Suppressing Dissent Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in Ethiopia s Oromia Region

Transcription

1 Human Rights Watch May 2005 Vol. 17, No. 7 (A) Suppressing Dissent Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in Ethiopia s Oromia Region Summary... 1 Recommendations... 3 To the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Regional Government of Oromia State... 3 To International Election Observers... 4 To Donor Governments... 4 To the World Bank and United Nations Agencies Involved in Development in Ethiopia... 5 Introduction... 6 Political Competition in Oromia... 7 Historical Background... 7 Ethiopia and Oromia under EPRDF Rule... 8 The Oromo Liberation Front... 9 The Struggle for Political Control in Oromia during the Transition... 9 The May 2005 Elections...11 Government Use of Torture, Arbitrary Detention, Surveillance and Harassment to Discourage and Punish Dissent Arbitrary Detention and Torture Arbitrary Detention...13 Prolonged Arbitrary Detention of High-Profile Oromo Defendants...16 Torture and Other Mistreatment...18 Continuing Harassment of Targeted Individuals Targeting Oromo Students for Harassment and Abuse Pressuring Teachers to Monitor Students for Subversive Speech The Chilling Effect of Government Abuse on the Freedom of Expression Mechanisms Used by the Ethiopian Government to Control Rural Communities in Oromia The Kebele System The Gott and Garee System The Imposition of Gott and Garee on Rural Communities...30 Forced Labor under the Garee...32 Forced Attendance at Political Meetings...34 Using the Garee to Monitor Speech...35

2 The Chilling Effect of the Gott and Garee System on Speech...37 Restrictions on the Freedom of Movement...39 The International Response and Official Reactions of the Ethiopian Government to Criticism about its Human Rights Record Acknowledgements... 44

3 Summary On May 15, 2005, Ethiopia will hold national elections. The international community, including international donors, who have poured substantial amounts of aid into Ethiopia since the current government came to power fourteen years ago, will be watching these elections closely for signs that Ethiopia is moving towards real democracy. In advance of these elections, the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi enacted reforms that could, on the surface, make the elections more open. However, as this report documents, the political freedoms required for elections to be a meaningful exercise of Ethiopian citizens fundamental right to participate in the selection of their government do not exist for many Ethiopians. In Oromia, the largest and most populous state in Ethiopia, systematic political repression and pervasive human rights violations have denied citizens the freedom to associate and to freely form and express their political ideas. As a result, on election day, most voters there are unlikely to be presented with real choices. Since 1992, regional authorities in Oromia have cultivated a climate of fear and repression by using state power to punish political dissent in often brutal fashion. Regional and local authorities have consistently harassed and abused perceived critics of the current government. And in the past year, these authorities have taken drastic new steps to consolidate their control over the region s large rural population. This backdrop of oppression must be factored into any assessment of the upcoming elections. Oromia is governed by the Oromo People s Democratic Organization (OPDO), which was formed by the Tigrayan People s Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1990 and integrated into the TPLF-controlled Ethiopian People s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition that seized power in and continues to hold power today. The OPDO has dominated politics in Oromia since 1992, when the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which had much older and deeper roots in Oromia, withdrew from the transitional political process after clashes with the EPRDF and the OPDO in the run-up to the country s first national elections in Since then, OLF has waged a generally ineffectual armed struggle against the government and the OPDO, the TPLF s regional surrogate, has governed Oromia as if it were facing a serious military threat. Since 1992, security forces have imprisoned thousands of Oromo on charges of plotting armed insurrection on behalf of the OLF. Such accusations have regularly been used as a transparent pretext to imprison individuals who publicly question government policies or actions. Security forces have tortured many detainees and subjected them to continuing harassment and abuse for years after their release. That harassment, in turn, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

4 has often destroyed victims ability to earn a livelihood and isolated them from their communities. In urban areas, regional authorities have treated Oromia s student population in particular with suspicion and mistrust. Between 2000 and 2004, Oromo students poured into the streets of major towns throughout the region several times to protest government policies. Police and security forces put those demonstrations down with unnecessary force and the regional government reacted by subjecting students in schools throughout the region to persistent and intrusive surveillance, both in and out of the classroom. Teachers have been required to gather information about their students for school administrators and government officials on pain of transfer to remote postings far from their homes and families. Students who have had the misfortune to be labeled subversives by government officials have been imprisoned, tortured or expelled from school. In the countryside, where more than eighty-five percent of Oromia s population resides, the government has gone to even greater lengths to maintain control and put down dissent. Expanding upon a pre-existing system of local government that was designed by the Derg primarily as a tool to maintain tight political control, regional authorities have created an entirely new set of quasi-governmental institutions that now monitor and control the activities, speech and movement of the rural population down to the level of individual households. Regional authorities claim that these new institutions, called gott and garee, are voluntary associations of like-minded farmers who have joined together to carry out development work in their communities. But farmers throughout Oromia told Human Rights Watch that woreda (district) authorities imposed these new structures on their communities and that the garee regularly require them to perform forced labor on projects they have no hand in designing. More disturbingly, regional authorities are using the gott and garee to monitor the speech and personal lives of the rural population, to restrict and control the movement of residents, and to enforce farmers attendance at meetings that are thinly disguised OPDO political rallies. These abuses stand in fundamental contradiction to the human rights principles enshrined in the Ethiopian Constitution and seriously call into question the Ethiopian government s claim that it is making real progress in putting in place democratic forms of governance. The thousands of Oromo who have been subjected to detention, torture and harassment for voicing their political opinions serve as examples that intimidate their neighbors and friends into silence. Improvements in the electoral process have HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 2

