PRB Annual Monitoring Report Volume 1 - European overview and PRB recommendations

Transcription

1 PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2014 Volume 1 - European overview and PRB recommendations Final Version: 3.1 Edition date: 14/10/2015

2 European Union, 2015 COPYRIGHT NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER This report has been prepared for the European Commission by the Performance Review Body of the Single European Sky, in its capacity as an advisory body to the European Commission. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. However, neither the European Commission, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this publication, or for any errors which may appear, despite careful preparation and checking.

3 Volume 1 - European overview and PRB recommendations Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT THE SES PERFORMANCE SCHEME RP1 KEY PERFORMANCE AREAS AIR TRAFFIC OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE IN SAFETY PRESENTATION ANS RELATED ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT APPLICATION OF RAT METHODOLOGY JUST CULTURE REVIEW OF 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS ON SAFETY OBSERVATIONS FOR SAFETY ENVIRONMENT PRESENTATION FLIGHT EFFICIENCY EFFECTIVE USE OF CIVIL MILITARY AIRSPACE STRUCTURES REVIEW OF 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT OBSERVATION FOR ENVIRONMENT CAPACITY PRESENTATION EN ROUTE ATFM DELAYS ANS CAPACITY AT AIRPORTS REVIEW OF 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS ON EN ROUTE CAPACITY OBSERVATION FOR EN ROUTE CAPACITY REVIEW OF 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS ON AIRPORT CAPACITY OBSERVATION FOR AIRPORT CAPACITY COST EFFICIENCY PRESENTATION OF THE EN ROUTE COST EFFICIENCY KPI AND TARGETS ACTUAL 2014 UNIT COST VS. DUR IN ADOPTED PERFORMANCE PLANS ACTUAL 2014 TRAFFIC VS TSUS IN ADOPTED PERFORMANCE PLANS (NPPS) ACTUAL 2014 EN ROUTE COSTS VS. COSTS IN ADOPTED NPPS ATSP NET GAIN FOR THE 2014 EN ROUTE ACTIVITY ATSPS ACTUAL 2014 OVERALL ECONOMIC SURPLUS VS. PERFORMANCE PLANS UNION WIDE 2014 ACTUAL COSTS AND UNIT COST FOR USERS ( TRUE EN ROUTE COSTS FOR USERS ) PRESENTATION OF THE TERMINAL ANS (TANS) COST EFFICIENCY PI ACTUAL 2014 TANS COSTS VS. FORECAST IN ADOPTED NPPS ACTUAL 2014 GATE TO GATE ANS COSTS VS. FORECAST IN ADOPTED NPPS REVIEW OF 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE COST EFFICIENCY OBSERVATIONS FOR COST EFFICIENCY CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (CAPEX) INTRODUCTION ALERT THRESHOLDS

4 7.1 UNION WIDE LEVEL LOCAL LEVEL MONITORING OF PERFORMANCE OVER RP1 ( ) BACKGROUND GOALS OF THE SES II PERFORMANCE SCHEME KEY PRINCIPLES OF THE SES II PERFORMANCE SCHEME OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST REFERENCE PERIOD OF THE PERFORMANCE SCHEME SAFETY KPA ENVIRONMENT KPA CAPACITY KPA COST EFFICIENCY KPA ANNEX I: AIRPORT DATA QUALITY ISSUES PROGRESS REPORT ANNEX II: ESTIMATED ECONOMIC SURPLUS FOR THE EN ROUTE ACTIVITY FOR THE MAIN ATSPS ANNEX III: COMPARISON OF ACTUAL COSTS AND SERVICE UNITS WITH PLANNED VALUES OVERALL RP1 PER EN ROUTE CHARGING ZONE ANNEX IV: UNION WIDE 2014 ACTUAL COSTS AND UNIT COST FOR USERS ( TRUE EN ROUTE COSTS FOR USERS ) ENDNOTES

5 Table of Figures FIGURE 1: RP1 SES STATES... 7 FIGURE 2: TRAFFIC (IFR FLIGHTS)... 8 FIGURE 3: TOTAL EN ROUTE SERVICE UNITS FIGURE 4: TARGET AND ACHIEVED PERFORMANCE IN FLIGHT EFFICIENCY... 9 FIGURE 5: TARGET (2014) AND ACHIEVED PERFORMANCE IN EN ROUTE ATFM DELAYS FIGURE 6: ANS RELATED ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS ( ) FIGURE 7: ANS CONTRIBUTION ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS ( ) FIGURE 8: EOSM SCORES OF INDIVIDUAL STATES (SELF ASSESSMENT) FIGURE 9: EOSM SCORES OF INDIVIDUAL ANSPS FIGURE 10: EU AVERAGES FOR SEVERITY ASSESSMENT USING THE RAT METHODOLOGY FIGURE 11: REPORTED SMIS IN STATES ( P) FIGURE 12: REPORTED RIS IN STATES ( P) FIGURE 13: REPORTED ATM SPECIFIC OCCURRENCES IN STATES ( P) FIGURE 14: TARGET AND ACHIEVED PERFORMANCE IN FLIGHT EFFICIENCY FIGURE 15: MONTHLY EVOLUTION OF HORIZONTAL FLIGHT EFFICIENCY DURING RP FIGURE 16: FAB BREAKDOWN OF HORIZONTAL FLIGHT EFFICIENCY AND CONTRIBUTION TO ADDITIONAL DISTANCE IN FIGURE 17: UTILISATION OF CONDITIONAL ROUTES FIGURE 18: EN ROUTE ATFM DELAYS FIGURE 19: RP1 AIRPORTS FIGURE 20: AIRPORT ARRIVAL ATFM DELAYS FIGURE 21: AIRPORT ARRIVAL ATFM DELAY 2014 BREAKDOWN PER MONTH FIGURE 22: AIRPORT ATFM DELAY BEST IMPROVEMENT FIGURE 23: AIRPORT ATFM DELAY WORST DETERIORATION FIGURE 24: ADDITIONAL ASMA TIME FIGURE 25: MONTHLY FLUCTUATION OF ADDITIONAL ASMA TIME DURING 2014 (VS 2013) FIGURE 26: ADDITIONAL TAXI OUT TIME FIGURE 27: MONTHLY FLUCTUATION OF ADDITIONAL TAXI OUT TIME DURING 2014 (VS 2013) FIGURE 28: AIRPORT CAPACITY PERFORMANCE, STATE LEVEL, FIGURE 29: EN ROUTE UNIT COSTS (ACTUAL VS. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE PLANS) FIGURE 30: 2014 ACTUAL UNIT COSTS AND SERVICE UNITS VS. NPP BY CHARGING ZONE FIGURE 31: EN ROUTE TRAFFIC MONITORING (ACTUAL TSU COMPARED TO NPP) FIGURE 32: TRAFFIC RISK SHARING MECHANISM FOR THE ATSPS FIGURE 33: OUTCOME OF 2014 TRAFFIC RISK SHARING ARRANGEMENTS FIGURE 34: BREAKDOWN OF 2014 ACTUAL EN ROUTE COSTS COMPARED TO NPPS (BY ENTITY AT UNION WIDE STATE LEVEL AND BY NATURE AT UNION WIDE ATSP LEVEL) FIGURE 35: NET GAIN/LOSS ON 2014 EN ROUTE ACTIVITY FOR THE (MAIN) ATSPS FIGURE 36: ESTIMATED SURPLUS FOR EN ROUTE ACTIVITY FOR THE (MAIN) ATSPS AT UNION WIDE LEVEL FIGURE 37: ESTIMATED SURPLUS FOR THE 2014 EN ROUTE ACTIVITY FOR THE MAIN ATSPS FIGURE 38: 2014 TANS ACTUAL COSTS VS. NPP AT STATE LEVEL FIGURE 39: EN ROUTE SERVICE UNITS AT UNION WIDE LEVEL FIGURE 40: EN ROUTE DETERMINED COSTS AND ACTUAL COSTS AT UNION WIDE LEVEL FIGURE 41: 2014 EN ROUTE ACTUAL SERVICE UNITS VERSUS NPP BY STATE FIGURE 42: 2014 EN ROUTE ACTUAL COSTS VERSUS DETERMINED COSTS BY STATE FIGURE 43: EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT FOR STATES AND ANSPS IN RP FIGURE 44: 2014 EU AVERAGES FOR SEVERITY ASSESSMENT USING RAT METHODOLOGY FIGURE 45: EVOLUTION OF HORIZONTAL FLIGHT EFFICIENCY DURING RP1 AND PROJECTION TOWARDS 2019 TARGET

6 FIGURE 46: EVOLUTION OF ATFM EN ROUTE DELAY DURING RP1 AND PROJECTION TOWARDS 2019 TARGET FIGURE 47: ACTUAL EN ROUTE ATSP COST BREAKDOWN BY NATURE (RP1 AVERAGE) FIGURE 48: OUTCOME OF RP1 TRAFFIC RISK SHARING ARRANGEMENTS (EN ROUTE) FIGURE 49: BREAKDOWN OF RP1 ACTUAL EN ROUTE COSTS COMPARED TO NPPS (BY ENTITY AT UNION WIDE STATE LEVEL AND BY NATURE AT UNION WIDE ATSP LEVEL) FIGURE 50: EUROCONTROL COSTS IN RP FIGURE 51: RP1 AND RP2 EN ROUTE COST EFFICIENCY TARGETS TRENDS

7 Table of Tables TABLE 1: KPAS AND PIS IN RP TABLE 2: SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR RP TABLE 3: EOSM STATE LEVEL (END OF RP1 VS RP2 TARGETS) TABLE 4: EOSM ANSP LEVEL (END OF RP1 VS RP2 TARGETS) TABLE 5: ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS FOR RP TABLE 6: CDR FPL USE BY AIRCRAFT TABLE 7: ENVIRONMENTAL KPA: EFFECTIVE BOOKING PROCEDURES TABLE 8: USAGE OF PRE TACTICALLY BOOKED AIRSPACE TABLE 9: COMPARISON OF PRE TACTICAL AND TACTICAL AIRSPACE ALLOCATION TABLE 10: CAPACITY INDICATORS FOR RP TABLE 11: EN ROUTE ATFM DELAY PER FLIGHT FAB / STATE CONTRIBUTION TABLE 12: ACTUAL AND TARGETED EN ROUTE ATFM DELAY PER FLIGHT TABLE 13: MAPPING OF SES PERFORMANCE INDICATORS ACROSS TRAFFIC VOLUMES FOR TABLE 14: AIRPORT CAPACITY INDICATORS PERFORMANCE PLAN LEVEL TABLE 15: EN ROUTE COST EFFICIENCY TARGETS FOR RP1 AS PER EC DECISION ON UNION WIDE TARGETS TABLE 16: EN ROUTE COST EFFICIENCY TARGETS FOR RP1 AS PER AGGREGATION OF NATIONAL TARGETS TABLE 17: TANS COST EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCE INDICATOR FOR RP TABLE 18: 2014 TANS ACTUAL COSTS VS. NPPS TABLE 19: 2014 GATE TO GATE ANS ACTUAL COSTS VS. NPPS TABLE 20: EOSM STATE LEVEL (END OF RP1 VS RP2 TARGETS) TABLE 21: EOSM ANSP LEVEL (END OF RP1 VS RP2 TARGETS) TABLE 22: CDR FPL USE BY AIRCRAFT TABLE 23: USAGE OF PRE TACTICALLY BOOKED AIRSPACE TABLE 24: ACTUAL AND TARGETED EN ROUTE ATFM DELAY PER FLIGHT TABLE 25: SUMMARY OF KEY RP1 COST EFFICIENCY DATA ( ) TABLE 26: ACTUAL EN ROUTE UNIT COSTS INCURRED BY STATES VS ACTUAL UNIT COSTS INCURRED BY AIRSPACE USERS TABLE 27: AIRPORT DATA QUALITY ISSUES IN 2014 PER FAB TABLE 28: ESTIMATED ECONOMIC SURPLUS FOR THE EN ROUTE ACTIVITY FOR THE MAIN ATSPS (IN % OF EN ROUTE REVENUES/COSTS) TABLE 29: COMPARISON OF ACTUAL COSTS AND SERVICE UNITS WITH PLANNED VALUES (RP1) PER EN ROUTE CHARGING ZONE TABLE 30: DETAILED CALCULATION OF THE TRUE EN ROUTE COSTS FOR USERS

8 1 Introduction 1.1 About this document PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2014 Volume 1 This Annual Monitoring Report 2014 was prepared by the Performance Review Body (PRB) of the Single European Sky (SES). It provides a summary of European Air Navigation Services (ANS) performance in four Key Performance Areas (KPAs: safety, environment, capacity and cost-efficiency) in 2014 as well as over the first Reference Period (RP1: ). It refers to, and uses data from, the States subject to the provisions of the SES Performance Scheme (RP1 SES States). This report highlights specific issues raised by the States, identifies corrective actions planned by States and makes recommendations to the Commission. The PRB Annual Monitoring Report consists of four Volumes: Volume 1 includes four chapters addressing the four KPAs at Union-wide level as well as some key highlights at Performance Plan level. Chapter 7 looks at the situation concerning alert thresholds, both at Union-wide and local levels. Chapter 8 presents an overview of performance over RP1. This Volume also reviews progress made on the recommendations contained in last year s report and presents new recommendations. (i) For ease of reference, the 2013 recommendations have been included in the respective sections. They are complemented by observations for the year (ii) The recommendations resulting from this report together with their rationale can be found in Chapter 8. Volume 2 presents the summary/overview pages of performance for each RP1 Performance Plan. Volume 3 presenting a specific analysis of capital expenditure (CAPEX) for the main ATSPs across the Union and by FAB was delivered to the Commission and has not been published at the time of writing this report. Volume 4 contains a detailed Safety Review, produced jointly by the Performance Review Unit (PRU) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Safety performance team. Much of the data used in this report comes from the PRB online monitoring dashboard, published on EUROCONTROL s website. It provides harmonised ANS performance data for all 29 States subject to the SES Performance Scheme in RP1. The dashboard can be accessed via the PRB website or by clicking on this link The SES Performance Scheme ANS performance targets are set under the SES Performance Scheme at both Union-wide and national/fab levels. Union-wide targets have been set for three of these KPAs during RP1: The Union-wide Environment target is a reduction of -0.75% point of the route extension in 2014 compared with 2009 (Flight plan vs. great circle distance); The Union-wide Capacity target is set at 0.5 of a minute en-route ATFM delay per flight for 2014; The en-route Union-wide Cost-efficiency target, set for each year of the Reference Period, is the en-route determined unit rate expressed in 2009 per service unit: in 2012, in 2013 and in

9 1.2.2 Unless otherwise indicated, the PRB Annual Monitoring Report for 2014 refers to ANS performance in the airspace shown in Figure 1, which is the geographical scope of the Union-wide targets for RP It covers the airspace controlled by the RP1 SES States in the ICAO EUR and AFI regions at the start of the reference period. Therefore, it covers the airspace controlled by the 27 EU Member States, the airspace controlled by Norway and Switzerland (29 States in total) in the ICAO EUR region, as well as the Canaries FIR (Spain), Bodø FIR (Norway) and NOTA/SOTA (UK/IRL). Performance monitoring is an iterative process using data collected and made available on the PRB online monitoring dashboard 1 and the data provided in the monitoring reports submitted by the RP1 SES States, including the reporting tables for ANS charges. Figure 1: RP1 SES States 1.3 RP1 Key Performance Areas Table 1 presents the Key Performance Areas (KPAs) and Performance Indicators (PIs) applicable for RP1 ( ) as set out in Regulation (EU) N 691/2010. The three PIs with Union-wide targets in RP1 are referred to as the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). KPA ANS PERFORMANCE INDICATOR RP1 Safety Environment Capacity Costefficiency Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) Application of severity classification scheme (RAT methodology) Separation Minima Infringements (SMI) Runway Incursions (RI) ATM-Specific occurrence (ATM-S) Application of Just Culture (JC) Horizontal flight efficiency of last filed flight plan (KEP) Utilisation of Conditional Routes Effectiveness of booking procedures for FUA En-route ATFM delay per flight Arrival ATFM delay Additional time in taxi-out phase Additional time in arriving sequencing and metering area (ASMA) Determined Unit Rate (DUR) for en-route ANS Reporting Reporting Reporting Union-wide target Reporting Reporting Union-wide target Nat/FAB targets Reporting Reporting Reporting Union-wide target Nat/FAB targets 7

10 KPA ANS PERFORMANCE INDICATOR RP1 Terminal costs Terminal unit rate Reporting Reporting Table 1: KPAs and PIs in RP1 1.4 Air Traffic In terms of average daily IFR flights, air traffic increased by +1.9% in 2014 after a two-year decrease, as shown in Figure 2. It was -6.4% below the highest level recorded in Reference Period 1 Figure 2: Traffic (IFR flights) It should be noted that these Union-wide averages mask considerable variations between States. For example, growth of IFR flights in 2014 vs ranged from +24.1% in Bulgaria to -6.8% in Malta. In terms of average daily en-route Service Units (SUs), the upward trend initiated in 2012 continued in 2014 with a +4.4% increase compared to 2013, as shown in Figure 3 below. This brings the 2014 SU traffic level to million, which is +5.6% higher than in 2008 (104.3 million). Higher growth in SUs (+4.4%) compared to IFR flights (+1.9%) can be explained by increases in both Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) and average distance flown. 8

