A financial evolution The medieval development of public debt in the county of Holland (13 th -16 th centuries) Jaco Zuijderduijn Utrecht University

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1 A financial evolution The medieval development of public debt in the county of Holland (13 th -16 th centuries) Jaco Zuijderduijn Utrecht University Historians often use the concept of financial revolutions to explain the rise of the Dutch Republic, and also of England after the Glorious Revolution. They claim that innovations in government funding allowed for marked progress in the field of public finance, for instance by pointing out that the introduction of county-wide public debt by the States of Holland, the gemenelandsrenten, started a financial revolution. However, it is the argument of this article that this does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the rise of the Dutch Republic, because the financial techniques that are usually associated with Holland s financial revolution were in fact already used for centuries. The article argues that the introduction of countywide public debt did not increase creditworthiness, but must be regarded as a way to improve the servicing of public debt. This was an important step toward the large public debt the county of Holland created under the Dutch Republic. Economic historians often assume that financial revolutions pushed states toward modern financial systems, and that these were the motor behind some of the most important examples of economic growth in history. Recently Richard Sylla connected the economic success of the Dutch Republic and the industrialization of England with advances in public finances and debt management and the rise of banking and insurance institutions. 1 Financial revolutions are also believed to have been behind the rise of the American and Japanese economies. 2 Earlier drafts of this article were presented at the seminar of the faculty of Social and Economic history of Utrecht University, at the European Social Science and History Conference in Amsterdam and at a workshop on government finance in Rotterdam. I thank the participants, as well as James Tracy, John Munro, Larry Neal, Bas van Bavel, Joost Jonker and Oscar Gelderblom, who commented on earlier drafts. 1 R. Sylla, Financial systems and economic modernization in Journal of Economic History 62, 2 (2002) , esp Cf. the British financial revolution P.G.M. Dickson, The financial revolution in England: a study in the development of public credit, (London 1967). Cf. the Netherlands financial revolution J.D. Tracy, A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands. Renten and renteniers in the county of Holland (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1985); M. t Hart, The merits of a financial revolution: public finance, in M. t Hart, J. Jonker & J.L. van Zanden (eds.), A financial history of the Netherlands (Cambridge 1997), there 11-36; W. Fritschy, A financial revolution reconsidered. Public finance in Holland during the Dutch Revolt, , in Economic History Review 56 (2003) 57-89; O. Gelderblom & J. Jonker, Completing a financial revolution: the finance of the Dutch East India Trade and the rise of the Amsterdam capital market, in Journal of Economic History 64 (2004) Cf. recent surveys Sylla, Financial systems and economic modernization ; P. Temin & H.-J. Voth, The speed of the financial revolution: evidence from Hoare s bank [3-6]. 1

2 The main idea behind these financial revolutions seems to be, that in order to grasp economic leadership, states had to gain a comparative advantage over competitors. Some states managed to do so by introducing new financial techniques, which often already existed elsewhere, but could be used more efficiently because the process of transplantation eliminated the legal restrictions and encumbrances that had been imposed in the country of origin. 3 This allowed states to experience a revolutionary increase in government funding, radical changes in the process of state formation, and permitted them to create the foundations for economic leadership. In the English historiography, the concept of financial revolution has been challenged by authors like Patrick O Brien and Larry Epstein, who argued that developments went much more slowly than is often presumed. 4 Others have claimed that other factors were at least as important as the introduction of financial techniques. Douglass North and Barry Weingast singled out limits to monarchical power as a main cause for the increase of government creditworthiness. 5 David Stasavage explained that the Whig Supremacy after 1715 helped to consolidate the financial revolution, because the Whigs were much more in favour of public debt than the Tories. Prolonged Whig rule assured potential creditors that the government was unlikely to default on public debt, and through increased credibility of debt repayment caused costs of borrowing to drop. 6 Whereas the debate about the English financial revolution has yielded serious doubt on the importance of financial innovations, the debate about Holland s financial revolution is still very much centred on financial techniques. The first, and still most prominent claim that a financial revolution paved the way for the Dutch Republic, comes from James Tracy. In his innovative, thorough and above all highly influential 1985 study A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands. Renten and renteniers in the county of Holland ( ) he argues that the county of Holland, in the West of the present-day Netherlands, experienced a financial revolution that allowed for a marked increase in government creditworthiness. 7 Tracy suggests that this development provided the county with the public funding it needed to 3 L. Neal, The rise of financial capitalism. International capital markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge1990) P. O Brien, Fiscal exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European rivals from civil war to triumph at Travalgar and Waterloo, Working paper 65/01 (2001), London School of Economics; S. Epstein, Freedom and growth: the rise of states and markets in Europe, (London 2000). 5 D.C. North & B. Weingast, Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England in The Journal of Economic History 49 (1989) D. Stasavage, Partisan politics and public debt: The importance of the Whig Supremacy for Britain s financial revolution in European Review of Economic History 11 (2007) , quote on p J.D. Tracy, A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands. Renten and renteniers in the County of Holland (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1985). 2

3 wage war with Spain during the Dutch Revolt ( ) and that these financial institutions ultimately became the backbone of the finances of the Dutch Republic. After 1515 the States of Holland entered capital markets in the Low Countries and created an apparatus capable of contracting and servicing a large public debt. According to Tracy the States managed to borrow unprecedented sums after they had improved their creditworthiness by introducing two institutional innovations. The first was the introduction of collective responsibility for debt: the States used a community responsibility system to secure impersonal exchange on capital markets. 8 The second was the use of future taxrevenues as a security for public debt. Starting in 1515, the States used these two techniques to create public debt by selling gemenelandsrenten, annual pensions more or less comparable to annuities. 9 The States used the funds they attracted on the capital market to provide emperor Charles V ( ) with funds, and also to wage war against Holland s hostile neighbours in the East, the episcope of Utrecht and duchy of Guelders, and even Lübeck in the North of the German Empire, to defend the county s interests in the Baltic trade. The emperor s need for funds caused a growth of provincial institutions and responsibilities, especially in the fiscal sphere. 10 This allowed the States to increase their control over tax-revenues, which they used to pay out gemenelandsrenten, and in this respect Tracy is right to conclude that in the long run it effected a dramatic shift in the relative position of the central government and its provinces. 11 In control of revenues and providing over massive creditworthiness, the States could take a more autonomous course toward the emperor and his successor, king Philip II of Spain ( ). The past decades the idea that the Dutch Republic was founded on sixteenth century developments in the sphere of government finances has quickly gained ground. It is believed 8 it was not easy to bring the members of a provincial States to accept the novel principle of collective responsibility for debt (Tracy, A financial revolution, 45). Cf. this technique allowing for impersonal exchange A. Greif, Institutions and the path to the modern economy. Lessons from medieval trade (Cambridge 2006) esp It is possible that these techniques also emerged elsewhere in the Low Countries: we know that the towns of Flanders collectively sold renten at the end of the fifteenth century, and recently Jord Hanus suggested that the States of Brabant may as well have sold renten in the sixteenth century. Historians encountered similar types of funding elsewhere in the Habsburg territories, like in Castile and the Kingdom of Naples (J. Hanus, Tussen stad en eigen gewin. Stadsfinanciën, renteniers en kredietmarkten in s-hertogenbosch (begin zestiende eeuw) (Amsterdam 2007) ; A. Calabria, The cost of empire. The finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the time of the Spanish rule (Cambridge 1991) ). I am indebted to Wouter Ryckbosch for pointing out the practise of collective rente-sales in Flanders. 10 J.D. Tracy, Holland under Habsburg rule The formation of a body politic (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1990) Tracy, Holland under Habsburg rule,