5 done nothing to change this reality. Instead, the pervasive pattern of repression and abuse documented in this report ensures that voting on May 15 will be a hollow exercise for most of Oromia s population. Human Rights Watch calls on the Ethiopian government to end the deeply entrenched patterns of human rights violations documented in this report. It also urges international observers charged with monitoring the May 2005 elections in Ethiopia to take into account the effects of pervasive human rights abuse on Ethiopians ability to exercise their right to free political expression. This report is based on a three-week Human Rights Watch research mission in March 2005 to the capital Addis Ababa and towns in Oromia s East Shewa, West Shewa, East Wollega, West Wollega and Jimma zones. Human Rights Watch interviewed about 115 persons; just over half were farmers from rural kebeles 1 in Oromia. The remaining interviews were of Oromo civil society and opposition figures, current and former government officials and residents of urban areas who have experienced various forms of human rights abuse. In most cases, names and other identifying details have been withheld to protect the security of victims and witnesses. Recommendations To the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Regional Government of Oromia State Prohibit gott and garee administrative units from dispensing punishment without due process, from engaging in forced labor, and from interfering with the freedoms of association, expression and movement. If decisive action is not taken to end these abuses, disband the gott and garee throughout Oromia. Take all necessary action to ensure that the police, armed forces and other security forces in Oromia abide by Ethiopia s obligations under international law, including respect for the rights to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and from torture and other mistreatment. In accordance with the Ethiopian constitution, ensure that all persons taken into custody be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours, 1 The kebele is the smallest unit of government in Ethiopia, corresponding roughly to neighborhoods in urban areas and to larger geographic areas in more sparsely-populated areas of the countryside. 3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

6 and have the right of access to family members and legal counsel, in addition to other due process rights. Conduct an independent investigation into violations of human rights committed in Oromia. Discipline or prosecute, as appropriate, government officials and members of the security forces at all levels who are implicated in abuses. Provide appropriate training to police and other security forces on human rights standards and the rule of law. In accordance with Ethiopian law and international standards, ensure that prosecutors do not initiate or continue prosecutions in cases where an impartial investigation shows that criminal charges are unfounded. Ensure, in accordance with international law, that persons whose rights have been violated have recourse to effective remedies. Prohibit local and regional officials from using members of the security forces, school administrators and teachers to monitor students speech and political opinions. Permit free and full access to domestic and foreign non-governmental organizations to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Oromia. To International Election Observers Prepare comprehensive reports on the electoral environment that take into account all aspects of the election process, including underlying patterns of human rights abuse that affect the ability of voters to freely express political opinions and determine who they want to govern them. To Donor Governments Recognizing that effective development programs depend on a government that respects the human rights of its citizens, publicly urge federal authorities in Ethiopia to conduct a thorough and independent HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 4

7 investigation into human rights violations committed by security and police forces in Oromia and to make the findings public. Closely monitor the progress of any government investigation and insist that its findings result in appropriate action to hold responsible officials accountable and provide adequate remedies to victims. Demand that police officials and other members of the security forces responsible for human rights violations be held accountable. Publicly call for more robust and comprehensive training on human rights standards for police and security forces and support such training. Insist that the federal and Oromia regional governments immediately act to end rights violations by the gott and garee structures or urge that they be disbanded throughout the region. Take steps to ensure that all forms of military assistance and cooperation with the Ethiopian government do not, directly or indirectly, aid or abet those responsible for human rights abuses committed in Oromia. To the World Bank and United Nations Agencies Involved in Development in Ethiopia Urge regional and federal authorities in Ethiopia to ensure that development imperatives are not used as a pretext to justify intimidation, harassment, forced labor and other human rights violations by the gott and garee structures. Take action to monitor the human rights impact of the gott and garee system in Oromia. 5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

