1 Page 1 The System: Objectives - Procedures - Experience Workshop at the Model WTO 2003 Thomas A. Zimmermann St. Gallen (Switzerland), [updated in September 2003] Thomas A. Zimmermann The Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research (SIAW-HSG) University of St. Gallen Dufourstr. 48 CH-9000 St. Gallen (Switzerland) Phone: or or Fax: Internet:
2 Page 2 Program 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 2. Objectives of 3. Dispute Settlement Procedures in the WTO 4. between 1995 and Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review 6. Outlook
3 Page 3 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism Overview Despite the basic economic insight that free trade is the best policy in the interest of a country, the political process and constitutional deficits leads to protectionist policies. International agreements are a possibility to overcome the political-economy logic of protectionism. Despite international agreements, protectionist pressures from import-competing sectors remain. A dispute settlement mechanism which is combined with efficient retaliatory threats can induce compliance with the provisions in international trade agreements.
4 Page 4 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism Functions Provide a limited enforcement device Deter from violations of provisions included in trade agreements Provide multilateral interpretations of trade rules Provide a multilateral forum for orderly re-negotiation of commitments respecting countries sovereignty Deter powerful countries from engaging in unilateral retaliatory practices (e.g. Section 301 in the U.S.) instead of choosing the multilateral avenue for enforcement
5 Page 5 Program 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 2. Objectives of 3. Dispute Settlement Procedures in the WTO 4. between 1995 and Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review 6. Outlook
6 Page 6 2. Objectives of Basic provision: Art. 3 DSU (Paras. 2, 3, 4) 2. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. 3. The prompt settlement (...) is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members. 4. Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements.
7 Page 7 2. Objectives of Basic provision: Art. 3 DSU (Paras. 7 and 9) 7. Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements. 9. The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions (...) under the WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
8 Page 8 Program 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 2. Objectives of 3. The Dispute Settlement Procedure 4. between 1995 and Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review 6. Outlook
9 Page 9 3. The Dispute Settlement Procedure The Stages of 1. Dispute Initiation on the National Level 2. Consultations 3. The Panel Procedure 4. Appellate Review 5. Implementation 6. The Issue of Non-Compliance 7. Disputed Compliance and the Sequencing Issue 8. Simplified Graphic Summary
10 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure Dispute Initiation on the National Level Issues: When should which case be brought against whom? The initiation of a dispute is governed by national legal and/or political mechanisms Only few countries have transparent and publicly known procedures with regard to dispute initiation (e.g.: U.S. [Section 301], the EU [Trade Barriers Regulation]) National initiation procedures vary with regard to * the relative weight of political and legal elements; * participation of the private sector; * the extent of government control and judicial supervision. Despite legal elements, even the most rule-oriented procedure (Section 301 in the U.S.) remains largely driven by politics and is subject to limited legal control.
11 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure Consultations First multilateral stage of dispute settlement The complainant country (C) has the right to ask the defendant country (D) to enter into consultations regarding D s trade measures. D has to answer the consultation request within 10 days and shall enter into consultations within 30 days. Consultations are confidential If a mutually acceptable solution has been found, it shall be notified to the Dispute Settlement Body (General Council meeting in dispute settlement mode ) If D has not entered into consultations or if no mutually acceptable solution has been found within 60 days, C may ask the DSB for the establishment of a panel. Consultations are the most political element in the DSU. They can be characterised as bargaining in the shadow of the law.
12 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure The Panel Procedure Terms of reference: Panels shall examine, in the light of the relevant legal provisions, the matter referred to the DSB, and make such findings that will assist the DSB in giving rulings. Panels consist of three trade experts. They are composed ad hoc. Nationals of disputing parties cannot serve as panelists. Panel procedures include written submissions and oral hearings Panels are established by the DSB on request of C unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel. Factually, agenda control rests with C unlike under GATT 1947 Panels shall submit their reports within 6 months. This period may be extended if parties continue consultations during the panel stage. The DSB shall adopt panel reports within 60 days after the circulation, unless at least one party appeals or DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. Further rules deal with third party participation, the panel s right to seek information, confidentiality of proceedings, and interim review.