4 that developments in taxation and public debt allowed the States of Holland to direct a revolt against Philip II, survive the Eighty Years War ( ) and become a world power in the seventeenth century. 12 James Tracy s financial revolution in the field of public debt is a major example of this view, but the idea that major advances in taxation during the sixteenth century were behind the course of events has also gained popularity. Tracy has already suggested that the introduction of province-wide excise-taxes, the Common Means, in 1542, was a crucial development, and that these tax revenues helped to enlarge Holland s creditworthiness. More recently Wantje Fritschy demonstrated that these Common Means only yielded increasing amounts after 1572, and that Holland rather experienced a tax-revolution than a financial revolution prior to and during the Revolt. She believes that the only revolutionary development in government borrowing was, that holders of obligations increasingly attached importance to interest payments only, and decreasingly to redemption. Furthermore, she only sees this development after Recently Oscar Gelderblom and Joost Jonker also dated the financial revolution after They argue that the high liquidity of the shares of the East India Company helped to bring about a secondary market that concluded the financial revolution. 14 They seem to agree with Larry Neal and John Munro, who also singled out negotiability of financial instruments as a major element of the financial revolutions of the Dutch Republic and England. 15 This article focuses on the financial revolution as suggested by Tracy, during which institutional changes should have allowed for the emergence of province-wide public debt. These gemenelandsrenten became an important type of government funding in the decades prior tot the Revolt, and had a decisive effect on the increasing political power the States managed to gain. Furthermore, even though recent publications have downplayed the importance of borrowing for the finance of the Dutch Revolt, province-wide public debt was still an important element of government funding after Fritschy, A financial revolution reconsidered ; M.C. t Hart, The making of the bourgois state. War, politics and finances during the Dutch Revolt (Manchester 1993) ; M. t Hart & M. Limberger, Staatsmacht en stedelijke autonomie. Het geld van Antwerpen en Amsterdam ( ) in Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis 3 (2006) 36-72, there Fritschy, A financial revolution reconsidered, esp. 70, O. Gelderblom & J. Jonker, Completing a financial revolution: the finance of the Dutch East India Trade and the rise of the Amsterdam capital market, in Journal of Economic History 64 (2004) Neal, The rise of financial capitalism, 3-4.; J. Munro, The medieval origins of the financial revolution: usury, rentes and negotiability in International History Review XXV (2003)

5 But in spite of the importance of public debt for the history of the Dutch Republic, the alternatives historians have offered to explain what happened in England after the Glorious Revolution, are still absent in the historiography about Holland s financial revolution. For instance, John Munro is the only one who discussed the emergence of some of the financial techniques of financial revolutions. He demonstrated that the success of renten lay in possibilities for resale, which developed slowly in the course of several centuries. Ultimately secondary markets for renten emerged in sixteenth century Antwerp and Amsterdam; the great liquidity of renten contributed in no small part to their popularity. 16 This article focuses on some other elements of financial revolutions in the field of the organization of public debt and provides evidence of slow, long-term growth of government finances. It contributes to Munro s idea of the medieval roots of financial revolutions, by showing the evolution of supra-local public debt. The article also contributes to the idea put forward by Douglass North and Barry Weingast, about the importance of institutional developments contributing to credible commitment. The shift in the organization of public debt from individual public bodies to the States helped to reduce the risk of reneging on renten. The article also attempts to open up the debate about the financial history of the county of Holland. With their financial revolutions, historians have created a concept that allows them to explain Holland s rise by merely looking at the decades prior to the Dutch Revolt, and the Revolt itself. As a consequence, in the historiography Holland s medieval financial history has become something that is deemed more or less rudimentary. This is reflected in the lack of studies into Holland s government finances in the Late Middle Ages: the study by Yvonne Bos-Rops into the finances of the counts of Holland between 1389 and 1433 is the sole monograph dedicated to this subject. 17 I will argue that the Late Middle Ages already experienced some important developments in government finances, and that back then the organization of public debt did certainly not differ that much from that of the sixteenth century. Thus, the article also contributes to recently voiced concerns about the idea that Holland only began to develop in the sixteenth century. This paradigm has been challenged by 16 Munro, The medieval origins of the financial revolution. 17 J.A.M.Y. Bos-Rops, Graven op zoek naar geld. De inkomsten van de graven van Holland en Zeeland (Hilversum 1993). Cf. other studies that touch upon the subject of Holland s government finances: R. Stein, Stände und Staat in den Niederlanden in R.C. Schwinges, C. Hesse & P. Moraw (eds.), Europa im späten Mittelalter. Politik Gesellschaft Kultur (Munich 2006) ; W. Blockmans & W. Prevenier, De Bourgondiërs: de Nederlanden op weg naar eenheid (Antwerpen 1983)