8 Introduction On May 15, 2005, Ethiopia will hold national elections. These elections are seen by many observers as an important indicator of Ethiopia s progress toward democracy. 2 In anticipation of the international scrutiny these elections will receive, the Ethiopian government pushed through a number of electoral reforms that could make these elections appear more open and competitive than any previous national election. Those reforms include granting opposition candidates access to state-owned media outlets, relaxing onerous registration requirements for opposition candidates, and inviting international observers to monitor the election process. These reforms are a positive step. But, if international observers focus solely on the mechanics of electioneering and the conduct of the vote on May 15, they could end up presenting a distorted picture of the current state of democracy in Ethiopia. For elections to be a meaningful exercise of citizens fundamental right to participate in the selection of a government, they must take place in an environment where all citizens have the opportunity to freely form and express their political ideas and voters are offered real choices among parties and candidates. Unfortunately, that kind of freedom and choice does not exist in most of Ethiopia today. It especially does not exist in the state of Oromia, which is home to roughly one-third of the Ethiopian population and the nation s largest individual ethnic group, the Oromo. International election monitors can perform an important role in the process of encouraging democratization. Monitors need to look not only at what happens on election day but at the context in which elections are taking place to discover long-term, invidious repressive practices and human rights abuses in places like Oromia. Those kinds of practices and abuses clearly determine whether or not elections can be meaningful expressions of citizens democratic will. 3 Where, as in Oromia, a government systematically stifles and punishes dissent and uses its coercive power to prevent genuine opposition parties from emerging, even procedurally flawless elections cannot be regarded as meaningful expressions of the electorate s political will. 2 For example, on April 18, 2005, the Carter Center announced that former President Jimmy Carter will lead a delegation that will observe the elections; and Rachel Fowler, a senior associate at the Center, called the election an important step in the consolidation of democracy since the 1991 transition. Press Release, Carter Center, April 18, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Ethiopia ratified in 1993, provides that: Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives and [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, article 25. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 6

9 Political Competition in Oromia To understand the context in which the 2005 election is taking place in Oromia and the underlying causes of the patterns of political repression and human rights abuses documented in this report it is necessary to understand the history of the competition for political control of Oromia. Historical Background Oromia is the largest and most populous of Ethiopia s nine regional states. It sprawls over 32 percent of the country s total land area and is home to at least 23 million people. 4 Oromia surrounds the nation s capital, Addis Ababa, and divides Ethiopia s southwestern states 5 from the rest of the country. While Oromia s population is ethnically diverse, the overwhelming majority of people who reside there are ethnic Oromo. 6 The Oromo population is quite diverse in terms of history, religion and other factors, but the group shares a common language, Afan Oromo and a strong and distinct sense of ethnic and national identity. Oromo nationalism has evolved in response to the Oromo people s long, difficult and often antagonistic relationship with the Ethiopian state. Much of what is now Oromia was conquered and forcibly incorporated into the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire towards the end of the nineteenth century. During the old imperial era, the Oromo people were subjected to widespread repression. The rulers in Addis Ababa adopted a policy of forced cultural assimilation and they took steps to suppress Oromo culture, including restricting the use and development of Afan Oromo. 7 Haile Selassie, the last Ethiopian emperor, was overthrown by the military in But the Derg, the 4 This estimate is based on a projection made by the 1994 National Census. This estimate is not without controversy, as many Oromo argue that the region s true population is substantially higher than this. It is also worth noting that there are substantial Oromo populations in other parts of Ethiopia, and the country s total Oromo population likely exceeds 27 million. 5 Namely, Gambella and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. 6 According to the 1994 national census, ethnic Oromo make up 85 percent of Oromia s total population. 7 The Imperial government maintained control over this vast territory through a highly repressive system of governance that granted power at the local level to large numbers of armed, non-oromo settlers generally referred to as neftegna (which translates as rifleman. ) Because the Oromo constituted such a large proportion of the Ethiopian population after their incorporation into the state, Imperial authorities treated any expression of Oromo national consciousness as a potential threat to the territorial integrity of the empire and the continued dominance of its ruling Amhara elite. Many Oromo regard their absorption into the Ethiopian state as a form of colonial conquest. See, e.g., Mekuria Bulcha, Survival and Reconstruction of National Identity, in P.T.W. Baxter, et. al, eds., Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Inquiries (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1996). 7 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

