RUSSIA IN SYRIA: TACTICAL MASTERSTROKE, STRATEGIC RISK

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2 1 RUSSIA IN SYRIA: TACTICAL MASTERSTROKE, STRATEGIC RISK Since early September, Russia has been bolstering its military presence in Syria, moving beyond supporting regime forces and playing an increasingly direct combat role. On September 30, Russian aircraft began attacking rebel positions, primarily those of anti-government forces but also elements of ISIS. The move caught the West by surprise, has encouraged the regime and has forced Washington to accept Moscow s role in Syria. However, it also raises the risk of escalation or humiliation or both and locks Russia into this volatile and dangerous region. RUSSIAN INTERESTS The timing of the Russian move is hardly coincidental, but instead reflects and indicates the strategic imperatives behind it: Fighting ISIS: The professed reason for the deployment of Russian forces is not entirely false, although it is the least important as far as Moscow s motivations are concerned. Initially, Russia regarded the rise of ISIS as a boon, both because it distracted Washington and drew out militants from the northern Caucasus. Now, though, it is becoming alarmed at its continued rise and the prospect of fighters returning home (some to Russia) with new experience and allies from the wider jihadist movement. This is therefore seen as an opportunity to strike at the militants safely away from Russian territory. Balancing Tehran: Iran and Russia are allies of convenience against ISIS, yet Moscow considers Tehran a regional rival. Russia works through the regular Syrian military while the Iranians have created a parallel militia force, supported by their Hezbollah proxies. This means that if the regime falls, Moscow is left without a foothold in Syria but Tehran retains an independent military presence. Supporting Assad: The immediate trigger for this intervention was a series of military setbacks that left Moscow concerned that the regime could break on the battlefield or fragment at home. Russia s move in Syria is not expected to radically alter the balance of power on the ground, but rather to stop the buildup of momentum against Assad and provide breathing space for his forces to regroup, rearm and reconsolidate. Breaking the Diplomatic Deadlock: The primary driver has, ironically enough, nothing to do with Syria. Rather, Putin saw injecting himself into the Syrian question in a way Washington could not ignore just before he made a rare trip to the United Nations as a way of forcing the West to deal with him. Whether it considers him a potential ally against ISIS, or a potential spoiler to be placated, the hope is to parlay this into some relaxation of sanctions or latitude over Ukraine. ABOUT US Wikistrat is the world s first crowdsourced consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a patent-pending Collaborative Competition methodology to provide a variety of analytic services. Scenario generation, policy planning, risk assessment and red-teaming exercises are conducted by Wikistrat on a realtime, interactive online platform.

