# ONLINE APPENDIX FOR PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE, LABOR SUPPLY,

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1 ONLINE APPENDIX FOR PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE, LABOR SUPPLY, AND EMPLOYMENT LOCK Craig Garthwaite Tal Gross Matthew J. Notowidigdo December 2013 A1. Monte Carlo Simulations This section describes a set of Monte Carlo simulations that evaluate our modified block bootstrap procedure. The procedure we rely up on for inference is based on the two-stage re-sampling procedure described by Rao and Wu (1988). Below, we compare the standard errors from this procedure to alternative methods of inference: block bootstrap standard errors, cluster-robust standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, and unadjusted OLS standard errors. Setup and notation We use the following empirical model for our Monte Carlo simulations: yst αs δt βdst εst This model is based on the main text s difference-in-difference model (equation 1). The variable D st represents the difference-in-difference interaction variable for each state s and each year t. To match our empirical setting, it takes on a value of unity for observations from one state and the seventh or eighth year. The outcome y st represents a cell mean based on N observations per state-year cell, while the variable ε st is given by the following: ε λn (1 λ) e nst ρns, t 1 vst vst e N(0,1) N(0,1) st st st st A-1

2 The variable n st represents the serially correlated state-year shocks (with amount of serial correlation given by ρ ), e st is sampling error, and λ controls the relative importance of the serially correlated shocks and sampling error in the overall state-year error term. Simulation parameters The purpose of the Monte Carlo simulation is to compare standard errors across a range of alternative parameterizations. We fix λ = 0.95, assume that there are 500 observations per state-year, and that we have 17 states. We vary the remaining parameters as follows: amount of serial correlation ρ = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} and number of time periods T = {8, 32}. For each combination of parameters, we simulate the model 10,000 times and compute the fraction of times that the null hypothesis ( ˆβ β ) is rejected at the 5-percent level and the 10-percent level. Results The results of each simulation exercise are reported in Online Appendix Table A2. The modified block bootstrap standard errors appear to perform the best across each of the alternatives. The cluster-robust standard errors and standard block bootstrap standard errors noticeably overreject across all columns, while the unadjusted OLS standard errors only perform well when the amount of serial correlation is low. A2. Alternative Standard Errors and p-values for the Main Results Panel A of Appendix Table A3 reproduces our primary, difference-in-difference regression results. The standard errors and p-values are based on the modified block bootstrap standard errors described in the previous section and in the main text. The remaining panels of the table report results based on alternative methods of computing standard errors and p-values. Panel B presents cluster-robust standard errors. These standard errors are very similar to block bootstrap standard errors that have been used in empirical settings similar to ours. These standard errors, however, are smaller than our preferred standard errors in Panel A, usually by a factor of approximately two. Next, Panel C reports heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and Panel D reports unadjusted OLS standard errors. In both panels, the standard errors are fairly similar to our preferred standard errors in Panel A. Panel E reports wild cluster bootstrap p-values, as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). Their method leads to p-values that are fairly similar to those in Panel A. A-2

3 Lastly, Panel F presents p-values from a permutation test, which is sometimes called a randomization-inference test (Rosenbaum 1996). The p-values from this test are valid under a different set of assumptions. Specifically, the permutation test does not rely on asymptotic approximations but instead requires exchangeability. To carry out this test, we assign placebo reforms one-by-one to each state-year combination. For each re-assignment we estimate the associated difference-in-difference model. We then compute the fraction of placebo difference-indifference estimates that are larger in magnitude than the actual difference-in-difference estimate. That share is the permutation test s p-value. The p-values from this test are fairly similar to the p- values from our preferred standard errors in Panel A. We interpret this as evidence that our standard errors (and associated p-values) in Panel A are reliable. In Appendix Table A4, we repeat the same set exercises described above for our triple-difference model. The pattern of results is similar, although with smaller cluster-robust standard errors. The remaining panels show similar standard errors as well as p-values that are similar to our preferred results. A-3

4 Appendix Figure A1. Long-Term Trends in Tennessee Medicaid Enrollment 1,500,000 Overall TennCare Enrollment Number of Tennessee residents enrolled in Medicaid 1,000, ,000 Traditional Medicaid Enrollment Enrollment in Uninsured and Uninsurable Programs Note: The data for this figure come from quarterly reports for TennCare. A-4