10 committee of military officers who seized control of the country, quickly evolved into an extremely brutal dictatorship that continued the oppression of the Oromo. 8 In 1991, after a long civil war, the Derg collapsed. The political vacuum that was created by the Derg s collapse was immediately filled by the TPLF-controlled Ethiopian People s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition, which has remained in power through the present day. The TPLF, led by Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia s current prime minister, gained control in Addis Ababa despite its humble origins as a narrowly based, ethnic guerilla movement with little support outside of the northern highlands. A major reason it was able to do so was the lack of strong potential rivals in much of the South and the respect it had earned by driving the Derg from power. But equally important was the TPLF s ability to include within the EPRDF groups claiming to represent different regions and ethnicities 9 ; and its enunciation of a new ethnic federalist vision of the Ethiopian state. Ethiopia and Oromia under EPRDF Rule Ethnic federalism promised, for the first time in Ethiopia s long history, to respect the country s incredible cultural diversity and give meaningful autonomy to its different ethnic groups. A new constitution was adopted in 1994 that divided Ethiopia into regions drawn roughly along ethnic lines. Under the new dispensation, the largest region by far was Oromia, a vast territory that had never before been governed as a single unit. One third of the seats in the national legislature are allocated to Oromia. In contrast, the TPLF s home region, Tigray, commands only seven percent of the seats in parliament. Thus, the TPLF s ability to remain in control in Addis Ababa depends entirely on the ability of its EPRDF allies in other regions, especially Oromia, to maintain regional political control. In Oromia, the TPLF s regional ally is the Oromo People s Democratic Organization (OPDO), which was created in 1990, as the Derg began to collapse. The OPDO was 8 Derg means committee in Amharic. This appellation refers to the committee of military officers who led the government when it seized power. 9 The EPRDF s members are the TPLF; the Oromo People s Democratic Organization (OPDO), which governs Oromia; the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), which governs Amhara region; and the Southern Ethiopia People s Democratic Front (SEPDF), which administers the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR). The TPLF has also created satellite parties in the country s other regions, but they are not full members of the EPRDF. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 8

11 created outside of Oromia without any grassroots political participation. 10 Thus, it started with very little popular support in Oromia. Its only real assets were the complete backing it received from the TPLF and a hope that the Oromo population, grateful for the role the EPRDF had played in liberating Oromia from the Derg, would rally behind its flag. 11 The Oromo Liberation Front The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) had its origins in a protracted armed struggle in Oromia against the Haile Selassie government in the 1960s. 12 Thus, long before the OPDO was created in Tigray, the OLF had established itself as the leading voice of Oromo nationalism. By 1991, when the Derg collapsed, it enjoyed widespread popular support in much of the region and its leaders had longstanding ties to Oromo civil society. 13 In the later years of the struggle against the Derg, the OLF forged a loose alliance with the TPLF, but the two organizations were never formally affiliated and each regarded the other with suspicion and the TPLF s decision to create the OPDO exacerbated tensions between the two groups. 14 The Struggle for Political Control in Oromia during the Transition In 1991, the OLF joined the TPLF-led transitional government and continued to administer an area around Dembi Dollo in Western Wollega, which it had controlled in the final days of the war. National elections were scheduled for June In Oromia, the contest pitted the OPDO against the OLF. The run-up to election day was marred by widespread violence and harassment. OLF candidates were intimidated and 10 Most of the OPDO s initial membership consisted of Oromo POWs who had been fighting for the Derg and who were captured by the TPLF and recruited into the OPDO while in captivity. 11 Human Rights Watch interviews with former OPDO officials, Addis Ababa, March In fact, the OLF s exact origins are a matter of some controversy, but some trace the organization s roots back to a long armed struggle waged against Imperial rule throughout the Bale region of Oromia from roughly The Bale revolt remains a potent symbol of Oromo nationalism and the struggle for selfdetermination. 13 Perhaps most importantly, much of the OLF s leadership had been involved with the Mecha-Tulema Association, the first Oromo civil society organization and an organization widely credited with helping to revive and nurture a sense of nationalism among Ethiopia s educated Oromo elite. The OLF also had strong ties with the Mekene Yesus Church, the largest and most influential Protestant Church in Ethiopia. 14 Many within the OLF s leadership viewed the TPLF s creation of the OPDO as a hostile act, as it seemed to indicate that the country s new rulers had no desire to maintain a lasting alliance with the OLF. On the other hand, many within the TPLF believed that the OLF was intent on destroying the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state by pressing for an independent Oromia. 9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

