Military Considerations in ICS/SCADA Attacks

Transcription

1 Military Considerations in ICS/SCADA Attacks W. Andrew Pennington CISSP, Net+, A+, MS, MIM Senior Program Manager Cyber Security Training October 13, 2011

2 Presentation Topics Military s Operational Ethos DoD Vulnerability Reporting Conclusions Cyber Warfighting Paradigm Vulnerability Reporting in the OODA Loop Competing Interests in Vulnerability Reporting Criticality of Vulnerability Remediation Vulnerability vs. Risk DoD Vulnerability Reporting Preference Benefits of Non-Public Disclosure Need for New Laws and Treaties Vulnerability reporting will change over time Need to balance priorities Disclosure is a public service

3 Cyber Warfighting Paradigm Sensor Integration (Surveillance & Reconnaissance) Observe Intelligence Orient Data Integration (Situational Awareness) Conventional Ops Land/Sea Air & Space Domains Cyber Domain Cognitive Domain Influence Ops Act Actions Integration Decide Operational Integration (Battle Management) Top Priority: Integrating Offensive and Defensive Ops

4 Vulnerabilities & the OODA Loop Command & Control (C2) Components Observe & Orient VULNERABILITIES Attack Defend C2 capabilities provide the ability to recognize what needs to be done in a situation and to ensure that effective actions are taken.

5 Influence of Cyber Weapons NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Tallinn, Estonia Estonia Attacks, April 27, 2007 Bronze Night DDOS via BOTNET Traced to Russia but no absolute proof NATO created a new Cyber Defense Center

6 Influence of Cyber Weapons Armed Conflict over Ossetia & Abkhazia Georgia Attacks, July 2008 Attack Vector DDOS via BOTNET on news media & government sites, external internet Master Controller in Russia, with BOTNETs in Canada, Turkey, & Estonia Cyber Attack integration with Kinetic Attacks during Armed Conflict Result Georgia lost all financial access to foreign banks Lost credit cards and cell phones Georgians shut down their own Financial web services

7 Influence of Cyber Weapons Buckshot Yankee, 2008 Disclosed by Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III Flash Memory moratorium Led to creation of new US Cyber Command

8 Influence of Cyber Weapons STUXNET WORM, July 2010 First known Cyber Precision Weapon Advanced Cyber Weaponization Changed world view on cyber attack capabilities

9 DoD Influence of Cyber Weapons Civilian CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE & KEY RESOURCES (CIKR)

10 Why Use Cyber as a Weapon System? Mature Weapon System Infant Weapon System $1,000 Asymmetric Weapon: 1 versus 1,000,000 $1,000,000,000 A weapon is near the end of its useful life cycle when defending it requires more resources than its offensive capability.

11 Cyber is Becoming a Symmetric Weapon Infant Weapon System Life Cycle Adolescent Mature Asymmetric Offensive Weapon: Symmetric Offensive & Defensive Weapon: $1K - $1 million $1-100 millions $Billions

12 8 Principles of Weapons Development Excerpt from: The Future of War by George & Meredith Friedman 1. New technology frequently appears less sophisticated than old technology 2. Each weapon system (B2) or culture of weapon systems (airplane) has a life cycle 3. A weapon system reaches its limit of usefulness when the defensive measures needed for its survival destroy its utility 4. The military that is least likely to recognize Point 3 is the one that has previously been the most successful 5. At its high point, just prior to disaster, the last generation of technology appears to be invincible 6. Technologies that defeat previous weapons systems share a common characteristic: simplification of warfare & relentless offensive 7. The life cycle of a weapon system is determined by the pace of countermeasure development and the ability to design defenses against the countermeasures 8. A successful military is one that can constantly overthrow old weapons and doctrine and integrate new ideas and personnel without social upheaval.

13 Aspects of Effective Weaponization Command and control Accurate targeting Adapts to navigation Capable of operating autonomously Recallable Self-destruct capable Operates in a predictable manner Supports situational awareness Controlled impact (minimization of collateral damage) Executes on command, timing after release, or target recognition Multipurpose functionality available on command

14 Aspects of Integrated Weaponization ODA Loop Requires Rules of Engagement (ROE)-based execution authority Need to identify the appropriate attack vector Need to respond to legal authority to act Need to provide further options and info to command authorities Attack Operate Defend Ability to Coordinate ALL levels of government response with a GLOBAL response

15 Aspects of Effective Weaponization Survivability Mobility with Stealth Reconstitution Surprise and deception Weapon superiority Upgrade-able to be technically superior Adaptable to tests on a range or in the field Sustainable Maintainable Repairable (field and depot) Life cycle program management

16 Aspects of Effective Weaponization Integrated into other national capabilities Used for military advantage, not from desperation Cost effective Simple New Accepted and usable in warfare