11 Reference Period 1 Figure 3: Total en-route service units The volume of air traffic in 2014 was significantly impacted by the crises in Syria, Ukraine and Libya 1.5 Overview of Performance in Safety: in 2014, there were no fatal accidents with ANS contribution and a decreasing trend, initiated in 2010, in the number of reported serious incidents. Environment: A significant improvement in horizontal route extension achieved in 2014 brought the Key Performance Indicator (KPI) down to 4.90%, as shown in Figure 4. This was not sufficient however to meet the target set for 2014: 4.67% (a 0.75% reduction compared to the 2009 baseline). Reference Period 1 Figure 4: Target and achieved performance in flight efficiency 9

12 1.5.3 Capacity: In 2014, en-route ATFM delays increased by 15% compared with 2013, while IFR flights increased +1.9%. The Union-wide Capacity KPI for 2014 was 0.61 minutes ATFM delay per flight, which does not meet the target set for 2014: 0.50 minute/flight. This was however well below the levels recorded before RP1 as shown in Figure 5. En-route ATFM delays were concentrated in Cyprus, France, Greece, Poland and Portugal. Reference Period 1 Figure 5: Target (2014) and achieved performance in en-route ATFM delays Regarding arrival ATFM delay, Zurich (ZRH) is the only airport with an average above two minutes, while Amsterdam (AMS) and London Heathrow (LHR) are close to this threshold. The European overall average arrival ATFM delay decreased by -19%. Weather conditions remain the major cause of arrival ATFM delay, accounting for 69% in The European average of additional taxi-out time decreased slightly to 3.0 min./dep. Additional ASMA time showed little variation across all reporting airports in 2014 with a European average of 1.9 min./arrival. Cost-efficiency: 2014 was the third year of the Determined Costs method with specific risk-sharing arrangements aimed at incentivising ANSPs economic performance. While SUs were higher than in 2013, they were -4.5% lower than planned. In response, States/ANSPs reduced their planned costs by -5.7%. As a result, the actual Union-wide unit cost in 2014 was 54.13, which is lower than the target of from the adopted NPPs although higher than the Union-wide target of It is also significantly below the baseline assumption of (RP2 baseline includes Croatia which was excluded from RP1) used in setting the RP2 targets. No specific targets were set for TANS (terminal air navigation services) costs and unit rates in RP1. However, actual Union-wide TANS costs in 2014 were -8.6% lower than planned, which is a greater reduction in percentage terms than the reduction in en-route costs. Overall gate-to-gate costs were -6.2% lower than planned. 10

13 2 Safety 2.1 Presentation PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2014 Volume 1 Although there are no Union-wide safety targets, the States are required to report on a number of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) in RP1. These are described in Annex I of Regulation 390/ and shown in Table 2. SAFETY Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) of Member States and their air navigation service providers. Application of the severity classification based on the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) methodology to the reporting of, as a minimum, Separation Minima Infringements (SMI); Runway Incursions (RI); and ATM-specific occurrences (ATM-S) at all Air Traffic Service Units. Reporting by Member States and their air navigation providers on the level of presence and corresponding level of absence of Just Culture (JC). Reporting Reporting Reporting Table 2: Safety Performance Indicators for RP The Safety Review presented below summarises Volume 4 of this report. It was produced by the PRU/EASA Safety team and contains consolidated observations made during a review of the National/FAB Monitoring Reports and measurements of SPIs for the third year of RP1 of the Performance Scheme. 2.2 ANS-related accidents and serious incidents Figure 26 shows the number of ANS-related accidents and serious incidents involving commercial air transport (CAT) aircraft above 2,250 kg maximum take-off mass (MTOM), alongside a rate calculated using the number of flight hours performed. The review of ANS-related accidents and incidents is based on: accidents and serious incidents from the EASA database ( ); incident data reported to EUROCONTROL via the Annual Summary Template (AST) reporting mechanism ( , 2014 preliminary). In the ten year period analysed, there were two (2) fatal accidents that were ANSrelated, one in 2005 and the other in In neither case was ANS considered to be a direct causal factor. The Figure 6 shows the number of accidents and serious incidents per year that involved ANS, alongside a rate calculated using the number of flight hours performed. In the six year period analysed, there were no fatal accidents that were ANS-related. The figure shows an overall decreasing trend in the number of serious incidents since 2010, whereas the number of accidents has remained static. The lower rate and number of serious incidents in 2009 is also reflected in historical data for 2008 and appears to be related to the downturn in traffic over the two year period. Overall, historical movement data and serious incident data from EASA indicate that in a ten year period, both the number and rate of serious incidents has reduced. A reversal in the decreasing trend of serious incidents is shown in 2014 and in the overall accident and serious incident rate, per million flight hours. This reversal is also reflected in other measures of aviation system safety, such as the global fatality rate for CAT Aeroplanes, or the European CAT accident rate 2. 11

14 Figure 6: ANS-related accidents and serious incidents ( ) Serious incidents are often a better measure of the performance of the ANS system, as they relate more closely to ANS itself and are more severe in their nature. As a whole, the RP1 period has shown a better level of ANS safety performance compared with the previous seven years. However, there has not been a measurable improvement (nor degradation) within the reference period itself. Analysis of occurrences with only an ANS-contribution (Figure 7) show that the rate of ANS-contribution accidents and serious incidents has significantly decreased since 2010 and also decreased consistently during the whole RP1. Historical movement data indicate that there was a reduction in traffic during The corresponding dip in 2009, as shown in Figure 7, suggests that the rate is not directly related to the number of flight hours. Earlier data had higher accident and serious incident rates and imply that overall, safety has improved over the past ten years. Therefore, it could be concluded that the ANS sector has improved at managing risks that directly relate to the service provided. 12

15 Figure 7: ANS contribution accidents and serious incidents ( ) 2.3 Effectiveness of Safety Management This section gives an overview of the responses to the questionnaires used for the measurement of the EoSM (provided by the States and service providers). All 29 States and 37 (out of 38) ANSPs filled in the self-assessment questionnaires used for the measurement of the EoSM SPI in accordance with Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) for the Implementation and Measurement of Safety Key Performance Indicators (EASA Decision 2011/017R). In accordance with the AMC, the responses of 28 States (out of 29) have been verified by EASA while the responses of the ANSPs have been verified by the State Competent authorities. Note: Submission of the Italy EoSM questionnaire was made several months after the official closing date for submission of the results and after the verification and processing of all other data had been completed. As a consequence, the 2014 Italy EoSM State results could not be verified during the 2014 review cycle. Note that EoSM self-score for Italy is however available on the PRB Dashboard. EASA examined the States responses using two methods thorough verification (TV) or light verification (LV)). More details about EASA s method of verification can be found in Volume 4 of this report. Volume 4 also provides further analysis of the EoSM Scores provided by the States and ANSPs. In addition, results of this verification exercise at State level can be found in Volume 2. The EoSM results achieved by individual States and their ANSPs in 2014, according to their own perception (before EASA s verification), are presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9. It is worth highlighting that a direct comparison of the results for 2014 with those of previous years should be taken with caution due to the necessary revision of EoSM questionnaires in view of RP2 (small revisions of questionnaires in light of RP2). More details about these changes can be found in Volume 4 of this report. The minimum effectiveness Score, by the individual States in 2014, is 42 with five States scoring below 50. This is an improvement when compared to the 2013 scores. The maximum effectiveness score at State level in 2014 is 86. The minimum effectiveness Score, by the individual ANSPs in 2013, is 44 with only 13

16 2.3.7 one (1) ANSP scoring below 50. The maximum effectiveness score at ANSP in 2014 is 92. Note: One ANSP has not reported figures for 2014, i.e. NAV Portugal (Portugal). The outcome of the 2014 exercise shows continuous improvement in the implementation of safety management at both State and ANSP levels Effectiveness of Safety Management (State Level) EoSM Score Hungary Portugal Slovenia Luxembourg Denmark Netherlands Austria Slovakia Poland Spain Sweden Estonia Lithuania Germany Norway Finland Malta Belgium Czech Republic Cyprus Bulgaria Romania France Greece Latvia Switzerland Italy United Kingdom Ireland Figure 8: EoSM scores of individual States (self-assessment) EoSM Score Effectiveness of Safety Management (ANSP Level) SAF Airport Sliac ACR ANA LUX CYATS ESNX PANSA Ferronats EANS HANSP Belgocontrol LFV NUAC Newcastle Airport Slovenia Control Budapest Airport Hungarocontrol Avinor ORO NAVIGACIJA ENAIRE LGS Finavia East Midlands IAA SKYGUIDE MUAC ROMATSA ANS CR MATS NATS NERL NATS NSL Austro Control BULATSA LPS SR LVNL DSNA NAVIAIR DFS Figure 9: EoSM scores of individual ANSPs 14

17 2.3.8 Based on information provided during the 2014 monitoring exercise and the introduction of the second metric for EoSM (EoSM Maturity Level) it is possible to give an overview of achievements in implementation of safety management, both at State and ANSP levels, in view of RP2 safety targets set for Note: The results of EoSM in RP2 will be measured both in terms of EoSM Maturity Score and in terms of Maturity Level. The Overall Score gives a high level overview of the organisation s SMS and it shows whether overall the State or service provider are mostly managing performance or it is still in the process of implementing the mandatory regulations and achieving the minimum standards of maturity. However, as this score may hide particular problems in certain areas as the methodology averages the scores by each of five EoSM safety Components (introducing a smoothing effect) and in order to identify whether the State or service provider still has a significant problem in at least one area (i.e. safety Component) the Maturity Level view is more appropriate RP2 EoSM FAB results are calculated using EoSM minimum/lowest level achieved principle (lowest level achieved of each Component, both at the State and ANSP level, is calculated as the lowest level of all questions within that Component; similarly this principle is then also applied at FAB level as the RP2 Union-wide targets for safety are set at FAB level). By applying the lowest level achieved principle in scoring at FAB level it is expected to encourage the States and the ANSPs with lower score to achieve the higher scores within the FAB in order not to reduce the overall FAB score The following two tables show the current results of achieved FAB EoSM minimum/lowest levels for all States (based on self-assessment) and their ANSPs. EoSM State level (FAB EoSM minimum level achieved) Safety Policy Risk Management Safety Assurance Safety Promotion Safety Culture 2019 RP2 Targets C C C C C 2014 Results Baltic FAB B B B B B Blue Med FAB A C B B B DANUBE FAB B B C B B DK-SE FAB B B B A A FAB CE A B A A A FABEC A A A A B NEFAB B B B B B SW FAB A A B A B UK-IR FAB C C D C B Table 3: EoSM State level (end of RP1 vs RP2 targets) 15

18 EoSM ANSP level (FAB EoSM minimum level achieved) Safety Policy Risk Management Safety Assurance Safety Promotion Safety Culture 2019 RP2 Targets D D D D C 2014 Results Baltic FAB C D C C C Blue Med FAB C D C C C DANUBE FAB D D C C C DK-SE FAB* D C D C D FAB CE* C D C C C FABEC B D C C C NEFAB C C C C C SW FAB** C D C C C UK-IR FAB* D D D C D Table 4: EoSM ANSP level (end of RP1 vs RP2 targets) * calculated including only ANSPs that are within the scope of RP2 as indicated in the FAB RP2 Performance Plans (more information provided in Volume 4) ** to be taken with caution as NAV Portugal did not provide results for 2014 and new ANSP within RP2 (Ferronats) was not monitored in RP1, hence results are not available. For a full report on the EoSM results, please refer to Volume 4 of this report. 2.4 Application of RAT methodology States have reported the proportion of Separation Minima Infringements (SMIs), Runway Incursions (RIs) and ATM-specific occurrences (ATM-S) for which the severity of the occurrence is assessed using the severity classification based on the RAT methodology. Figure 10 presents EU averages for each SMI, RI and ATM-S (data submitted and updated at the end of April 2015). The verification of the application of the RAT methodology was done following the Annual Summary Template s (AST) safety data reporting system, with the exception of one State that used a different channel to report the RAT methodology application. Further details about the verification method can be found in Volume 4 of this report. 90% Severity Classification (RAT Methodology) 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 64% 83% 85% 46% 65% 63% 49% 69% 79% 36% 51% 66% 61% 52% Ground Overall Ground Overall Overall Separation Minima Infringements Runway Incursions ATM Specific Occurrences % Figure 10: EU averages for severity assessment using the RAT methodology Note: Percentages for 2012 and 2013 (where applicable) have been updated since 16

19 to take into account the final 2013 RAT methodology application data, which was received through the AST reporting mechanism at the end of September The EU averages for the application of RAT severity methodology for RIs and ATM-S show overall improvement in the final year of RP1. On the other hand, severity classification of SMIs shows a slight drop in Overall, all three occurrence types are severity classified in approximately 60% of the cases on a State level (ATM Overall). Summary information about the three types of occurrences (SMIs, RIs and ATM-S), for which the severity of the occurrence should be assessed using the RAT severity classification, is provided in the following paragraphs. Preliminary 2014 data (Figure 11) show a small decrease of risk-bearing SMIs, in absolute numbers, compared with 2013 (approximately 5%): Serious incidents (severity class A) decreased in absolute numbers from 30 to 19. Major incidents (severity class B) decreased in absolute numbers from 229 to 227. The total number of SMIs reported across all severity categories increased by 5% in Approximately 8.5% of the reported SMI incidents are still under investigation Reference Period 1 Source: AST % Severity A+B SMI [Severity B] SMI [Severity A] Classified Events % 14% % % % % N of States reporting Total n reported %SeverityA+B 12% 14% 16% 16% 12% 11% Figure 11: Reported SMIs in States ( P) Preliminary 2014 data (Figure 12) shows an increase of risk-bearing RIs compared with 2013 (approx. 23%): Serious incidents (severity class A) increased in absolute numbers from 14 to 23. Major incidents (severity class B) increased in absolute numbers from 60 to 68. The total number of RIs reported across all severity categories shows almost no change compared with the previous year (approx. 0.2%). Approximately 8.5% of the RIs reported in 2014 are still under investigation. 17

20 % Severity A+B Classified Events % RI [Severity B] 60 5% % 68 RI [Severity A] N of States reporting Total reports %SeverityA+B 5% 7% 6% 4% 5% 6% Figure 12: Reported RIs in States ( P) ATM-S include those situations where the ability to provide safe ATM services is affected by the event reported. ATM-S occurrences typically include failure of ATM/CNS technical systems which could potentially have an impact on the safety of air navigation The total number of ATM-S occurrences reported across all severity categories decreased by approximately 18% in In addition, preliminary 2014 data (Figure 13) shows an overall decrease of riskbearing ATM-S occurrences compared with 2013 (approx. 11%). The number of occurrences that had a serious impact on the ANSPs ability to supply ATM services has decreased in 2014 compared with the previous year as follows: Severity class AA (total inability to provide ATM Services) decreased from 21 to 20; Severity class A (serious inability to provide ATM Services) decreased from 90 to 87; Severity class B (partial inability to provide ATM Services) decreased from 390 to % Reference Period 1 Source: AST 5% 6% 18

21 Number of ATM-Specific Occurrences Reference Period Source: AST AA A B C D E Not classified Figure 13: Reported ATM Specific Occurrences in States ( P) Based on 2014 preliminary data, the number of severity not classified or severity not determined (category D) for the above categories of occurrences has overall decreased by almost 25% compared with the previous year s data (for more details see Volume 4 of this report) The numbers of severity not classified or not determined have decreased for all three types of occurrences. For SMIs and RIs, an improvement in severity classification is almost 40% and 60% respectively compared to This improvement may have been achieved as a result of the new targeted requirements for the Safety KPIs in the Performance Scheme and increased support activities for States provided by DPS/SSR As for the completeness of data received through the AST mechanism, it can be observed that the ATM Occurrences contribution data is left blank in over 20% of the reported incidents. In addition, data related to the aircraft involved is not available for roughly 50% operational occurrences (more information available in Volume 4 of this report). In consequence, this lack of completeness diminishes still further the safety analysis capability at European level. 2.5 Just Culture Just Culture is assessed by the responses given to the self-assessment questionnaires on Just Culture for both States and ANSPs in the three areas: Policy and its implementation ; Legal & Judiciary ; and Occurrence reporting and investigation. Under each area, the questions vary for the State and for the ANSP. The aim of review was to identify certain tendencies and approaches in place in the context of measuring the presence and corresponding level of absence of Just Culture. All 29 States and 37 (out of 38) ANSPs filled in the self-assessment questionnaires used for the measurement of the JC SPI in accordance with EASA AMC/GM for the Implementation and Measurement of Safety Key Performance Indicators. Note: Submission of Italy s Just Culture questionnaire was made several months after the official closing date. As a consequence, the 2014 JC State results could not be verified by EASA. Note that self-perceived JC Score for Italy (State level) are however available on the PRB Dashboard and Volume 2 of this report. In addition, 19