6 a number of historians, who argue that the economy of Holland already showed progress at an earlier stage, in the fourteenth or even thirteenth century. 18 This article does not only provide an overview of the medieval development of public debt in Holland, but also offers a refinement to Tracy s financial revolution, which can be used to integrate the medieval and early modern history of Holland government finances. Section 1 shows how the two indispensable elements of Tracy s sixteenth century financial revolution, collective responsibility for debt and the securing of loans with future taxrevenues, were already used by cooperating towns in the Late Middle Ages. In order to explain why these techniques were not applied on a large scale before 1515, section 2 discusses the socioeconomic sphere where public debt was created and serviced, and explains why the rulers and the public sector had clear incentives to limit the number of securities. Section 3 shows that they only had to yield to the demands by creditors for better securities, after the States of Holland and the towns were hit by a profound financial crisis around It argues that this brought about the introduction of the gemenelandsrenten,and that these must not be regarded as a new and clever way to improve creditworthiness, but as a reorganization aimed at the recovery of fifteenth-century creditworthiness. This required hard securities and especially improvements with regard to the servicing of public debt, which were created through the centralization of public debt in the hands of the States of Holland. This reorganization brought about some important improvements in debt-servicing, which helped Holland to pay out gemenelandsrenten in time and thus to regain and maintain its solvency. 1. Public debt in medieval Holland Until the present day, count Floris V ( ) is renowned for his policy of expansion. He gained influence in the Sticht of Utrecht, to the east of Holland, and subjected the stubborn 18 Most historians identify the second half of the fourteenth century as the time when the Holland economy started to develop. Peter Hoppenbrouwers recently argued that this development took place at the end of the thirteenth century (P.C.M. Hoppenbrouwers, Van waterland tot stedenland. De Hollandse economie ca ca in T. de Nijs & E. Beukers (red.) Geschiedenis van Holland. Deel I. Tot 1572 (Hilversum 2002), , there 118; W.P. Blockmans, The economic expansion of Holland and Zeeland in the fourteenth-sixteenth centuries in E. Aerts, B. Henau, P. Janssens, R. van Uytven (eds.), Studia Historica Oeconomica. Liber amicorum Herman van der Wee (Leuven 1993) 41-58; H.P.H. Jansen, Holland s advance in Acta historiae Neerlandicae. Studies on the history of the Netherlands X (1978) 1-20; B.J.P. van Bavel, Early protoindustrialization in the Low Countries? in Revue Belgique de philologie et d histoire 81 (2003) ; B.J.P. van Bavel & J.L. van Zanden, The jump-start of the Holland economy during the late-medieval crisis, c c. 1500, Economic History Review 57, 3 (2004), , there ; J.L. van Zanden Taking the measure of the early modern economy: Historical national accounts for Holland in in European Review of Economic History 6 (2002)

7 debts. 19 Floris seems to have been the first count of Holland to involve his towns in his search Westfrisians to the north. However, because his political ambitions were not always matched by his revenues, the count had to look for possibilities to increase his funds. He borrowed from a host of individual creditors, including wealthy noblemen, family members, foreign merchants and moneylenders, and mobilized noblemen and family members to bail for his for credit. 20 In 1280 and 1281 he promised the town of Haarlem it would not be damaged because of loans the town had secured, and in 1282 he promised the same to Dordrecht. 21 This construction may raise some questions: the count borrowed money, but Dordrecht and Haarlem were held responsible for defaults. This was possible because a distinction was made between indebtedness and responsibility, which did not necessarily go together. Thus, Floris V could be indebted, without being responsible for the payment, while Dordrecht and Haarlem were responsible without being indebted. 22 In medieval Holland this principle was applied on a large scale. It frequently created problems for the towns: for instance, in 1282 Dordrecht secured one of Floris debts. The count had bought wine on credit from Gerard Burh of Cologne and Michael Baceleer of Bruges. He asked Dordrecht to secure the transaction, and in return the count promised to pay for any damages the town might suffer. 23 When the count defaulted, Michael Baceleer had members of the city-government imprisoned for debt, and thus forced them to negotiate a solution. 24 In 1284 Baceleer and representatives of Dordrecht agreed that the city would pay the arrears. 25 Dordrecht negotiated the payment of damages by the count, the results of which 19 M. Slingerland, Wie zal dat betalen? De financiering van Floris machtspolitiek in E.H.P Cordfunke, F.W.N. Hugenholtz, Kl. Sierksma (eds.) Handel en wandel in de dertiende eeuw (Muiderberg 1986) 59-69; R. van Uytven, De macht van het geld: financiers voor Floris V in D.E.H. de Boer, E.H.P. Cordfunke & H. Sarfatij (eds.), Wi Florens De Hollandse graaf Floris V in de samenleving van de dertiende eeuw (Utrecht 1996), ; J.W.J. Burgers, Tussen burgerij en adel. De financiële, politieke en maatschappelijke carrière van de Utrechtse patriciër Lambert de Vries (ca ?), in Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 106 (1991) I have rejected Slingerland s suggestion that Dordrecht lend Floris 2158 lb. Holland and 200 lb. sterling in First of all, Kruisheer already concluded that the charter must either date from September or September , and more importantly, the loan was not provided by the city of Dordrecht, but by two of its citizens, Giso and Willem Dukink (J.G. Kruisheer, Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland tot Deel IV tot 1291 (OHZ IV) (Assen 1997), nr. 2227; Slingeland, Wie zal dat betalen? De financiering van Floris machtspolitiek, 64-65). 21 Kruisheer, Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland (OHZ) IV, nrs. 1917, 1943 & This construction is also known as Schuld und Haftung (A.S. de Blécourt & H.F.W.D. Fischer, Kort begrip van het oud-vaderlands burgerlijk recht (7 th printing 1959), ). 23 OHZ IV, nr This type of imprisonment for debt was known as leisting (J.L. van Dalen, Oorkonden en regesten betreffende de stad Dordrecht en hare naaste omgeving tijdens het grafelijk huis van Holland ( ) in Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 33, , there nr. LIX). 25 OHZ IV, nr

