First Expert Meeting of the GCTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters Initiative: Police and Border Law Enforcement, Judiciary, and Information Sharing

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1 Overview First Expert Meeting of the GCTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters Initiative: Police and Border Law Enforcement, Judiciary, and Information Sharing May 2014 Marrakech, Morocco Summary Hosted by the Netherlands and Morocco, this meeting brought together more than 80 law enforcement, border security, and information sharing practitioners and policy makers from 19 GCTF members, the UN, INTERPOL, and Hedayah, to develop recommendations for addressing the complex challenge of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) individuals who leave their home countries to participate in conflicts abroad and join terrorist organizations, acquiring skills and an ideological commitment that could be used in acts of terrorism in their home countries or elsewhere. The first of two expert meetings designed to build upon the opening meeting of the initiative in The Hague on February 2014, this meeting focused on the legal and administrative responses to recruitment and facilitation, travel and fighting, and return to country of origin. (The second expert meeting, to be held in Abu Dhabi in June 2014, will focus on detecting and intervening against violent extremism leading to FTF activity, as well the rehabilitation and reintegration aspects of return.) The initiative will produce a set of non-binding recommendations for addressing the FTF phenomenon that is expected to be adopted at the GCTF high-level meeting in New York in September To provide the basis for expert discussions, several delegations briefed on aspects of their response to FTF recruitment, travel, and return. The Netherlands presented its analytical framework for assessing the risk of FTF returnees. Spain described a law-enforcement operation in cooperation with Morocco against an FTF facilitation network. France briefed on its recently adopted action plan to deal with the FTF phenomenon. The UK described its approach to detecting and responding through prosecution if warranted to FTF returnees. Key cross-cutting themes from the meeting include the following: For information sharing, quality and timeliness are key. Although the quantity of information shared is important, participants emphasized that getting the right information to the right authorities in time for them to act is critical. Moreover, there was general agreement on the need for more sharing of threat analysis on FTFs. The Internet is a powerful tool both for FTF recruiters and for states seeking to prevent and interdict FTFs. Participants agreed the Internet is feeding the FTF phenomenon, especially, but not exclusively, in Syria. But they noted that the extensive

2 - 2 - use by extremist groups of open social media platforms provides an opportunity for states to lawfully gather information and intelligence about FTFs. Successful action against FTFs before they depart and/or when they return requires both an appropriate legal and administrative framework and pragmatism by prosecutors and other relevant officials. Given the difficulty of obtaining admissible evidence of terrorist acts from the battlefield, it was noted that states need laws criminalizing preparatory acts, and should also consider making travel abroad to participate in a conflict a crime, as some states have already done. Investigators and prosecutors also need to be inventive in lawfully employing all tools available to secure evidence. It was noted that many states are using administrative powers to curb FTF travel as well. Border security and control are central to dealing with the FTF phenomenon. FTFs may be most vulnerable to interdiction during international travel, when they must as a matter of course come into contact with law enforcement, including border officials who often have powerful search authorities. Participants agreed that enhanced information sharing and training of border officials would help states take better advantage of this FTF vulnerability. Summary The following is a thematic summary of the workshop. It is not intended to be a transcript of the proceedings. Opening Remarks Morocco and the Netherlands opened by noting that the FTF phenomenon is a global challenge requiring a comprehensive and strategic response that transcends any particular conflict zone. They said that the GCTF offers a trusted platform for countries to share information and good practices in an effort to craft such a response. Session 1: General Reflections/Case Studies by Delegations on the FTF Phenomenon The Netherlands opened with a returnee case study to illustrate the complexity of the FTF challenge and illustrate the benefits of using a comprehensive analytic framework for assessing risk and determining an appropriate response. The Dutch case study, using a composite returnee from the Syrian conflict based on a number of actual returnees, illustrated how a CT analysis unit can draw from a wide range of sources to build a detailed profile of individual returnees, as well as the returnee population. These profiles, which include, inter alia, an individual s radicalization history, activity in conflict zones, and social support network at home, help determine the intervention strategy for a given returnee. A number of delegations offered general reflections that highlighted several key features of the FTF challenge and response. Turkey, Russia, Jordan, and China emphasized the importance of sharing information and risk assessments about returnees with other states. INTERPOL and Canada noted the value of analysis that enables states to intervene before would-be FTFs travel to conflict zones, which some countries, including Canada, may do in accordance with their