22 2.5.4 one ANSP has not submitted its response for 2014, i.e. NAV Portugal (Portugal). Volume 4 of this report explains the methodology for EASA s verification of the responses and gives a detailed analysis of Just Culture implementation levels per FAB, in order to identify the JC elements, which are already in place (see Volume 4, section 2.3). It has to be noted that late assessment is solely based on the information provided by the States and ANSPs in their responses to the questionnaires and has not been verified by an on-site inspection. 2.6 Review of 2013 Recommendations on safety Recommendation made in 2013: States were requested to invest additional effort in the final year of RP1 to achieve higher levels of safety management. The EoSM results have shown rather small improvements. In addition, States implementation levels of safety management principles are still below that of ANSPs. States were asked to make further efforts to enhance their reporting and application of the RAT methodology by seeking, planning and providing training for this matter. There have been relatively small improvements in the application of RAT severity methodology. States were requested to improve the completeness of safety data reported via the AST mechanism Continuous lack of completeness of AST data still diminishes the capability of improved safety analysis at European level. States were requested to make the investment necessary for the effective implementation of the JC policy and to make every possible effort to encourage the conclusion of the necessary arrangements in order to have cooperation between the relevant actors involved in safety investigation. The PRB notes that the reports have shown some improvements in the reporting of the level of JC observations for safety In 2014, there were no fatal accidents with ANS-contribution and a decreasing trend, initiated in 2010, in the number of reported serious incidents continued. Submission of safety performance results by several States and ANSPs in this year was made several weeks and even months after the official closing date for submission of the results. As a consequence verification, processing and analysis of data were either rather delayed or in some cases even not possible. The lack of completeness of data received through AST mechanism, continues to be a concern. Consequently, this lack of completeness of various safety information diminishes the capability of safety analysis at European level. The PRB acknowledges the improvements made in safety management. The verified results of the EoSM questionnaires for States still show that their implementation of safety management principles is below that of ANSPs. There have been relatively small improvements in the application of RAT severity methodology. States are encouraged to continue additional efforts to enable further enhancements in the reporting and application of severity classification using the RAT methodology by seeking, planning and applying training on this matter. States requiring support in applying severity classification using the RAT methodology should contact EUROCONTROL DPS/SSR. With regards to the reporting by States and their ANSPs the level of presence and corresponding level of absence of JC, the PRB notes that the reports have shown some improvements in the reporting of the level of JC. Recommendation based on the observations and overall RP1 recommendations can be found in Section 8.5 of this report. 20

23 3 Environment 3.1 Presentation PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2014 Volume 1 The Performance Indicators for the Environment KPA in RP1 are listed in Table 5. While the average horizontal en-route flight efficiency of the last filed flight plan trajectory is a KPI with a target, the Commission is required to monitor and report against the effective use of civil military airspace structures in RP1. ENVIRONMENT Horizontal flight efficiency of last filed flight plan (KEP) Utilisation of Conditional Routes Effectiveness of booking procedures for FUA Union-wide target Reporting Reporting Table 5: Environment Indicators for RP1 3.2 Flight Efficiency A flight efficiency target of 4.67% (measured as the flight extension as a proportion of the great circle distance) has been established for 2014; this represents a -0.75% point reduction compared to the 2009 baseline. The Route Network Design function and the ATFM function carried out by the Network Manager (NM) directly support the achievement of this flight efficiency target. Figure 14 shows the recorded horizontal flight efficiency figures for the period The average horizontal en-route flight efficiency of the last filed flight plan trajectory for 2014 is equal to 4.90%. This corresponds to a major improvement over the 2013 value, but is not enough to meet the target of 4.67% in Reference Period 1 Figure 14: Target and achieved performance in flight efficiency 21

24 3.2.4 The comparison of the monthly values over the period (Figure 15) shows a consistent improvement in every month the recorded value in 2014 is the best over the three years considered. Figure 15: Monthly evolution of horizontal flight efficiency during RP Figure 16 provides a geographical breakdown by FAB, with the values of flight efficiency for the FABs and their share in terms of the additional distance taken into consideration for the Union-wide calculation. What is shown as contribution combines the effects of the horizontal flight efficiency in the area with the distances considered for the same area. 22

25 Figure 16: FAB breakdown of horizontal flight efficiency and contribution to additional distance in Effective Use of Civil Military Airspace Structures UTILISATION OF CONDITIONAL ROUTES Data on this indicator is only available on a network level. Figure 17 shows the ratio of aircraft which filed flight plans using conditional routes. Figure 17 (left) shows that 70% of aircraft that could have used CDR1s (which are available by default) filed flight plans that included conditional routes. Figure 17 (right) shows that 64% of aircraft that could use CDR2s (which, by default, are not available) filed flight plans that included conditional routes. Rate of CDR1 FPL use by aircraft Rate of CDR2 FPL use by aircraft Planning on CDR1 70% Not planning on CDR1 30% Planning on CDR2 64% Not planning on CDR2 36% Figure 17: Utilisation of conditional routes

26 UTILISATION OF CONDITIONAL ROUTES OVER RP1 YEAR Aircraft Planning on CDR 1 74% 73% 70% Aircraft Planning on CDR 2 64% 66% 63% Table 6: CDR FPL Use by aircraft Table 6 shows that the rate of uptake of CDRs Free Route Airspace (FRA) has been relatively static over the period 2012 Concept This could be explained by several reasons: civil military authorities may not be Free route airspace (FRA) is a key making the CDRs available when there is development with a view to the actual demand; aircraft operators may not know implementation of shorter routes and when CDRs are available, or may for business more efficient use of the European reasons simply prefer not to fly on them; CDRs airspace. availability may not be coordinated across national regional boundaries making individual FRA refers to a specific portion of segments unusable despite being available. airspace within which airspace users may freely plan their routes between an The PRB understands that work continues entry point and an exit point without between all stakeholders, including Network reference to the fixed Air Traffic Services Manager, ANSPs, military authorities, aircraft (ATS) route network. Within this operators and computer flight plan service airspace, flights remain at all times providers to focus on each of the areas subject to air traffic control and to any overriding airspace restrictions. highlighted above. The PRB is aware that, as Free Route Airspace is increasingly deployed across the Network, the monitoring of CDR planning and CDR usage becomes less relevant. Aircraft are no longer constrained to the limits of ATS routes, including conditional routes, but are able to plan individual trajectories that meet their business objectives in terms of fuel burn and flight efficiency. The PRB considers that the focus in the future should be on monitoring whether or not the national/regional civil and military authorities manage the airspace effectively, in terms of capacity and flight efficiency, to meet the needs of civil and military users. EFFECTIVENESS OF BOOKING PROCEDURES FOR FUA For RP1, States were asked to provide data on the number of hours that airspace structures were allocated for activities requiring segregation or restriction of other traffic. From these hours, States were asked to provide information on the number of hours that were still allocated three hours prior to activation of the airspace structure, and the number of hours during which the airspace structures were actually used for activities requiring segregation or restriction of other traffic Due to the specific nature of national training and operational requirements, it is not possible to present a homogenous indicator for the Union, although a summary of the national indicators is presented in Table 7. Using the data provided by the States, it is possible to present the following characteristics: the percentage of hours that allocated airspace was used for an activity requiring segregation/restriction from general air traffic [Usage]; the percentage of hours that allocated airspace, surplus to requirements, was released with more than 3 hours notification to the Network Manager [H-3 Release]; the percentage of hours in which allocated airspace was neither used for an 24

27 3.3.7 activity requiring segregation or restriction from general air traffic, nor released with at least 3 hours notice to the Network Manager [Delta]. Each of the characteristics above was calculated by using the total number of hours that airspace was allocated, as being segregated or restricted on the day prior to operations (pre-tactical), as the baseline. STATE USAGE H-3 RELEASE DELTA STATE USAGE H-3 RELEASE DELTA Austria 66% No info No info Lithuania (a) (a) (a) Belgium 69% 0% 31% Luxembourg (a) (a) (a) Bulgaria 39% No info No info Malta (a) (a) (a) Cyprus No info No info No info The Netherlands 88% 0% 12% Czech Republic 40% No info No info Norway 47% No info No info Denmark 17% 9% 74% Poland 45% 10% 45% Estonia No info No info No info Portugal (a) (a) (a) Finland 27% 0% 73% Romania 62% 14% 24% France 63% 5% 32% Slovakia 57% No info No info Germany 52% 2% 46% Slovenia 51% No info No info Greece No info No info No info Spain 37% 0% 63% Hungary 30% No info No info Sweden 42% 9% 49% Ireland No info No info No info Switzerland 59% 0% 41% Italy 44% 0% 56% United Kingdom 40% 21% 39% Latvia 30% 0% 70% Table 7: Environmental KPA: effective booking procedures (a) These States reported that the allocation and activation of military areas had no adverse impact, either on available ATC capacity, or on route options for general air traffic. No info refers either to no data being provided or insufficient data to calculate the KPI. Evolution of Usage of Pre-tactically Booked Airspace from STATE STATE Austria 38% No info 66% Lithuania (a) (a) (a) Belgium 54% 25% 69% Luxembourg (a) (a) (a) Bulgaria 40% No info 39% Malta (a) (a) (a) Cyprus (a) 100% No info The Netherlands 90% 89% 88% Czech Republic 38% 35% 40% Norway 44% 46% 47% Denmark 58% 42% 17% Poland 48% 44% 45% Estonia No info No info No info Portugal (a) (a) (a) Finland 23% 22% 27% Romania 41% 49% 62% France 64% 54% 63% Slovakia 25% 26% 57% Germany 37% 45% 52% Slovenia 72% 41% 51% Greece No info No info No info Spain No info 58% 37% Hungary 33% 21% 30% Sweden 100% 96% 42% Ireland (a) No info No info Switzerland 69% 74% 59% Italy 48% 42% 44% United Kingdom 30% 33% 40% Latvia 7% 18% 30% Table 8: Usage of Pre-tactically booked airspace The huge variation across the States in the figures for the usage of pre-tactically 25

28 booked airspace can be due to many factors: After internal review, States may be reporting on a greatly different selection of areas than they did in 2012; States may be monitoring the actual use of airspace more closely than was previously the case; States may have revised national booking procedures to only book airspace when there is a need; States may have decided that there is no capacity or flight efficiency issue and that they have no objective to improve airspace booking procedures, etc However, it is of concern to the PRB that several States either do not provide any information (Greece), or provide only partial information which means that the KPI cannot be monitored (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia) Furthermore, since the PRB accepts that some States may not be adversely impacted by military operations and training, e.g. Malta, Luxembourg, it would appreciate if the Commission could confirm that such States may discharge their reporting requirements simply by providing the PRB with a statement to that effect States were also asked to provide information on the tactical allocation and use of airspace, whenever the airspace management technique Procedure 3 was applicable within the State. Out of the 29 SES States, only Germany and Ireland provided information on the tactical allocation and use of airspace for 2014: Table 9. STATE ACTUAL USAGE PRE-TACTICAL ALLOCATION TACTICAL ALLOCATION Germany 52% 58% Ireland No info 92% Table 9: Comparison of Pre-tactical and Tactical airspace allocation Review of 2013 Recommendations on the Environment Recommendation made in 2013: The PRB advised the EC to request the NM to continue and expand those activities which have led to the marked improvements in the latter part of 2013 so as to ensure that the Flight Efficiency target of 4.67% can be reached by end The marked improvements in the latter part of 2013 have indeed continued in 2014, but were not sufficient to meet the target. The PRB advised the EC to request the Member States to review the impact of allocating or activating individual restricted or segregated areas on either the available ATC capacity, or on the availability of route options within the relevant airspace. The PRB is not aware of any resulting action stemming from this recommendation. The PRB advised the EC to clarify to Member States that the reporting requirement for the effective use of civil military airspace structures performance indicator relates exclusively to all restricted or segregated areas, which the Member States have identified as having an impact on available ATC capacity, or on available route options within the relevant airspace. The PRB notes that the requested clarification has not yet been provided to the States. 26

29 observation for Environment A significant improvement in horizontal route extension achieved in 2014 brought the Key Performance Indicator down to 4.90%. This was not sufficient however to meet the target set for 2014: 4.67% (a 0.75% reduction compared to the 2009 baseline). Recommendations based on the 2014 observation and overall RP1 recommendations can be found in Section 8.6 of this report. 27

30 4 Capacity 4.1 Presentation PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2014 Volume Under the Capacity KPA, a Union-wide target has been set for en-route ATFM delays per flight. Furthermore, the performance Regulation 4 stipulates that the three PIs related to airport capacity, as outlined in Table 10, be reported on. En-route ATFM delay per flight Arrival ATFM delay Additional time in taxi-out phase CAPACITY Union-wide target (Nat./FAB targets) Reporting Reporting Additional time in arriving sequencing and metering area (ASMA) Reporting Table 10: Capacity indicators for RP1 4.2 En-route ATFM Delays UNION-WIDE LEVEL The Union-wide target for en-route ATFM delays in RP1 was 0.5 minutes per flight for 2014, with intermediate targets of 0.7 min./flight in 2012 and 0.6 min./flight in These targets are shown in Figure 18; which also presents a breakdown of enroute ATFM delays according to the causes, as classified by the Flow Management Position requesting the regulation for the period In 2014, the Union-wide target of 0.5 minutes was not met, with actual en-route ATFM delay per flight reaching 0.61 minutes. The Union-wide traffic level increased by 1.9% from 2013 levels, compared to a predicted increase of 1.4% (STATFOR September 2013 forecast) There were several political events that significantly impacted traffic flows during 2014: the crises in Syria, Ukraine (including the downing of MH017 in July 2014), Libya and Israel / Palestine These events triggered significant and prolonged disruptions to traffic flows, with several States incurring substantial (more than 8%) increase in traffic volumes, and well above the levels previously forecasted. Such States include: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece The PRB is pleased to report that Bulgaria (+24%), Romania (+16%), Hungary (+11%) and Slovakia (+9%) were able to handle the additional increase in traffic and still provide a positive contribution to the Union-wide target on en-route capacity. The PRB acknowledges the tremendous effort from the staff and management of the concerned ANSPs. The PRB also notes the value in planning additional capacity to deal with unexpected events. 28

31 Reference Period 1 Figure 18: En-route ATFM delays LOCAL LEVEL Table 11 shows the contribution of each FAB & States to the 2014 total en-route ATFM delay minutes per flight. The table shows the 2014 reference value provided by the Network Manager in 2011 and used to determine consistency with the Unionwide target; the adopted national or FAB target as contained in the national / FAB Performance Plans, and the actual value recorded in The colours indicate whether the actual value is consistent (green) or inconsistent (red). PERIOD: JAN-DEC 2014 NM REFERENCE TARGET (PP) ACTUAL FAB STATE VALUE JAN-DEC Baltic FAB 0.24 No target 0.73 Lithuania Poland Blue Med FAB 0.21 No target 0.41 Cyprus Greece Italy Malta Danube FAB 0.08 No target 0.00 Bulgaria Romania DK-SE FAB Denmark 0.07 No target 0.00 Sweden 0.06 No target 0.03 FAB CE (SES RP1) 0.33 No target 0.06 Austria Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Slovenia FABEC Belgium/Luxembourg 0.21 No target 0.02 France 0.24 No target 0.66 Germany 0.29 No target 0.26 Netherlands 0.18 No target

32 PERIOD: JAN-DEC 2014 NM REFERENCE TARGET (PP) ACTUAL FAB STATE VALUE JAN-DEC Switzerland 0.14 No target 0.10 MUAC 0.22 No target 0.17 NEFAB 0.12 No target 0.05 Estonia Finland Latvia Norway SW FAB 0.34 No target 0.43 Portugal Continental Spain UK-IR FAB 0.29 No target 0.06 Ireland United Kingdom SES AREA RP Table 11: En-route ATFM delay per flight FAB / State contribution Table 11 shows that, where a national target was published, all States except Poland, Cyprus, Portugal and Finland achieved their national target. In the national monitoring reports: Poland attributed the poor performance to a combination of increased traffic demand, industrial action in France and the delay in the implementation of their new ATM system; Cyprus attributed the poor performance to a combination of increased traffic, reroutings due to political events (see above), a downward revision of available capacity and the inflexibility of ATC working practices, which it is claimed, is outside the control of the ANSP; Portugal attributed the poor performance to a combination of unexpected and significant increase in traffic demand and an inability to deploy capacity outside the peak summer period due to the general economic situation in Portugal, and the national Economic Adjustment Program; Finland attributed the temporary poor performance to the implementation of major airspace changes in November [Note: Despite Finland failing to meet their national target, they still provided a positive contribution to the Unionwide target on en-route capacity by surpassing the respective national reference value of 0.16 minutes per flight.] When a FAB target was published (FABEC & DK-SE FAB), the DK-SE FAB achieved its FAB target, whereas FABEC did not In the FAB monitoring report, FABEC states that traffic levels in 2014 were 11% below the traffic levels considered during the drafting of the FABEC Performance Plan. FABEC states analysis of the root causes of the remaining delay shows that most of them are local causes or, like weather, cannot be influenced. INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PERFORMANCE ON FAB PERFORMANCE The national performance of France adversely impacted FABEC performance Unsurprisingly, as the larger of the two ANSPs in the FAB, Poland s national performance had significant adverse impact on the Baltic FAB s performance The national capacity performance of Cyprus adversely impacted the Blue Med FAB 30