8 have unfortunately not been handed down, but it is altogether hard to imagine that the count did in fact pay them any money; instead, the town probably received a privilege or a tax-cut. Collective responsibility for debt Thus, count Floris already turned his private loans into public debt, simply by having his towns securing them. In this respect we also encounter collective responsibility for debt: in 1291 Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden and Alkmaar secured a loan worth lb. Holland. They were joined by Middelburg and Zierikzee, towns in the county of Zeeland, to the South of Holland, which was also ruled by Floris. The count offered the cities securities by appointing all his domain revenues, with the exception of those of the village of Poortvliet in Zeeland. 26 This construction offered some clear advantages for the creditors, Jan lord of Arkel, Lambert de Vries and Rikoud van Noordeloos. Medieval rulers were ill reputed for reneging on debts: although medieval rulers usually tried to maintain their creditworthiness, John Veitsch showed that they were often tempted to renege once they encountered alternative creditors. 27 Furthermore, count Floris was the highest judge within his own territory, and anyone lodging a complaint against him stood little chance of success. 28 By involving his towns in credit transactions, Floris created a buffer zone between himself and his creditors, because the latter could sue townsmen in case of default. The count especially needed his cities to build a bridge between the old capital of monarchs and noblemen, and the new capital of merchants and citizens. Of course, count Floris was an exponent of the old capital. He could easily borrow money from fellow rulers and noblemen, but had a hard time tapping into the new capital. Regarding loans, both spheres had different ways to secure transactions. Monarchs and noblemen often appealed to the debtor s sense of honour; their 26 E.C. Dijkhof, Oorkondenboek van Holland en Zeeland tot Deel V (OHZ V) (The Hague 2005), nr Before April , Lambert de Vries seems to have taken over the loans of his fellowcreditors (OHZ V, nr. 2724). Elsewhere, we encounter collectives of cities taking responsibility for debt as well: in 1325 the nobility of Guelders and cities of Roermond, Nieuwstad, Venlo, Gelders, Goch, Nijmegen, Zaltbommel, Arnhem, Emmerich, Doetinchem, Doesburg, Zutphen and Harderwijk collectively secured a loan of Reinoud, son of the count of Guelders. In 1339 the cities Zutphen, Geldern, Nijmegen, Roermond, Arnhem, Harderwijk, Emmerich, Zaltbommel, Goch and Venlo collectively secured lijfrenten of Brussels renteniers. In 1452 the Guelders cities Nijmegen, Arnhem and Zutphen secured the payment of 3000 guilders the duke of Guelders had borrowed from Henric Haicken of Cologne (W.E. Smelt, Het oud-archief der gemeente Zutphen. Tweede stuk: Regestenlijst (tot 1550) (Utrecht 1941) 22, 29; J.A.B.M. de Jong, Het oud-archief der gemeente Nijmegen. Deel I: inventaris (Nijmegen 1960) 50). 27 J.M. Veitsch, Repudiations and confiscations by the medieval state in Journal of Economic History 46 (1986) Cf. E.B. Fryde & M.M. Fryde, Public credit, with special reference to North-Western Europe, in The Cambridge economic history III (Cambridge 1963) , there ; 8

9 loan-contracts rarely mention hard securities, and when they started legal action to seek compensation for defaults, this was often aimed at the debtor s reputation. Clear examples are maanbrieven and klaagbrieven, complaints about a person in writing, which were nailed to the doors of churches. Legal procedures to have someone declared infamous are another example. 29 Even though merchants and citizens made use of such informal instruments as well, they also demanded hard securities, and count Floris had quite some trouble finding these; this is why he used public bodies as intermediaries on the capital market. Especially towns were useful: townsmen were subjected to legal systems, and more importantly, they frequented the cities of Flanders and Brabant, home to the most important creditors of the Low Countries. A community responsibility system, known as the law of reprisal, made all townsmen responsible for debt. This greatly increased the legal security of creditors from Flanders and Brabant, because they could be sure not to have any trouble running into, for instance, a citizen of Dordrecht when they were looking for compensation for arrears. 30 Dealing with Holland and Zeeland towns was less risky than directly lending to the counts, and it was this principle that made public bodies attractive as intermediaries in state finances. This is clearly visible when we look at their involvement in loans count Floris contracted with foreign townsmen: most of the thirteen examples we know of involved Holland and Zeeland towns as guarantors. 31 Thus, the towns clearly derived their creditworthiness from their position in interregional trade with Brabant and Flanders. 32 Collective responsibility for debt is a crucial novelty of Tracy s sixteenth century financial revolution. 33 But in the course of the late Middle Ages Holland and Zeeland towns frequently took collective responsibility for debt, initially for short-term loans, but later also for renten. 29 De Blécourt & Fischer, Kort begrip, Cf. a fourteenth century example concerning the nobleman Jan van Arkel, who refused to appear in court for debt litigation F. van Mieris, Groot Charterboek der Graaven van Holland, van Zeeland en heeren van Vriesland III (4 vols. Leiden ) Epstein stressed that the law of reprisal and collective responsibility for debt were highly damaging to trade (Epstein, Freedom and growth, 60). However, I would rather argue the law of reprisal was an indispensable institution underlying medieval long-distance trade. The abolition of this institution (according to Epstein during the fifteenth century) must be regarded in the light of the introduction of other means to secure loans. When these alternatives were still not available, the law of reprisal rather improved than obstructed economic performance. 31 Holland and Zeeland towns secured sixteen out of 22 large loans Floris V contracted (C.J. Zuijderduijn, Medieval capital markets. Markets for renten between state formation and private investment in Holland ( ) (Ph.D. thesis Utrecht 2007) appendix 3). 32 Cf. Charles Tilly s remark that the position of cities within market hierarchies [ ] correlated approximately with [ ] the extent of capital accumulation [ ] (Tilly, Entanglements of European cities and states, 22). 33 it was not easy to bring the members of a provincial States to accept the novel principle of collective responsibility for debt (Tracy, A financial revolution, 45). 9

10 Eventually they organized the sale of renten, advancing the yields to the counts, and took care of debt servicing as well. Furthermore, cities even started to cooperate so they would be able to meet any problems caused by collective responsibility for debt. In 1345 the cities of Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft and Leiden, all from Holland, and the cities of Zierikzee and Middelburg from Zeeland, already made a treaty stating they would help one another out, in rade in dade ende in vercrigen ende te innen dat voirs. goit ons mede te lossen ende te quijten vander voirnoemder borchtochte 34 with advice and deeds, and by collecting the securities they could use to redeem themselves from the bail Another 1345 statement by the city of Haarlem is even more explicit about the collective character of the loan: the cities were supposed to mit hem te staen te dragen ende te liden ende te gelden allen last cost ende scade gelike hem tot enige tiden die hun of ons upcomen mach 35 carry the burden, and pay all costs and damages that may befall them [the other cities] or us [Haarlem] Thus a collective of the main cities of Holland and Zeeland secured the repayment of loans. Moreover, even noblemen from Holland were involved in this treaty, making for a strong similarity with public debt created by the States in the sixteenth century. 36 Even though the 1345 sale was not yet in the name of the common land, the organizations behind it the four main cities and a group of noblemen strongly resemble those making up the States in the sixteenth century. 37 In this respect the appearance of the lude van Suethollant, the people of 34 L.M. VerLoren van Themaat, H.W. Dokkum, E.C. Dijkhof, J.T. Roggen & N. Sanderson (eds.), Oude Dordtse Lijfrenten. Stedelijke financiering in de vijftiende eeuw (Amsterdam 1985) Gemeentearchief Leiden, Archief der secretarie I, inv. nr. 81 (privilegeboek B) f An early example of noblemen standing surety is a 1290 charter stating twelve knights and four squires guaranteed the Teutonic Knights of Koblenz that the count would pay for the 720 roeden wine he had bought (OHZ IV, nr. 2477). 37 Historians believe that the representative body of the States first emerged in the second half of the fourteenth century. Yet, there is reason to believe the broad societal groups collectively bargaining with the counts in 1292 and 1345 may have been rudimentary precursors of the States. Likewise, Holland noblemen, citizens and communities allowed the count to levy a tax in 1334 (Van Mieris, Groot Charterboek II, 332; J.G. Avis, De directe belastingen in het Sticht Utrecht aan deze zijde van de IJsel tot 1528 (Utrecht 1930) 12). 10

