North Korea s Declining Life Expectancy

Transcription

1 Departments North Korea s Declining Life Expectancy DONG Yong Sueng North Korea recently revealed the results of its census, conducted with the help of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in 2008, fifteen years after its last headcount. Since official statistics related to North Korea are rarely attainable, the census results are truly useful in catching a glimpse of the regime. To be sure, there are constraints to analyzing these results due to the lack of related statistics. Also, considering the secretive nature of North Korea toward the outside world, it is hard to say that the data compiled by North Korea s Central Bureau of Statistics is reliable. Nonetheless, the numbers are worthy of analysis in that five monitoring teams of the UNFPA participated in the census, and it was one of the rare times that North Korea has released statistics. Since its last census in 1993, North Korea has undergone a slew of changes both internally and internationally, so the 2008 census data is useful in taking direct and indirect looks at how those changes have affected the population structure of North Korea. This paper compares the 1993 and 2008 censuses to analyze North Korea s internal changes and identify possible economic problems that may arise in future. Also, based on the findings, some suggestions are made regarding policies vis-à-vis North Korea. The main highlights of the 2008 census are as follows. As of October 1, 2008, the population of North Korea totaled 24 million, about 2.8 million more than in During the 15-year interim period, the population grew at an annual average rate of 0.85 percent. Taking into account the mass starvation in the late 1990s caused by natural disasters, it is noteworthy that the size of the overall population hardly changed. The average lifespan was shortened from 72.7 years in 110

2 1993 to 69.3 years in 2008, moving in the opposite direction of the global trend. The infant mortality rate, which was 14.1 out of 1,000 live births in 1993, increased to 19.3 in The maternal mortality rate also worsened from 54 out of 100,000 live births to 77, while the fertility rate edged down from 2.1 to 2 percent. Two things are particularly noteworthy from these results. First, it is apparent that North Korea is being forced into an aging society. The percentage of those aged fifteen or below dropped 3.6 percentage points from 1993 to 2008, while that of those aged 65 or above rose 3.3 percentage points. This indicates that the elderly population increased as much as the younger population shrank. The proportion of the population aged 65 or above is much lower than in the fastest aging countries such as Japan or Italy, where the rate nears 20 percent but higher than in China (8 percent) and India (5 percent). South Korea has a slightly older population with 9.3 percent. The problem is that North Korea s aging trend is not the result of a naturally developing society. An aging society usually results from advancements in medical care, rising income among the senior population, and an increasingly complicated social structure that contributes to marriage at older ages and more households opting to have fewer children. Therefore, the term aging society is often used with low birthrate, heightening concerns over population shrinkage. In North Korea, however, the overall life expectancy is becoming shorter, in- Table 1 North Korea: Selected Demographic Indicators, 1993 and Total Population 21,213,378 24,052,231 Women 10,329,699 11,721,838 Men 10,883,679 12,330,393 Ratio of Women to Men 94.9% 95.1% Average Annual Growth 0.85% ( ) - Percentage of Urban Population 60.9% 60.6% Ages % 7.1% Ages % 24.9% Ages % 68.1% Ages 65 or above 5.4% 8.7% Total Fertility Rate Infant Mortality Rate 14.1 per 1,000 live births 19.3 per 1,000 live births Life Expectancy at Birth Total 72.7 years 69.3 years Men 68.4 years 65.6 years Women 76.0 years 72.7 years Maternal Mortality Rate 54.0 per 100,000 live births 77.2 per 100,000 live births April 2010 SERI Quarterly 111

3 North Korea s Declining Life Expectancy Figure 1 North Korean Population by Age Groups, 1993 and Percent Percent dicating that the elderly population does not benefit from medical advancements. Infant mortality rate is also rising along with maternal mortality rate. This reflects that the shrinking infant population of North Korea is not because of general trends such as fewer marriages, older marrying age, and having fewer children but because of absolute poverty and outdated medical services. As seen in Figure 1 above, when compared to 1993, the age structure graph of the population in North Korea has changed into a more pot-like shape by In particular, those aged fifteen or below shrank significantly, representing that quality of life for North Korean residents had further deteriorated since In 1993, even though the North Korean economy tumbled after the collapse of socialism, factory operations or government rationing did not stop completely. But fifteen years later, the rationing system had nearly stopped functioning, and people had become largely dependent on private markets for their living. Actually, given their backwardness and poor conditions, most of the markets existed in name only. Since they comprised an unofficial sector, intervention by the governing and legal systems was infrequent. Transactions became based on social customs, and commodities were not smoothly distributed. Accordingly, compared to when rationing was working to some degree in 1993, North Korea s population in 2008 showed a de facto forced aging structure. The second salient point about the census is that it indicates a lack of future manpower. It is of especially serious consequence when North Korea s changing population structure is overlaid onto its future economic development. North Korea is not yet industrialized. To be more specific, industrialization had been under way driven by heavy industry until the early 1970s and stopped thereafter. The collapse of socialism in the 1990s heightened the seriousness of the problem. North Korea itself attributed its economic hardship to the collapse of socialism, imperialists maneuvers to isolate and crush the regime, and a series of natural disasters. If North Korea had embraced reform and openness and had switched to a policy of active