33 performance, although it must be noted that Greece, despite meeting their national target, did not provide a positive contribution to the Union-wide target for en-route capacity The national capacity performance for Portugal adversely impacted the SW FAB performance As noted above, despite failing to achieve their national target, the national capacity of Finland still provided a positive impact on the NEFAB performance, resulting in NEFAB providing a positive contribution to the Union-wide target for CAPACITY PLANNING Capacity planning remains a significant issue. As noted above, when States make provisions for additional capacity they are able to handle unexpected rises in traffic volumes without penalising the airspace users However, when States fail to plan and implement sufficient capacity even for the forecasted traffic then they will not be in a position to provide acceptable capacity performance Despite the recommendations of the EC that FABEC should require their ANSPs to develop and implement capacity plans to meet the FABEC reference value of 0.4 minutes average ATFM delay per flight at the earliest possible date, failure to do so has resulted in FABEC being unable to deliver the required level of service even with traffic levels 11% below what was forecasted in The PRB previously raised concerns about the continuous postponement and downgrading of capacity plans, especially in those States that were unable or unwilling to adopt the reference capacity values to be consistent with the Union-wide target for capacity The PRB remains concerned that the same States have not made adequate provisions for capacity planning during RP2, and that as traffic grows again, capacity will become a serious problem for the network. ACTUAL CAPACITY PERFORMANCE AND TARGET SETTING Table 12 below shows a graphical comparison between the actual en-route capacity performance for each State and FAB against the targeted capacity performance as adopted by the relevant FAB/national authorities. Once again it is important to recall that several individual States (Cyprus, Greece, Poland & Spain) and one FAB, (FABEC) adopted targets that were not consistent with the Union-wide target of 0.5 minutes ATFM delay per flight for It shows that the vast majority of States adopted targets that were easily achieved by the respective ANSPs The graphic further shows that several of the States/FABs that did not set targets consistent with the union wide targets, could have pushed their ANSPs a lot further into providing better capacity performance. Greece and Spain easily surpassed the national targets over the three years of RP1. FABEC and Poland significantly surpassed their local targets in 2012 & 2013 but not in The PRB considers that when States set easy targets for ANSPs it leads to downgrading or postponement of capacity plans, which creates problems in the future. 31

34 FAB Baltic Lithuania Poland FAB BLUE MED Cyprus Greece Italy Malta FAB DANUBE Bulgaria Romania FAB DK SE Denmark Sweden FAB CE (SES RP1) Austria Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Slovenia FAB FABEC Belgium/ Lux France Germany Netherlands Switzerland MUAC FAB NEFAB Estonia Finland Latvia Norway FAB SW Portugal (Cont.) Spain FAB UK Ireland United Kingdom Ireland SES AREA RP1 Target Actual Source: EUROCONTROL/ PRU Table 12: Actual and targeted en-route ATFM delay per flight

35 4.3 ANS Capacity at Airports UNION-WIDE LEVEL No targets have been set for ANS capacity at airports in RP airports are subject to the Performance Scheme during RP1, as shown in Figure 19 (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) N 691/2010 superseded by Regulation (EU) N 390/2013). The full list of RP1 airports can be found in Volume 2 of this report. Operational ANS performance in terms of arrival ATFM delay and additional taxi-out time is monitored for all of these airports, whilst RP1 airports accommodating more than 100,000 movements per annum are subject to monitoring of additional ASMA time, i.e. 39 airports Performance Monitoring is carried out by using the data flow defined in Annex IV of Regulation (EU) N 691/2010, and further on in Annex V of Regulation (EU) N 390/2013. The PRU has been tasked with the organisation and day-to-day management of the respective airport data flows. Figure 19: RP1 airports The technical processes and organisational measures to ensure regular airport performance monitoring have been established and are being maintained by the PRU. PRU has also established a quality assurance framework to ensure and improve the quality of data reported by airport operators. Few cases of substantial non-compliance of airports with the reporting requirements remain (e.g. establishment of data flow, completeness of data provision, accuracy/consistency of data). In such cases, remedial action has been planned by the PRU in close collaboration with the respective authorities and/or airports. These action plans have resulted in improvements to the reporting situation in 2013 and 2014 (e.g. integration of German and Italian airports). Work is on-going to iteratively close these action plans. When data required for the calculation of additional ASMA and taxi-out times has not been provided by airports, these indicators are not published by the PRB. At the end 33

36 of RP1, additional ASMA time could be calculated for 36 airports out of 39 satisfying the threshold of 100,000 movements for the calculation of additional ASMA time (information was missing for Oslo/Gardermoen, Warsaw and Nice). Additional taxiout time could not be computed for 17 airports out of the 77 airports subject to RP1; out of the 17 missing airports, 16 of them did not yet manage to provide data at acceptable quality standards 5, whilst another airport did not provide any data at all (Vilnius airport). As part of the above-mentioned quality assurance framework, the PRU coordinates and maintains the remedial action plans with the reporting entities regarding the identified instances of non-compliance with the reporting requirements (i.e. "missing" data). The Union-wide averages of performance indicators are included in this chapter in order to provide a high-level trend. It needs to be acknowledged that the averages may hide significant variances between airports due to local specifics. The respective performance at airport level is detailed in Volume 2 as well as on the PRB online monitoring dashboard 1. The European average for arrival ATFM delay decreased from 0.7 min./arr. in 2012 to 0.6 min./arr. in 2014 (representing a decrease of -19%). What could be deduced from Figure 20 is that the average arrival ATFM delay is at an all-time low since 2008 and that weather conditions remain the major cause of delay, accounting for 69% of arrival ATFM delay in Airport Arrival ATFM Delays (Minutes per Arrival) Reference Period A 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A Other Weather ATC Other Capacity/Staffing Total Figure 20: Airport arrival ATFM delays As depicted in Figure 21, July and October are the months during which the highest level of average arrival ATFM delay (0.7 min./arr.) was experienced in Europe in Nevertheless, the monthly distribution of arrival ATFM delay varies on a yearby-year basis. Indeed, the highest arrival ATFM delay in 2013 occurred in January (1.2 min./arr.) and December (0.9 min./arr.) (c.f. the PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2013). The two major causes of arrival ATFM delay remain weather and capacity/staffing shortages. 34

37 Figure 21: Airport arrival ATFM delay 2014 Breakdown per month The situation at airports may vary significantly due to local circumstances. In 2014, the greatest arrival ATFM delay was experienced at Zurich and London Heathrow airports, with respectively 2.7 and 1.9 min./arr., whilst it was relatively low at Charlesde-Gaulle (0.3 min./arr.). The time series for each airport is reported at the SES Performance Dashboard. The dashboard can be accessed via the PRB website or by clicking on this link Figure 22 shows the most significant changes in arrival ATFM delay observed on the local level throughout RP1. The five most significant improvements in terms of impact on the network have been achieved at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle, Madrid, Oslo, Manchester, and Tenerife. In analogy, as shown in Figure 23, the five most increases in arrival ATFM delay were observed at Brussels, Warsaw, Bergen, London City and Ibiza. Figure 22: Airport ATFM delay Best improvement 35

38 Figure 23: Airport ATFM delay Worst deterioration Both the traffic volume and the level of coordination at each airport are key factors to be considered before drawing conclusions on performance. For example in 2013, with an average arrival ATFM delay of 0.7 min./arr., Paris/Charles-de-Gaulle had a similar impact on the network than Vienna which recorded 1.2 min./arr. ATFM delay on average, because the traffic volume at Charles-de-Gaulle was 1.9 times greater than Vienna s over the same period of time. In absolute terms, the total airport arrival ATFM delay generated at Paris/Charles-de-Gaulle resulted in 158,869 minutes extra time in 2013 compared with 153,171 minutes at Vienna Airport, representing 3 days 22 hours and 58 minutes less When compared to 2012, additional ASMA time remained relatively unchanged across all reporting airports in 2014 with a European average of 1.9 min./arr. (see Figure 24). 2.5 ASMA (Additional Minutes per Arrival) A 2013A 2014A ASMA (Add'l Min per Arrival) % Change -2.8% -5.9% Figure 24: Additional ASMA time The monthly fluctuation of additional ASMA time in 2014 is depicted in Figure 25. December remains the month during which the highest additional ASMA time was recorded in This is probably due to unpredicted adverse weather conditions and snow removal operations at some airports. 36

39 ASMA (Additional Minutes per Arrival) % +15% +10% +5% +0% -5% -10% -15% % Change (vs. Same Month in Previous Year) 0.0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec ASMA (Add'l Min per Arrival) % Change vs % Figure 25: Monthly fluctuation of Additional ASMA time during 2014 (vs 2013) Reflecting local circumstances, the additional ASMA time varied from 0.5 min./arr. at Athens and Milano/Linate airports to 8.6 min./arr. at London Heathrow on average during Additional taxi-out time slightly decreased over RP1, with a European average of 3.1 min./dep., as shown in Figure Additional Taxi-Out Time (Minutes per Departure) Add'l Taxi-Out Time (Min per Departure) 2012A 2013A 2014A % Change -2.1% -6.7% Figure 26: Additional taxi-out time Equally to the other two indicators, Figure 27 shows that additional taxi-out times vary on a seasonal basis. While in 2013, the times in the winter exceeded the times measured during the summer, shows that the peak month for additional taxi-out times in 2014 are June and July (when capacity shortages occurred), as well as December (due to winter conditions: remote de-icing and snow removal operations). 37

40 Figure 27: Monthly fluctuation of Additional taxi-out time during 2014 (vs 2013) Similarly to arrival ATFM delay and additional ASMA time, there were significant local variations in additional taxi-out times, ranging from 1.0 min./dep. at Berlin/Schoenefeld airport to 8.7 min./dep. at London Heathrow. It is recognised at several airports that A-CDM can significantly reduce additional taxi-out time, due to a better predictability. LOCAL LEVEL Table 13 presents the SES performance indicators for airports clustered by traffic volume categories, at the end of RP1. IFR MOVEMENTS PER DAY > ARRIVAL ATFM DELAY ADDITIONAL ASMA TIME Above 2 min./arr. Between 1and 2 min./arr. Above 2 min./arr. Between 1 and 2 min./arr. London Heathrow (EGLL, 1.9 min./arr.) Amsterdam (EHAM, 1.9 min./arr.) Frankfurt (EDDF, 1.3 min./arr.) London Heathrow (EGLL, 8.6 min./arr.) Frankfurt (EDDF, 2.6 min./arr.) Amsterdam (EHAM, 1.4 min./arr.) Munich (EDDM, 1.8 min./arr.) Roma/Fiumicino (LIRF, 1.7 min./arr.) Zurich (LSZH, 2.7 min./arr.) Geneva (LSGG, 1.5 min./arr.) Zurich (LSZH, 3.2 min./arr.) London/Gatwick (EGKK, 3.0 min./arr.) Vienna (LOWW, 2.0 min./arr.) Geneva (LSGG, 2.0 min./arr.) Dusseldorf (EDDL, 1.8 min./arr.) Barcelona (LEBL, 1.9 min./arr.) Copenhagen (EKCH, 1.3 min./arr.) Paris/Orly (LFPO, 1.0 min./arr.) 38

41 IFR MOVEMENTS PER DAY > ADDITIONAL TAXI-OUT TIME Above 4 min./dep. Between 3 and 4 min./dep. London Heathrow (EGLL, 8.7 min./dep.) Paris/Charles-de-Gaulle (LFPG, 3.9 min./dep.) Frankfurt (EDDF, 3.6 min./dep.) Roma/Fiumicino (LIRF, 6.8 min./dep.) Madrid (LEMD, 3.9 min./dep.) London/Gatwick (EGKK, 5.2 min./dep.) Barcelona (LEBL, 3.9 min./dep.) Table 13: Mapping of SES Performance Indicators across Traffic Volumes for As shown in Table 13, London Heathrow remains the most critical airport in Europe from a performance perspective, for both inbound and outbound traffic flows. Despite a smaller traffic volume, a similar low level of performance for inbound operations was recorded at Zurich Airport Averages for the three performance indicators required by the Regulation (EU) N 390/2013 are shown in Figure 28. These averages are weighted and based on airport traffic volume. The Performance Plan level generally matches the State level, and is also aggregated at FAB level for Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on one side (FABEC), and Denmark and Sweden on the other (DK- SE FAB). AVerage delay (Minute per arrival or departure) [a] All RP1 airports below the minimum threshold of 100,000 movements. [b] Data no available or missing partial data. Average Airport ATFM Delay (min/arr) Average Additional ASMA time (min/arr) Average Additional Taxi Out Time (min/dep) Figure 28: Airport capacity performance, State level, The three airport-related indicators are provided per State and/or FAB over RP1 in Table

42 STATE AVERAGE ARRIVAL ATFM DELAY (MIN./ARR.) AVERAGE ADDITIONAL ASMA TIME (MIN./ARR.) AVERAGE ADDITIONAL TAXI- OUT TIME (MIN./DEP.) Austria Bulgaria [a] [a] [a] Cyprus [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Czech Republic Estonia [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Finland Greece Hungary Ireland Italy [b] [b] [b] Latvia [a] [a] [a] Lithuania [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Malta [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Norway [a,b] [a,b] [a,b] [b] [b] [b] Poland [b] [b] [b] Portugal [b] Romania [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Slovak Republic [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Slovenia [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Spain UK [b] [b] [b] DK-SE FAB [b] [b] [b] Denmark Sweden [b] [b] [b] FABEC [a,b] [a,b] [a,b] [b] [b] [b] Belgium France [a,b] [a,b] [a,b] [b] [b] [b] Germany [a,b] [b] [b] [b] Luxembourg [a] [a] [a] [b] [b] [b] Netherlands Switzerland [a] [b] At least one RP1 airport below the minimum threshold of 100,000 movements for ASMA calculation. Data not available or missing partial data for at least one of the indicators. These statistics are based on the SES Dashboard released on 30/03/2015. Please connect to the SES dashboard for updated figures, if required. For predictability purposes, the figures in bold emphasize the airports that experienced a fluctuation by 0.5 minutes or more during RP1. Table 14: Airport capacity indicators Performance Plan Level 40

43 The aggregation and comparison of local ANS performance indicators at airports result in a loss of granularity and detail when presented at a Performance Plan level. Further appreciation of the underlying number of airports and their local characteristics (e.g. traffic volume, cf. Table 13) should be considered when aggregated State/FAB results are compared with each other While the aggregation at Performance Plan level subsumes and balances local inefficiencies of the arrival flow into relatively small or moderate levels (c.f. arrival ATFM delays ranging mostly well below one minute), the prominence of additional taxi-out times is still clearly observable at that level. The threshold of 100,000 movements p.a. for the monitoring of the additional ASMA time indicator makes the appraisal difficult at the Performance Plan level, as the aggregated results hide nuances on the airport level. Details on airport performance are provided in Volume 2 of this report. 4.4 Review of 2013 Recommendations on En-route Capacity Recommendation made in 2013: The PRB advised the EC to request the Member States to immediately review the en-route capacity performance for 2014, including planned capacity levels, implementing remedial actions where necessary, to ensure that their respective ANSPs meet the required level of capacity performance to achieve the Union-wide target of 0.5 minutes ATFM delay per flight for No evidence has been provided to the PRB that this has been done. The PRB advised the EC to remind Member States of their obligation to report on the specific remedial actions being taken with their ANSPs to ensure that the 2014 annual values in their Performance Plans and the union-wide en-route capacity target of 0.5 minutes per flight will be achieved. The PRB is not aware if any official communication was made by the EC to the States in this regard. The PRB advised the EC to request Member States, particularly those States experiencing capacity issues, to review their application of the FUA concept in accordance with the governing principles of FUA as contained in Article 3 of EC Regulation No. 2150/2005, with the aim of meeting the needs of all airspace users. No evidence has been provided to the PRB that this has been acted upon Observation for En-route Capacity In 2014, en-route ATFM delays increased by 15% compared with 2013, while IFR flights increased +1.9%. The Union-wide Capacity KPI for 2014 was 0.61 minutes ATFM delay per flight, which does not meet the target set for 2014: 0.50 minute/flight. This was however well below the levels recorded before RP1 as shown in Figure 5. En-route ATFM delays were concentrated in Cyprus, France, Greece, Poland and Portugal. Recommendation based on the 2014 observations and overall RP1 recommendations can be found in Section 8.7 of this report. 4.6 Review of 2013 Recommendations on Airport Capacity Recommendation made in 2013: The PRB advised the EC to request those States where data deficiencies prevent the calculation of the additional ASMA and/or taxiout time indicators to urgently implement the remedial action plan established by the EUROCONTROL s Performance Review Unit. The airport data flow has been implemented in 2011 in order to monitor and assess ANS performance at airports in RP1, as per Regulation (EU) N 691/2010. Although the situation improved throughout RP1 (see Annex I: Airport data quality issues Progress Report), there 41

44 are still a few cases of substantial non-compliance with the data provision requirements; these cases are explicitly reported in Volume 2. Data completeness and consistency, in particular, are key issues in these cases Observation for Airport Capacity Regarding arrival ATFM delay, Zurich (ZRH) is the only airport with an average above two minutes, while Amsterdam (AMS) and London Heathrow (LHR) are close to this threshold. The European overall average arrival ATFM delay decreased by - 19%. Weather conditions remain the major cause of arrival ATFM delay, accounting for 69% in The European average of additional taxi-out time decreased slightly to 3.0 min./dep. Additional ASMA time showed little variation across all reporting airports in 2014 with a European average of 1.9 min./arrival. There are still a few cases of substantial non-compliance with the data provision requirements regarding airports subject to RP1. A recommendation can be found in Section 8.7 of this report. 42

45 5 Cost-efficiency PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2014 Volume Presentation of the en-route cost-efficiency KPI and targets Under the cost efficiency KPA, Union-wide targets have been set for the average Determined Unit Rate (DUR) for en-route ANS in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (Table 15). The aggregation of the individual national cost-efficiency targets for RP1 as adopted in the National Performance Plans provides for a slightly lower figure for 2012 and higher figures for 2013 and 2014 (Table 16) in comparison to the Union-wide targets. COST EFFICIENCY UNION-WIDE TARGETS Real en-route unit costs per Service Units (in EUR 2009 ) Table 15: En-route cost-efficiency targets for RP1 as per EC Decision on Union-wide targets COST EFFICIENCY DATA FROM NATIONAL PERFORMANCE PLANS Real en-route unit costs per Service Units (in EUR 2009 ) 2012P 2013P 2014P Table 16: En-route cost-efficiency targets for RP1 as per aggregation of national targets 5.2 Actual 2014 unit cost vs. DUR in adopted Performance Plans In order to ensure consistency with the Determined Costs (DCs) data provided in the adopted NPPs and to allow for Union-wide consolidation, actual costs are expressed in real terms ( 2009 prices). Figure 29 below shows that, in 2014, the Union-wide actual en-route unit cost ( ) was -1.3% lower than planned in the NPPs ( ). This is because in 2014 actual en-route costs were -5.7% (or M 2009 ) lower than the DCs in the NPPs (6,304.8 M 2009 ), while the actual number of Total Service Units (TSUs) was -4.5% lower than planned. However the Union-wide actual en-route unit cost ( ) was 0.4% higher than the EU target of set for This report does not include Italy s most recent updates to their final actual costs 2014 data. These updates have no bearing on the cost-efficiency analysis and recommendations contained in this report. 43