11 Southern Holland, a large rural region, who borrowed money on behalf of the count, already in 1289, is interesting as well. 38 Noblemen, citizens, and peasants were all used to improve comital creditworthiness, and medieval public debt was already backed by a considerable number of Holland subjects. This was especially the case during the turbulent period at the beginning of the fifteenth century, when towns frequently agreed to collective responsibility for debt (table 1). [insert table 1] Future tax-revenues According to Tracy, faced with expensive wars, the government of Charles V could only survive by converting future revenues into ready cash. 39 A key element of the financial revolution was the appointing of future tax-revenues as securities for loans; Tracy believes that anticipated tax-revenues were introduced as a security for the first time in However, more than two hundred years earlier future tax-revenues were already used as a security. In 1291 Floris V secured a loan worth lb. Holland with alle onse rente ende tolne, op cominghe ende voerval binnen onse landen alse in Zelant, Suthollant, Northollant ende in Vrieslant, vit ghenomen den goede van Portvliet, dat wi behouden toete onser cost 40 all our rents and tolls and revenues within our lands Zeeland, Southern Holland, Northern Holland and Westfriesland, with the exception of the goods of Poortvliet, which we keep to ourselves The revenues served as securities for the creditors Jan lord of Arkel, Lambert de Vries and Rikoud van Noordeloos. In 1345 count William IV badly needed money to finance his war against Utrecht and the Frisians. He ordered representatives of the cities of Dordrecht, Zierikzee, Middelburg, Delft, Leiden and Haarlem to visit his army camp before the besieged city of Utrecht, and 38 Van Dalen, Oorkonden, Tracy, A financial revolution, OHZ V, nr Cf. idem nr

12 persuaded them to sell 300 oude tournooische ponden worth of lijfrenten on his behalf. The cities would be responsible for the rente-payments, for which the count appointed revenues from tolls, mills, ferries and tithes as a security, as well as all future tax-revenues from the large bailiwick of Rijnland. If the cities did not receive the money they required to pay the renten from the count s stewards, they were allowed to seize the securities. 41 A few years later, in 1351, the count took matters even one step further, when some cities of Holland collectively took responsibility for debt once again. Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Amsterdam, Alkmaar, Medemblik, Geertruidenberg, Schiedam, Rotterdam and Oudewater secured the lijftocht (pension) of the duchess of Brabant, the 3500 lb. zwarte tournooische count William V owed to the bishop of Utrecht, and the 400 lb. zwarte tournooische he had agreed to pay for repairs to the castle of Woerden. The count appointed all his ancient rents, including a considerable part of the Northern Holland bede an irregular tax 42, as well as the confiscated goods of outcasts. The cities were allowed to appoint one or two receivers in Northern Holland to make sure they would get the money. 43 Thus, the cities gained full control over the future tax-revenues. In the fifteenth century future tax-revenues were appointed as securities for collective public debt in 1405, 1407, 1416, , 1418 and 1430 as well (table 1). These examples indicate that medieval counts used future revenues of domains and taxes to secure loans. 2. Toward a more dynamic model: the slow evolution of collective responsibility for debt So, if the key elements underlying the sixteenth century financial revolution can in fact be traced back two to three centuries, why did it take so long before they were applied on a large scale? The slow development of this type of funding can best be comprehended when we take a close look at the demands of the parties involved. The counts and towns had strong incentives to minimize the securities; collective responsibility for debt and future tax revenues only made sense from the perspective of the renteniers. 41 On the same day the six cities agreed to sign a treaty they would mutually assist each-other and share the damages the issue of lijfrenten might bring them. Two days later the government of Haarlem signed a separate treaty stating they would assist the other cities for the sum of 82 lb. 7 s. oude tournooische worth of lijfrenten (Van Mieris, Groot charterboek II, Mutual assistance could be a successful measure, as is indicated by a 1432 example (A.S. de Blécourt & E.M. Meijers (eds.) Memorialen van het Hof (den Raad) van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland van den secretaris Jan Rosa, delen I-II-III (Haarlem 1929) 62-63). 42 Bos-Rops, Graven op zoek naar geld, Van Mieris, Groot charterboek II, 796, 801. Although Van Mieris hesitated to choose between 3500 lb. and 4500 lb., when the May 29 charter is compared with that of September 1, it seems likely the debt to the bishop was 3500 lb. 12