5 Appendix Figure A2. Share Publicly Insured, Triple Difference, Long-Term Trends.24 TennCare Disenrollment Share covered by public health insurance Tennessee, No Children Other Southern States, No Children Tennessee, Has Children Other Southern States, Has Children Note: This figure presents the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree who report being publicly insured in Tennessee versus other Southern states. The figure presents means by two-year cells. See text for details. Appendix Figure A3. Share Employed, Triple Difference, Long-Term Trend.78 TennCare Disenrollment Tennessee, Has Children Other Southern States, Has Children Share employed Other Southern States, No Children Tennessee, No Children Note: This figure presents the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree who report being employed and at work in Tennessee versus other Southern states. The figure presents means by two-year cells. See text for details. A-5

6 Appendix Figure A4. Share Privately Insured, Triple Difference, Long-Term Trends Other Southern States, Has Children TennCare Disenrollment Share covered by private health insurance Other Southern States, No Children Tennessee, Has Children Tennessee, No Children Note: This figure presents the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree who report being privately insured in Tennessee versus other Southern states. The figure presents means by two-year cells. See text for details. A-6

7 Appendix Figure A5. Share Publicly Insured, Triple Difference for Entire US.2 TennCare Disenrollment.18 Share.16 covered by public health insurance.14 Tennessee, No Children Other Southern States, Has Children Tennessee, Has Children.12.1 Other Southern States, No Children Note: This figure presents the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree who report being covered by public health insurance in Tennessee versus all other states. The figure presents means by two-year cells. See text for details. Appendix Figure A6. Share Employed, Triple Difference for Entire US.8 TennCare Disenrollment Other Southern States, Has Children.75 Share employed.7 Tennessee, Has Children Other Southern States, No Children.65 Tennessee, No Children Note: This figure presents the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree who report being employed and at work in Tennessee versus all other states. The figure presents means by two-year cells. See text for details. A-7

8 Appendix Figure A7. Share Privately Insured, Triple Difference for Entire US Other Southern States, No Children TennCare Disenrollment Share covered by private health insurance Tennessee, Has Children Other Southern States, Has Children.6.58 Tennessee, No Children Note: This figure presents the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree who report being privately insured in Tennessee versus all other states. The figure presents means by two-year cells. See text for details. A-8

10 Appendix Figure A10. Applications to SSDI 150 TennCare Disenrollment 140 Number of applications relative to Other Southern States Tennessee Note: This figure presents the number of applications to the Social Security Disability Insurance Program for each year. The numbers are normalized so that applications in 2001 are equal to 100. See text for details. A-10

11 Appendix Figure A11. Searches on Google in Tennessee for Word TennCare 1.2 Announcment TennCare Disenrollment 1 Search Volume.8 Relative to January, Note: This figure presents Google search volume for the word TennCare. The numbers are normalized by Google to represent relative changes in search volume over time, but not the absolute magnitude. We then divide each month s number by the value in January of In November of 2004, Governor Bredesen announced the process that ultimately led to the disenrollments. The disenrollments then began in July of A-11

12 Appendix Figure A12. Share Privately Insured 0.68 TennCare Disenrollment 0.66 Share covered by private health insurance, other Southern states Other Southern States Tennessee Share covered by private health insurance, Tennessee Note: This figure presents the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree who report being privately insured in Tennessee versus other Southern states. The figure presents means by two-year cells. See text for details A-12

13 Appendix Figure A13. Event-Study Figure for Public Coverage.12 TennCare Disenrollment.08 Point Estimate Note: This figure presents event-study coefficients which compare the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree and in households without a child under the age of 18 who report being publicly insured to other adults in Tennessee and other adults in other Southern states. The event study coefficient in 2000 is normalized to zero. A-13

14 Appendix Figure A14. Event-Study Figure for Employment.06 TennCare Disenrollment.04 Point Estimate Note: This figure presents event-study coefficients which compare the share of CPS respondents ages without an advanced degree and in households without a child under the age of 18 who report being employed and at work to other adults in Tennessee and other adults in other Southern states. The event study coefficient in 2000 is normalized to zero. A-14