46 Actual unit cost vs. DUR in adopted Performance Plans SES States - Data from RP1 national performance plans 2009A 2010A 2011F 2012P 2013P 2014P Real en-route costs (determined costs ) - (in EUR2009) Total en-route Service Units Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) SES States - Actual data from June 2015 Reporting Tables 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A Real en-route costs - (in EUR2009) Total en-route Service Units Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) Difference between Actuals and Planned in absolute value and in percentage (Actuals vs. NPP) Real en-route costs - (in EUR2009) in value in % -3.4% -5.9% -5.7% Total en-route Service Units in value in % -4.5% -5.6% -4.5% Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) in value in % 1.2% -0.2% -1.3% En-route unit costs in 2014 (actual vs. NPP) Index (2009=100) % +1.2% -0.2% -1.3% En-route unit cost / DUR ( 2009) En-route unit costs (NPP, DUR ) En-route unit costs (actual) En-route costs (NPP, DC ) En-route costs (actual) En-route TSU (NPP) En-route TSU (actual) Figure 29: En-route unit costs (actual vs. National Performance Plans) 6 44

47 These results confirm that the Performance Scheme for the cost-efficiency KPA is working as expected with ATSPs taking actions to reduce their costs in response to lower than planned traffic demand (TSUs) so as to preserve (or even increase) their economic surplus (see sub-section 5.6 below). In 2014, in 19 States/Charging zones (CZs) actual traffic was lower than planned (especially Spain Canarias -16.9%, Finland -15.3%, Spain Continental -11.1%, and Austria -10.2%). Of these 19 States/Charging Zones, ten managed to reduce their costs by more than the fall in planned revenue, so that the actual unit costs were lower than planned. From this group, the largest reductions in unit costs against plans were achieved by Denmark ( ), Ireland ( ), Belgium/Luxembourg ( ) and Sweden ( ). The largest increases in the actual unit costs against the DUR adopted in the NPPs were in Spain Canarias ( ), Germany ( ), Italy ( ) and Finland ( ). Although cost reductions were achieved in these four States/Charging Zones, they were not sufficient to compensate for the reduction in en-route TSUs. In ten States/Charging zones, actual traffic was higher than planned (especially Bulgaria +29.5%, Norway +20.5%, and Malta +19.8%). All ten States achieved actual unit costs in 2014 lower than planned as they kept any increases in costs to less than the increase in revenue. For example, although the actual traffic in Bulgaria was +29.5% higher than planned, actual costs were only +1.4% above planned, leading to an actual unit cost lower than planned. 40% 10 30% 20% Malta Norway Bulgaria % 0% -10% -20% -30% Spain Canarias Finland Spain Continental Austria United Kingdom Germany Switzerland Greece Italy Poland Denmark Estonia Czech Republic Sweden Slovenia France Belgium-Luxembourg Ireland Netherlands Portugal Latvia Slovakia Lithuania Romania Cyprus Hungary Difference in costs (in %) Difference in TSUs (in %) Difference in unit cost (in 2009) Difference in unit cost (in 2009) Figure 30: 2014 actual unit costs and service units vs. NPP by charging zone 45

48 5.3 Actual 2014 traffic vs TSUs in adopted Performance Plans (NPPs) In 2014, Union-wide TSUs were -4.5% lower than planned in the adopted NPPs (i.e. within the ±10% alert threshold). At State level: Spain (Canarias & Continental), Finland and Austria exceeded the -10% threshold (see Chapter 6), while four States (Bulgaria, Norway, Malta and Hungary) experienced a traffic increase above the +10% threshold TSUs (millions) % threshold -10% threshold NPP TSUs (+/- 2% deadband; +/-10% threshold) Actual TSUs Figure 31: En-route traffic monitoring (Actual TSU compared to NPP) The traffic risk-sharing arrangements provided in the SES charging Regulation 7 foresee that ATSPs additional (or lost) revenue (in respect of DCs) due to the difference between the actual and the planned TSUs are shared with airspace users (see illustration in Figure 32 below) as follows: For a difference in TSUs falling within the dead band of ± 2%, the additional (or lost) revenue in respect of ATSP DCs is fully retained by the ATSP concerned. Note that Spain has invoked the application of Article 2 of EU Regulation 1191/2010 amending the charging Regulation 1794/2006 and has applied the exemption of the dead band for ENAIRE traffic risk-sharing. The application of this exemption and the Spanish interpretation of this article have not been approved and are under review by the European Commission at the time of drafting this report. For a difference in TSUs falling outside the threshold of ± 10%, the additional (or lost) revenue in respect of ATSP DCs is fully reimbursed (or charged) to the airspace users; For a difference in TSUs falling between the dead band of ± 2% and the threshold of ±10%, the additional (or lost) revenue in respect of ATSP DCs is shared between the ATSPs (30%) and the airspace users (70%). The DCs of the other entities such as States/NSAs/EUROCONTROL and MET Service Providers (which comprise around 10% of the total DCs at Union-wide level) are not subject to traffic risk-sharing and are fully reimbursed (or charged) to the airspace users, irrespective of traffic evolution. 46

49 < - 10 % -2% + 2% + 10 % > 0% Min. 30% 100% 100% Max. 30% 0% Figure 32: Traffic risk-sharing mechanism for the ATSPs The net loss of revenues, due to the lower than planned traffic in 2014, amounts to M As a result of the traffic risksharing arrangements, States/ATSPs bear 39.3% of the loss (135.2 M 2009 ) and airspace users 43.8% (150.4 M 2009 ) of the costs that are subject to traffic risk sharing. Additionally airspace users bear 16.9% (58.1 M 2009 ) which relates to costs not subject to traffic risk-sharing as described in Figure 33: Outcome of 2014 traffic risk-sharing arrangements 5.4 Actual 2014 en-route costs vs. costs in adopted NPPs At Union-wide level, total actual en-route costs in 2014 were M 2009 lower than planned (see Figure 29). Figure 30 above shows that in response to the lower than expected traffic levels, 23 of the 29 States/CZs were able to reduce their 2014 actual costs compared to the DCs adopted in their NPPs. The largest cost reductions compared to the adopted NPP are in Spain Continental (-15.2%) followed by Ireland (-14.4%), United Kingdom (-11.1%) and Denmark (-11.0%). Figure 34 below shows the distribution of the difference between the actual costs and the planned DCs ( M 2009 in 2014) categorised by entity at Union-wide state level and by nature at Union-wide ATSP level. Costs by entity at Union-wide State level ATSP Other ANSPs METSP NSA/EUROCONTROL Total -5.7% -6.0% -6.2% -4.0% -2.2% Costs by nature at Union-wide ATSP level Staff Other operating costs Depreciation Cost of capital Exceptional costs Total -6.0% -4.6% -8.0% -11.6% -1.3% M 2009 Figure 34: Breakdown of 2014 actual en-route costs compared to NPPs (by entity at Union-wide State level and by nature at Union-wide ATSP level) While all entities have contributed to reducing costs, the bulk of the reduction 47

50 (-6.0%) is attributable to the main en-route ATSPs (i.e. the main designated ATSP subject to traffic risk-sharing arrangements). Figure 34 also indicates that savings were achieved by the MET service providers (-6.2%) and by the States/NSAs, including EUROCONTROL Agency costs (-4.0%). 71% ( M 2009 ) of the cost savings achieved by ATSPs in 2014 relate to reductions in staff costs (-4.6%) and other operating costs (-8.0%) categories. Depreciation costs are also significantly lower than planned in the NPPs (-11.6%). As in 2012 and 2013, NSA monitoring reports for 2014 explain that this is mainly due to the postponement of capital expenditures (CAPEX) to future years. This reflects, in some cases, an adjustment to the lower than expected traffic volumes for the RP1 period (-4.9% TSUs) but also temporary delays which are due to technical issues. At this stage, it is not clear whether some investment plans (and associated depreciation costs) presented in the RP1 NPPs might have been overestimated (see Volume 3 - Report on Capital Expenditure 2014). The unit rates charged to airspace users include the planned depreciation costs and cost of capital. It is therefore important that NSAs ensure that airspace users do not pay again in RP2 for the CAPEX projects already charged for in RP1 in cases where these projects were postponed. The cost-sharing mechanism in the SES Regulations provides that, except for costs exempt from this mechanism (see below), the difference between the DCs set in the adopted NPPs and the actual costs for the year shall be retained by the States/ATSPs. Hence, the difference between the DCs and the actual costs for 2014 (359.2 M 2009 ) will be retained by the States/ATSPs as a gain (see Figure 34 above). The costs exempt from cost-sharing are taken into account in the calculation of the ATSP net gain for the 2014 en-route activity that is presented in sub-section 5.5 below. At the time of writing, final figures for the costs that will be reported for exemption in 2014 and allowed by the Commission are not known. Current estimates are that these costs will be relatively low and so do not change the overall conclusions. The PRB is preparing a separate report containing its advice on States RP1 ( ) exempted costs. 5.5 ATSP net gain for the 2014 en-route activity The analysis of the overall economic surplus generated from the en-route activity by an ATSP 8 can be broken down in two main elements: the net ATSP gain/loss on en-route activity; and, the estimated surplus embedded in the cost of capital. Sub-section 5.5 focuses on the first element, the net ATSP gain/loss on en-route activity, which results from the combination of the traffic risk sharing, the cost sharing and the incentives on quality of service generated during the year. An analysis of the overall economic surplus, including the estimated surplus embedded in the cost of capital is provided in sub-section 5.6. The (main) en-route ATSP is the most significant contributor to a State s en-route costs (around 84% of the total cost base) and is the main entity subject to the costs and traffic risk-sharing mechanisms. The analysis of the net ATSP gain/loss focuses on the ATSP en-route activity for It does not consider the cash flow position and liquidity balance at the end of the year as those are impacted by the charging mechanism whereby the eligible under-recoveries (for traffic, etc.) are to be recovered in year N+2 or later. The analysis of the ATSPs results in 2014 shows that, at Union-wide level, the (main) ATSPs of the SES States have generated a net gain for the en-route activity 48

51 5.5.5 of M 2009 (see bottom of Figure 35 below), provided that the reported exemptions from cost-sharing are allowed by the Commission. The net gain referred to in the above paragraph results from the combination of three distinct elements: a gain resulting from the cost-sharing mechanism of M 2009, corresponding to the difference between actual 2014 costs and the determined costs from the adopted NPPs for the (main) ATSPs, and claimed costs exempt from cost-sharing; a net loss resulting from the traffic risk-sharing mechanism of M 2009 for the (main) ATSPs; and a net gain resulting from the financial incentive mechanism for the capacity KPI, amounting to M 2009 (+7.3 M 2009 for ENAV, +5.5 M 2009 for NATS and -2.2 M 2009 for Hungarocontrol 9 ). 49

52 Figure 35: Net gain/loss on 2014 en-route activity for the (main) ATSPs 50

53 5.6 ATSPs actual 2014 overall economic surplus vs. Performance Plans This analysis estimates the economic surplus, comprising the net ATSP gain/loss on en-route activity (see sub-section 5.5 above), and the surplus embedded in the cost of capital. Economic surplus is a useful tool to monitor the financial strength of the ATSPs. Economic surplus is different from the net accounting profit disclosed by the ATSPs in their financial statements. The latter includes revenues and costs relating to the provision of terminal ANS, and other activities (e.g. consultancy services) which are not financed through user charges, as well as revenues and costs pertaining to other years of activity, and is therefore not comparable with the notion of economic surplus. During the Ad hoc Single Sky Committee of 24 October 2014 some States requested further clarification on the economic surplus calculation presented in the PRB Monitoring reports. Accordingly, the PRB provided an information paper on this subject at the SSC55 in January Some States have expressed reservations since the estimated surplus is calculated assuming that the eligible under-recoveries due to traffic shortfall will be charged to users in future years, and this may not be the case for some States, for example Spain (see also (v) below). The overall economic surplus expressed as a percentage of the en-route revenues 10 is not directly comparable to the profit margin that would be calculated from ATSPs financial statements. Furthermore, due to some inconsistencies in the data reported by a few ATSPs, the surplus analysis developed by the PRB is based on certain assumptions (in particular for the share of equity and debt used to calculate the weighted average cost of capital). Based on the information reported by the States, the surplus embedded in the cost of capital in the planning phase is estimated at M 2009 for the 28 main ATSPs, based on a Union-wide level planned asset base of 6,258 M 2009, of which on average 56% is financed through equity at an average (pre-tax) RoE rate of 6.4%. However, when estimating the surplus embedded in the actual cost of capital (251.3 M 2009 based on an actual asset base of 6,283 M 2009 and an actual share of financing through equity of 59%) and adding the net gain/loss generated in respect of the en-route activity in 2014 (see sub-section 5.5 above), the PRB computes that the actual Union-wide overall surplus for 2014 amounts to some M 2009 (see column 2014A in Figure 36 below). When expressed as a percentage of the en-route revenues 10, the actual Union-wide overall surplus reaches 8.4%, which is higher than planned in the NPPs (4.2%). This corresponds to a (weighted average) ex-post actual RoE of 11.8%, which is also higher than planned in the NPPs (6.4%). The actual overall surplus includes the reported exemptions from cost-sharing (i.e. 1.8 M 2009 ) within the ATSP net gain/loss generated in respect of the en-route activity in If these exemptions are not allowed by the Commission, the actual estimated surplus would be slightly lower (i.e M 2009 of the en-route revenues, compared to M 2009 if exemptions are allowed). 51

54 ATSP estimated surplus (' ) 2012P 2012A 2013P 2013A 2014P 2014A Total asset base Estimated proportion of financing through equity (in %) 55.0% 59.9% 55.4% 59.2% 55.9% 58.8% Estimated proportion of financing through equity (in value) Estimated proportion of financing through debt (in %) 45.0% 40.1% 44.6% 40.8% 44.1% 41.2% Estimated proportion of financing through debt (in value) Cost of capital pre-tax (in value) Average interest on debt (in %) 3.8% 3.6% 3.8% 2.9% 3.8% 3.1% Interest on debt (in value) Determined RoE pre-tax rate (in %) 6.4% 6.7% 6.5% 6.7% 6.4% 6.8% Estimated surplus embedded in the cost of capital for en-route (in value) Net ATSP gain(+)/loss(-) on en-route activity Estimated surplus (+/-) for the en-route activity Revenue/costs for the en-route activity Estimated surplus (+/-) in percent of en-route revenue/costs 4.3% 6.4% 4.3% 7.9% 4.2% 8.4% Estimated ex-post RoE pre-tax rate (in %) 6.4% 9.0% 6.5% 11.2% 6.4% 11.8% M NPP Actual NPP Actual NPP Actual % 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% Estimated actual surplus (+/-) for the en-route activity (in value) Estimated surplus embedded in the cost of capital for en-route (in value) Estimated surplus (+/-) in percent of en-route revenue/costs Figure 36: Estimated surplus for en-route activity for the (main) ATSPs at Union-wide level This is an important result since it indicates that in 2014, for a third consecutive year, at Union-wide level, ATSPs succeeded in retaining their (ex-ante) surplus and even increasing it substantially, in a context of significantly lower traffic levels than planned The situation differs at individual ATSP level across the States, as shown in Figure 37 below, depending on the surplus embedded in the determined cost of capital and the net loss (or gain) resulting from the cost and traffic risk-sharing arrangements. Figure 37 shows that 20 of the 28 main ATSPs have succeeded in increasing their surplus in 2014 in percentage terms compared to the NPPs Figure 37 also shows that four ATSPs (LFV, LVNL, PANSA and MATS) have incurred losses and show a negative actual estimated surplus in (i) For LFV, in 2014 the overall estimated surplus is negative by a small amount (-0.1% of the en-route revenues/costs). The surplus embedded in the cost of capital (+3.3 M 2009 ) and the gain to be retained by the ATSP in respect of cost sharing (+0.4 M 2009 ) were not quite sufficient to cover the losses arising from the traffic risk sharing (-3.8 M 2009 ). LFV reported negative costs exempted from cost sharing (relating to pensions) amounting to M If allowed by the Commission, these costs will be returned to airspace users in the following reference period(s). Without this, LFV s estimated surplus for 2014 would be 15.9% of en-route revenues. (ii) In 2014, LVNL actual costs were higher than planned (+8.0% in real terms) while traffic was lower than planned (-1.0%). Taking into account the claimed costs exempt from cost sharing, LVNL generated a net loss of -5.0 M 2009 on en-route activity, some 4.6% of the en-route revenues for This is the third consecutive year that LVNL has incurred a loss on en-route activity. It is important to note that before RP1, LVNL was fully financed through debt and did not have any equity. Therefore there was no return on equity embedded in LVNL determined cost of capital. In order to enable LVNL to cope with the traffic risk sharing arrangements while preserving its financial strength, a mechanism was established to progressively build up equity capital over RP1. Further information on this mechanism can be 52