13 The counts were almost constantly looking for funds: political ambitions and international competition put government funding under constant pressure. This opened up possibilities for public bodies that could provide the rulers with taxes and access to capital markets. Wim Blockmans explains that cities provided rulers with funding in order to achieve economic goals: the security of roads, quick settlement of disputes, supervision of exchange values, freedom from tolls and arbitrary seizure. 44 Bargaining strengthened both centre and periphery. This went predominantly at the expense of the nobility: government funding provided the rulers with possibilities to submit other feudal lords and provided cities with privileges protecting them from the same lords. 45 To make the most of this bargaining, the public sector had to develop representative institutions that could negotiate with the rulers, levy taxes and sell renten. 46 This paved the way for a strong public sector that was (occasionally) capable of resisting comital policy. This is for instance visible at the beginning of the fifteenth century, when the Holland public sector created a large public debt during the war of succession after the death of count William VI in The competitors to power, William s daughter Jacqueline of Bavaria and his son John of Bavaria, were both supported by towns that gave them access to the capital market. They persuaded collectives of towns to sell renten in 1417 and 1418, and had many individual towns attracting funds on the capital market as well. Towns almost immediately failed to pay renten in Brabant and Flanders, and renteniers reacted by arresting Holland merchants. The already war-torn county thus also faced severe obstructions to trade. Recently Robert Stein has argued that the mounting debts forced John to request a moratorium for himself, and on behalf of the Holland towns, in The only dynasty in the Low Countries with the creditworthiness to pull Holland through was that of Burgundy, and 44 W.P. Blockmans, Voracious states and obstructing cities in C. Tilly & W.P. Blockmans (eds.), Cities and the rise of states in Europe, A.D to 1800 (Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford 1994) , there 233. Cf. also M. Körner, Public credit in R. Bonney, Economic systems and state finance (Oxford 1995) , there ; Fryde & Fryde, Public credit, with special reference to North-Western Europe, ; E.C. Dijkhof, De economische en fiscale politiek van de graven van Holland in de dertiende eeuw in Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 108 (1993) 3-12, there 11; Stein, De Staten en de ontwikkeling van de Raad van Holland, 22-27; Jansma, De voorgeschiedenis, A. Molho, The state and public finance: A hypothesis based on the history of late medieval Florence in The journal of modern history 67 (1995), S97-S135, there S101; Blockmans, Voracious states and obstructing cities, C. Tilly, Entanglements of European cities and states, in C. Tilly & W.P. Blockmans (eds.), Cities and the rise of states in Europe, A.D to 1800 (Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford 1994) 1-27, there 24; Tracy, A financial revolution; 71-72; Tracy, Holland under Habsburg rule. 13

14 according to Stein this was the key financial element for the States of Holland to embrace duke Philip of Burgundy. 47 While Stein is probably right to stress Holland s indebtedness as a key-element in the switch to the dynasty of Burgundy, his account needs some further elaboration. Stein implicates that Philip was heralded as the foreign ruler that was about to take over all debts that had been burdening the towns of Holland for years. 48 But the last thing the duke did was literally abolishing Holland from its indebtedness: the towns still had to pay the renten they had sold in Brabant and Flanders between 1416 and 1418 for many years after the moratorium. 49 The key element was not Philip s creditworthiness, but the fact he was an arbitrary figure that wielded power over the Flemish cities. He could negotiate a moratorium between Flanders and Holland. It is likely that the cities of Holland that were represented in the States choose Philip with the coming-to-being of a moratorium in mind. And indeed, within a month after the moratorium was agreed, John of Bavaria appointed Philip as his successor; this seems to indicate that Philip s capacity to bring about a moratorium was crucial indeed. 50 Collective public debt helped to align the Holland towns. Jacqueline and John of Bavaria unwillingly created a strong opposition of public bodies; facing obstructions to trade, the latter used the States as a vehicle to press for commercial interests. We see a similar development in the sixteenth century, when government funding contributed heavily to the emancipation of the States. James Tracy s accounts of the development of government funding in the sixteenth century show perfectly how the States used their capacity for government funding to gain power. 51 Collective responsibility for debt forced public bodies to cooperate to gain access to capital markets; it provided rulers with funds, but in the long run altered the political constellation to the advantage of the public sector. 47 Stein, Stände und Staat in den Niederlanden, 225. The principle of strategically taking over debts in order to expand power already had a precedent in the way count Floris V managed to gain control over the Sticht (Slingerland, Wie zal dat betalen?, 63-66). 48 At least, Stein strongly stresses the creditworthiness of the Burgundian dynasty, which was caused by its vast revenues (Stein, Stände und Staat in den Niederlanden, 230). 49 A. Meerkamp van Embden, Stadsrekeningen van Leiden, II(2 vols. Amsterdam ) 68, 170, Perhaps Philip s ties with Brabant, ruled by his cousin John IV ( ), made him attractive for the States as well: even though the latter was the husband of Jacqueline of Bavaria, and therefore was already closely connected to Holland, Philip may still have offered the Holland public sector more diplomatic options. 51 Tracy, A financial revolution; Tracy, Holland under Habsburg rule. Charles Tilly pointed out that bargaining about funding for war contributed to the emergence of representative institutions (C. Tilly, Entanglements of European cities and states, in C. Tilly & W.P. Blockmans (eds.), Cities and the rise of states in Europe, A.D to 1800 (Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford 1994) 1-27, there 24). 14

15 Even though the public sector could benefit from government funding by negotiating privileges, it was not too keen on selling renten. When public debt was not properly serviced, it carried the risk of reprisals undertaken by angry renteniers. The law of reprisal posed a serious threat to trade, which happened to be the number one priority of towns. The public sector carefully had to weigh whether exchanging renten for privileges would yield positive results. A complicating matter was that refusing to cooperate usually meant that competing public bodies could land a comparative advantage, by agreeing to cooperate and receiving privileges. Public debt posed a serious threat to trade. The renten collectives of towns sold in 1417 and 1418 yielded nothing but trouble: in 1418 rente-payments were already postponed and it did not take long before angered renteniers turned to the law of reprisal. 52 The next few years arrests frequently hindered trade 53, ultimately resulting in the 1423 moratorium, which provided renteniers from Brabant and Flanders with terms of payment, and the towns of Holland with the safeguards they required to keep foreign trade going. 54 Yet, the moratorium did not prevent further defaults, and at least until 1435 the public sector of Holland frequently renegotiated agreements with renteniers. 55 Considering the risks for trade, it is easy to see that towns were not too keen on contracting public debt. Whereas public debt in itself was already a potential threat to trade, collective public debt was particularly dangerous, because it created interdependence between public bodies. If one of them failed to pay out renten, they all risked reprisals, and as we will see, this was a major problem at the end of the fifteenth century, when Haarlem and Leiden defaulted, and caused other towns to suffer obstructions to trade as well. Public debt was created in a complicated socioeconomic sphere where rulers, public sector and renteniers had conflicting interests. The latter demanded strong securities to be able to seek compensation for defaults: they wanted to be able to hold as many people as possible accountable for timely payments. This is why they refused to deal directly with the counts and 52 Bos-Rops, Graven op zoek naar geld, Citizens of Leiden were arrested because of lijfrenten in Dordrecht and Delft (1426 and 1427), and Dordrecht, Gouda and Utrecht (1434). In 1430 citizens of Rotterdam were advised to pass Utrecht by because they risked being arrested because of arrears (Meerkamp van Embden, Stadsrekeningen II, 46, 51-52, , 329, 383; W.S. Unger, Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van Middelburg in den landsheerlijken tijd II (3 vols. The Hague ) 302; Z. W. Sneller, Rotterdamse poorters te Deventer en te Wilsnack anno 1430 in Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 7 th series 9 (1938) 55-84, there 55-57). 54 Bos-Rops, Graven op zoek naar geld, 172; Meerkamp van Embden, Stadsrekeningen I, This happened in 1425 (Meerkamp van Embden, Stadsrekeningen II, 39-40, 82), 1427 (Meerkamp van Embden, Stadsrekeningen II, , 224, 279), (De Blécourt & Meijers, Memorialen Rosa I-II-III, 46) and 1435 (De Blécourt & Meijers, Memorialen Rosa I-II-III, 170). 15

