N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N ENTGEGENGE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N

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1 LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGE - SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT- BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EIN- V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGE - SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT- BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EIN- V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGE - SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT- BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EIN- V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGEN- GE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊT- R E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT RENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PAR- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGEN- GE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON- ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CON- TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N ENTGEGENGE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT R ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGEN- GE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊT- R E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT RENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PAR- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGEN- GE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON- ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CON- TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N ENTGEGENGE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT R ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGEN- GE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊT- R E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT RENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PAR- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGEN- GE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON- ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CON- TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N ENTGEGENGE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT R ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGEN- GE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSO - M ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SO - M ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NO LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU EL- QU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT R ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGEN- GE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊT- R E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT RENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PAR- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGEN- GE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON- ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CON- TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N ENTGEGENGE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT R ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGEN- GE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - METHINGDIFFERENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊT- R E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMB- L E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT RENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PAR- LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ GEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGEN- GE SETZ E S DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT-BEING, WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING, BUT ONLY OF SO - M ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N ENTGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTR E, Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE- T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS NE PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSOMETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON- ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO DE S SEIENDEN, SON DER N N U R EI N V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGE - SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT- BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EIN- V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGE - SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT- BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EIN- V ER SCHIEDENES W H EN W E SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LORSQUE NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGE - SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SON WE SPEAK, I THINK, NOT OFSO - METHING THAT IS THE OPPOSI NOUS PARLONS DU NON-ÊTRE, NOUS NE PARLONS PAS, SEMBLE-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER ENT LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQUELQUE CONTRAIRE DE L ÊTRE, MAIS SEULEMENT D UNE AUTRE CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑΝΤΟ ΜΗ ΟΝ ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚEΝ, ΟΥΚ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΛΕΓOΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ WENN WIR NICHTSEIENDES SAGEN, SO MEINEN WIR NICHT, WIEES SCHEINT, EIN ENTGEGENGESETZES DES SEIENDEN, SONDERN NUR EINVERSCHIEDENES WHEN WE SAY NOT- BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E, NOUS N E PA R LONS PAS, SEMBL E-T-IL, DEQU ELQU E CON TR A IR E DE L ÊTR E, M A IS SEU L EMENT D U N E AU TR E CHOSE ΟΠΟΤΑ Ν ΤΟ Μ Η ΟΝ Λ ΕΓΩΜΕΝ, ΩΣ ΕΟΙΚ EΝ, ΟΥ Κ ΕΝΑ Ν ΤΙΟΝ ΤΙ Λ ΕΓOΜ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝ ΤΟΣ, Α Λ Λ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ W EN N W IR N ICHTSEIENDE S SAGEN, SO M EI N EN W IR N ICHT, W I EES SCH EI N T, EI N EN TGEGENGE SETZ E S SAY NOT-BEI NG, W E SPE A K, I THINK, NOT OFSOM ETHING THAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEI NG, BU T ON LY OF SOM ETHINGDIFFER EN T LOR SQU E NOUS PA R LONS DU NON-ÊTR E,

2 Géraldine Hertz (Paris) God Un-titled: Platonic and Gnostic Uses of Negation I am interested in studying the tension between positivity and negativity in the discourse about god among first and second century Platonic and Gnostic thinkers, with special attention to Philo of Alexandria, Albinus, Celsus and Basilides. Among the various negative adjectives attributed to god by these authors, I focus on the utterance god is a non-rhêton / god is an arrhêton (that is: a non-effable / an ineffable being ). My first aim will be to stress how this negative predicate comes into conflict with all the other postulates of negative theology as well as with itself, inasmuch as negating is still asserting. I will analyze here the status of a complex negation attributed to the Gnostic Basilides, God is oude arrhêtos, not even ineffable. By this remarkable double negation, Basilides places God in an indefinite beyond, beyond affirmation and asserting negation, and tries in that way to avoid the danger of self-contradiction. I will then widen the scope of my analysis to consider the unique coexistence of positivity and negativity which is allowed by the rhetorical devices of comparison ( god is superior to X ) and antithetical negation ( god is neither X nor not-x ). Having received her Masters and passed the agrégation in Classics, Géraldine Hertz is currently a Teaching Assistant in Latin and Ancient Greek Languages and Literatures at Université Paris-Est. At the same time, she is conducting Ph. D. research on the constellation of philosophers and writers from the beginning of the first century to the late second century AD known as Middle Platonists. Ms. Hertz s dissertation focuses on the highly ambiguous theology of these authors, who all declare that God is ineffable while still exploring ways of speaking about it. 1