3 - 3 - national laws. The United States and Qatar were among the states emphasizing the need for a legal framework to enable prosecution of high-risk returnees. The United States added that having an effective process for designating terrorist organizations can mitigate the challenge of obtaining evidence from conflict zones by requiring evidence only of support to a designated terrorist group including participating in training rather than of participation in an actual terrorist act. The UK said placing returnees in risk bands has helped it develop standardized responses, and suggested that states may benefit from harmonizing their risk assessments and responses to returnees. Indonesia noted the difficulty of detecting FTF departures and returns due to challenges in controlling its long maritime borders. It also cited the challenge of fake passports. Saudi Arabia said it has found success placing returnees in its national rehabilitation and reintegration center. Session 2: Recruitment and Facilitation Participants identified a number of challenges to identifying and interdicting recruitment and facilitation networks for FTFs, notably the emergence of hybrid models of recruitment and facilitation driven by the Internet. Traditional recruitment and facilitation networks operated by established terrorist organizations targeting specific communities persist in some settings, and pure Internet-only self-radicalization may occur. However, in between these two extremes are hybrid models that take advantage of the Internet s scale and anonymity while retaining some elements of the traditional model, such as ethnic or linguistic affinity. FTF video clips from Syria are one aspect of this phenomenon; how-to guides for avoiding detection while traveling to Syria to join a fighting group are another. These tools present not only challenges, but opportunities for authorities, who can use FTFs activity on the Internet to gather both intelligence about travel patterns and evidence for eventual prosecution. The following preliminary recommendations emerged from the discussions: Reach out to communities to develop awareness of the FTF threat and build resilience to extremist messages. Members of communities targeted for recruitment may not be aware of Internet-based or in-person recruitment of FTFs. Community awareness briefings and table-top exercises enable the communities themselves to develop effective responses to FTF recruitment, and help establish the trust needed for community members to share information about FTFs with authorities. Incorporating culturally sensitive specialists, such as psychologists and social-service providers, into community engagement is another good practice. 1 Gather and fuse detailed information from law enforcement, communities, and social media to detect recruitment and facilitation. States can obtain information about known and suspected FTFs from time-tested law enforcement techniques such the use of wiretaps and confidential informants, and also from lawful monitoring of social media platforms and interviews with family and community members. States should share this information with local authorities, other national agencies, and bilateral and multilateral partners in order to aid in the identification and interdiction of recruitment 1 See the GCTF Good Practices for Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism for more on community outreach.

4 - 4 - and facilitation networks. In many cases, this is simply a matter of making better use of existing information-sharing platforms. Pool resources and collaborate with the private sector to curb online recruitment of FTFs. States that have the legal authorities and resources to monitor online FTF recruitment and facilitation should pool their resources and share analysis through trusted mechanisms such as Europol. Moreover, states should collaborate with reputable Internet companies to take action against websites and social-media users who violate the companies terms of service by engaging in criminal behavior. Session 3: Travel and Fighting Participants identified a number of challenges to identifying and interdicting FTFs while they travel to conflict zones, take part in training and fighting, and return from conflict zones to their countries of origin or travel to third countries. Because a high proportion of FTFs are not known to authorities before they travel, it may be difficult to detect when they enter the international travel system and to provide other states sufficient warning to interdict them en route. For those FTFs entering conflict zones by land from neighboring states, additional challenges may arise from the presence of large refugee populations, the remoteness of some land borders, and the lack of effective border control in the conflict zone. The following preliminary recommendations emerged from the discussions: Exploit airports as a chokepoint for FTF travel. States should make better use of existing information systems, such as INTERPOL s databases and the EU s Schengen Information System (SIS), and should deploy new tools if necessary to share advanced passenger information (API) and passenger name records (PNR) in time for other transit states to take action against suspected FTFs. Moreover, states should develop and refine air travel watchlists to account for the particular characteristics of FTF travel. Further, states should consider using sophisticated and specialized tools such as behavioral analysis and travel-pattern analysis to identify FTF travelers and their likely routes. States can also partner more effectively with private-sector entities at airports, including private security companies. Finally, as there is evidence countering violent extremism (CVE) messaging is effective at the point of travel, states should consider using CVE messaging at airports. Use all available tools to prevent the misuse of travel documents for FTF travel. States should use all available tools including administrative and judicial action where appropriate and greater sharing of information about dual citizens to deny suspected FTFs the ability to travel to conflict zones. At the same time, states should take all possible steps to mitigate the use of stolen or forged passports, including by making greater use of INTERPOL s lost and stolen passport database, and by implementing international standards for the use of biometric information. Build the capacity of states neighboring conflict zones to prevent FTF travel across land borders. So-called neighbor states face the most acute challenge in controlling FTF travel, and several Turkey and Jordan, for example have taken extensive measures to stem the flow of FTFs across land borders. In addition to high-technology measures such as networked cameras and aerial surveillance, states can apply many