55 found in the PRB monitoring report for FABEC. (iii) For PANSA, the overall estimated surplus in 2014 is negative at -6.9% of en-route revenues/costs. PANSA actual costs were +3.9% higher than planned, generating a loss of -4.7 M 2009 in respect of cost sharing and traffic was -5.5% lower than planned, resulting in a loss of -3.8 M 2009 in respect of traffic risk sharing. The surplus embedded in the cost of capital amounted to +0.4 M 2009, which was not sufficient to cover the losses. This embedded surplus was much lower than in 2012 and 2013 (3.9 M 2009 and 4.1 M 2009, respectively) due to a lower return on equity (0.3% in 2014, compared to 3.5% in 2012 and 2013). (iv) For MATS, the overall estimated surplus in 2014 is negative at -7.5% of enroute revenues/costs. MATS actual costs were +15.3% higher than planned, due to higher staff costs and capital-related costs, generating a loss of -1.9 M in respect of cost sharing. Traffic was +19.8% higher than foreseen due to the closure of Libyan airspace and diversion of flights through Maltese airspace in the first half of This resulted in a gain of +0.6 M 2009 in respect of traffic risk sharing. However the surplus embedded in the cost of capital (+0.4 M 2009 ) was not sufficient to cover the losses arising from higher costs. (v) As mentioned in above, Spain applied the exemption from the deadband for ENAIRE traffic risk sharing. Thus any gains/losses in the deadband range are not shared and are allocated 100% to users. As a result the loss of M 2009 of the traffic risk sharing mechanism for Spain in 2014 is lower, and therefore impacts positively on ENAIRE s overall estimated surplus of M However, Spain has indicated that their entitlement positive under-recoveries generated due to traffic risk sharing mechanism, now foreseen to be recovered in the last 2 years of RP2 and in RP3, based on the June 2015 Reporting tables, may not be finally charged to users in future years. If this is finally the case, the genuine value of the economic surplus over RP1 would significantly lower For completeness, the estimated surplus of the main ATSPs for each year of RP1 is shown in Annex II: Estimated economic surplus for the en-route activity for the main ATSPs. A detailed analysis at State/Charging zone level and for each (main) ATSP is provided in the companion Volume 2. 53

56 Spain (AENA) United Kingdom (NATS) Ireland (IAA) Hungary (HungaroControl) Austria (Austro Control) Bulgaria (BULATSA) Denmark (NAVIAIR) Cyprus (DCAC Cyprus) Portugal (NAV Portugal) Belgium-Luxembourg (Belgocontrol) Czech Republic (ANS CR) Switzerland (Skyguide) Romania (ROMATSA) Lithuania (Oro Navigacija) Latvia (LGS) Slovakia (LPS) Estonia (EANS) Italy (ENAV) Greece (HCAA) Slovenia (Slovenia Control) France (DSNA) Germany (DFS) Finland (Finavia) Norway (Avinor) Sweden (LFV) Netherlands (LVNL) Poland (PANSA) Malta (MATS) -7% -7% -5% 0% 4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2% 0% 4% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7% 9% 8% 9% 8% 7% 7% 9% 7% 7% 8% 11% 10% 10% 10% 11% 14% 13% 12% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 12% 15% 15% 17% 18% 18% Estimated actual surplus in percentage of the en-route costs/revenue. (in respect of en-route activity 2014 for the main ATSPs) Estimated determined surplus from adopted NPPs in percentage of the en-route costs/revenue (in respect of en-route activity 2014 for the main ATSPs) Figure 37: Estimated surplus for the 2014 en-route activity for the main ATSPs 5.7 Union-wide 2014 actual costs and unit cost for users ( True en-route costs for users ) This sub-section analyses the actual en-route unit cost for airspace users in respect of ANS activities in 2014 (also referred to as the true cost for users ). Note that the true cost for users is different from the cost charged during RP1 due to the adjustments foreseen in the performance 4 and charging 7 Regulations. In this context, the true costs are a better reflection of the cost-efficiency performance from an airspace user s point of view. This section attempts to quantify the true costs in respect of ANS activities carried out in 2014 which comprise: the amounts that have already been charged to the users through the 2014 unit rates, and; the different adjustments relating to 2014 activities which will be charged or reimbursed to users in future years. 54

57 5.7.4 Annex IV: Union-wide 2014 actual costs and unit cost for users ( True en-route costs for users )Table 30 (in Annex IV, p.89) presents more detailed information on the calculation of the figures discussed below. It should be noted that the PRB computation of the true costs for users does not comprise the risk associated with exchange rates linked to the billing of the chargeable unit rate. The unit rate charged to airspace users is established in national currency but billed in Euros using the current exchange rate. In case of exchange rate fluctuations, the actual costs paid by airspace users will be higher or lower than planned. 55

58 The amount relating to the 2014 activities which has already been charged through the 2014 unit rate is 5,955.5 M It corresponds to the DCs (after deduction of costs for exempted VFR and of other revenues) that have been billed in 2014 according to the actual traffic. The additional amount relating to the 2014 activities which will be billed to users through future years unit rates is M 2009 and is broken down as follows: inflation adjustment: M 2009 ; adjustments resulting from the implementation of traffic risk-sharing (ATSP): M 2009 ; adjustments resulting from the difference in traffic (for costs not subject to traffic risk-sharing): M 2009 ; bonuses and penalties arising from incentives: M 2009 ; the net amount of costs exempt from cost-sharing (if deemed eligible by EC): M The main driver for the adjustments to be billed to users is related to the traffic shortfall in 2014 compared to what was planned in the NPP (actual TSUs were -4.5% lower than planned). As a result, the true costs for users for 2014 are estimated at 6,115.9 M 2009, which is M 2009 (or -2.1%) lower than the amounts that were forecasted to be charged for 2014 activities on the basis of the RP1 PPs (6,245.7 M 2009,). Based on the actual traffic, it is computed that the actual unit cost incurred by users for the en-route activity in 2014 is (see Annex IV: Union-wide 2014 actual costs and unit cost for users ( True en-route costs for users ) for details). So, while States/ATSPs collectively reduced their 2014 costs in line with lower revenues and managed to increase their economic surplus, airspace users will end up incurring a higher actual unit cost ( ) than the one incurred by the States ( , see Figure 29 above). 5.8 Presentation of the terminal ANS (TANS) cost-efficiency PI Under the cost-efficiency KPA, TANS costs and unit rates for RP1 are to be monitored. The aggregation of the TANS costs from the NPPs is shown in Table 17 below. Due to the non-uniform application of the formula for calculating the terminal unit rates before the charging Regulation 7 requirements for 2015, it is not possible to provide an aggregation or consolidation of a Union-wide unit cost for TANS services. SES States - Data from RP1 national performance plans 2012P 2013P 2014P Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Table 17: TANS cost-efficiency performance indicator for RP1 56

59 5.9 Actual 2014 TANS costs vs. forecast in adopted NPPs SES States - Data from RP1 national performance plans 2012P 2013P 2014P Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) SES - Actual data from June 2015 Reporting Tables 2012A 2013A 2014A Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Difference between Actuals and Planned in absolute value and in percentage (Actuals vs. NPP) Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) in value in% -5.5% -8.6% -8.6% Table 18: 2014 TANS actual costs vs. NPPs In 2014, large savings were achieved in Spain (actual costs were M 2009 lower than forecast in the NPP), Italy (-23.7 M 2009 ), the UK (-22.1 M 2009 ), Germany (-12.7 M 2009 ) and France (-12.1 M 2009 ). A further 16 States achieved smaller savings in Terminal ANS costs were higher than planned for seven States, with the largest deviations observed for Norway (+5.5 M 2009 ) and Romania (+4.0 M 2009 ). More details are provided in Figure 38 below Norway, 5.5 Romania, 4.0 Switzerland, 1.9 Poland, 1.9 Lithuania, 0.6 Slovakia, 0.3 Estonia, 0.0 M Cyprus, 0.0 Slovenia, -0.3 Bulgaria, -0.7 Finland, -0.9 Malta, -1.0 Portugal, -1.1 Actual terminal ANS costs vs. NPP (M 2009) Netherlands, -2.1 Belgium-Luxembourg, -2.5 Latvia, -2.6 Czech Republic, -2.7 Ireland, -3.6 Hungary, -3.9 Denmark, -4.2 Sweden, -5.2 Austria, -6.7 Greece, -7.1 France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Figure 38: 2014 TANS actual costs vs. NPP at State level 5.10 Actual 2014 gate-to-gate ANS costs vs. forecast in adopted NPPs SES States - Data from RP1 national performance plans 2012P 2013P 2014P Real en-route costs (determined costs ) - (in EUR2009) Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Real gate-to-gate ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Share of en-route costs in gate-to-gate ANS costs 80.9% 81.1% 81.0% SES States - Actual data from June 2015 Reporting Tables 2012A 2013A 2014A Real en-route costs - (in EUR2009) Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Real gate-to-gate ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Share of en-route costs in gate-to-gate ANS costs 81.3% 81.6% 81.5% Difference between Actuals and Planned in absolute value and in percentage (Actuals vs. NPP) Real gate-to-gate ANS costs - (in EUR2009) in value in% -3.8% -6.4% -6.2% Table 19: 2014 gate-to-gate ANS actual costs vs. NPPs 57

60 Total Union-wide gate-to-gate ANS costs in 2014 were -6.2% lower than the costs presented in the adopted NPPs (7,294 M 2009 compared with 7,780 M 2009 ). Actual 2014 en-route costs accounted for 81.5% of gate-to-gate ANS costs, a similar proportion to that foreseen in the NPPs (81.0%) In other words, at Union-wide level, there was no evidence of an increasing share of TANS costs over RP1, given that these costs are not subject to the DCs method (except for France) Review of 2013 Recommendations on the Cost-Efficiency Recommendation made in 2013: The PRB advised the EC to request the States to reconsider downwards the levels of Determined Costs in the early years of RP2 in the light of the actual performance achieved in 2013, for both the en-route and terminal charging zones. In 2014, at the time of drawing up and consulting the RP2 PPs and associated targets, several States have reconsidered downwards their starting point level. This point was also carefully considered by the PRB during the assessment phase of the RP2 cost-efficiency targets in the second part of 2014, leading in several instances to specific recommendations for revision of the targets observations for Cost-Efficiency was the third year of RP1 in which SES en-route ATSPs were subject to risksharing arrangements aimed at incentivising ATPSs economic performance The results for 2014 confirm that the Performance Scheme is working as intended. In 2014, en-route traffic (Service Units) was -4.5% lower than planned. In response, States/ATSPs reduced their en-route costs by -5.7% or M 2009, the third successive year in which actual costs were lower than planned costs. This which resulted in a Union-wide actual unit cost of 54.13, -1.3% lower than in the adopted NPPs ( 54.84) but 0.4% higher than the Union-wide target for 2014 of Lower staff, operating and depreciation costs were the biggest contributors to the lower costs In 2014 most ATSPs maintained and even improved the economic surplus generated from the en-route activity. At Union-wide level, the overall economic surplus amounted to M 2009 which represents 8.4% of en-route revenue 10, compared to 4.2% planned in the NPPs In 2014, the true costs incurred by airspace users (taking account of adjustments to be billed in future years) are estimated to be 6,115.9 M 2009, which is lower than planned. However, based on the actual traffic, the airspace users will end up paying a higher unit cost ( ) than the incurred by the States. The difference mainly reflects traffic risk-sharing from the lower than planned traffic. 58

61 6 Capital expenditure (CAPEX) 6.1 Introduction The analysis of ANSPs investment has been performed on the basis of limited information collected from the Member States through the CAPEX part of the 2014 monitoring reports. Taking into account that all the ANSPs did not provide adequate investment information, the analysis cannot be considered to be exhaustive. Moreover, it does not validate the ANSPs individual investments, as this is a State/NSA responsibility. The actual 2014/RP1 CAPEX reported in June 2015 has been assessed against CAPEX planned in the adopted RP1 NPPs, while evaluating its coherence with the European ATM Master Plan. The detailed review at EU, FAB and State levels was delivered to the Commission and has not been published at the time of writing this report. 7 Alert thresholds 7.1 Union-wide level Article 18 of the performance Regulation (Regulation (EU) N 691/2010) defines specific mechanisms to handle exceptional situations occurring in Reference Periods. These alert mechanisms can be triggered in Reference Periods at both Union-wide level and local level when new, unforeseeable circumstances occur that are both insurmountable and outside the control of the States, or when alert threshold(s) are reached at EU level. If these cases occur, the following steps will be taken at Union-wide level: the Commission will review the situation in consultation with the States through the SSC and provide proposals for appropriate actions within three months, which may include the revision of the Union-wide performance targets and, in consequence, a revision of the national or FAB performance targets. Two alert thresholds were defined in Commission Decision of 21 February 2011 (2011/121/EU) setting the Union-wide performance targets and alert thresholds for the provision of ANS for the years : a deviation over a calendar year by at least 10% of actual traffic expressed in enroute service units compared to a planned figure defined in the Commission Decision (114,610,000 in 2014) ( traffic alert threshold, applicable to all key performance indicators); a deviation over a calendar year by at least 10% of actual costs compared to determined costs with reference determined costs forecasted at Union-wide level in the Commission Decision (6,179 M 2009 for 2014) ( cost alert threshold, applicable to the cost-efficiency indicator) The PRB has assessed the 2014 traffic data and has concluded that the traffic alert threshold of ±10% has not been reached at Union-wide level. Actual en-route Service Units in 2014 were 109,836,771 i.e. -4.2% lower than the planned 2014 value in Article 3(1) of the Commission Decision (see Figure 39). 59

62 En-Route Service Units ('000) SU (EC Decision on RP1 EU-wide targets) SU Actual Figure 39: En-route service units at Union-wide level The PRB has assessed the 2014 actual cost data reported by each State and has concluded that the cost alert threshold of ±10% has not been reached at Union-wide level. Actual en-route costs in 2014 were 5,946 M 2009, i.e. -3.8% lower than the 2014 value in Article 3(1) of the Commission Decision (Figure 40). Therefore, neither of the alert thresholds at Union-wide level was reached in Determined costs (M 2009) DC (EC Decision on RP1 EU-wide targets) DC Actual Figure 40: En-route determined costs and actual costs at Union-wide level 7.2 Local level According to Article 18(3), States may decide to apply different alert thresholds than the Union-wide at local level. In this case, they shall describe and justify them in their Performance Plan. So far, no States have reported specific alert thresholds therefore the same thresholds (±10%) apply at national (or FAB) level, as compared with the traffic and cost forecasts contained in each Performance Plan. 60

63 7.2.3 Figure 41 presents the proportional difference between actual and planned Service Units for each State in % En-Route Service Units (Actual vs. Plan) +20% +10% +0% -10% -20% 29.5% 20.5% 19.8% 10.1% 8.5% 4.3% 4.3% 2.6% 0.2% 0.0% -1.0% -2.0% -2.5% -2.9% -3.1% -3.2% -4.3% -4.3% -4.6% -5.5% -8.3% -8.4% -8.8% -9.3% -9.6% -10.2% -12.0% -15.3% -30% Bulgaria Norway Malta Hungary Cyprus Romania Lithuania Slovakia Latvia Portugal Netherlands Ireland Belgium-Lux. France Slovenia Sweden Czech Rep. Estonia Denmark Poland Italy Greece Switzerland Germany UK Austria Spain Finland Traffic Sharing Band Dead Band En-Route Service Units (Actual vs. Plan) Figure 41: 2014 En-route actual Service Units versus NPP by State Figure 41 shows that Bulgaria (+29.5%), Norway (+20.5%), Malta (+19.8), Hungary (+10.1%) experienced a traffic increase, in 2014, above the +10% threshold. Finland (-15.3%), Spain (-12.0%) and Austria (-10.2%) reached the traffic alert threshold with a decrease below -10%. In line with Article 18(2) of the performance Regulation 4 and taking the considerations outlined above into account, the relevant NSAs have been invited to review the traffic situation by liaising with the Commission. Due to the fact that 2014 is the last year of RP1, in 2014 the planning activity was focused on RP2 and as a result none of them has proposed a revised RP1 NPP. Figure 42 presents the proportional difference between actual and planned Determined Costs for each State in 2014 (expressed in 2009 ). 61

64 +20% En-Route Determined Costs (Actual vs. Plan) +15% +10% +5% +0% -5% -10% -15% -20% -14.4% -14.0% -11.1% -11.0% -9.9% -9.8% -9.6% -8.9% -7.9% -6.7% -5.4% -4.5% -4.1% -4.0% -3.7% -3.1% -3.1% -2.2% -2.2% -1.1% -0.3% -0.1% 0.9% 1.4% 2.1% 4.1% 7.1% Ireland Spain UK Denmark Austria Greece Sweden Hungary Belgium-Lux. Switzerland Finland Estonia Portugal France Slovenia Czech Rep. Latvia Germany Lithuania Italy Cyprus Slovakia Romania Bulgaria Netherlands Poland Norway Malta 15.5% ER Determined Costs (Actual vs. Plan) Figure 42: 2014 En-route actual costs versus determined costs by State Ireland (-14.4%), Spain (-14.0%), United Kingdom (-11.1%), and Denmark (-11.0%) have lower costs that planned that exceeded the -10% threshold in On the other hand, Malta is above the +10% threshold i.e % higher cost than planned. For cost-efficiency, the PRB notes that the ±10% traffic alert threshold corresponds to the outer bands of the traffic risk-sharing mechanism defined in Article 11a of the charging Regulation (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1794/2006). Therefore, if traffic is below -10% (or respectively above +10%), all losses exceeding -10% (or respectively all gains exceeding +10%) may be recovered from (or shall be returned to) airspace users through an adjustment of the chargeable unit rate in n+2. 62