3 Michael J. Young (Baltimore) Knowing by Negation: A Maimonidean Account of Knowledge and Negativity Medieval philosopher Moses Maimonides famously argues that no positive knowledge can be had of the divine. All we can know of such ethereal entities, he claims, we know as propositions of the form it is not the case that X is Y. On his theory, negation provides us with the sole means of justified affirmation in theorizing about matters such as these. By understanding what X is not, we come closer to the truth about what X is. In this paper I reconstruct Maimonides argument found in The Guide for the Perplexed for his theory of negative attributes, casting it into a modernized mold. In doing so, I explicate the implicit links between negative knowledge claims and truth which ground this theory, and explain how negative statements may function to produce distinct cognitive impressions. I then suggest how this account could be expanded for use within a general epistemological framework to explain how claims beyond the reach of standard subject/predicate propositions can qualify as candidates for knowledge. With this elucidated, I examine whether negative propositions may be indispensable to any complete philosophical system, just as they are in Maimonides apophatic theology. In particular, it is argued that completeness of any theory may be more distinguished by what we may not say about it than what can be said about it. Michael Young is a student at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, studying philosophy, chemistry and linguistics. He presently serves as a summer Research Fellow for the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. His philosophical interests range across philosophy of mind, metaethics and philosophy of medicine. 2

4 Romain Jobez (Bochum) The Je-ne-sais-quoi as an Experience of Reading The je-ne-sais-quoi can be defined as an encounter with a certain something that changes the subject and cannot be positively and rationally described. It is a commonplace of the language of passion in French classical literature. Racine, among other authors of this era, uses this term in his plays to mark the limits between the rationality of human conduct and the stroke of passion. The latter, by overcoming the characters of Racine s tragedies, leads to the catastrophe which results in their incapacity of acting as political subjects on the stage of history. Roland Barthes conducted an investigation into this phenomenon in his essay On Racine (1960) and was immediately accused by scholars from the Sorbonne of misreading the dramatist s work. His structuralist method was criticised for dismantling the sense of the plays broadly considered as a monument of French culture. His opponents opposed the clarity of Racinian language, which supposedly allows an immediate understanding of the tragical stakes, to his allegedly confused critical analysis. Nowadays this controversy looks indeed like a rear-guard action. But by denying Barthes a certain form of critical assessment, the zealots of direct and then rationally founded understanding of Racine indirectly focussed attention on the very question of reading. Besides the various topics of his work, Barthes remains a passionate reader of all sorts of phenomena, all linked together by providing signs, which are organized in structures. He gives a very personal portrait of himself as a reader in The Pleasure of the Text (1970). In this essay, Barthes distinguishes between two sorts of texts associated with different feelings. A first group provides the pleasure of immediate understanding while the second provokes bliss. It then overtakes the reader who can no longer rationally describe his experience, whose account is the task of semiology. This leads us back to a particular form of je-ne-sais-quoi where the text plays the role of the certain something. Although Barthes put classical literature in the first textual category, it seems that his interest in Racine tends to bring the playwright s work back within the second because the experience of passion encountered by the characters has very much to do with its reading. In my paper I would like to show how the two sides of je-ne-sais-quoi overlap in the encountering of the reader with classical text, pushing his understanding beyond a solely rational analysis of it. Romain Jobez studied German Language and Literature at the École Normale Supérieure (Fontenay St Cloud). In 2004 he received his PhD at the universities of Frankfurt am Main and Paris X Nanterre with a dissertation on the question of sovereignty in German baroque drama. He is currently Humboldt Fellow at the University of Bochum. 3