12 prevented from campaigning effectively in most of Oromia, while, in the small area that was under OLF control, OPDO officials faced similar intimidation and restrictions. 15 After the OLF became convinced that it would not be allowed to compete fairly in the election, it withdrew from the race. 16 Relations between the OLF and EPRDF quickly degenerated into open conflict, and OLF ministers who had been serving in the transitional government withdrew and left the country. The result was complete disaster for the OLF. EPRDF military forces captured thousands of OLF fighters within the space of a few weeks and drove the OLF administration in Dembi Dollo out of the country. 17 Virtually overnight, it was almost entirely neutralized as a military force and excluded from the political process. After the OLF s departure, no other substantial party emerged in Oromia to challenge the OPDO. The OPDO currently controls 172 out of Oromia s 179 seats in the House of People s Representatives, Ethiopia s national legislature. 18 The OPDO s dominance is equally overwhelming at the local level. From top to bottom, the OPDO has had a near-total monopoly on political power in Oromia since Despite its defeat on the ground and long absence from the political scene, the OLF has retained its status as the most potent symbol of Oromo nationalism and continues in many ways to be the central focus of political discourse in Oromia. Since 1992, the OLF has waged what it calls an armed struggle against the EPRDF government; and in recent years, it has accepted military training and assistance from Eritrea. 19 The OLF has occasionally managed to infiltrate fighters into Ethiopia and it has been blamed by EPRDF officials for a number of terrorist attacks throughout the country. 20 But the OLF s military adventures proved largely ineffectual, and few if any observers regard 15 See Siegfried Pausewang, et. al., Ethiopia Since the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance (London: Zed Books, 2002) at 30-32; National Democratic Institute, An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia, (Washington: National Democratic Institute, 1992). 16 Human Rights Watch interviews with former high-ranking OLF officials, February and March Ibid.; see also Siegfried Pausewang, et. al., Ethiopia Since the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance (London: Zed Books, 2002) at The opposition Oromo National Congress (ONC) won only one seat in the HPR. The other six non-opdo seats went to opposition or independent candidates widely believed to be supportive of the EPRDF. Nationwide, the EPRDF and affiliated parties won 520 out of 547 seats in the House of People s Representatives. 19 Much of the OLF s leadership is currently based in Asmara, Eritrea. 20 Most recently, in 2002 the OLF reportedly managed to infiltrate fighters into Wollega from Sudan with logistical support from the Eritrean government. Those fighters were quickly wiped out by EPRDF forces. There have not been any confirmed clashes between OLF and EPRDF forces since, although the OLF has periodically issued claims that its forces have engaged and defeated EPRDF soldiers. The OLF has also been blamed for a number of bomb attacks carried out against railroad installations and hotels. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 10

13 it as a serious military threat to the Ethiopian government. 21 Nevertheless, the OPDO has used the specter of an ongoing OLF armed struggle to justify the widespread repression that is described in this report. Regional government and security officials routinely accuse dissidents, critics and students of being OLF terrorists or insurgents. Thousands of Oromo from all walks of life have been targeted for arbitrary detention, torture and other abuses even when there has been no evidence linking them to the OLF. Even some apolitical civil society organizations have been treated as subversive threats to the regime, hampering their ability to operate effectively. 22 Thus, the OLF and the OPDO are engaged in a tragic charade: The OLF pretends to be waging the kind of armed struggle that Meles Zenawi and the TPLF fought to bring down the Derg. The OPDO and the TPLF/EPRDF use the OLF s quixotic guerrilla campaign to justify political repression. And the people of Oromia suffer from both sides pretentions. The May 2005 Elections The only Oromo parties of any real strength contesting the May 2005 elections are the Oromo National Congress (ONC), which until recently has not attempted to build a permanent base of support outside its leader s home region in Ambo woreda, and the Oromo Federal Democratic Movement (OFDM), which only emerged in mid Both parties claim that they will field candidates in a large proportion of Oromia s electoral constituencies and expect to win some seats, but neither is likely to pose a serious threat to the OPDO s regional political monopoly. One indication of the lack of genuine political competition in this year s election is that, as of March, when Human Rights Watch visited the area, there were no signs of any opposition presence or campaigning in rural areas outside of Ambo woreda. In addition, many of the individuals Human Rights Watch interviewed did not know whether any opposition parties were running in their constituencies, or what opposition parties existed in Oromia. 21 Human Rights Watch interviews with western diplomatic and intelligence sources and other observers, March and April Human Rights Watch interviews with Oromo civil society leaders and western diplomatic officials, Addis Ababa, Nekemte and Dembi Dollo, March Neither of these parties has any apparent link with the OLF, although OPDO officials have made such accusations in some communities. 11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