13 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure Appellate Review A standing Appellate Body (AB) comprised of seven jurists shall hear appeals from panel cases. Three members shall serve on any one case. Appeals are limited to issues of law and legal interpretations. In other terms, the AB shall not re-engage in fact finding. Proceedings shall normally not exceed 60 days. Appellate Body proceedings are confidential. The AB may i.) uphold, ii.) modify, or iii.) reverse panel findings. The AB report shall be adopted by the DSB within 30 days unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it.
14 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure Implementation At a DSB meeting held 30 days after adoption of the reports, D shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation. Countries should implement recommendations immediately. If immediate implementation is impracticable, D shall have a reasonable period of time (RPT) to do so. The RPT may be proposed by D, may be agreed between the parties to a dispute within 45 days, or may be determined through binding arbitration within 90 days. The RPT should not exceed 15 months. Six months after the establishment of the RPT, the issue of implementation is placed on the DSB agenda where it remains until the issue is resolved. D must provide written status reports. Compensation or suspension of concessions are temporary measures if recommendations are not implemented in time.
15 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure The Issue of Non-Compliance In case rulings are not implemented within the RPT, D shall enter into negotiations with C on mutually acceptable compensation. If no such compensation has been agreed upon within 20 days after expiry of the RPT, C may seek authorisation from the DSB to suspend concessions or obligations vis-à-vis D. The suspension of concessions should take place preferrably i.) in the same sector; or ii.) in a different sector under the same agreement if i.) is impracticable; or iii.) under other agreement if ii.) is impracticable The level of suspension shall be equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment; if D objects to the level of suspension proposed, binding arbitration shall be carried out by the arbitrator (original panel or to be appointed by Director General).
16 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure Disputed Compliance and the Sequencing Issue If C doubts whether D has correctly implemented the DSB recommendations, C may have recourse to the panel procedure to challenge the implementing measure. Recourse should be made to the original panel, and this compliance panel should circulate its report within 90 days. The DSU has some ambiguities and gaps with regard to the sequencing of steps in the implementation stage (e.g.: Must C await the compliance report before it may ask the DSB for the authorisation to suspend concessions? May compliance panel report be appealed from?) In the application of these provisions, parties have developed a practice to fill these gaps through bilateral agreements (e.g. FSC Case).
17 Page The Dispute Settlement Procedure Simplified Graphic Summary In practice: bilaterally agreed procedures at this stage Consultations Establishment of a Panel Panel Report Appellate Body Report Supervised Implementation during Reasonable Period of Time Compliance Panel Procedure Negotiations on Compensation Authorised SCOO (possibly with arbitration) Settlement Settlement Settlement (D wins, no appeal) D wins No challenge to implementation; settlement Compensation; new balance of rights and obligations; settlement SCOO; new balance of rights and obligations; settlement
18 Page 18 Program 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 2. Objectives of 3. Dispute Settlement Procedures in the WTO 4. between 1995 and Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review 6. Outlook
19 Page 19 Between 1995 and 2002 Use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism I % 50 80% Number % 40% Appeal Ratio 10 20% % Complaints Circulated Appellate Body Reports Ratio of Panel Reports Appealed Circulated Panel Reports Art Complaints Data Source: Dispute Settlement Commentary (http://www.worldtradelaw.net)
20 Page 20 Between 1995 and 2002 Use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism II Number of Complaints U.S. EU Brazil Canada India Japan Korea Complainant Defendant Data Source: Dispute Settlement Commentary (http://www.worldtradelaw.net)
21 Page 21 Between 1995 and 2002 Use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism III GATT SC M A griculture AD L icen sin g Safeguards TBT TRIPS SP S TRIM s ATC GATS Custom s GPA R u le s o f O rig in N um ber of C om plaints Data Source: Dispute Settlement Commentary (http://www.worldtradelaw.net)
22 Page 22 Between 1995 and 2002 Use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism IV Source: Park and Panizzon, 2002
23 Page 23 Between 1995 and 2002 Results of Analytical Studies I The increase in the number of disputes and the changes brought by the 1994 DSU have been overstated in literature. While the Uruguay Round mid-term harvest of 1989 did much to increase the number of disputes, the 1994 DSU did not raise the likelihood of disputes among developed countries. The increase in the number of disputes is in line with the increase in the number of member countries. Dispute initiation is subject to positive feedback (probability of a counter-complaint by D against C in the same year rises by 55 times) and bandwagon effects. Members of regional trade agreements (RTAs) are seven times less likely to file disputes against one another than other states. Empirical data suggests that the GATT dispute settlement system was more accessible for developing countries than the WTO system.
