Presented by James Giuliano, Director New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Division of Reliability and Security

Transcription

1 Presented by James Giuliano, Director New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Division of Reliability and Security

2 Regulatory jurisdiction over investor-owned public utilities in New Jersey. Primary State-level ESF #12 agency with a reliability and security mission that includes emergency response coordination responsibilities. Primary ESF #12 Agency Support Agencies State Fusion Center New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) State Fusion Center (ROIC) NJ Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM) NJ Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) Department of Community Affairs/ Division of Fire Safety (DCA/DFS) NJ Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Homeland Security & Preparedness (OHSP)

3 To meet the energy needs of the State s 8.8 million residents, NJ relies on a complex regional energy infrastructure which is primarily divided into three interrelated subsectors: Electricity Natural gas Petroleum Percentage of Annual Energy Use by Fuel Petroleum from refineries, pipelines & overseas imports 45% Natural Gas from out-of-state imports 27% Electricity from coal 3% Interstate flows of electricity 9% Electricity from renewables 2% Electricity from nuclear power 14%

4 Electric Power: Over 100 power producers with over 18,000 Megawatts of capacity. Natural Gas: Over 1,500 miles of interstate and intrastate transmission pipelines. Five interstate pipeline companies. Petroleum: Five refineries with an operating capacity of over 500,000 barrels per day. 15 liquid pipeline companies delivering petroleum products to distribution centers, bulk terminal facilities and interconnecting with refineries. Out-of-state imports provided primarily by Colonial Pipeline.

5 Approximately 80% of the State s annual electricity use comes from in-state generation with the remaining coming from out-of-state generation. Demand for electricity in NJ is divided into four consuming sectors: Residential - 38% use Commercial - 51% use Industrial - 10% use Transportation less than 1% use Residential 38% Commercial 51% Industrial 10% Transportation 0.4%

6 On a regional level, several organizations oversee the regional bulk power system. The key organizations include: The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) PJM Interconnection NERC s mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system by establishing and enforcing reliability standards. PJM is responsible for coordinating the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia. PJM Control Area

7 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS (PSE&G) 2,247,440 CUSTOMERS 1,450 SQ MI JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT 1,091,614 CUSTOMERS 3,256 SQ MI ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC 533,452 CUSTOMERS 2,760 SQ MI ROCKLAND ELECTRIC COMPANY 70,900 CUSTOMERS 207 SQ MI TOTAL ELECTRICITY CUSTOMERS 3.94 MILLION

8 New Jersey s Energy Assurance strategy is based on the all hazards approach adopted by the Federal government s National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF approach provides the flexibility to adapt to every energy emergency situation regardless of the origin which could include: a natural disasters, weather event, system failure, acts of terrorism/intentional acts, or cyber attack.

9 All hazards response is coordinated at NJ s Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC). The ROIC houses the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and is also the State Fusion Center for all hazards intelligence gathering and dissemination. During normal operations, the ROIC's intelligence activities are continually operating providing situational awareness and real time tactical intelligence to the operators in the field. During an emergency event, the SEOC is activated and the ROIC serves as the command center for all State-led emergency response operations.

10 Community dependency on electric power is pervasive, and the loss of electric service causes immediate community impact: Traffic Lights go out creating congestion and hazards Police departments scramble to address traffic issues Air and ground transportation is impacted Wireless telephones fail; FIOS backup fails after 6 to 8 hours Internet and voice over IP fails Manufacturing is interrupted HVAC systems fails Water and wastewater facilities fail or go to backup Hospitals go to backup but curtail certain functions; backup may fail Nursing homes and senior complexes may require evacuation Local commerce is impacted: ATM and financial transactions may shut down Gasoline stations cannot pump which can cause shortages Petroleum refineries may curtail certain processes 911 capabilities may be compromised Long duration outage equals economic impact

11 With the exception of the 2003 Northeast Blackout, virtually all significant events causing widespread electric utility outages in the past years have been weather related events. Few hurricanes have hit NJ directly, but major storms that start as hurricanes or develop regionally have been responsible for causing significant damage to the State s utilities and electric infrastructure, including: Hurricane Floyd 1999 Hurricane Isabel Hurricane Ivan 2004 Hurricane Irene October Snow Storm Derecho Storm Hurricane Sandy -2012

12 During past significant weather events, electric restoration efforts have taken 4 to 7 days before all customers were fully restored. Tropical storm Irene took 7-8 days before all of the approximately 1 million peak customer outages due to this storm were fully restored. The October 2011 Snowstorm took 7 days before all of the approximately 1 million peak customer outages were fully restored. In the case of Super Storm Sandy, despite having the largest utility workforce ever mobilized in NJ, full restoration of the approximately 2.8 million peak customer outages affected by the storm took 14 days. Weather preparedness has radically changed. There has been a radical shift in the paradigm for weather event preparedness.