5 Jeffrey Champlin (New York) Kleist s Double Negation: The Terrorized Subject in Michael Kohlhaas While Hegel developed a theory of negation in the first decade of the 1800s that would allow the forward motion of thought and history, the violent attacks recounted in Kleist's novella Michael Kohlhaas (1811) negate power without leading to the establishment of a counter regime. In this paper I show how terror, as an inability to stabilize the negative, continues to dominate Kleist's text even after Kohlhaas ends his campaign of arson and murder. Specifically, I argue that the fortune-teller's encounter with the Elector of Saxony causes him such extreme panic not because he fears a particular outcome, but because he desires knowledge that is logically inaccessible. Examining the relation between violence and the complex structures of negation in Michael Kohlhaas both provides a connection between the apparently disjunctive earlier and later parts of the novella and suggests how terror may be conceived in terms of a negativity that resists dialectical progress. Jeffrey Champlin is a graduate student at New York University. He will defend his dissertation, "The Making of a Terrorist: German Rogues in Götz von Berlichingen, Die Räuber, and Michael Kohlhaas" in September. His review of the last decade of Kleist scholarship appeared in this winter's issue of the Germanic Review ("Authority in a Time of War: 21st Century Kleist Scholarship.") Forthcoming articles focus on Hegel's citation of Faust and a reconsideration of Eichendorff's conservatism. He is also the editor of the volume Terror and the Roots of Poetics, to be published in the fall. 4

6 John Bova (Philadelphia) Negation and Incommensurability: On the Metalogical Kernel of Platonic Dialectic Our routine logical practices remain constrained, largely unconsciously, by Aristotle's epochal decision on negation. More precisely we should speak of Aristotle's decision against negation, since we find that Aristotelian logic is founded on a decision against taking as intraphilosophical the mathematics necessary for a rigorous and conceptually powerful exploration of the question of negation. Perhaps surprisingly, we can receive guidance on this point from Plato. While it has been tempting for philosophers from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Deleuze and Derrida to read Plato and Aristotle as strategically convergent with respect to the finitization of negation through the delimiting (or repression) of difference, this paper argues that, to the contrary, Plato's dialectic is characterized by a significant (though not total) recognition and integration into philosophical thinking of just those mathematical forms necessary for presenting the problematic of negation which are constitutively excluded by Aristotelian logic. In Plato s immediate mathematical context, metalogical forms arise most forcefully not in the context of propositional or term-negations (which are amenable to a first-order treatment, however sterile) but in the context of the problem of incommensurability. The crisis of Pythagorean rationality, to which Plato s thought responds, marks the first rigorous appearance of what I call metalogical difference - the disjunction of the metalogical properties of consistency and completeness, arising in the pursuit of their synthesis. Qua repressed, incommensurability is equally methodologically central to Aristotle: the reduction of negation to contrariety via setting a maximum to meaningful difference is isomorphic to an axiomatic insistence on an exclusive and exhaustive disjunction of commensurability and nonsense. This assertion guarantees metalogical synthesis at the price of formal impoverishment. In contrast, I argue that Plato s decision, legible at crucial points of the dialogues, is to accept a fully logical role for incommensurability, and that in consequence his thought is able to absorb as torsion rather than as ontotheological paradox or logical nihilism a large measure of incommensurability s negation of received philosophical and prephilosophical ideals of perfection - and even of the primacy of Being. Thus in Platonic dialectic, metalogical negation serves to keep open metalogical difference, while at the same time metalogical difference finally allows us a formalism by which negation can be presented in its problematicity without caving to either Sophistical paradox or Aristotelian repression. The ethical-political stakes of this metalogical rereading are no less than a conception of the Good subtracted more rigorously from the treacherous perfections of Being. John Bova is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Villanova University (Philadelphia, USA) where he teaches courses in Logic and Philosophy of Mind. 5