65 8 Monitoring of performance over RP1 ( ) 8.1 Background The Performance scheme (PS) including performance targets and incentives was introduced by the second package of Single European Sky legislation (SES II) adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 21 October The first Reference Period (RP1: ) was implemented under Regulation (EU) 691/2010. This has now been replaced by Regulation (EU) 390/2013, which is applicable for the second Reference Period (RP2: ). 8.2 Goals of the SES II Performance Scheme The stated objectives of the SES Performance Scheme are to contribute to the sustainable development of the air transport system by improving overall efficiency of the air navigation services across the key performance areas of safety, environment, capacity and cost-efficiency, in consistency with those identified in the Performance Framework of the ATM Master Plan, all having regard to the overriding safety objectives. The main goal 11 was to drive ANS performance towards greater efficiency while ensuring safety and minimising: unnecessary costs to implement the Performance Scheme; unintended consequences and undesired behaviours resulting from inappropriate application of the Performance Scheme; regulatory risks (e.g. uncertainty about outcomes, proliferation of different models leading to less transparency, more complexity for users and EC/PRB); the burden on NSAs, given likely low capabilities in the short run; and, the burden on airspace users to simultaneously engage in consultations. The SES II Performance Scheme was also intended to be operationally and economically viable: costs for performance review have to be seen in the light of expected economic benefits for airspace users or passengers, and safety/environmental benefits to society. 8.3 Key Principles of the SES II Performance Scheme The Performance Scheme was designed to be: Acceptable for stakeholders; (i) Non-discriminatory among users (ii) Fair allocation of risks between parties while taking business realities into account Transparent for stakeholders (local, regional and European levels); Able to drive ANSPs behaviour (i.e. focus on main outcomes) so as to significantly improve performance at European and national/fab levels; Simple to administer (compliance costs much lower than benefits); Workable (drive efficiency while considering business realities); Predictable and financially stable (i.e. limit uncertainty and regulatory risks) Predictable in terms of ANS unit charges for airspace users Provide a stable regulatory environment. 63

66 8.4 Overview of the first reference period of the Performance Scheme RP1 is the first Reference Period in the implementation of the SES Performance Scheme and Charging scheme. Considering the tight implementation schedule, the complex nature of the ANS system, the absence of prior experience and the magnitude of change for all stakeholders, RP1 can be considered as a transition and learning period, with more ambitious targets and stricter rules applying from RP2 onwards. The duration of RP1 was limited to three years, so as to limit the transition period while allowing sufficient time for targets and incentives to operate. This was a pragmatic decision. The experience gained in RP1 was used to update the performance Regulation 4 and to set the RP2 performance targets. Performance targets set for RP1 were relatively ambitious considering the absence of prior experience. In a context of increasing traffic (some +15% forecast from 2009 to 2014), capacity was to improve even faster so as to reduce en-route ATFM delays below the best-ever achieved levels (target of 0.5 minute/flight in 2014), flightefficiency was to improve faster than traffic so as to ensure carbon neutrality of ANS already during RP1 11, and costs were to be kept nearly unchanged, leading to a significant decrease in unit costs (some -13% vs. 2009). In fact, RP1 started with a challenge. Instead of forecast growth, traffic dropped significantly in 2012 (-3%) and remained below plans over the duration of RP1, albeit within the alert threshold at EU level (±10%). This made it easier to reach the capacity target and ensure carbon neutrality of ANS, but much more difficult to meet the cost-efficiency targets. This was even more difficult as full cost recovery was replaced by determined costs and incentives for ANSPs to manage the traffic and costs risks. A key learning point is the need for ANS to be able to respond flexibly and efficiently to unforeseen events. In this context, here are the main performance outcomes over RP1: There was no fatal accident with ANS contribution since 2011 in the SES area. En-route ATFM delay reached the best levels ever recorded in 2013 (0.53 minute per flight), although the target set for 2014 (0.5 minute per flight) was not achieved. The Flight-efficiency KPI improved slower than target (but faster than traffic). The cost-efficiency target for 2014 was outperformed compared to the adopted targets arising from the NPPs. Providers responded to lower revenue than planned arising from traffic downturn and cut their costs so as to maintain or improve their margins. The risk sharing and incentive mechanism proved to work as intended. Given the circumstances, both the regulatory framework and results achieved during RP1 can be considered as relatively satisfactory, even if not perfect. RP1 has provided a lot of experience, which should be used to further improve the Performance Scheme and Charging Regime, and drive European ANS performance much further, while minimising associated risks. Much remains however to be done. At the consultation on SES strategy in May 2015, the Commission quoted the following key remaining issues: Opaqueness in safety; Fragmentation of ANS; Monopolies, little competition, oversight; 64

67 High ANS unit cost; Lack of flexibility of labour intensive industry; Institutional, legal & decision making issues. 8.5 Safety KPA OVERVIEW Back in 2010 it was deemed that setting targets on safety in RP1 was premature and that a period of performance monitoring would be required first. A harmonised safety assessment mechanism had to be established in order to allow for a uniform basis for the assessment of ANS safety performance in Europe. Safety maturity and the application of just culture had to be ensured and harmonisation in the identification and classification of risk to be achieved, before an acceptable level of Safety could be set for the European system. RP1 was therefore always considered as a transitional period in the Performance Scheme with greater improvement expected in RP2 (introducing also target setting) and subsequent Reference Periods Nevertheless, progress made in safety performance so far in RP1 is noteworthy and good results were achieved during the period However, there is still room for improving safety performance levels overall and hence specific safety targets are being set for RP2. These will help the change management process by identifying and managing safety risks through reporting and monitoring systems In terms of ANS-related accidents and serious incidents (lagging safety indicators), ANS safety performance improved over the past seven years, however, there has not been a measurable improvement (nor degradation) within the reference period itself. The negative effect of performance Regulation 4 on safety that was feared by some did not materialise The rate of ANS-contribution to accidents and serious incidents significantly decreased over the six year period and RP1, which could indicate that the ANS sector improved at managing risks that directly relate to the service provided Leading safety indicators show a continuous improvement over RP1 in the implementation of safety management (Figure 43) and in the application of the severity classification scheme for each type of three occurrences in the PS scope (Figure 44). In addition, the level of presence and corresponding level of absence of Just Culture at both States and ANSPs level shows constant improvement over RP1. Figure 43: Effectiveness of Safety Management for States and ANSPs in RP1 65

68 Severity Classification (RAT Methodology) 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 64% 83% 82% 46% 65% 60% 49% 69% 82% 36% 51% 66% 66% 61% 52% Ground Overall Ground Overall Overall Separation Minima Infringements Runway Incursions ATM Specific Occurrences Figure 44: 2014 EU averages for severity assessment using RAT methodology There were no Union-wide safety targets for RP1. However, in RP2 the Performance Scheme introduces Union-wide targets on safety for two safety indicators: Effectiveness of Safety Management and application of severity classification Based on information provided during the 2014 monitoring exercise and the introduction of the second metric for EoSM (EoSM Maturity Level) it is possible to give an overview of achievements in implementation of safety management, both at State and ANSP levels, in view of RP2 safety targets set for Note: The results of EoSM in RP2 will be measured both in terms of EoSM Maturity Score and in terms of Maturity Level. The Overall Score gives a high level overview of the organisation s SMS and it shows whether overall the State or service provider are mostly managing performance or it is still in the process of implementing the mandatory regulations and achieving the minimum standards of maturity. However, as this score may hide particular problems in certain areas as the methodology averages the scores by each of five EoSM safety Components (introducing a smoothing effect) and in order to identify whether the State or service provider still has a significant problem in at least one area (i.e. safety Component) the Maturity Level view is more appropriate RP2 EoSM FAB results are calculated using EoSM minimum/lowest level achieved principle (lowest level achieved of each Component (both at the State and ANSP level) is calculated as the lowest level of all questions within that Component; similarly this principle is then also applied at FAB level as the RP2 Union-wide targets for safety are set at FAB level) By applying the lowest level achieved principle in scoring at FAB level it is expected to encourage the States and the ANSPs with lower score to achieve the higher scores within the FAB in order not to reduce the overall FAB score Two tables below show the current results of achieved FAB EoSM minimum/lowest levels for all States (based on self-assessment) and their ANSPs. 66

69 EoSM State level (FAB EoSM minimum level achieved) Safety Policy Risk Management Safety Assurance Safety Promotion Safety Culture 2019 RP2 Targets C C C C C 2014 Results Baltic FAB B B B B B Blue Med FAB A C B B B DANUBE FAB B B C B B DK-SE FAB B B B A A FAB CE A B A A A FABEC A A A A B NEFAB B B B B B SW FAB A A B A B UK-IR FAB C C D C B Table 20: EoSM State level (end of RP1 vs RP2 targets) EoSM ANSP level (FAB EoSM minimum level achieved) Safety Policy Risk Management Safety Assurance Safety Promotion Safety Culture 2019 RP2 Targets D D D D C 2014 Results Baltic FAB C D C C C Blue Med FAB C D C C C DANUBE FAB D D C C C DK-SE FAB* D C D C D FAB CE* C D C C C FABEC B D C C C NEFAB C C C C C SW FAB** C D C C C UK-IR FAB* D D D C D Table 21: EoSM ANSP level (end of RP1 vs RP2 targets) * calculated including only ANSPs that are within the scope of RP2 as indicated in the FAB RP2 Performance Plans (more information provided in Volume 4) ** to be taken with caution as NAV Portugal did not provide results for 2014 and new ANSP within RP2 (Ferronats) was not monitored in RP1, hence results are not available The comparison of the current achievements (end of RP1) and the RP2 targets for application of severity classification using RAT methodology is not possible due to a different scope of the RAT application in RP1 and RP2 (i.e. minimum number of ATM movements criteria and reportable severity scope has been changed) Overall, the PRB believes that safety performance is about managing risk - and feels that safety management systems, safety plans and safety cultures can still be significantly improved by national Just Culture programmes, as well as by Community-wide initiatives The PRB recognises that efforts will be required within most States and ANSPs during RP2 in order to reach safety targets. Safety should continue to have primacy and should never be compromised whilst trying to achieve a target in a different KPA. 67

70 RECOMMENDATIONS Improvements are made in implementation of safety management at both the State and ANSP level, however States still show that their implementation of safety management principles are below that of ANSPs EASA audits only reaffirm the message that establishing strong safety oversight systems is a necessary first step to ensure the successful transition to improved safety management. Hence, safety strategies must have the ability to consider the varying maturity levels of State s safety oversight systems States that have not yet effectively implemented the eight critical elements of a safety oversight system must first resolve these deficiencies and develop a sound foundation upon which to build their State Safety Programmes (SSPs). Only those States having mature safety oversight systems will be able to realise the benefits associated with safety management principles, and achieve further improvements in safety performance overall Therefore, the PRB advises the Commission to closely monitor safety management implementation levels in the early years of RP2, especially in light of the requirement to meet EoSM targets by the end of There have been consistent improvements in the application of RAT severity methodology over the course of RP1. The PRB advises the Commission to closely monitor the application of severity classification in the early years of RP2, especially in light of the requirement to meet severity classification targets by the end of The completeness of data received through AST mechanism, continues to be a concern. Lack of completeness of various safety information, as a consequence, diminishes the capability of safety analysis at European level. Therefore the PRB recommends that States improve the completeness of data reported to them via their national occurrence reporting schemes, such that the data reported to the Performance Scheme also improves With regards to the reporting by States and their ANSPs the level of presence and corresponding level of absence of JC, the PRB notes that some improvements in the reporting of the level of JC have been made. The PRB recommends that States devote the necessary investment to the effective implementation of the JC, especially in view of RP2 and necessary coordination at FAB level. 68

71 8.6 Environment KPA PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2014 Volume 1 HORIZONTAL FLIGHT EFFICIENCY BASED ON LAST FILED FLIGHT PLAN In 2010, the Performance Review Body consulted widely on setting an RP1 target for en-route flight efficiency in the range between 0.6 to 0.8 percentage points improvement to the baseline additional distance of 5.42% in Following the comments of interested stakeholders, the PRB recommended setting a Union-wide en-route flight efficiency target based on the last filed flight plan of 0.75 percentage points improvement The Commission Decision (2011/121/EU) set down the European Union-wide performance targets and alert thresholds for the years 2012 to The environment target was set as: an improvement by 0,75 of a percentage point of the average horizontal en-route flight efficiency indicator in 2014 as compared to the situation in The preference of the PRB and many stakeholders was to use the actual trajectory to monitor environmental performance; however, the absence of consistent position reporting across the SES States meant that this was impossible to implement. Therefore the last filed flight plan was selected as a proxy for the actual trajectory, and the PRB agreed to work with stakeholders to ensure that the actual trajectory would be used for the second reference period The PRB proposals for Union-wide performance targets noted that there was no legal requirement for States/FABs to set any environmental performance target for RP1. The body responsible for NMD functions (which subsequently became the Network Manager) should be the owner of the union-wide target for environment. However, this body could not be held legally accountable for achieving the union-wide target in RP1, as airspace design and use remain State responsibilities The Route Network Design function and the ATFM function carried out by the Network Manager (NM) directly support the achievement of this flight efficiency target The NM in 2013 established a dedicated Flight Efficiency Initiative to work closely with aircraft operators, including the pro-active suggestion of improved routings when available Of the 0.75% improvement targeted between 2009 and 2014, 0.55% was planned by the Network Manager for the RP1 period (0.10% in 2012, 0.20% in 2013 and 0.25% in 2014). The actual improvement was equal to 0.28% (0.03% in 2012, 0.04% in 2013 and 0.21% in 2014) In the NM annual report 2014 (page 13), the Network Manager explains that [t]he target was missed mainly due to longer routes being planned because of: The general crisis situation in Ukraine; Closure/avoidance of Libyan, Syrian and Iraqi airspace Capacity shortfalls during the ATC strikes; Traffic composition; scenarios applied due to capacity problems in the network; special events. Although the targeted improvement was not achieved in each of the three years, the one which was closest was the most ambitious and the most recent one. This shows the effect of useful initiatives taken by the NM, possibly with a lag in the implementation or in the expected outcome. 69

72 Figure 45 shows the recorded horizontal flight efficiency figures for the period and a projection towards the RP2 target. Since the 2014 target was missed, greater effort will be required in RP2 to achieve the flight efficiency target of 4.10% by Figure 45: Evolution of horizontal flight efficiency during RP1 and projection towards 2019 target UTILISATION OF CONDITIONAL ROUTES YEAR Aircraft Planning on CDR 1 74% 73% 70% Aircraft Planning on CDR 2 64% 66% 63% Table 22: CDR FPL Use by aircraft Table 22 shows that the rate of uptake of CDRs has been relatively static over the period This could be explained by several reasons: civil military authorities may not be making the CDRs available when there is actual demand; aircraft operators may not know when CDRs are available, or may for business reasons simply prefer not to fly on them; CDRs availability may not be coordinated across national regional boundaries making individual segments unusable despite being available. The PRB understands that work continues between all stakeholders, including Network Manager, ANSPs, military authorities, aircraft operators and computer flight plan service providers to focus on each of the areas highlighted above The PRB is fully aware that as Free Route Airspace is implemented across the Network, the monitoring of CDR planning and CDR usage becomes more and more irrelevant. Aircraft are no longer constrained to the limits of ATS routes, including conditional routes, but are able to plan individual trajectories that meet their business objectives in terms of fuel burn and flight efficiency The PRB considers that the focus in the future should be on monitoring whether or not the national/regional civil and military authorities manage the airspace effectively, in terms of capacity and flight efficiency, to meet the needs of civil and military users. 70

73 EFFECTIVENESS OF BOOKING PROCEDURES FOR FUA Evolution of Usage of Pre-tactically Booked Airspace from STATE STATE Austria 38% No info 66% Lithuania (a) (a) (a) Belgium 54% 25% 69% Luxembourg (a) (a) (a) Bulgaria 40% No info 39% Malta (a) (a) (a) Cyprus (a) 100% No info The Netherlands 90% 89% 88% Czech Republic 38% 35% 40% Norway 44% 46% 47% Denmark 58% 42% 17% Poland 48% 44% 45% Estonia No info No info No info Portugal (a) (a) (a) Finland 23% 22% 27% Romania 41% 49% 62% France 64% 54% 63% Slovakia 25% 26% 57% Germany 37% 45% 52% Slovenia 72% 41% 51% Greece No info No info No info Spain No info 58% 37% Hungary 33% 21% 30% Sweden 100% 96% 42% Ireland (a) No info No info Switzerland 69% 74% 59% Italy 48% 42% 44% United Kingdom 30% 33% 40% Latvia 7% 18% 30% Table 23: Usage of Pre-tactically booked airspace (a) These States reported that the allocation and activation of military areas had no adverse impact, either on available ATC capacity, or on route options for general air traffic. No info refers either to no data being provided or insufficient data to calculate the KPI The huge variation across the States in the figures for the usage of pre-tactically booked airspace can be due to many factors: After internal review, States may be reporting on a greatly different selection of areas than they did in 2012; States may be monitoring the actual use of airspace more closely than was previously the case; States may have revised national booking procedures to only book airspace when there is a need; States may have decided that there is no capacity or flight efficiency issue and that they have no objective to improve airspace booking procedures, etc However, it is of concern to the PRB that several States either do not provide any information (Greece), or provide only partial information which means that the KPI cannot be monitored (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia) Furthermore, since the PRB accepts that some States may not be adversely impacted by military operations and training, e.g. Malta, Luxembourg, it would appreciate if the Commission could confirm that such States may discharge their reporting requirements simply by providing the PRB with a statement to that effect. 71