14 Government Use of Torture, Arbitrary Detention, Surveillance and Harassment to Discourage and Punish Dissent Many local authorities and security officials in Oromia routinely commit various human rights violations against people they believe to be critical or unsupportive of the government. These abuses range from arbitrary detention and torture to long-term patterns of surveillance and harassment that isolate targeted individuals from their communities and destroy their livelihoods. In much of Oromia, these abuses are so widespread and so arbitrarily inflicted that they have left many people afraid to engage in any kind of public discussion related to issues of concern to their communities. These abuses take on an added importance in the context of the coming elections, as they have tainted the entire electoral process by leaving many voters convinced that government authorities are certain to punish any sign of support for the political opposition. Arbitrary Detention and Torture Since 1992, security officials have arrested tens of thousands of Oromo whom they have accused of being members or supporters of the OLF since that organization was banned in According to former Ethiopian President Negasso Gidada, when he left office in 2001 roughly 25,000 people were in prison on OLF-related charges throughout Oromia and in Addis Ababa and no public moves have since been made to substantially reduce the number of detainees. 25 Oromo civil society and community leaders have long complained that allegations of OLF involvement are used as a thinly veiled pretext to detain government critics and intimidate others into silence 26. One leading Oromo opposition figure, voicing an often-repeated complaint, lamented that If you are a young man you are liable to ask questions. But if you ask questions you are liable to go to jail as an OLF suspect. 27 A prominent Oromo academic put it this way: OPDO officials feel that if you are not with them then you are their enemy. If you are not OPDO, you are OLF, and if you are OLF you are a terrorist and a criminal While there is no provision in the Ethiopian criminal code dealing specifically with the OLF, allegations of involvement with the organization can lead to charges of inciting or participating in armed insurrection against the government, arms trafficking and treason, among other offenses. 25 Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Negaso Gidada, Addis Ababa, March This figure includes a large number of OLF fighters who were captured almost immediately after relations between the OLF and TPLF broke down in Human Rights Watch interviews with Oromo civil society leaders, Addis Ababa, Nekemte and Dembi Dollo, March Human Rights Watch interview with Bulcha Demeksa, Addis Ababa, March 2, Human Rights Watch with Addis Ababa University professor, March HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 12

15 Human Rights Watch interviewed forty-one individuals who have been detained and released since 2001 by local or security officials who accused them of conspiring against the government. Many had been arrested more than once and some had been arrested as many as ten times since Most were accused of providing support to the OLF or of plotting acts of armed insurrection on the organization s behalf. Many were individuals who had been outspokenly critical of government actions or policies. In all forty-one cases investigated by Human Rights Watch, courts or police investigators ultimately found the allegations against these detainees to be unsupported by any sort of evidence. None were ever tried for any offense related to the allegations that led to their arrest, but all were nonetheless imprisoned for weeks or months before being released. 29 In many cases, police and military officials also subjected these detainees to interrogation and torture aimed at forcing them to produce information about OLF activities that they did not possess. Taken together, their testimonies describe a widespread climate of suspicion and abuse within which many security and government officials make widespread use of arbitrary imprisonment as a weapon in an ongoing war against dissent. Arbitrary Detention Police and security officials often target people who publicly criticize government policies for arrest and detention. One farmer from a village near Agaro said that he has been arrested four times since 1992 and accused of providing support to the OLF but has never been formally charged. In several public meetings in June and July of 2004, he stood up and argued that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi should be required to stand down because he has been too long in power. 30 In August 2004, he was arrested along with more than a dozen other people and accused of conspiring with the OLF to make the [May 2005] elections unsuccessful. 31 No evidence was presented against him, but he was detained for six weeks before being released. In meetings, I speak out, he said. The others don t. That is my crime. 32 Another man from Nekemte told Human Rights Watch that in the past, many times in meetings when they said, you are free to talk, I stood up and talked about the oppression that is taking place and said that these things should be corrected. I used to ask why people were being arrested. In early 2004, he was arrested and detained for 29 None of the detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch outside of Addis Ababa benefited from any legal representation. 30 Human Rights Watch interview, Agaro, March 15, Documentation provided by police officials to interviewee, on file with Human Rights Watch. 32 Human Rights Watch interview, Agaro, March 15, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

16 four months on charges of being a member of an OLF cell. 33 A court ordered his release in May 2004 after the police failed to produce any evidence to substantiate the charges. Human Rights Watch interviewed several other people who were detained shortly after publicly criticizing the government or specific actions of local officials. All were eventually released after one or more months in prison without being charged with any crime. 34 Not all of those arrested by security officials on allegations of OLF involvement are outspoken critics of the government. In fact, many of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch were at a loss to explain why they or their family members had been targeted for arrest. One distraught mother whose teenage son had repeatedly been arrested and accused of being involved with the OLF and was being held in Dembi Dollo prison when she spoke with Human Rights Watch said: They say he is a shifta [bandit] and that he raises unrest among the people. I don t know why they say this about him. I was asking [the woreda] many times but they started showing signs they suspected me also and so I stopped asking them. [My son] doesn t speak much and because of this many people think he doesn t like people or is hiding something. But really he is just a quiet fellow. Now every night at home I look at his exercise books and cry because my home seems so empty. 35 The young man had not formally been charged with the commission of any crime and had never been tried on any of the other occasions when he was arrested. In some cases, arrests of suspected OLF terrorists border on the absurd. One 77 year-old farmer who has not seen his son since he ran away from home in 1992 told Human Rights Watch that he had been imprisoned ten times since his son s disappearance and accused of collaborating with him to carry out acts of terrorism on behalf of the OLF: The last time they arrested me was in September [2004]. I am not sure exactly what it is all about but it has something to do with my son. He 33 Documentation provided by police officials to interviewee, on file with Human Rights Watch. 34 Human Rights Watch interviews, Addis Ababa, Ambo, Nekemte, Agaro, Tokke, Jimma and Dembi Dollo, March Human Rights Watch interview, Dembi Dollo, March 18, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 14