24 Page 24 Between 1995 and 2002 Results of Analytical Studies II The probability that D will make concessions are greatest after a panel has been installed and before it has issued its ruling. Once a ruling is available, the likeliness of concessions being made drops (possible explanation: normative force of rulings). Highly democratic countries are more likely to settle cooperatively at the consultations stage. More open economies are less likely to settle early. Democracies are less likely to comply with adverse rulings. Retaliatory power of C is a key factor in inducing compliance by D.
25 Page 25 Program 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 2. Objectives of 3. Dispute Settlement Procedures in the WTO 4. between 1995 and Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review 6. Outlook
26 Page Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review A History of Missed Deadlines A 1994 Ministerial Declaration called for a review of the DSU and a Ministerial Decision to continue, modify, or terminate the DSU within four years after entry into force (1 January 1995) The original December 1998 deadline lapsed, as did an extension until mid The Seattle Ministerial Conference in December 1999 failed to take the required decision. The DSU Review remained in limbo during 2000 and 2001 It was included again in the agenda of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations (see Ministerial Declaration of November 2001). Negotiations should have been completed by 31 May 2003 and should have yielded an early harvest. However, the deadline was missed again. A new deadline has been set for 31 May 2004 by the General Council on 24/25 July For the time being, the DSU will continue to apply as before.
27 Page Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review Key Proposals and Their Sponsors (I) Panel Composition: Should ad-hoc panels be replaced by a Permanent Panel Body (EU)? Amicus Curiae Briefs: Should panels and the Appellate Body be allowed to consider information (so-called Amicus Curiae Briefs) submitted by non-governmental actors such as NGOs, firms, industry associations etc. (pro: EU, US; against: most developing countries). Transparency: Should hearings and submissions be made public (U.S., EU, Canada; against: most developing countries)? Should the Appellate Body be given remand authority to remand issues to a panel if it is unable to decide on an issue due to insufficient factual findings in the panel report?
28 Page Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review Key Proposals and their Sponsors (II) Sequencing Issue: Is a compliance panel necessary before C may request authorisation from the DSB to suspend concessions (EU, Japan and many other countries)? Should remedies against non-compliance be made more effective (e.g. collective retaliation, monetary and retroactive compensation)? Should carousel retaliation be banned (EU and others)?
29 Page Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review Key Proposals and their Sponsors (III) Third Party Rights: Should the rights of third parties be strengthened (Costa Rica and other small and medium-sized countries)? Should more flexibility be brought into the system (e.g. Should parties have the right to adopt panel and Appellate Body reports only in part? Should the Appellate Body issue confidential interim reports, and should countries be able to suspend Appellate Body procedures for further negotiations?) Should adjudicative bodies given guidance by Members (US)? Should developing countries be treated more favourable and provisions on special and differential treatment (S&D) be expanded (legal assistance, longer time-frames, limit of cases brought against developing countries etc.) (most developing countries).
30 Page 30 Program 1. The Need for a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 2. Objectives of 3. Dispute Settlement Procedures in the WTO 4. between 1995 and Current Reform Efforts: The DSU Review 6. Outlook
31 Page Outlook Since the establishment of the GATT in 1947, the dispute settlement mechanism has gradually and pragmatically evolved from a diplomatic towards a more rule-oriented system. Despite its flaws, it is considered as one of the most successful elements of the WTO. However, there is a danger that the strong imbalance between (effective) rule-oriented dispute settlement and (ineffective) political decision making creates increasing tensions in the WTO. Political mechanisms are in dire need of strengthening. The current deadlock of the DSU Review and the many proposals going into diametrically opposed directions (more flexibility, negotiations and power-orientation vs. more rule-orientation) are an expression of parties uncertainty with regard to the future course that WTO dispute settlement in particular and the WTO in general should take. Reforming a system in use is an extremely difficult task. Thank you for your attention!
Jayant Raghu Ram Research Fellow (Legal) Centre for WTO Studies Indian Institute of Foreign Trade OUTLINE I. Origins of WTO Dispute Settlement-GATT Days II. Objectives of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
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