4 DONG Yong Sueng Even if North Korea institutes reform and openness and resumes industrialization, it will ultimately face an absolute labor shortage only ten years into the process. ly absorbing foreign capital in 1993, the regime could have had a sufficient work force. As seen in the graph above, the economically active population in their 20s and 30s constituted the highest proportion in 1993, most of them a part of the baby boom generation. The teen population shrank sharply since, but the percentage of those aged less than twenty rose. In 2008, however, the largest age group among the economically active population was those in their 40s, while people in their 20s and 30s had diminished. This population structure normally represents significant progress in industrialization, but North Korea s experience differs. When broken down by occupation, the farming population is the largest, followed by government officials, soldiers, and teachers. Most of these jobs are services dependent on state support. Manufacturing workers in the secondary industry form a relatively smaller proportion of the national workforce. For North Korea to become a nation that provides sufficient daily allowances to its people as it always aspires to, the regime needs industrial- Figure 2 North Korean Working Population by Occupation Occupation not specified Workers in elementary occupation Machine operators and assemblers Craft and related trades workers Skilled agriculture, fishery and forestry workers Service and sales workers Clerks Technicians and associate professionals Professionals Senior officials and managers ,000 Persons April 2010 SERI Quarterly 113

5 North Korea s Declining Life Expectancy ization. But the problem is that it will face an absolute labor-force shortage. In its population structure in 2008, it is noteworthy that the population of those aged twenty or below is decreasing. This means that even if North Korea institutes reform and openness and resumes industrialization, it will ultimately face an absolute labor shortage only ten years into the process. Furthermore, those under the age of twenty in North Korea are extremely malnourished due to its dragging economic difficulties. The economically active population may drop further when this generation matures. In sum, it is clear that if North Korea continues to remain isolated from the international community, then the situation in that country will become even more difficult than it is now. The present condition of forced aging population structure only signals labor shortages in the future. Already, the Kaesong Industrial Complex is not being supplied with young workers. Out of about 310,000 residents in Kaesong city, the female population numbers about 162,000. The 2008 census shows that economically active population is about 68 percent of North Korea s total population. Applying the percentage to Kaesong city yields 110,000 women of the work force. Yet, the total number of women in the age group of 20s 40s who are actually capable of working is estimated to be about merely 40,000 50,000. Since the number of North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex reached 41,000 as of the end of October 2009, it is believed that most women in the city work at the industrial complex. There are now 116 companies operating in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but when business activities proceed in full swing, hundreds of additional companies may operate at the complex. In such a case, due to an insufficient working population in Kaesong city, workers from nearby regions will be needed. North Korea s economic development should be based on labor-intensive industries for a while. But the fact that the regime is turning into a society with an insufficient labor force is clouding the future of North Korean economy. North Korea has announced a plan to establish a national development bank to raise $10 billion in capital, and to attract $400 billion in foreign capital over the next ten years. Aside from the feasibility of this plan, an internal breakdown inside the country means that the regime will likely be unable to digest foreign aid. Regardless of how much foreign capital it raises, economic development cannot be sustained without enough labor to support those foreign investments. For the sake of its future, North Korea needs to change now (not to mention join the international community by abandoning its nuclear program); it should not waste anymore time by adopting reforms and openness as did China and Vietnam; and reverse the ongoing forced aging population structure. Translation: KIM Young-kyu Keywords North Korea census, life expectancy, population, demographics, aging society, working population, economically active, Kaesong Industrial Complex DONG Yong Sueng is senior fellow at SERI. His areas of expertise include North Korean issues and international relations, and he is adviser to Korea s National Security Council, Ministry of Economy & Finance, and Ministry of Unification. He holds an MA in Economics from Yonsei University. Contact: yongsueng. dong@samsung.com