7 Samo Tom i (Ljubljana/Maastricht) A Matter of Language: Lacan vs. Aristotle In discussing Lacan's later confrontation with Aristotelian metaphysics, the paper will return to the Aristotelian foundation of philosophy, as it is developed in the first and third books of the Metaphysics. Here, the focus will concern the problem of delimitation between philosophy and sophistics, being and non-being, full speech and empty speech. The mentioned passages in fact articulate a theory of the semblant, which is compatible with the one Lacan produced in the early 70's where le semblant is identified with the signifier. And indeed, in his foundational gesture, Aristotle focuses precisely on the problem of language excess, embodied by the sophists. In the line of Plato's Sophist he rediscovers the problematic blurriness, which comes from the fact that the question of being is entangled with the dynamics of language, or in psychoanalytical terms, with the problem of jouissance. Language as problem is thus inscribed in the very core of philosophical foundations but as a foreclosed problem. This reading will serve as a basis for rethinking the reasons for Lacan's declaration of antiphilosophy in his final teaching. The paper will also indicate in which sense Lacan's final teaching, through the re-articulation of its reference to linguistics, elaborates a theory of the subject which goes beyond the subject of structural linguistics (or the subject of the signifier: $). Samo Tom i is currently research assistant at the Institute of Philosophy (Scientific research centre of Slovenian academy of sciences and arts, Ljubljana, Slovenia) and researcher at Jan van Eyck Academie (Maastricht, Netherlands). He has published several papers on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis and contemporary French philosophy, and he has also collaborated in translations of Freud, Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze and Badiou into Slovenian. His book Other Love. Lacan and Antiphilosohy is to be published in Ljubljana in

8 Tania Espinoza (Cambridge) Negating Woman in Psychoanalysis: A Question of Infinite Judgement Negation and femininity are connected through a series of well known psychoanalytic mantras: from Freud's paradigmatic example in his 1925 essay on negation, It is not the mother, to Lacan's more controversial La femme n'existe pas. I will revisit the question of negation and femininity in psychoanalysis through two contemporary philosophical readings of Freud and Lacan, which meet on the question of the Kantian infinite judgement : on the one hand, Joan Copjec's seminal essay Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason in which she delineates an homology between the Kantian antinomies of pure reason and the Lacanian formulas of sexuation, and on the other, Monique David-Ménard's introduction of the concept of negative magnitudes into psychoanalysis. My concern is that Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason, because it omits a central insight on the Kantian proof of the mathematical antinomy Kant's criticism of logic produces an inaccurate philosophical parallel between the non-existence of the world in Kant and the non-existence of Woman proposed by Lacan. If we are to understand the Lacanian dictum that the real touches logic at the point of its impossibility as a comment on the insufficiency of logic to apprehend processes occurring in reality, it does not follow that an expression of logic's failure therefore has an epistemological privilege to apprehend reality. In discussing sexual difference in the terms of the antinomies, Kant's constant preoccupation that thought might get entangled in a discussion about nothing deserves to be taken seriously. I will not focus on the specifics of the parallel drawn to the Lacanian formulas, but on Copjec's and David-Ménard's different interpretations of the use of the Kantian 'negative judgement' in psychoanalysis and its consequences in theorising sexual difference. However technical and specific, Copjec s article, largely accepted as the last word on the relationship in Lacan between Woman and the limits of reason, attempts to represent the psychoanalytic position on sexual difference as opposed to the deconstructionist one, making a political intervention in central questions for feminism. It is thus important to point to its possible inconsistencies and to alternative renderings of that relationship, if indeed there is one. Tania Espinoza is a doctoral student in the Department of French at the University of Cambridge. She is writing a thesis on Negative Space in the work of Jacques Lacan, Maurice Blanchot, and Virginia Woolf. She has a BA in Humanities and Cultural Studies (Macalester College, Saint Paul, Minnesota) and an MPhil in European Literature and Culture (Cambridge). 7

9 Beau Madison Mount (Princeton) Negation and Generality: Intuitionistic Themes in Contemporary French Philosophy This paper discusses the status of intuitionistic logic in Jacques Lacan's "formulas of sexuation", in Alain Badiou's and Jean-Claude Milner's interpretations of Lacan's formulas, and in Badiou's own recent work Logics of Worlds. In the 1971 Séminaire XX, Lacan claims that intuitionistic logic can serve to explain his thesis that, although not-all (pas-tout) subjects are inscribed under the phallic function, it is nonetheless not the case that there exists any subject exempt from that function. In the 1992 essay Sujet et infini, Alain Badiou invokes this linkage to mount an argument against Lacan s claims, asserting that Lacan s appeal to intuitionistic logic requires an unacceptable rejection of actual infinity. I argue that Badiou is incorrect about the link between intuitionistic logic and (weak) finitism; moreover, Lacan s formulas are not adequately explained by his own intuitionistic model. Jean-Claude Milner s neo-aristotelian interpretation of the formulas, although in some ways preferable to Badiou s, has similar limitations. I offer an alternative reading of the formulas as a type of structuralist semantic opposition. However, some of the questions raised in Sujet et infini are directly relevant to Badiou s 2006 book Logiques des mondes. I discuss this work in the context of Badiou s philosophical development, arguing that it is unclear whether Badiou s attempt to use intuitionistic logic (interpreted through topos theory) as the 'transcendental' logic of worlds while maintaining a classical background logic is ultimately philosophically coherent. Beau Madison Mount is currently completing a dissertation on F.W.J. Schelling's theory of modality in the Department of Comparative Literature at Princeton University. In autumn 2010 he will begin a Fellowship at the Institute for Cultural Inquiry in Berlin. His other research interests include the philosophy of mathematics, contemporary analytic and Continental metaphysics, seventeenth-century philosophy, legal theory, and avant-garde poetry and film. 8