15 Appendix Table A1. Descriptive Statistics of Individuals Affected by Four Recent Health Reform Efforts TennCare Disenrollment Affordable Care Act MA Health Reform Oregon Medicaid Lottery Children Child in the Household 8.9% 17.6% 49.4% 43.3% No Child in Household 91.1% 82.4% 50.7% 56.7% Age 19 to % 26.1% 29.4% 13.2% 25 to % 26.0% 34.3% 24.4% 35 to % 34.5% 31.6% 47.8% 55 to % 13.4% 16.6% 14.5% Sex Male 41.9% 53.0% 44.3% 44.3% Female 58.2% 47.0% 55.7% 55.7% Race White 75.9% 54.9% 77.2% 82.0% Black 22.8% 18.7% 19.5% 3.8% Other 1.3% 25.7% 3.3% 14.2% Education High School Drop Out 33.8% Not Available 25.7% 17.7% High School Graduate 52.9% Not Available 36.5% 49.1% Any College Attendance 13.3% Not Available 37.8% 33.2% Notes: Numbers for the TennCare Disenrollment are based on the change in public health insurance amongst CPS respondents from to Numbers for the ACA come from Kenny et al. (2012). The numbers for the Massachusetts health reform are based on the change in public health insurance amongst CPS respondents from to Numbers for the Oregon Medicaid lottery come from Finkelstein et al. (2012) and from correspondence with the the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment team. A-15

16 Appendix Table A2. Alternative Samples Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Public Employed Working <20 hours per week Working 20 hours per week Working hours per week Working >35 hours per week Private Crowdout Estimate Tennessee Post 2005 A , South Only (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.347) [0.001] [0.032] [0.843] [0.042] [0.195] [0.236] [0.091] [0.106] R Tennessee Post 2005 B , All States (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.793) [0.000] [0.026] [0.839] [0.038] [0.246] [0.203] [0.027] [0.350] R Tennessee Post 2005 C , South Only (0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.018) (0.630) [0.001] [0.008] [0.536] [0.008] [0.202] [0.045] [0.077] [0.333] R Tennessee Post 2005 D , South Only (0.017) (0.018) (0.007) (0.019) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.285) [0.000] [0.014] [0.154] [0.005] [0.702] [0.013] [0.040] [0.045] R Notes: For Panel A, N = 272; for Panel B, N = 816; for Panel C, N = 408; for Panel D, N = 170. The sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status group. State fixed effects, year fixed effects, group fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms not shown. The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. A-16

17 Appendix Table A3. Monte Carlo Simulations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Simulation Parameters: Number of individuals per cell (N ) Number of state clusters (S ) Number of time periods (T ) Serial correlation in state-year shocks (ρ ) Two-Stage Resampling (Modified Block Bootstrap) Simulated 5% rejection rate Simulated 10% rejection rate Standard Block Bootstrap Simulated 5% rejection rate Simulated 10% rejection rate Cluster-Robust Standard Errors Simulated 5% rejection rate Simulated 10% rejection rate Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors Simulated 5% rejection rate Simulated 10% rejection rate Unadjusted OLS Standard Errors Simulated 5% rejection rate Simulated 10% rejection rate Notes: This table reports results from the Monte Carlo simulation exercise described in Online Appendix Section A.1. Each column reports results from a different combination of parameters, while the rows report rejection rates across 10,000 simulations. The cells in bold font indicate rejection rates below the specified level of statistical significance. All other cells over-reject the null hypothesis. A-17

18 Appendix Table A4. Different Methods of Inference for Difference-in-Difference Results Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Has Public Health Insurance Employed working <20 working 20 working working >35 A. Modified Block Bootstrap Standard Errors (From Table II, Panel A) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) [0.000] [0.038] [0.758] [0.023] [0.906] [0.041] B. Cluster-Robust Standard Errors (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) [0.000] [0.000] [0.396] [0.000] [0.643] [0.000] C. Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) [0.000] [0.010] [0.726] [0.002] [0.848] [0.002] D. Unadjusted OLS Standard Errors (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) [0.000] [0.064] [0.804] [0.064] [0.914] [0.095] E. Wild Bootstrap [0.000] [0.000] [0.350] [0.000] [0.400] [0.000] F. Permutation Test [0.010] [0.039] [0.382] [0.029] [0.471] [0.088] Mean of dep. variable Notes: For Panel A, N = 136; the sample consists of state-by-year means; state and year fixed effects not shown. For Panel B, N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through See Online Appendix for more information on the alternative standard errors and p-values reported in this table. A-18