17 disappeared a long time ago but the imprisonment continues up until now. They always tell me to bring them my child and I tell them that I have lost him myself. They also say that I send provisions to the OLF. They never bring any evidence or take me to court. I go to jail and then I come out, sometimes after a month, sometimes after two weeks. 36 In early 2004, police in Dembi Dollo arrested a twelve-year-old schoolboy and imprisoned him after discovering that he had tattooed ABO, the Afan Oromo acronym for OLF, onto his hand. They said he was a terrorist, his father said. They said he was a supporter of the OLF. 37 The child s family petitioned the local authorities and secured his release after two weeks of detention, but the police continued to follow and harass the boy until the family was forced to send him to live with relatives in Addis Ababa. At least twenty other children under the age of fifteen have been imprisoned for similar reasons in Dembi Dollo alone since A relative of one of those boys shook his head incredulously when remembering the incident that led to his arrest in early I had an eleven-year old relative who wrote ABO on the blackboard at school. He was dragged off to the police station and imprisoned there. They released him after several days because there was too much noise about it. I mean, come onyou re not supposed to imprison 11 year-olds. That child also experienced problems with the police after his release and eventually left to live with relatives in Canada. 39 In most of the cases reported to Human Rights Watch, the courts eventually stepped in to order the release of detainees when the police failed to produce any evidence in support of the accusations against them. This has not, however, prevented the authorities from detaining people for periods long enough to be punitive, or from detaining the same people repeatedly without any evidence. In many cases, the courts allowed police to hold detainees for several months by acquiescing to repeated requests for more time to look for evidence even though the police had already failed to meet one or more court-imposed deadlines for the production of such evidence. While prosecutors are legally obligated to promptly dismiss charges that are not supported by any evidence, they did not exercise that discretion in any of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch. 40 Human Rights Watch also interviewed several people who had been detained on between five to ten separate occasions on allegations of OLF 36 Human Rights Watch interview, Nekemte, March 10, Human Rights Watch interview, Dembi Dollo, March 18, Human Rights Watch interviews, Dembi Dollo, March 16-18, 2005; Documentation provided by parents of child detainees, on file with Human Rights Watch. 39 Human Rights Watch interview, Dembi Dollo, March 17, See Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, Article 42(1)(a). 15 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

18 involvement only to be released each time when the police failed to produce evidence against them. 41 Of the thirty-three people interviewed by Human Rights Watch who had been detained on suspicion of involvement with the OLF, not one had ever been brought to trial or confronted with any evidence that they had committed a crime. Some were released after several weeks or months without explanation while others were released after a court ordered the police to free them if they could not produce any evidence that they had committed a crime. 42 Police detained several of them for weeks without being brought before a judge, in violation of the Ethiopian Constitution. 43 Prolonged Arbitrary Detention of High-Profile Oromo Defendants In relatively high-profile cases involving Oromo civil society leaders, regional and federal authorities have used several methods to keep persons in detention for longer periods despite prosecutors inability to produce any evidence against them. As of April 2005, four prominent Oromo civil society leaders were being kept in detention after having been released on bail and then quickly rearrested and eventually charged with new offenses arising out of the same allegations. 44 Four leaders of the Mecha-Tulema Association, the oldest and most prominent Oromo civil society organization, 45 were arrested in May 2004 and accused of providing support to the OLF and of having plotted a grenade attack at Addis Ababa University that took place on April 29, A court ordered their release on bail just over three months later, but 41 Human Rights Watch interviews, Agaro, Addis Ababa, Dembi Dollo and Nekemte, March Human Rights Watch interviews, Addis Ababa, Nekemte, Jimma, Agaro, Tokke, Ambo and Dembi Dollo, March Article 19(3) of the Ethiopian Constitution requires that every detainee to be brought before a court within 48 hours of their arrest. 44 The right to bail is guaranteed by the Ethiopian Constitution and protected under international law. Article 19(6) of the Ethiopian Constitution provides that Persons arrested shall have the right to be released on bail. Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that bail be reasonably available to detainees as an alternative to pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention generally is lawful only in exceptional cases where release on bail would impede due process of law. 45 The Mecha-Tulema Association (MTA) was established in 1963 and played a leading role in building and nurturing a sense of Oromo nationalism among Ethiopia s educated Oromo elite. The MTA has always been a highly political organization; the OLF and most prominent contemporary Oromo civil society groups trace their roots back to Mecha Tulema, and many of their leaders are among those who helped to found and grow the MTA in the 1960s. The MTA was banned by the Imperial government in 1967 after the Association s leadership was implicated in an abortive assassination attempt against Emporer Haile Selassie. The Derg did not permit any sort of independent civil society to exist in Ethiopia, including the MTA. When the EPRDF government came to power in 1991, it won widespread praise among educated Oromo when it allowed the Association to resurrect itself and resume its work. 46 The Association had aroused the ire of the authorities by organizing a large, unauthorized public demonstration in January 2004 to protest the Oromia regional government s decision to move the regional capital from Addis Ababa to Adama. The police broke that demonstration up by force and the event led to the Association s being formally banned in July 2004 for involvement in political activities in violation of its charter. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 16