74 RECOMMENDATIONS In order to meet the horizontal flight efficiency target set for the end of RP2, the gap between the actual and targeted performance at the end of RP1 will also have to be recovered. As a consequence, the PRB recommends that the Network Manager continues and expands those activities that have led to improvements in horizontal flight efficiency of the last filed flight plan To improve consistency in reporting on civil military airspace structures, across the states, and to enhance civil military cooperation and coordination, it is important to quantify and qualify the impact of the allocation of individual segregated / restricted areas on the provision of ANS to general air traffic (GAT). The PRB recommends that the EC requests the States to review the impact of allocating or activating individual restricted or segregated areas on either the available ATC capacity, or on the availability of route options within the relevant airspace; To improve consistency in reporting on civil military airspace structures, and to reduce the reporting burden on States, it is desirable to ensure that all impacting areas are included whilst simultaneously excluding those areas that have no impact on the provision of ANS to general air traffic. The PRB recommends that the EC clarifies that the reporting requirement for the effective use of civil military airspace structures performance indicator relates exclusively to all restricted or segregated areas, which the States have identified as having an impact on available ATC capacity, or on available route options within the relevant airspace As the current rigid route network evolves into Free Route Airspace and the concept of conditional routes becomes less and less relevant, the monitoring of the planning and use of conditional routes is also becoming less and less relevant to the performance of ANS. Furthermore, the simplistic reporting on the allocation and use of segregated / restricted airspace does not reflect the impact that the allocation has had on the provision of ANS to general air traffic. The PRB recommends that the environment performance indicators described in Regulation (EU) No 390/2013, Annex 1, Section 1, paragraph 2.2 (a), (b) & (c) should be reviewed in terms of their relevance to the performance of air navigation providers and the impact on aircraft operations The crucial role of effective civil military coordination and cooperation is highlighted in the overall SES legislation, and repeated in the performance legislation. It is vital that the efforts of civil and military stakeholders to improve air navigation services for all airspace users is monitored and reported. The PRB recommends that the Commission invites EDA to place focus on monitoring how the national / regional civil and military authorities actually manage the airspace to satisfy the requirements of both civil and military airspace users. 8.7 Capacity KPA EN-ROUTE CAPACITY OVERVIEW In 2010, the Performance Review Body consulted widely on setting an RP2 target for en-route capacity in the range between 0.35 and 0.7 minutes per flight. Following the comments of interested stakeholders, the PRB recommended setting an European Union-wide en-route capacity target of 0.5 minutes per flight for The Commission Decision (2011/121/EU) set down the European Union-wide performance targets and alert thresholds for the years 2012 to The capacity target was set as: an improvement of the average en-route Air Traffic Flow 72

75 Management (ATFM) delay so as to reach a maximum of 0.5 minutes per flight in From a baseline performance in 2009 of 0.9 minutes average delay per flight, it was necessary for ANSPs to review and realign capacity plans towards the more ambitious target. To prepare ANSPs to establish and implement adequate capacity plans to achieve the binding target of 0.5 minutes delay in 2014, intermediate targets of 0.7 minutes per flight and 0.6 minutes per flight were proposed for the years 2012 and 2013 respectively. As depicted in Figure 46, whilst the intermediate targets of 0.7 and 0.6 minutes average en-route ATFM delay per flight were achieved in 2012 and 2013 respectively, the Union-wide binding target of 0.5 minutes per flight for 2014 was not reached. Figure 46: Evolution of ATFM en-route delay during RP1 and projection towards 2019 target During the first reference period, three States did not provide adequate capacity to meet their respective reference values for all three years: Cyprus, Poland and Portugal. Portugal did not meet its national targets in each of the three years of RP1; Poland did not meet its national target in 2014, although it did so in 2012 & 2013; Cyprus did not meet its national target in 2014, although it did so in 2012 & FABEC (comprising Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland) did not provide sufficient capacity to meet its respective reference values in two of the three years of RP1, 2013 & FABEC did not meet its FAB target in 2014, although it did so in 2012 & CAPACITY PLANNING The performance legislation, Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 Annex III, paragraph 4 stipulated that, for en-route capacity, consistency between the union-wide target and national/fab targets was to be determined by comparing the expected level of en- 73

76 route ATFM delay used in the Performance Plan with a reference values provided by the capacity planning process of EUROCONTROL, the reference values During RP1, several individual States (Cyprus, Greece, Poland & Spain) and one FAB, (FABEC- Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland) adopted targets that were not consistent with their respective reference values and hence the Union-wide target of 0.5 minutes ATFM delay per flight for Although the Commission accepted the Performance Plans of these States, the notification letters of 19 th July 2012 contained the proviso that the relevant States would require their respective ANSPs to develop and implement capacity plans to meet the respective reference values at the earliest possible date in the second reference period, with the assistance of the Network Manager Despite the requirement outlined in the notification letters, the capacity plans of the States/FABs above are still not in line with the respective reference values, which promise a continued deficit in capacity performance The PRB previously raised concerns about the continuous postponement and downgrading of capacity plans, especially in those States that were unable or unwilling to adopt the reference capacity values to be consistent with the Union-wide target for capacity The PRB remains concerned that the same States have not made adequate provisions for capacity planning during RP2, and that as traffic grows again, capacity will become a serious problem for the network The national monitoring reports, provided by the States, give little or no explanation of the remedial actions to improve capacity performance that the NSAs have imposed upon their respective ANSPs. Therefore it is impossible to ascertain if the States are effectively monitoring the situation The Performance Plans, and national monitoring reports provide little or no indication of how States are implementing the Flexible Use of Airspace to improve capacity performance for all airspace users. This is despite the explicit recognition, in the performance legislation, of civil military cooperation and coordination being of the utmost importance to achieving the performance objectives. ACTUAL CAPACITY PERFORMANCE AND TARGET SETTING Table 24 below shows a graphical comparison between the actual en-route capacity performance for each State and FAB against the targeted capacity performance as adopted by the relevant FAB/national authorities. Once again it is important to recall that several individual States (Cyprus, Greece, Poland & Spain) and one FAB (FABEC) adopted targets that were not consistent with the Union-wide target of 0.5 minutes ATFM delay per flight for It shows that the vast majority of States adopted targets that were easily achieved by the respective ANSPs The graphic further shows that several of the States / FABs that did not set targets consistent with the union wide targets, could have pushed their ANSPs a lot further into providing better capacity performance. Greece and Spain easily surpassed the national targets over the three years of RP1. FABEC and Poland significantly surpassed their local targets in 2012 & 2013 but not in The PRB considers that when States set easy targets for ANSPs it leads to downgrading or postponement of capacity plans, which creates problems in the future. 74

77 FAB Baltic Lithuania Poland FAB BLUE MED Cyprus Greece Italy Malta FAB DANUBE Bulgaria Romania FAB DK SE Denmark Sweden FAB CE (SES RP1) Austria Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Slovenia FAB FABEC Belgium/ Lux France Germany Netherlands Switzerland MUAC FAB NEFAB Estonia Finland Latvia Norway FAB SW Portugal (Cont.) Spain FAB UK Ireland United Kingdom Ireland SES AREA RP1 Target Actual Source: EUROCONTROL/ PRU Table 24: Actual and targeted en-route ATFM delay per flight

78 AIRPORT CAPACITY PERFORMANCE There was no KPI for airports during RP1. Nevertheless, a general trend in performance could already been observed regarding the indicators that were monitored at the 77 airports considered during the first reference period: (i) Arrival ATFM delay decreased by 19% (0.7 min./arr. in 2012 compared to 0.3 min./arr. in 2014). This decrease occurred most often at major airports (Paris Charles-de-Gaulle, Madrid and Oslo). (ii) Weather remains the main cause of delay every year (63% in 2012, 67% in 2013 and 69% in 2014) followed by capacity/staffing shortage (26% in 2012, 22% in 2013 and 24% in 2014). (iii) Additional ASMA time slightly decreased from 2.1 min./arr. in 2012 to 1.9 min./arr. in 2014 (-8.5%). (iv) Additional taxi-out time also slightly decreased from 3.3 min./dep. in 2012 to 3.1 min./dep. in 2014 (-8.7%). Likewise as for arrival ATFM delay, weather is a critical factor for additional taxi-out time, in particular during winter conditions when de-icing and snow removal operations are required Overall it can be noted for the SES area that additional taxi-out time surpasses the sum of arrival ATFM delay and additional ASMA time, penalising outbound traffic compared to inbound. RECOMMENDATIONS The ANSPs of certain States continue to plan capacity levels below the minimum required to meet the union-wide targets of 0.5 minutes average ATFM delay for each year in RP2. The ANSPs then use their lack of capacity plans to persuade the authorities of the States / FABs that they should adopt less ambitious performance targets than those required to meet the union-wide targets. This circular argument will ensure that capacity problems will continue and that airspace users will not benefit from the level of capacity performance they were promised by the Performance Scheme legislation. The PRB recommends that the Commission requests the States to review en-route capacity performance, including planned capacity levels, implementing remedial action where necessary, to ensure that their respective ANSPs meet the Union-wide target of 0.5 minutes ATFM delay per flight The SE region is experiencing severe disruption. The Commission should note the importance of Turkey in this region. The two Istanbul airports currently in operation (Istanbul Ataturk and Sabhia Gökçen) have a major impact on the SE Regional plans, although Turkey is not subject to the provisions of the SES legislation. A new airport, to replace Istanbul Ataturk airport, is being built and it is scheduled to become operational in Moreover, the Commission should work with the Network Manager to minimise adverse impacts on capacity planning in the SE Region The PRB invites the Commission to note that the two Istanbul airports currently in operation (Istanbul Ataturk and Sabhia Gökçen) have a major impact on the SE Region, although Turkey is not subject to the provisions of the SES legislation. A new airport, to replace Istanbul Ataturk airport, is being built and it is scheduled to become operational in The PRB recommends that the Commission takes cognisance of the Istanbul airports' impact on the SE Regional plans The PRB invites the Commission in association with the Network Manager, to pay careful attention to the traffic changes in the SE region, and its knock-on effect on the capacity planning of certain States. 76

79 Article 17 of Regulation 691/2010 (and Article 18 of Regulation 390/2013) clearly requires national supervisory authorities to apply appropriate measures to rectify deficits in performance, and to report these to the Commission. The PRB recommends that the Commission reminds States of their obligation to report on specific remedial actions being taken with their ANSPs to ensure that both local and union-wide en-route capacity targets are achieved In view of the importance of civil military cooperation and coordination on increasing capacity for all airspace users, it is vital that the efforts of civil and military stakeholders in this regard are monitored and reported. The PRB recommends that the Commission requests States to review their application of the FUA concept, in accordance with the governing principles of FUA as contained in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 2150/2005, with the aim of meeting the needs of all airspace users There are still a few cases of substantial non-compliance with the data provision requirements regarding airports subject to RP1. Since the number of airports subject to RP2 is much greater, the PRU established a data specification document in collaboration with airport reporting entities and developed an associated web interface to facilitate the data submission process ensuring a minimum level of data quality and consistency across all airports. The RP2 airports are encouraged to provide their data through that interface, in compliance with the data requirements document. The PRB advises the Commission to request all the SES States to comply with the data provision specifications established by the EUROCONTROL s Performance Review Unit for RP Cost-Efficiency KPA SUMMARY OF THE KEY EN-ROUTE COST-EFFICIENCY DATA FOR RP Table 25 below summarises the key data for each year of RP1 as well as the aggregated values for the RP taken as whole. It comprises data as per EC Decision on Union-wide targets for RP1, data from adopted National Performance Plans, and actual data taken from the annual NSA Monitoring Reports (including latest June 2015 Reporting Tables for charging purposes). In addition to information relating to en-route cost-efficiency, Table 25 also comprises key data on terminal ANS costs and gate-to-gate ANS costs. This information comprises the 29 States that were part of the SES Performance Scheme in RP1 (i.e. it excludes Croatia) This report does not include Italy s most recent updates to their final actual costs 2014 data. These updates have no bearing on the cost-efficiency analysis and recommendations contained in this report Table 25 shows that: i) Compared to the adopted Performance Plans, actual performance at Unionwide level was better than the DUR target in 2014 ( compared to ) and was also better than the intermediate value in 2013, though was worse in ii) Compared to the Union-wide target, actual performance was worse than the 2014 target ( compared to the target of ) and also worse than the intermediate values in 2013 and iii) In terms of traffic, SUs have increased over RP1 (+1.5% p.a. between 2011 and 2014) but were below the levels planned in each year and over RP1 as a whole some 4.9% lower than planned. iv) In response to the lower-than-planned traffic and in order to preserve their financial strength, States/ATSPs have reduced their en-route costs by M 2009, - 5.0% on average, over RP1. 77

80 En-route Terminal Gate-to-gate SES States - Data as per EC Decision on Union-wide targets for RP1 2012P 2013P 2014P Real en-route costs (determined costs ) - (in EUR2009) Total en-route Service Units Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) SES States - Data from RP1 national performance plans 2012P 2013P 2014P Real en-route costs (determined costs ) - (in EUR2009) Total en-route Service Units Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) SES States - Actual data from June 2015 Reporting Tables 2012A 2013A 2014A Real en-route costs - (in EUR2009) Total en-route Service Units Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) SES States - Data from RP1 national performance plans 2012P 2013P 2014P Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) SES - Actual data from June 2015 Reporting Tables 2012A 2013A 2014A Real terminal ANS costs - (in EUR2009) SES States - Data from RP1 national performance plans 2012P 2013P 2014P Real gate-to-gate ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Share of en-route costs in gate-to-gate ANS costs 80.9% 81.1% 81.0% SES States - Actual data from June 2015 Reporting Tables 2012A 2013A 2014A Real gate-to-gate ANS costs - (in EUR2009) Share of en-route costs in gate-to-gate ANS costs 81.3% 81.6% 81.5% SES States - Actual data extracted from STATFOR dashboard 2012A 2013A 2014A Number of IFR flights Real gate-to-gate unit costs per IFR flight - (in EUR2009) En-route Difference between actuals and EU Decision on Union-wide targets Real en-route costs - (in EUR2009) in value in % Total en-route Service Units in value in % Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) in value in % Difference between actuals and RP1 national performance plans Real en-route costs - (in EUR2009) in value in % Total en-route Service Units in value in % Real en-route unit costs per Service Units - (in EUR2009) in value in % RP1 overall % % % RP1 overall % % % Table 25: Summary of key RP1 cost-efficiency data ( ) Actual en-route costs for RP1 as a whole amount to some 17,941 M 2009 (see Table 25), of which 84% relate to the main ATSPs. The RP1 actual average en-route cost breakdown by nature for the main ATSPs is shown in Figure 47. This cost structure remained relatively stable over RP1 and is not significantly different from the plans. Staff costs represent on average 63% of en-route costs for the ATSPs. 17% 13% 6% 63% Staff Other operating costs Depreciation Cost of capital Figure 47: Actual en-route ATSP cost breakdown by nature (RP1 average) 78

81 COMPARISON OF EC DECISION ON UNION-WIDE DUR TARGETS WITH DUR TARGETS IN ADOPTED PERFORMANCE PLANS The Commission adopted RP1 Union-wide en-route cost-efficiency targets (expressed in terms of Determined Unit Rate DUR) in February 2011 (EC Decision 2011/121/EU). The DURs for each year of RP1 are set out in Table 25 above, with a target DUR of by the end of RP1, representing a decrease of -3.5% p.a. over The Commission s decision also considered the RP1 targets as part of the process to achieve its political vision and high-level goal for the Single European Sky (recital 8), and that the assessment of Performance Plans should be global, considering tradeoffs between KPAs and taking into account of local circumstances and past performance improvements (recital 11) In November 2011, after assessing the Performance Plans with PRB input, the Commission issued a recommendation (C(2011) 8329), asking several States to revise their local targets. The revised Plans were assessed and although the aggregate targets fell short of the targets in EC Decision (a planned DUR for 2014 of compared to in the EC Decision), they were accepted by the Commission. OUTCOME OF RP1 TRAFFIC RISK-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS The traffic risk-sharing arrangement provided in the SES charging Regulation 7 foresees that ATSPs additional (or lost) revenue due to the difference between the actual and the planned TSUs are shared with airspace users. For a difference in SUs falling within the dead band of ±2% difference between planned and actual traffic, ATSPs fully bear the loss/gain. However any larger traffic decline/growth is shared with the airspace users (70% vs 30% share) and beyond 10% traffic decline/growth the loss/gain is fully charged/reimbursed to airspace users. As a result, the maximum revenue loss/gain is capped at 4.4% Over RP1 as a whole, the net loss of revenues due to the lower than planned traffic was 1,036.0 M As a result of the traffic risksharing arrangements, States/ATSPs bear 39.3% of this loss (407.0 M 2009 ) and airspace users 44.0% (456.3 M 2009 ). Additionally airspace users bear 16.7% (172.7 M 2009 ) which relates to costs not subject to traffic risk-sharing as described in Figure 48: Outcome of RP1 traffic risk-sharing arrangements (en-route) Thus in total during RP1 airspace users incurred an additional M 2009 (sum of and M 2009 ) compared to RP1 Plans. 79