Intrusion Avoidance for SCADA Security in Industrial Plants

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1 Intrusion Avoidance for SCADA Security in Industrial Plants Athar Mahboob Department of Electronic and Power Engineering National University of Sciences & Technology Karachi, Pakistan Junaid Zubairi Department of Computer Science State University of New York at Fredonia New York, USA ABSTRACT In this paper we present an overview of security threats to the cyber infrastructure of industrial and power plants and the current state of affairs of industrial and SCADA cyber security. Control systems security is of prime importance especially for energy sector. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) has issued mandatory rules which must be complied by 2010 by all registered power operators in order to ensure control systems security for power plants. Cyber security assessment was conducted on ICS (Industrial control systems) of different companies for a period of four years and several vulnerabilities were identified. Main problems included use of weak encryption, standard protocols and information disclosure using unencrypted communication among ICS hosts on the network. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, a hacker could alter the communication between ICS and controlled equipment, resulting in malfunction. Overcoming these vulnerabilities is essential in order to protect the vital power sector in any country of the world. We present important guidelines and standards in cyber security and propose a simple intrusion detection scheme for SCADA networks. which have been Internet and web-enabled. The driving force behind this adoption has been the possibility of huge cost savings and the ease of use and familiarity with these interfaces [1]. One important aspect was overlooked during this wide-spread adoption of Internet Technologies. Industrial control systems hitherto had been operating in isolation with the world outside the industrial plant. This defacto isolation provided a security to these control systems which now stands withdrawn. Now these industrial control systems stand vulnerable to the same threats that the enterprise information systems have faced for decades. However, the consequences of these threats are much more severe in case of industrial and SCADA systems. What exacerbates the situation is that while Information Security has been well studied in Enterprise IT, in the industrial environment the problem has just started to be studied and addressed. At the same time the operations and maintenance staff of these systems is not fully prepared to face the challenges. The road to secure SCADA systems will be a long and arduous one. In this paper we present the current state of affairs and propose a simple technique for intrusion detection. 1.1 What is SCADA? KEYWORDS: SCADA Security, Industrial Cyber Security 1. INTRODUCTION The industrial environment has changed significantly in last two decades. Networked control systems have become ubiquitous. There is increasing use of standard protocols like TCP/IP and Ethernet. Many control and status monitoring systems have Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) is a system to automate industrial control and monitoring. SCADA includes field sensors, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) and Remote Telemetering Units (RTU). SCADA use can be found in power generation, manufacturing automation, oil and gas exploration and utilities monitoring and control. A typical SCADA system is shown in figure 1. SCADA can turn ON and OFF equipment automatically under the control of software or remotely through human interface devices. SCADA can be used to monitor pa-

2 that many industrial control systems became insecure without their owners realizing this. Operator HMI Internet MTU RTU RTU To give a proof of concept of the threat to cyber infrastructure of industrial plants in March 2007, the Department of Energys Idaho National Laboratory made a video demonstrating the Aurora vulnerability. A series of on and off commands were sent to a large generator set connected to a TCP/IP network. These commands were timed so that the generator became out of phase and was destroyed. The video was released to the press and made the point that the use of open networking standards such as TCP/IP was creating system-wide vulnerabilities [1]. Sensor Sensor Sensor Figure 1. Typical SCADA System Components rameters such as temperature, pressure, flow rate, ph, etc. SCADA can set off alarms based on collected and observed data. SCADA remote access can be enabled through a web based interface or specialized software on networked machines. 1.2 IT Penetration in Industrial Plants and Cause of Problem Industrial process equipment is generally controlled by devices (PLCs, RTUs and DCS). These devices are monitored and controlled by Human Machine Interfaces (HMI). HMI increasingly use common commercial operating systems and standard PCs. The upside of this is that networking allows sharing of data for maintenance and management thus improving process and industrial productivity. The downside is that PCs can be hacked enabling intruder access to industrial process. An informative study of the problem has been done in [1] which highlights that utility control systems were originally designed for dependability and ease of safe use by operators. In the past they used completely private networks. For this reason their designers gave no attention to authentication or encryption. These networks tend to be organized in star topology, with many sensors and actuators connected to a control center. Use of protocols such as DNP and Modbus on these control networks enables anyone who can communicate with a sensor to read it and for anyone who can send data to an actuator to give it instructions. Private networks are generally expensive, and the prospects of mammoth cost reductions lured engineers to connect control systems to the Internet. The end result is 2. Industrial IT Systems versus Enterprise IT Systems Whereas cyber security has received considerable attention in enterprise information systems and that knowledge definitely needs to be applied to the industrial IT systems. The Industrial environment is inherently very different from enterprise IT environment. Intrusions in Industrial Environment can cause: Environmental damage Poor quality Safety risk Lost production Power outages We highlight some major contrasts between enterprise IT (IT) and industrial control systems (IC) below. For further detailed comparison the reader is referred to [2]. IT can tolerate delays; IC cannot IT malfunction causes loss of data; IC malfunction causes loss of lives and/or equipment IT can reboot to solve problem; IC must continue to function without interruption There are various peculiarities of industrial control systems which make the attaining cyber security objectives for them even more challenging. Industrial control systems have: Lock-in due to very long lifecycles. A typical power plant has an operating life in excess of 30 years. Complex supply chains: Heterogeneous OEM environment and complex vendor relationships.