3 2 NEXT STEPS Considering the multi-vector motivation behind Moscow s adventure, it will have to balance a series of priorities: Maintain the tempo of attacks. Putin needs to demonstrate that this is not a brief demonstration of capability and by extension that the West cannot simply hope to wait him out. Help rebuild the Syrian military. Moscow does not wish to attempt to fight this war on the ground it would be all but impossible for it to deploy a substantial expeditionary force in any case and so it is going to strengthen the regime s army as much as it can with both new weapons and training. Extend intelligence and planning support. As part of the process, Russian intelligence support will be stepped up as drones, aerial reconnaissance and satellite imagery supplement the signals interception also being provided. Russian officers are also playing a greater role within the Syrian Defense Ministry and general staff. Consolidate political authority in Damascus. The more the Russians are integrated into the Syrian planning and command structures, the more power they acquire. This is not just an essential response to having allowed Tehran virtually free reign to dominate Damascus in recent years it also opens up strategic options if it begins to appear that the West might be willing to contemplate a grand bargain. Explore options for a post-assad Syria. While loudly proclaiming their support for Assad, there is a sense in Moscow that he badly misplayed his hand and may be a lost cause. Moscow will seek to develop options that would allow him a safe exit perhaps to exile in Russia and to let a new leadership emerge that is similarly close to Moscow yet able to make overtures to some rebels and the West. Deny Syria to the West as much as possible. Russia seeks not only to maximize its own options in Syria, but to minimize those of the West not least to reinforce the point that Moscow needs to be involved in any strategic discussions about the region s future. The continued influx of advanced surface-to-air systems and presence of Su-30 interceptor jets, as well as an upgrade for Syrian air defense radars, are part of an anti-access/area denial effort intended to prevent the West from enforcing a no-fly zone or striking targets close to (or in) government centers. RISKS FOR MOSCOW Russian spokespeople have said that they anticipate their operation taking several months, but so far there has been no hint of a clear exit strategy beyond complete victory over all rebel forces something that is vanishingly improbable. While the aim is to provide a period of respite for the Assad regime, it is unlikely that Russian forces will substantively change the situation on the ground. Furthermore, serious potential risks abound: Russia Targeted: So far, ISIS has regarded Russia as a less serious enemy than the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies. That may now change, leading to a resurgence of terrorist attacks inside Russia, given the number of northern Caucasus insurgent groups now professing their allegiance to ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi. Stuff Happens: All wars are unpredictable and multi-sided civil wars all the more so. There will be inevitable setbacks for the Russians e.g., the rebels may begin to acquire and deploy anti-air systems, or there could be suicide bomb attacks on their bases in Tartus and Latakia. In such circumstances, will Moscow be able to maintain its current commitment, withdraw or feel forced to escalate thus running the risk of becoming mired in this conflict? Perversely, unexpected successes will also pose a sudden challenge to Moscow s will and strategy. Damascus Fragments: The Assad regime remains brittle. Major defections or desertions, or open rifts within the Alawite elite, could easily send it into a spiral of fragmentation and recrimination. In those circumstances, will Moscow back an alternative to Assad who may have a better chance of recovering the regime s coherence? Or will it feel forced to deploy ground troops to try and force a reconstitution of the regime? Commercial in Confidence Copyright 2015, Wikistrat Inc. All Rights Reserved. Patent Pending.

4 3 OPTIONS FOR WASHINGTON The White House was clearly surprised and irked by Putin s move. It has reluctantly come to realize that it has neither the practical levers nor moral authority to force Russia to withdraw, and thus faces uncomfortable choices: Quiet Cooperation: Although it falls short of Putin s ambitions, there is scope for the kind of informal cooperation enjoyed with Iran against ISIS in Iraq, not least in military deconfliction. This does in effect sanction Russia s intervention, but essentially does nothing more than recognize the facts on the ground and offers no rewards to Russia for its coup de main. Make A Deal: Putin is clearly looking for a wider political arrangement; he might well be willing to back away from his support for Assad in return for concessions over Ukraine. However, this would be ruinous for Washington in terms of international and domestic credibility. Bind and Bleed. The temptation must be to allow Putin to overreach and become mired in Syria not least because the more effort committed there, the less available for his parallel Ukrainian adventure. However, given that his priority is supporting Assad and not fighting ISIS, the outcome would also be to extend the duration of the war and increase the polarization between ISIS and Damascus a polarization which is squeezing out the other, so-called moderate rebel forces. It also grants Putin the initiative in the region.

5 4 DISCLAIMER This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, economic, financial planning, trading or any other advice. You should consult with a competent independent financial advisor before making any investment or other decisions and should independently verify information on which you rely. The report is provided without any express or implied warranty of any kind including warranties of accuracy, completeness, or fitness for any particular purpose. Without limitation, although we have prepared this report based on sources we believe to be reliable, legally derived, and unbiased, we can provide no assurance with respect to the objectivity or any other aspect of its content. In addition and without limitation, this report may contain predictions, estimates or other information that might be considered forward-looking or predictive. Such statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. We assume no obligation to update the report or any part thereof or to correct any inaccurate or outdated information and reserve the right to remove or modify the report, in each case without notice to you or any other party. Without limitation, this report is subject to the Terms of Service posted on our internet website at ATTRIBUTIONS [cover] This work, cover, is a derivative of Bashar al-assad by Fabio Rodrigues Pozzebom, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Brazil license; Syrian people by Beshr O, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license; Azaz, Syria by Christiaan Triebert, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license; Vladimir Putin by Russian Presidential Press and Information Office, released into the public domain. Commercial in Confidence Copyright 2015, Wikistrat Inc. All Rights Reserved. Patent Pending.

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