19 Appendix Table A5. Different Methods of Inference for Triple-Difference Results Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Has Public Health Insurance Employed working <20 working 20 working working >35 A. Modified Block Bootstrap Standard Errors (From Table II, Panel B) (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021) [0.001] [0.032] [0.843] [0.042] [0.195] [0.236] B. Cluster-Robust Standard Errors (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) [0.000] [0.000] [0.757] [0.001] [0.002] [0.018] C. Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors (0.018) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) [0.000] [0.000] [0.820] [0.000] [0.010] [0.056] D. Unadjusted OLS Standard Errors (0.019) (0.022) (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) (0.023) [0.000] [0.035] [0.866] [0.054] [0.133] [0.256] E. Wild Bootstrap [0.000] [0.000] [0.370] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] F. Permutation Test [0.005] [0.088] [0.471] [0.098] [0.127] [0.181] Mean of dep. variable Notes: N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through See Online Appendix for more information on the alternative standard errors and p-values reported in this table. A-19

20 Appendix Table A6. The Effect of TennCare Disenrollment on Employment Using Individual-Level Data Dependent Variable: An indicator equal to one for CPS respondents who report the given outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Has Public Health Insurance Employed Working <20 Working 20 Working Working >35 A. Triple-Difference Estimates (0.018) (0.020) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) [0.000] [0.021] [0.834] [0.035] [0.172] [0.236] R N 233, , , , , ,980 B. Triple-Difference Estimates with Controls for Demographic Characteristics (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021) [0.000] [0.019] [0.883] [0.027] [0.195] [0.179] R N 233, , , , , ,980 Notes: The sample consists of individual-level CPS data. State fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through The controls added to regressions in Panel B are: a fourth-order polynomial in age; gender; an indicator function for whether the respondent reports being a high school graduate, attended some college, has an associate s degree, or has a college degree; and all two-way interactions between age, gender, and education variables. The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. A-20

21 Appendix Table A7. Other Triple-Difference Fixed Effects Estimates Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (1) (2) (3) Has Public Health Insurance Has Private Health Insurance Employed Tennessee Post (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) [0.000] [0.058] [0.025] (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) [0.780] [0.661] [0.871] (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) [0.333] [0.382] [0.575] (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) [0.054] [0.105] [0.915] R Notes: N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and childless-status fixed effects not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p-values are in brackets. A-21

22 Appendix Table A8. Estimated Premiums for TennCare and the ACA in 2004 TennCare Estimated ACA Under 100% No Premium No Premium 138% \$24 No Premium 150% \$42 \$47 200% \$120 \$98 250% \$180 \$ % \$240 \$ % \$350 \$295 Notes: This table reports estimated premiums for TennCare and the ACA as a function of household income relative to the federal poverty line. To maximize comparability, the 2004 federal poverty line is used when computing premiums in both columns. A-22

23 Appendix Table A9. Share Offered Health Insurance Offered health insurance by employer Holds private health insurance in own name All Employed Respondents Working Working Working more than Notes: The sample consists of respondents to the 2005 National Health Interview Survey who are between the ages of 21 and 64 and who live in the South. The reported means are adjusted using the survey s sampling weights. A-23

24 Triple-difference estimate for men Public Coverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Employed Working <20 Working 20 Employed with Private Insurance through Employer Private Coverage Crowdout Estimate (0.023) (0.027) (0.010) (0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (1.052) [0.004] [0.007] [0.880] [0.013] [0.053] [0.231] [0.587] Mean for men Triple-difference estimate for women Appendix Table A10. Heterogeneity in the Degree of Crowdout By Gender Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (0.024) (0.029) (0.013) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (2.045) [0.001] [0.386] [0.726] [0.486] [0.576] [0.103] [0.757] Mean for women p -value of test for equality [0.756] [0.208] [0.707] [0.168] [0.308] [0.813] R Notes: N = 544. The sample consists of means for each state, year, childless status, and gender. State fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless status fixed effects, gender fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms are included and not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. A-24

25 Appendix Table A11. The Effect of TennCare Disenrollment on Public Insurance and Employment for Those Older Than 65 Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome Has Public Health Insurance (1) (2) (3) (4) A. Younger than 65 B. Older than 65 Employed Has Public Health Insurance Employed (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) [0.000] [0.038] [0.940] [0.897] R Notes: N = 272. The sample consists of means for each state and year. State fixed effects and year fixed effects not shown. The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. A-25

26 Appendix Table A12: The Effect of TennCare Disenrollment on Source of Private Insurance Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given type of insurance (1) (2) (3) Public Coverage Private Coverage Crowdout Estimate A. Assign Private Non-Group to Private Coverage (0.017) (0.022) (0.370) [0.001] [0.133] [0.193] R Mean of dep. variable B. Assign Private Non-Group to Public Coverage (0.019) (0.024) (0.344) [0.001] [0.091] [0.126] R Mean of dep. variable Notes: N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. A-26