5 - 5 - effective low-technology approaches, such as varying patrol times and taking advantage of the knowledge of local communities about routes used by FTFs and other illicit actors. Finally, the ability of neighbor states to interdict FTFs depends upon the timely sharing of information about FTF travel by origin and transit states. Sessions 4 and 5: Remarks by Conference Chairperson The meeting co-chairs recapped the Day One discussions, grouping comments and recommendations under four general rubrics: (1) information sharing; (2) the role of the Internet; (3) the need for a legal and administrative framework; and (4) border security and control. Session 6: Return Participants identified a number of challenges to detecting FTFs when they return from conflict zones and either prosecuting them, referring them to prevention, disengagement, and rehabilitation programs, or a combination of the two. [Note: The content and structure of prevention, disengagement, and rehabilitation programs for FTF returnees will be discussed in greater detail at the second expert meeting of the FTF Initiative in June 2014 in Abu Dhabi.] The following preliminary recommendations emerged from the discussions: Use as wide as possible a range of information sources to anticipate and detect returns. FTFs often plan their returns in advance, discuss them in open social media platforms, and make arrangements for their own reintegration such as airport pickups, medical appointments, and jobs. Thus, states should lawfully use a wide range of information sources including social media, family, friends, and acquaintances, socialservices providers, and private-sector employers to anticipate and detect returns. International databases and information systems, such as INTERPOL s system of notices and diffusions, also may provide information useful in anticipating and detecting return. Finally, greater sharing of information by third countries about deportations of suspected FTFs may help states of origin detect unidentified returnees. Build and use evidence-based, individual-level risk assessment frameworks for returnees. Robust risk assessment based on a variety of factors including an individual s behavior while in a conflict zone and the reason for return, which may be readily available from social media, and social influences upon return, which may be obtained from interviews with family and friends enables authorities to build tailored responses ranging from prosecution to monitoring to referral to a prevention program. Risk assessment can also help authorities ensure responses are commensurate with the threat and do not further radicalize returnees or members of their communities. Strengthen investigations and prosecutions of returnees, when applicable, through improved information sharing and evidence gathering. In general, the evidence needed to prosecute FTFs for appropriate crimes will reside in more than one country, necessitating recourse to mutual legal assistance (MLA), which can be greatly enhanced through informal cooperation among investigators and prosecutors for instance, by giving another country advanced notice that an MLA request is forthcoming so that time-

6 - 6 - sensitive evidence can be preserved. 2 Deploying liaison investigators and prosecutors to foreign embassies is also a good practice for improving information sharing, and can also be used to strengthen the capacity of third-country partners to properly gather evidence admissible in a domestic prosecution, as the UK has done in partnership with Kenya. Many states also have special search authorities at their borders, which may be used lawfully to gather not only evidence about suspected FTFs but also intelligence about FTF recruiters and facilitators. Finally, where applicable, the investigation of FTFs under authorities designed for suspected terrorists can enhance evidence gathering and increase the likelihood of successful prosecution. Prepare and exercise responses to the kinds of terrorist acts for which FTF returnees may have special skills. Some returnees may have received training in the use of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), improvised explosive devices (IED), and high-capacity automatic firearms. Response and consequence-management plans and exercises should therefore specifically address ground-based attacks on aviation, roadside bombs, and marauding firearm attacks. Sessions 7: Wrap up and Recommendations Specifically Related to FTFs including Practical Follow-ups by Co-chairs The co-chairs summarized the Day Two discussions under the same broad rubrics of information sharing, the Internet, legal and administrative framework, and border security and control. They noted that the next expert meeting of the FTF Initiative would develop complementary recommendations on CVE-related responses to the FTF phenomenon, focusing on the FTF s formation of the intent to travel to a conflict zone (i.e., radicalization) and the reintegration of the FTF into the country of origin. Finally, the co-chairs said the recommendations developed in the two expert meetings would be coordinated among members and presented for adoption at the next high-level meeting of the GCTF in New York in September See Good Practice 9 of the GCTF Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector for more on formal and informal international cooperation.