10 Matthew Moss (New York) Nothing to Speak of: Ontological Commitment and Negative Existentials Pegasus does not exist. There is no such thing as phlogiston. There are no carnivorous cows. These three sentences are all paradigmatic negative existentials sentences used to assert the non-existence of some entity or class of entities. Negative existentials present a notorious problem for understanding the relationship between semantics and ontology. Supposing the sentences cited above are all true, what are they about? Intuitively: Pegasus, phlogiston, and carnivorous cows, respectively. Do I refer to carnivorous cows in asserting their non-existence? Under such an assumption, negative existentials take on an air of incoherence: they seem to say of some entity that it is not an entity. In this way, the truth of such sentences leads to prima facie ontological difficulties and perhaps points the way to peculiar ontological commitments. Must carnivorous cows exist after all, in some sense of exist, such that I can coherently predicate non-existence of them? I take as my point of departure the philosopher W.V.O. Quine s classic 1948 paper On What There Is. On Quine s view, natural language expressions do not have determinate ontological commitments at all. In asserting each of the sentences above, I commit myself neither to the existence nor to the non-existence of Pegasus, phlogiston, and carnivorous cows. Rather, ontological commitments are only incurred in a language we adopt for express theoretical purposes, what Quine calls a regimented language. I briefly sketch the details of Quine s regimentation strategy for negative existentials before pursuing the following question: how should we conceive of the relationship between the range of possible readings a negative existential can take and the single reading legislated by Quine s criteria of theory choice? I conclude by considering how Quine s strategy bears on the general problem of relating ontology to natural language semantics. Matthew Moss is a PhD candidate in the Philosophy Department at Columbia University, New York. His primary research interests lie in the philosophy of language, with a particular focus on issues related to truth, propositions, linguistic modality, the theory of content, and the foundations of truth-conditional semantics. 9

11 Renate Schindler (Berlin) Hermann Cohen s Concept of Negation of Privation In his critical philosophy of Religion of Reason from the Sources of Judaism (1919) the Neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen ( ) developed a complex theory of negation at the same time near and distant to fundamental positions in German idealism and in ancient ontology. One of the central reasons in Cohen s thought is the motif of negation of privation. In a historical perspective it can be interpreted as opposition against the disappearance, as a no to the process of elimination of traditions of knowledge. Cohen combines this motif with the messianic idea of eternal History. Can we recognize here a concept that is less utopian than the Kantian Idea of eternal peace? Renate Schindler studied philosophy and Romance languages at the universities of Heidelberg, Potsdam, Paris and Berlin, focusing on Jewish philosophy, German Idealism and existentialism. In 2003 she obtained a PhD with a dissertation entitled Zeit, Geschichte, Ewigkeit in Franz Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung, published by Parerga (Berlin) in Since 1997 she has been a teacher and lecturer in philosophy, ethics, Jewish studies, and philosophy with children, as well as a project-manager at universities and schools, and the author of philosophical broadcast-features. 10