3 2.1 Control Systems Security is Integrity Centric A major difference between IT and IC is that control systems security is fundamentally about integrity and availability rather than confidentiality. This requires cyber security specialist to focus effort on these aspects of cyber security assessment and implementation in industrial control systems. 2.2 Control System Security Needs to be Pro-active In enterprise information systems IT security is a reactive technology. As incidents get reported security patches are produced by vendors and system owners and operators apply these patches, periodically or reactively. Often these patches require a reboot of the system. Industrial cyber security needs to be proactive tainted water supplies, for example, cannot be reversed. Plugging the holes and securing the interfaces is required. In fact, in USA, the government is leading efforts to secure cyber infrastructure of industrial and power plants [3, 4, 2]. 2.3 System Longevity IT platforms like PCs get patched every month (PCs) through vendor released security updates. Mobile phones tend to get replaced frequently. Control systems on the other hand may remain in use for decades. Most of their components were not designed for remote upgrade. There may be a substantial cost to downtime for application of patches as many of these systems may have a requirement of % availability less than 6 minutes downtime per annum. The result may be that control systems may be patched late or not at all. Many organizations believe that vulnerability information should not be published, resorting to security through obscurity. 3. Vulnerabilities Industrial Control and SCADA systems face many vulnerabilities. These include: Organized criminals Saboteurs Disgruntled insiders Novice users Firmware malfunction To emphasize the fact of the above mentioned vulnerabilities we provide results of certain case studies in industrial cyber security. 3.1 Cyber Security Case Study-1 Timeline June 1999 Bellingham, WA, USA Incident Gas pipeline ruptured igniting fires killing 3 people and spilling 1/4 million gallons into the environment Culprit SCADA failure Cause Attempted update on live SCADA caused it to become unresponsive 3.2 Cyber Security Case Study-2 One of the best studied breaches include the Maroochy Water Breach [5, 6]. Australia Timeline Feb to April 2000 Target SCADA radio controlled sewage equipment in Queenslad Person Vitek Boden, ex-employee Method Issued a series of control commands to spill sewage around open areas like parks and playgrounds and disabled alarms at pumping stations 3.3 Cyber Security Case Study-3 Ohio, USA Timeline January 2003 Target Safety Monitoring System Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant Culprit Slammer worm Method Entered the business network through unprotected T1 line backdoor then spread to plant control network disabling SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System) 3.4 Cyber Security Case Study-4 23 states in USA

4 Timeline August 2003 Target Culprit signal and dispatch system CSX Railroad Worm infection Method Worm entered the network and infected signal and dispatch system halting passenger and cargo train traffic in 23 states 4. Top SCADA Security Issues Top cyber security issues include [7]: Inadequate security policy of the organization The organization does not define and enforce cyber systems security rules across the board. Even if the security policy is defined, it is not implemented, updated or reviewed regularly. Lack of Layered Defense The organization considers security enforcement at one level to be sufficient. For example, a perimeter firewall that protects from intruders at the entry point does not stop the unauthorized access of SCADA systems from inside. Missing logs of access In general, logs of access must be maintained for critical systems but the system manager may forget to backup the log files before these are periodically overwritten by the server. The system manager may not be familiar with forensic and audit methods and detection tools. The organization may not attach importance to obtaining something beyond the normal requirements. Internet based SCADA Users may like the convenience of accessing SCADA equipment remotely however opening Internet based access is always perilous for such systems. The chances of intrusion increase greatly when there is a link from worldwide network to the SCADA infrastructure. Non-related Software on PCs Games and non-related software may be installed by authorized users on control PC. The use of such software may interfere with the control function of the PC. Beta version software may not be stable and result in system crash. This could result in malfunction of the equipment. Control software not scrutinized Such software is not sold to millions of customers. Therefore, the initial testing and scrutiny that occurs in beta versions of general purpose software is missing. It may not be surprising that some failures and faults are discovered during the actual operation. Moreover, control commands and data not are not authenticated. CSSP (Control Systems Security Program) is a DHS agency that carried out detailed industrial cyber security assessment in 2009 [8, 9]. The results of this assessment were surprising. The top issue identified was the use of weak standard ITC protocols and lack of input validation in industrial control systems. Most of the ICS computers were found to be prone to buffer overflow mishaps as bounds check was not enforced in the software. Another point of concern was unencrypted protocol communication causing SCADA data and user credentials to become open to hacking. Even if encryption was enforced, it was weak as per the standard protocols being used. The third most prevalent issue found was none or weak password enforcement and improper security enforcement. 5. Addressing SCADA Security Concerns There has been substantial progress in addressing SCADA security concerns. Idaho and Sandia National Labs have developed SCADA power grid and wireless Testbed. Sandia Lab has established center for SCADA Security. Risk assessment for water utilities was performed recently by these agencies. US Government has issued guidelines for implementing industrial systems security. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) has issued mandatory rules for securing cyber infrastructure of power plants. These rules must be complied by 2010 by all registered power operators in order to ensure control systems security for power plants [4, 3]. Mitigation of SCADA security threats and vulnerabilities can be done by implementing a few rules consistently and across the organization. For example, keeping SCADA computers private can reduce the risk of intrusion considerably. If these computers are made accessible from the Internet, only the absolute minimum number of such machines should be connected. Wireless SCADA communications must be encrypted and authenticated with hardware signatures. If users are allowed to issue and execute commands from the Internet, a command subset should be defined that is much restricted than the original set. One important aspect of SCADA security is multi-layered defense or the defense in depth. Slay and Miller presented multiple layers of defense for SCADA systems in [5]. Their proposed architecture uses a DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) to