13 After Hurricane Irene and the October 2011 Snowstorm struck NJ, Governor Christie directed the BPU to conduct an investigation of the EDCs storm planning and restoration efforts. The investigation s report provided to the BPU by its consultant contained 143 recommendations designed to enhance EDC performance. Some of the key recommendations included: Vegetation Management - all EDCs should develop a program to track tree outage information. Incident Command System (ICS) develop and/or follow the ICS for major events. Communications - EDC websites and social media need more granular outage details. Mutual Aid EDCs should obtain from the parent company a written mutual aid plan that includes crews from both affiliated and non-affiliated companies. Training & Exercise Drills - All EDCs should hold annual exercise drills on restoration plans with scenarios that include 75% of the EDCs customers affected. Benchmarking & External Analysis - The practice of benchmarking and external analysis should be required of all EDCs.

14 Approximately 14 months after Hurricane Irene, and 1 year after the October 2011 Snowstorm, NJ and its neighboring States experience another devastating weather event in Super Storm Sandy. Super Storm Sandy caused unprecedented damage not only to the State s electric systems but also to the State s petroleum and natural gas infrastructure. Approximately 70% of the State s electric customers lost power

15 Tidal surge, flooding and wind damage caused power outages and a shut down of the State s petroleum bulk storage terminals along the Arthur Kill, as well as 2 major refineries and several petroleum pipelines. Approximately 70% of the State s retail gas stations in the northern part of the State lost power and the ability to pump gasoline.

16 Barrier Islands: In addition to losing electric service, natural gas service was also shut down along the NJ barrier islands and thousands of residents were force to evacuate due to severe flooding. Electric, gas and water service along the 10 mile barrier islands were shut down.

17 Physical Impact to the Electric Infrastructure: 71% of all New Jersey distribution circuits were damaged Sandy downed 116,671 trees Sandy downed 9,441 poles 100 transmission lines were out of service 4,000 overhead transformers replace

18 On October 26, 2012, approximately 4 days before Sandy made landfall, all 4 of the State s EDCs began pre-positioning supplies, securing workers, and requesting mutual assistance. The State EOC was activated and BPU staff, along with other State and federal agencies began preparing for the storm. On October 27 th, Governor Christie declared a State of Emergency and directed a mandatory evacuation of the barrier islands. The petroleum sector also took measures to brace for Sandy by shutting down the Hess and Phillips 66 refineries as well as several area terminals and 2 major pipelines. On October 30 th, the 4 EDCs, with the assistance of thousands of mutual aid workers, began restoring service to the 2.8 million customers without power. According to estimates, the total number of out-of-state crew workers ultimately grew to approximately 17,000 throughout the restoration process including federal assets.

19 Power Outages (million customers) Day 7 Day 8 Hurricane Sandy Makes Landfall Restoration begins - Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Wednesday, Nov 7 - Nor' easter Day 10 Day 11 Day 12 Day 13 Restoration ends - Day 14 By Sunday, November 4 th - 6 days into the restoration - over 60% of the peak customer outages were restored. On Wednesday, November 7 th - 9 days into the restoration - nearly 90% of the 2.8 million peak customer outages were restored. On Monday, November 12th, - 14 days into restoration virtually all customers who could safely accept power were restored Sandy Electric Restoration Timeline

20 Based on the consultants report, input from the public and elected officials, and after action studies, on January 23, 2013, the BPU issued an Order with 103 directives. The Order requires the EDCs to improve their: preparedness for future storm events, ability to communicate accurate and timely information, effectiveness of recovery operations, and resiliency and hardening tactics with cost benefit analysis.

21 What Went Well Experiences from Irene Resulted in Better Preparation and Recovery by the Electric Utilities for Super Storm Sandy More Effective Workforce Preparation and Response, with over 17,000 Out of State Mutual Assistance Workers Restoring Service to 2.8 million (70%) customers: 60% Restored in 6 days 90% Restored in 9 days Complete Restoration in 14 Days Coordinated and Structured Natural Gas Recovery on Barrier Islands Good Communication and Command Structure with Top Utility Leadership

22 What Needs Improvement: Target Hardening and Resiliency in the Electric Grid Substation Flood Mitigation Distributed Generation/Smart Grid Selective Circuit Undergrounding Tactical Hardening of Poles/Infrastructure Communications Vegetation Management More Aggressive Tree Trimming Damage from Trees Outside the ROW

23 Full awareness and documentation of your state s energy profile. All hazards response and recovery plans. Exercise regularly with all stakeholders. Expand planning assumptions to consider catastrophic impacts. Address vulnerabilities and buy down risk.

24 For additional information concerning this presentation, please contact: Joe Costa NJ Board of Public Utilities