16 demanded that the public sector acted as intermediary. Provided that Holland merchants frequented the renteniers residences, the law of reprisal offered them good securities against eventual defaults. Collective responsibility for debt even helped to increase their security further. The public sector acted as an intermediary, and had to manoeuvre between the counts and renteniers. Although towns often agreed to cooperate, sometimes they bluntly refused to intermediate on the capital market. This happened at the end of the fourteenth century, and in 1418, when Haarlem refused to cooperate, and in 1444, when Philip the Good requested the Holland towns a loan of rijders, which the city-governments refused, because they thought it to be too risky to increase their debts. 56 Collective public debt was not in the interest of the rulers, who had to buy the cooperation of the public sector, nor was it in the interest of the public sector, which faced a potential threat to trade. Collective public debt was only in the interest of the renteniers, and this is why collective public debt was only occasionally contracted during the Late Middle Ages. 3. The introduction of gemenelandsrenten After the troublesome rente-sales in 1417 and 1418, collective public debt only reappeared in , when Maximilian of Habsburg (regent, ) asked Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden and Gouda to sell renten to pay for the war with Utrecht. 57 These were referred to as gemenelandsrenten: renten of the common land. The sale raised guilders, far more than the preceding issues of collective public funded debt. 58 Even in the sixteenth century such amounts were rarely contracted: between 1515 and 1565 only one sale raised more, at guilders. 59 It did not take long before the gemenelandsrenten caused problems: in 1486 the cities already discussed how to pay renteniers living in Flanders. They managed to pay, but the next ten years the cities defaulted on the renten and 56 Prevenier & Smit, Dagvaarten, 352, 357, ; J.C. van Loenen, De rente-last van Haarlem (unpublished manuscript available at the Rijksarchief Kennemerland) 9. In 1398 both Bergen (Hainault) and the towns of Zeeland refused to attract funds on behalf of the count (A. Janse, Grenzen aan de macht. De Friese oorlog van de graven van Holland omstreeks 1400 (The Hague 1993) ). 57 Dordrecht did not cooperate in the sale of these gemenelandsrenten: renten only secured by Haarlem, Delft, Leiden and Gouda were sold as well (Nationaal Archief (NA), Archief van de Staten van Holland (ASH), inv. nr. 618 f. 53v). 58 NA ASH, inv. nr. 102; Tracy, A financial revolution, 58 note 99. According to Van Loenen the issue raised only 7381 lb. gr. He has probably mistaken the arrears, just over 7000 guilders, with the principal sum (Van Loenen, De rente-last, 55). 59 Tracy, A financial revolution, 94 table 7. 16

17 only paid when renteniers seized merchants from Holland. 60 In 1497 the States complained with Philip the Fair ( ) about their indebtedness and the damage reprisals caused. After lengthy considerations with government officials the duke granted them a number of measures aimed at the recovery of debts contemporaries used the term Staet to refer to these measures. The most important advantage the Staet offered was a moratorium, which allowed for the postponement of payment: Philip guaranteed Holland subjects a safe journey through his realms, without risking seizure. 61 Another measure the Staet provided the States with was the cancelling of collective public debt. Shared responsibility caused solvent towns to be hindered by reprisals as much as insolvent towns, and therefore the Staet unilaterally ended collective responsibility for debt, and in stead made six towns and their surroundings responsible for their parts of the rentepayments: Item datmen die vanden eender steede off quartier van onsser voors. landen noch de inwonenden ende inghesetenen van dien niet en sal moghen aenspreken arresteren noch vervolghen voir die portie vanden anderen steden ende quartieren voors. 62 Inhabitants of one city or region of our country are not to be pursued for the debts of other cities and regions Thus, Philip the Fair and the States cancelled the law of reprisal and collective responsibility for debt. This operation clearly harmed creditworthiness and as we will see, it must be regarded as one of the main reasons why Emperor Charles V ( ) and the States of Holland had to turn to hard securities when they wanted to sell renten after The 1497 Staet was no immediate success: in 1503 the States once again defaulted on the gemenelandsrenten, in 1517 they were granted another moratorium for renten owed by the common body and individual cities, and in 1518 renteniers from Brabant and Flanders were summoned to appear in The Hague to negotiate about arrears. Renten of the ill-fated issue were only redeemed in H. Kokken, Steden en Staten. Dagvaarten van steden en Staten van Holland onder Maria van Bourgondië en het eerste regentschap van Maximiliaan van Oostenrijk ( ) (The Hague 1991), NA ASH, inv. nr. 102 f v. 62 NA, ASH, inv. nr. 102 f. 29v. 63 P.A. Meilink, Inventaris van de archieven van de Staten van Holland voor 1572 (The Hague 1929) 53, ; Tracy, A financial revolution, 58. According to Tracy, sixteenth century gemenelandsrenten were paid on time (Tracy, A financial revolution, 58, 109). 17