19 all four defendants were rearrested one week later. When a second judge ordered that the original grant of bail be respected, the four were released only briefly before being rearrested on new charges of homicide related to the same grenade attack. As of April 2005, nearly a year after the date of their original arrest, all four remained in detention awaiting trial. One of the men responsible for organizing their defense told Human Rights Watch that he was not aware of any evidence that had been produced in support of the charges against them. 47 In late April 2004, police arrested two employees of the state-owned Ethiopian Television s Afan Oromo service, Shiferu Insermu and Dhabasa Wakjira, and charged them with involvement in acts of terrorism, transferring information to the Eritrean government and to the OLF, and acting as a link between the OLF abroad and students in Ethiopia. 48 Shiferu was released on bail several months later but was then rearrested in August 2004 on new charges alleging his involvement in arms trafficking. As of April 2005, roughly a year since the date of their original arrest, no evidence had been produced to substantiate the charges against either defendant. I have no doubt that they will be acquitted, their lawyer told Human Rights Watch. But it may happen only after two or three years. 49 In another prominent case, eight founding members of the Human Rights League, an organization that set out to report on human rights issues affecting Ethiopia s Oromo community, were detained in October 1998 and charged with involvement in terrorist activity. No evidence was produced in support of these charges, but by the time the detainees were acquitted and released in 2002 they had spent three-and-a-half years in detention. The organization itself fared little better; federal authorities denied the Human Rights League the registration it needed to operate legally for eight years; the League obtained formal recognition only in March 2005, two years after a federal court ordered the government to recognize the organization. 50 All of the lawyers and Oromo civil society leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they believed that these delays were deliberately used to keep outspoken Oromo in detention despite the lack of evidence implicating them in any crime, and to use their detention as an example to intimidate others into silence Human Rights Watch interview, Addis Ababa, March 3, Human Rights Watch interview, Addis Ababa, March 21, Human Rights Watch interview, Addis Ababa, March 21, Human Rights Watch interviews with Human Rights League representatives, March 4, 2005 and March 21, 2005; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Garoma Waqassa, former Human Rights League detainee, February 26, Human Rights Watch interviews, Addis Ababa, March HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A)

20 Torture and Other Mistreatment Police officials in Oromia often subject individuals who are arrested on suspicion of OLF-related activities to torture and other forms of mistreatment. In some cases torture is applied in the course of interrogations, while in other cases it is used as a form of punishment. Human Rights Watch interviewed several former detainees who had been severely beaten in police custody in 2003 and One nineteen-year-old woman who had recently been expelled from school after arguing with another student was arrested in Agaro in August 2004 and accused of working with other detainees to sabotage the May elections: They told me that I had gone to school not for education but to do politics. They told me that I knew how much money [the other detainees] were receiving from abroad from the party [OLF]. Then they forced me to take off my clothes and I was naked except for my underwear when they started kicking me. They had some kind of a stick and they hit me with that one as well. [Then] they put a pistol in my mouth and said that they would kill me. I couldn t go to the bathroom after that because of how they kicked me. 52 An elderly man who was arrested at the same time described being taken to an office inside the police station and beaten by several police officers. He said, I told them, I am an old man. Are you not afraid of God at least? But they beat me a lot. After that they didn t touch me but the others were taken out at night and beaten. 53 In other cases, Ethiopian military personnel have taken people accused of OLF involvement into their custody and subjected them to torture during interrogation in their own facilities. Human Rights Watch interviewed one man who had been detained in a military camp near Mendi in West Wollega in He was interrogated about his alleged involvement with the OLF and beaten severely by soldiers who nearly killed him when they fractured his skull with a blow from one of their rifles. Nearly four years later when Human Rights Watch interviewed him, his forehead was marked by a deep depression left by that fracture. In April 2004, the same man was again arrested and taken to a military garrison near Nekemte where he was imprisoned and tortured for nearly six months without ever being brought before a judge. His release came when 52 Human Rights Watch interview, Agaro, March 15, Human Rights Watch interview, Agaro, March 15, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO.7 (A) 18