5 isolate SCADA systems from outside world. The arrangement is shown in figure 2. must be processed by the system administrator. Thresholds can be set by defining for each node N i : U i as utilization of upward transmission link Other connections directly to the SCADA network SCADA Application Server(s) HMI SCADA Control System Field Units (PLCs/RTUs) SCADA Network Gateway including a Firewall, IDS and Antivirus Shared Servers/Resources DMZ Gateway including a Firewall, IDS and Antivirus Corporate Network Figure 2. Firewall Protection for SCADA Network [5] The layers of protection include firewalls, IDS (Intrusion Detection System) and anti-virus software on SCADA PCs. It is recommended not to use default settings of firewalls but to go through all the configuration steps. It must be part of standard operating procedure to update all the software and firmware related to RTU (Remote Telemetry Unit) and PLC (Programmable Logic Controller). Multiple layers of defense should also include zoning where the users accessing the SCADA controllers would be granted command and control access rights as per their location. We suggest to restrict the sets and combinations of commands, that can result in drastic changes to the system parameters, to local zone only. Alternately, users may be asked to enter additional authentication information such as second password or their confidential PIN if they attempt to run the commands to reset the whole system or override alarm conditions. Log of such access must be maintained on permanent basis. One-way secure web servers can be installed for remote monitoring of the system. However, the web pages should not contain an interface to login for system console. An important signature of intrusion is increased level of network traffic between the SCADA machines and outside network. Since the SCADA commands are mostly simple and text format instructions, the network bandwidth utilization remains low. Triggers can be activated when the network bandwidth utilization increases above and beyond a threshold level. Increased traffic between the SCADA machines and the outside world signals something unusual and D i as the utilization of downward transmission link And for all nodes: (U i + D i ) T L (1) i where T L is defined by dividing max acceptable SCADA flow rate by available bandwidth. 6. CONCLUSION The threats to cyber infrastructure of industrial plants have been proven to be an emerging problem requiring the information security experts and industrial control systems designers to collaborate and incorporate information security best practices into the design and operation of new industrial control systems. Inevitably the new industrial control systems will utilize Internet and web based technologies. Proactive protective measures must be built into these systems because the stringent constraints placed on operational availability do not allow for reactive security measures to be practiced. REFERENCES [1] R. Anderson and S. Fuloria, Security Economics and Critical National Infrastructure, in Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 2009, [2] N. C. S. D. Control Systems Security Program, Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-In-Depth Strategies, Homeland Security, Tech. Rep., [3] T. Nash, An undirected attack against critical infrastructure - a case study for improving your control system security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Tech. Rep., [4] K. Stouffer, J. Falco, and K. Kent, Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Tech. Rep., [5] J. Slay and M. Miller, International Federation for Information Processing, Volume 253, Critical Infrastructure Protection. Springer, 2008, ch. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MAROOCHY WATER BREACH, pp

6 [6] M. Abrams and J. Weiss, Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia, MITRE Corporation, Tech. Rep., [7] P. Welander, 10 Control System Security Threats, Control Engineering, [Online]. Available: Control System Security Threats.php?q=10+Control+ System+Security+Threats [8] Control Systems Security Program (CSSP). [Online]. Available: systems [9] Strategy for Securing Control Systems, Department of Homeland Security, Tech. Rep., 2009.

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