeting of the INES National Officers, October 1995, Vienna BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE WITH INES Tinko K. GANTCHEV INES National Officer Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes Sofia, BULGARIA INTRODUCTION; In Bulgaria INES Scale has been in trial implementation since November Since the start of the INES trial considerable progress has been made with the implementation of INES in Bulgaria. At the beginning the Scale was used only for the defining of the safety significance of the events, which were reported by Kozloduy NPP to the Regulatory Authority in accordance with the Law. Later began the use of the INES scale for information of the public about domestic and foreign events. In 1991 INES National Officer was appointed, which is a representative of the Regulatory Authority. The policy of the Regulatory Authority is that the INES scale should become appropriate and effective tool for common understanding among nuclear community, the public and the media. EXPERIENCE WITH INES IN In events have been reported to the Regulatory Authority in compliance with the reporting criteria. These events happened at the six units of
27 Kozloduy NPP. Safety significance of the events was assessed by the means of the INES scale. 34 events were ranked as level 0, which represents 85% of all the reported events. Remaining events were distributed as follows: 5 events (12,5%) as level 1 (anomaly) and 1 event was ranked "out of scale" with no safety relevance. During the first 9 months of 1995 (January-September) 17 events were reported. 2 events (11,7%) were assessed as level 1 anomalies, with the remainder at level 0 or out of scale. It proves that during the last 3-4 years there is a clear tendency of reduction of the safety significance of the reported events. While in % of events were rated at level 1, in 1995 the percentage of level 1 events dropped to 11,7%. Some of the events which have been of generic safety significance or of media and public interest in 1994/95 are the following: INES1: * Loss of Off-site AC Power at Kozloduy NPP, Units 1 to 6, (24 Nov.1994), (Preliminary ERF and final ERF submitted to INES); * Water Level Decrease in the Spent Fuel Pull, Unit 1, (14 Aug. 1995); * Minor Radioactive Contamination near the Auxiliary Building, Units 5 and 6, (3 July 1995). INESO: * Minor Radioactive Contamination of the Turbine Hall from the Leak and Drainage Water Purification System, Unit 1, (30 June 1995); * Flooding of some premises of the Turbine Hall with Electronic Equipment after Heavy Rain, Unit 4, (15 June 1995). PUBLIC COMMUNICATION POLICES AND PRACTICES The INES scale is adopted in Bulgaria since November 1990 for power reactors. The condition of the other nuclear facilities in Bulgaria is the following: * research reactor in Sofia was shut-down in 1989 for reconstruction. It should be taken a decision about future opera - tion of the research reactor. * mining facilities in Bulgaria are in decommissioning stage. * uranium enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities does not exist in Bulgaria. * irradiated fuel storage and waste conditioning facilities are situated at Kozloduy site. For the time being we don't consider appropriate the implementation of the INES scale for rating of events at other installations.