12 Taylor Carman (New York) Heidegger on Being and Nothing Central to Heidegger s philosophy, early and late, is what he calls the ontological difference, that is, the difference between entities or what is (das Seiende) and being (das Sein). Is the ontological difference a sharp or a gradual difference? On the one hand, Heidegger seems to endorse Hegel s thesis that Pure being and pure nothing are the same, for being is literally no thing, i.e. not an entity. The opposite of nothing is therefore not being, but something, or entities and surely the distinction between nothing and something is a sharp distinction. But this is not obvious. Heidegger rejects the thesis, common to Kant and Hegel, that being is simple, hence inaccessible to thought. Moreover, he is at least sympathetic to a long metaphysical tradition that goes back to the Presocratics, and which includes Plato, Descartes, and Kant, that countenances degrees of being. And to say that there are degrees of being is to say that the difference between being and nonbeing (or better, between something and nothing) is a gradual difference. This is not to say that there is a middle state between them that is neither something nor nothing, any more than the gradual difference between red and not red implies a third hue that is neither red nor not red. The logical distinction between red and not red, that is, differs from the material distinction between red and orange. In the purely logical sense, then, the distinction between something and nothing could be said to be sharp, after all. It is important to see, though, that the logical sense sheds no light on Heidegger s notion of the nothing (das Nichts), which he denies is an artifact of negation, understood either logically or psychologically. But if being is not simple, if, as Heidegger maintains, there are several ways of being, must he also concede that those ways of being are, at least in this respect, entity-like? No. For ways of being are transcendental conditions of the intelligibility of entities, and so in this respect remain distinct from them. The ontological difference is therefore sharp in one sense and gradual in another. Metaphysically, it may be gradual, inasmuch as we can understand (as some have understood) the difference between something and nothing as a gradual difference. Methodologically, however, the difference remains sharp, since ontological questions have transcendental status in relation to ontic questions. Taylor Carman received his PhD from Stanford University in 1993 and is currently Professor of Philosophy at Barnard College, Columbia University. He is the author of Heidegger s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time (Cambridge, 2003) and Merleau-Ponty (Routledge, 2008) and coeditor of The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty (Cambridge, 2005). He has written numerous articles on issues in phenomenology. He is currently writing a(nother) book on Heidegger. 11

13 Deborah Goldgaber (Chicago) The Pure Negativity of Language : On Opposition and Difference in Saussure s Account of Value Saussure in his famous Course on General Linguistics is widely criticized (directly and indirectly by thinkers like Samuel Weber, Descombes and Rorty) for confounding the concept of difference with that of opposition. On this view, Saussure s famous dictum on the essential negativity of language, i.e. that in language there are nothing but differences and that in language there is not the least positive term, has improperly received, in certain philosophical quarters, a determination as an ontological principle. Instead of reading Saussure s principle in a dialectical or a neo-dialectical fashion, some suggest, one would be better off viewing it as a statement about the economy of means in language (creating a maximum set of meaning out of a minimum set of elements) or simple a statement about the importance of oppositional relations in the determination of linguistic value. In this case, Jakobson s re-reading of Saussure s Course, which focuses on the functioning of phonemes, or distinct units, would disabuse of this original confusion. It is my intention in this talk to attempt to show that while opposition plays an important role in the determination of linguistic values for Saussure, it plays a secondary role. Following carefully Saussure s account, one discerns that more original genesis of linguistic values involves the arbitrary correlation of pure differences qualitative variations on two planes. This general movement of differentiation accounts for the emergence of the biplanar sign, as Saussure describes it both in the Course and in the more recently discovered Geneva Manuscripts (1997) and allows us to speak of a linguistic units, or positivities as primary, original synthesis arising from a movement of negation. We will inquire whether such an account of the genesis of linguistic values implies an ontological principle, and about the relationship of the concepts of form and content in Saussure s account, and the way Derrida s famous deconstruction of Saussure in Grammatology underlines the singularity of Saussure s account of language s essential negativity while showing the problems of any ontological generalization of this principle. Deborah Goldgaber is a PhD candidate at the Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University.. 12