27 Appendix Table A13. The Effect of TennCare Disenrollment on Source of Private Insurance Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given type of insurance (1) (2) (3) (4) Has Employer-Provided Insurance Employed but No Employer-Provided Insurance Uninsured Individual Insurance (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) [0.035] [0.496] [0.622] [0.509] R Mean of dep. variable Notes: N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p - values are in brackets. A-27

28 Appendix Table A14: Heterogeneity in the Degree of Crowdout Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome Triple-difference estimate for ages Public Coverage (1) (2) (3) Private Coverage Crowdout Estimate A. Heterogeneity by Age (0.023) (0.037) (1.074) [0.002] [0.072] [0.374] Mean for ages Triple-difference estimate for ages (0.024) (0.029) (0.452) [0.001] [0.548] [0.635] Mean for ages p -value of test for equality across rows [0.708] [0.303] R Triple-difference estimate for high school dropouts B. Heterogeneity by Education (0.057) (0.055) (0.191) [0.000] [0.066] [0.066] Mean for high school dropouts Triple-difference estimate for those with a high school diploma or more (0.017) (0.024) (4.077) [0.051] [0.151] [0.805] Mean for high school graduates p -value of test for equality across rows [0.000] [0.269] R Triple-difference estimate for those who report excellent health C. Heterogeneity by Health Status (0.023) (0.043) (25.931) [0.439] [0.833] [0.984] Mean for excellent health Triple-difference estimate for those who report good or poor health (0.021) (0.025) (0.289) [0.000] [0.017] [0.021] Mean for good or poor health p -value of test for equality across rows [0.020] [0.160] R Notes: N = 544. The sample consists of means for each state, year, childless status, and group. State fixed effects, year fixed effects, group fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interaction terms not shown. We restrict the sample to southern states from 2000 through The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. A-28

29 Appendix Table A15. The Effect of TennCare Disenrollment on Public Health Insurance Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (1) (2) Has Public Health Insurance Has Medicaid Coverage A. Difference-in-Difference Estimates (0.010) (0.004) [0.000] [0.000] R B. Triple-Difference Estimates (0.017) (0.016) [0.001] [0.006] R Mean of dep. variable Notes: The sample includes the 17 southern states between 2000 through For Panel A, N = 136; the sample consists of state-by-year means; state and year fixed effects are included, but not shown. For Panel B, N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interactions are included but not shown. The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p-values are in brackets. The associated p -values in brackets are based on two-tailed t -test with 16 degrees of freedom. A-29

30 Appendix Table A16. The Effect of TennCare Disenrollment on Employment Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Has Public Health Insurance Employed Working <20 Working 20 Working Working >35 A. Difference-in-Difference Estimates (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) [0.000] [0.036] [0.845] [0.880] [0.039] [0.006] R B. Triple-Difference Estimates (0.017) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) [0.001] [0.009] [0.186] [0.121] [0.326] [0.068] R Mean of dep. variable Notes: This table is identical to Table II except that the definition of employment is broadened to include all adults who report that they are employed whether or not they are currently at work. The sample includes the 17 southern states between 2000 through For Panel A, N = 136; the sample consists of state-by-year means; state and year fixed effects are included, but not shown. For Panel B, N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interactions are included but not shown. The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. The associated p -values in brackets are based on two-tailed t -test with 16 degrees of freedom. A-30

31 Appendix Table A17. The Effect of TennCare Disenrollment on Employment Dependent Variable: The share of CPS respondents reporting the given outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Has Public Health Insurance Employed Working <20 Working 20 Working Working >35 B. Triple-Difference Estimates (0.022) (0.021) (0.009) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) [0.005] [0.032] [0.801] [0.097] [0.284] [0.051] R Mean of dep. variable Notes: This table is identical to Table II except that the definition of 'No Children' is based on whether or not there are any children under age 18 of your own in the household. The sample includes the 17 southern states between 2000 through For Panel A, N = 136; the sample consists of state-by-year means; state and year fixed effects are included, but not shown. For Panel B, N = 272; the sample consists of means for each state, year, and childless status; state fixed effects, year fixed effects, childless fixed effects, and fixed effects for all possible pairwise interactions are included but not shown. The standard errors in parentheses are modified block bootstrap standard errors (see Table II for more details); associated p -values are in brackets. The associated p - values in brackets are based on two-tailed t -test with 16 degrees of freedom. A-31

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