18 Collective public debt did not reappear before The reasons are obvious: both the States and many individual towns had had enormous problems paying renten, causing their creditworthiness to decline heavily. Especially the towns of Haarlem and Leiden remained heavily indebted until well into the sixteenth century, and as long as they and other towns still lacked funds to service collective public debt, returning to this type of funding was not an option. Moreover, in the face of the damage reprisals did to trade, willingness to intermediate between ruler and capital market was low. Only when most financial problems were resolved, and the solvency of the public sector had gradually recovered, the States once again created collective public debt. According to Tracy the 1515 issue of gemenelandsrenten started off the financial revolution. 64 Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden and Gouda issued renten in the name of the common land. These gemenelandsrenten did not differ that much from the issue of collective public debt. The ruler secured the public sector with Holland s subsidy (ordinaris bede); we have already seen that the application of future tax-revenues was not an innovation. Public debt was secured by the five cities that acted in the name of the common land, as can be read in one of the 1515 rente-contracts: welcke somme wij allen gesamenderhandt ende elck onser een voor all inde name van ons zelven ende vander gemeene landts wegen als principael sculdenaeren geloeft hebben ende geloven 65 which sum we, as main debtors, have secured together in the name of ourselves and the common land The main cities sealed the renten and were responsible for the payment. 66 The main innovation was neither the collective character, nor the use of future tax-revenues as a security, but the more centralized organization of rente-payments, which shifted to the States, 64 Tracy, A financial revolution, Regionaal Archief Leiden (RAL), Archieven Kloosters (AK), inv. nr D. Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen voor 1672 (Rotterdam 1950) The same goes for the 1482 and 1528 issues (Verloren van Themaat, Oude Dordtse lijfrenten, nr. 78; RAL AK, nr ; Tracy, A financial revolution, 59-60). 18

19 and to a lesser extent clerks of the Council of Finance and the Receiver General, who engrossed the contracts and looked for foreign buyers. 67 Although the sixteenth century did not witness the introduction of new financial techniques regarding public debt, Charles V and Philip II did manage to raise large amounts through the sale of gemenelandsrenten: guilders between 1515 and Collective public debt was created more often than in the preceding centuries: no less than 29 times between 1515 and How can we account for the rise in collective public debt in the sixteenth century? Perhaps the reason is very obvious: the gemenelandsrenten took the place of the numerous renten cities had contracted on an individual basis during the fifteenth century. The sale of renten by individual towns increased markedly in the Late Middle Ages. The wars of expansion at the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth century and the war of succession after the death of William VI in 1417, forced towns to look for funds on the capital market. When Philip the Good ascended to power, Holland entered a relatively peaceful era, during which allowed the towns to stop selling renten and reduce public debt. Public debt mounted again during the reigns of Charles the Bold ( ), Mary of Burgundy ( ) and Maximilian of Habsburg ( ). The main towns sold enormous sums worth of renten to be able to support the rulers. Unable to pay renten, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Leiden, Amsterdam and Gouda received moratoriums, which allowed them to postpone rente-payments; Delft was the only large city that did not request a moratorium. 69 Public debt was not restricted to the main cities though: even a large number of smaller cities and villages had created public debt on behalf of the central government and some of them had serious problems paying renten as well. 70 It is possible to come to a fairly good estimate of the public debt Holland towns and villages had contracted between 1477 and In 1514 government agents travelled through Holland to interview representatives of nearly all towns and villages. 71 They tried to gain insight in the economic situation to come up with a new distribution code for taxation. In Holland the 67 Tracy, A financial revolution, Tracy, A financial revolution, 62 table 4, 89 table 6, 94 table 7. I have omitted the conversion renten funded by the States of Holland (idem, 97 table 9). 69 Zuijderduijn, Medieval capital markets, Zuijderduijn, Medieval capital markets, The only region not investigated was Voorne en Putten in the South of Holland. Some villages under the jurisdiction of powerful noblemen, and therefore exempt from taxation, do not appear in the source either (R. Fruin (ed.), Informacie op den staet, faculteyt ende gelegenheyt van de steden ende dorpen van Hollant ende Vrieslant... (Leiden 1866) VI, XXVIII). 19

20 central government was not entitled to tax its subjects individually. Instead, the central government ordered each community to pay its share, based on a distribution code; next, local governments taxed subjects. 72 The government agents questioned representatives of towns and villages about the number of inhabitants, the economic situation and the way they usually levied taxes. They also asked about the financial situation, about revenues and expenses, including renten local communities had sold, and when and why they had contracted these. 73 Before we demonstrate what the Informacie can tell us about the public debt the towns and villages of Holland had created, it is important to point out that some representatives probably tried to make things look worse than they were in order to get a favourable taxassessment. Some of them clearly overacted, resulting in fine reading material about the horrors of war and natural disaster. And although they were under oath, some representatives even made false statements, especially about the number of inhabitants, the size of villages, the proportion of land owned by villagers and industrial production. 74 Representatives had fewer incentives to lie about public debt, simply because there was no clear connection between public debt and tax-assessment, and exaggerating was unlikely to yield them much. Furthermore, government agents could check statements about public finances with the accounts the public bodies kept. As a result, the Informacie seems a reliable source for our purposes. 75 The Informacie provides us with an indication of the minimum value of renten the public sector of Holland had sold between about 1477 and In 1514 the public sector owed renten worth guilders. 76 When we assume that the average rate of return was somewhere between 1:10 for lijfrenten and 1:16 for losrenten, the money the public sector had generated with these issues was between and guilders. However, this 72 Fruin, Informacie, IX-X. 73 The questionnaire the government agents used has been published by Fruin, Informacie, 4-5. Unfortunately an earlier survey on the economic situation in Holland held in 1494, the Enqueste, is less elaborate: the government agents did not explicitly ask about public debt (R. Fruin (ed.), Enqueste ende Informatie upt stuck van der reductie ende reformatie van den Schiltaelen... (Leiden 1876). 74 P.C.M. Hoppenbrouwers, Mapping an unexplored field. The Brenner debate and the case of Holland in P.C.M. Hoppenbrouwers & J.L. van Zanden, Peasants into farmers? The transformation of rural economy and society in the Low Countries (middle ages-19th century) in the light of the Brenner debate (Turnhout 2001) 41-66, there 44; H. Kaptein, De Hollandse textielnijverheid, (Hilversum 1998) 240; C. Boschma- Aarnoudse, Tot verbeteringe van de neeringe deser stade. Edam en de Zeevang in de late Middeleeuwen en de 16e eeuw (Hilversum 2003) Van der Woude, Noordegraaf and Van Zanden also concluded that the overall view the source provides seems reliable (A.M. van der Woude, Het Noorderkwartier. Een regionaal historisch onderzoek in de demografische en economische geschiedenis van westelijk Nederland van de late middeleeuwen tot het begin van de negentiende eeuw (3 vols. Wageningen 1972); L. Noordegraaf, Hollands welvaren? Levensstandaard in Holland (Bergen 1985); J.L. van Zanden, Taking the measure of the early modern economy: Historical national accounts for Holland in in European Review of Economic History 6 (2002) ). 76 Zuijderduijn, Medieval capital markets, 129 table