14 Alexander Kuba (Berlin) Precarious Negations: Transgression and Profanation in Modern Anthropological Thought In an essay dedicated to Georges Bataille, Michel Foucault describes Bataille s concept of transgression as affirmation which affirms nothing. This seemingly paradoxical expression points to an operation which, while crossing a limit, remains tied to the boundary crossed. Transgression negates a limit (a rule which is defied, a law which is broken, a sacred space which is invaded), and at the same time it affirms it by opening up a liminal space which would collapse immediately if the negated term were in fact annihilated. In this sense, it may be identified as a non-positive affirmation, a non-negative negation, or, as Foucault puts it, as an affirmation of partition. Bataille developed his concept of transgression within the framework of modern anthropology. The partition at stake in this field is the fundamental distinction between the sacred and the profane, which, along with its subdivision pure/impure, is pivotal to modern anthropological thought. The paper explores such hybrid figures of affirmation and negation in modern anthropology, taking a side glance at their aestheticisation by the avant-garde. Alexander Kuba studied comparative literature, performance studies and philosophy at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, at the Freie Universität Berlin and at Yale University. Since 2002 he has been Lecturer in Performance Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin, where he obtained his PhD in

15 Vesna Madzoski (Amsterdam) Inclusion as Exclusion: Obscured Crimes in the Manifesta Archive Manifesta European Biennial of Contemporary Art was created after the fall of the Berlin Wall by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a way to accommodate newly discovered art brothers and sisters from the East. On the rhetorical level, it was there to promote democracy and transparency, while bringing the logic of the art market into new territories. I decided to start my research into contemporary modes of censorship in this institution, but at the very beginning was denied access to most of the documents of their democratic and open archive. Instead, I was sold a monograph publication of their ten-year history to perform my research on. Very soon, a particular gesture revealed itself on the pages. In the part entitled Manifesta Archive, I have discovered a being I had not encountered until then. Under numerous photographs, one or more of the participants in this history has been given the name unidentified. Having in mind the short course of Manifesta history, as well as the geographical closeness and new modes of communication, this gesture becomes even more absurd. Nevertheless, through this detail, it became possible to locate the blind spots of Manifesta archive and history. As it turned out, the unidentified ones always belong to the community of the former East that hosted this European art manifestation. In my presentation, I want to bring this new being into discussion as a way to demonstrate the existing practices of exclusion through the rhetorical inclusion of the Other. Instead of censoring its presence, this strange creature will remain on the photograph, carrying a new name to cover the otherwise unpleasant blank space in the signature. Through this analysis, I hope we will be able to better define current practices of deletion happening under the guise of inclusion. In its own way, the discovery of the unidentified questions the true democracy of democracy itself. On the formal level, I would attempt to read this situation in relation to the paraconsistent system of negation. Following Alain Badiou, this might allow us to define the fall of the communism as a simulacrum of an event from the perspective of the former West. Therefore, we might even be able to talk about the new rule of included middle as a replacement for the excluded middle within this new logical framework. Vesna Madzoski (1976, Serbia) is Amsterdam-based researcher and curator. At the moment, she collaborates with the artists' initiative Public Space With A Roof while working on the last part of her PhD project on practices of control and censorship in contemporary arts. For more details on her biography, projects or texts, please visit: 14

16 Jan Rohgalf (Rostock) Negation, Symbolic Integration and Utopia This paper approaches the theme of negation and affirmation from the perspective of political theory. The first part briefly outlines the role of negation in connection with the symbolic integration of societies. According to Claude Lefort and Marcel Gauchet, societies institute themselves by referring to their outside. It marks the space of the common, the universal and of law that is unavailable to any particular individual or group. Mediated by political power, this symbolic outside assures the members of society that they, though often entangled in conflicts, interact in one and the same social reality, bound to same set of rules. The second part relates this idea to another figure of negation in political thought: utopia. Since the inaugural book by Thomas More, utopia depicts a perfect society, in which antagonisms have been reconciled in ultimate harmony. Presented as the logical negation of the author s reality, it suggests a dichotomous understanding of the world: either perdition or salvation. Utopias are a product of early modern times and modernity when the classical and mediaeval images of a hierarchical cosmos or a divine chain of being progressively lost their plausibility. They try to compensate for this loss by restoring an unconditional outside. Jan Rohgalf, born 1979, is a research and teaching assistant at the Department of Political and Administrative Sciences at the University of Rostock. His research foci are political imaginaries and theories of late modern society. As a doctoral student, he is working on a PhD project entitled From Utopias of Progress to the Myth of Globalisation? An Enquiry in Late Modern Political Imaginaries (working title). 15

17 Jakob Norberg (Durham) The Poverty of Critique This paper will explore the relationship of affirmation and negation in the context of modern satire s alliance with the trait of destructiveness. In his study of the recuperative mechanisms of failing organizations, Albert O. Hirchman shows how critique is often supported by and perhaps even presupposes a degree of loyalty. Protest can be expressed by means of departure or articulated criticism exit or voice. While we tend to think of critics as negating a present practice or state of affairs, they clearly do not leave (i.e. exercise the silent option of exit). Rather, by voicing critique, in however strident a fashion, they remain loyal to society, if not in its present form then at least to some ideal version of it. This tendency of critique to affirm established conditions (at least in the form of hopefulness) is a well-known conundrum for satirists and critical theorists, who have sought to reduce loyalty to a minimum. On a radical view, critique should not even be carried out in the name of an unambiguous and fully constituted image of something better, since such a practice would only chain society to something that already possesses positive existence. Critique, then, should proceed by the rhetorical means of litotes, broadly conceived: alternatives are only hinted at through endless series of rejections and repudiations. The necessary poverty of this form of critique has earned its practitioners the reputation of being querulous. However, critics trying to minimize their apparent investment in societal improvement have embraced this role, converted critique into a character trait (such as destructiveness or misanthropy), and thereby complicated the analysis of their endeavors in terms of some morally or socially oriented betterment. The analysis of destructiveness as an escape from the trappings of loyalty that critique traditionally implies will focus on Walter Benjamin s portrait of Karl Kraus. Jakob Norberg is an Assistant Professor of German at Duke University. His essays have appeared or are forthcoming in Arcadia, Cultural Critique, The German Quarterly, Modern Austrian Literature, Monatshefte, and PMLA. He is working on a book entitled Sociability and Its Enemies: German Political Theory After

18 Jack Woods (Princeton) Attitudinal Inconsistency and Non-Negatable Contents I argue that the notion of attitudinal inconsistency is a legitimate notion necessary for successful theorizing about a wide class of attitudes. In particular, I argue that there are attitudes which take objects other than propositions as object. Since such objects don't admit of negation, any inconsistency or tension between two such attitudes must reside at the level of the attitude itself, not in a tension between the contents of such attitudes. I further demonstrate that such attitudes admit of inconsistency. Together, these points legitimate the notion of attitudinal inconsistency. Jack Woods is a PhD candidate in the Philosophy Department of Princeton University specializing in the philosophy of logic. His current areas of research include deflationism about truth and reference, the epistemology of logic, the normative role of logic, and moral non-cognitivism. 17

19 David Gibbons (Pavia) Conceding the Point: Leopardi s Use of Concession in the Zibaldone Concession is one way of relating separate propositions to each other, which allows the speaker to remain committed to the truth of both of them. Put differently, concession may be seen as an alternative to negation or a form of qualified, complex affirmation. Viewed in this light, the phenomenon goes beyond stylistics and linguistics to the realms of logic and philosophy, which is how it has been studied in recent years. In this paper I aim to explore the use of concession in Giacomo Leopardi s Zibaldone. My analysis will move from the grammatical forms of concession to some of the broader issues raised by them. Concession in the Zibaldone provides Leopardi with a space in which to negotiate between apparently contradictory propositions and between illusion and truth itself, which at times brings him close to relativism. Concession also allows Leopardi to explore tensions between self and other, enabling him to stand outside the propositions he espouses and to shift between his own voice and the arguments of potential adversaries. All these are aspects of what has been described as the provisional nature of Leopardi s philosophizing in the Zibaldone, and part of what makes him such an un-dogmatic thinker. Comparison with how others use or do not use this structure, finally, and in particular with Leopardi's contemporary Alessandro Manzoni, illustrates how distinctive a feature of his style and thought concession is. David Gibbons graduated in modern languages from Oxford, did a doctorate in Italian at Cambridge, and was a postdoctoral research fellow at Edinburgh University. During this time he wrote a book on metaphor in Dante and published articles on Petrarch and Tasso. He now lives in northern Italy and works as a translator. Authors he has translated include Leopardi, Carlo Cattaneo and Vincenzo Cuoco. He is currently working on the first English translations of Manzoni as part a broader project on translation and national identity. 18

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