Certification Report

Transcription

1 Certification Report Issued by: Communications Security Establishment Certification Body Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment, 2015 Document number: CR Version: 1.0 Date: 30 June 2015 Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 11

2 DISCLAIMER The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied. - Page i of iii -

3 FOREWORD The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment. A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada. The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility. By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF. This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 30 June 2015, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report. The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project). This certification report makes reference to the following trademarks or registered trademarks: VMware is a registered trademark of VMware, Incorporated. Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety. - Page ii of iii -

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Disclaimer... i Foreword... ii Executive Summary Identification of Target of Evaluation TOE Description Security Policy Security Target Common Criteria Conformance Assumptions and Clarification of Scope SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE Evaluated Configuration Documentation Evaluation Analysis Activities ITS Product Testing ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING CONDUCT OF TESTING TESTING RESULTS Results of the Evaluation Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations References Page iii of iii -

5 Executive Summary (hereafter referred to as VMware vsphere 5.5), from, is the Target of Evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE short name meets the requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented for the evaluated security functionality. CGI IT Security Evaluation & Test Facility is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 30 June 2015 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS). The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for VMware vsphere 5.5, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report. Communications Security Establishment, as the CCS Certification Body, declares that the VMware vsphere 5.5 evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project). - Page 1 of 11 -

6 1 Identification of Target of Evaluation The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this EAL 2+ evaluation is VMware vsphere 5.5 Update 2 (hereafter referred to as VMware vsphere 5.5), from. 2 TOE Description The TOE is a system that provides an environment to host multiple virtual machines on industry standard x86-compatible hardware platforms (64-bit) and provides the management of these virtual machines. Each virtual machine acts as a physically separated guest and only communicates with other virtual machines using standard networking protocols. The vcenter Server acts as a management console server, and is responsible for deploying, monitoring, and managing virtual machines that are distributed across multiple hosts running the ESXi software. The Inventory Service maintains information about all the ESXi hosts managed by a vcenter server. vsphere Update Manager handles updates and patches for the TOE. SSO performs all authentication for vcenter users. The Syslog Collector manages system logs from distributed TOE components. On the client machines, the vsphere Client, vcli, and vsphere Web Client provide interfaces for administrators and users accessing vcenter and ESXi. A diagram of the VMware vsphere 5.5 architecture is as follows: 3 Security Policy VMware vsphere 5.5 implements a role-based access control policy to control administrative access to the system. In addition, VMware vsphere 5.5 implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes: - Page 2 of 11 -

7 Security Audit Cryptographic Support User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security Management Protection of the TOE Security Functions (TSF) Resource Utilization Virtual Machine Domain Separation TOE Access Trusted Path/Channel The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated for correct implementation in VMware vsphere 5.5: Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate # Triple-DES (3DES) FIPS , 1955, 1945, 1956, 1949 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS , 3466, 3454, 3455, 3458 Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) ANSI X , 1777, 1769, 1770, 1773 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) FIPS , 2861, 2850, 2851, 2854 Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) FIPS , 2211, 2200, 2201, 2204 Random Number Generator (RNG) ANSI X , 1385, 1377, 1380 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) FIPS , 979, 972, Security Target The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified below: Security Target, Version 0.6, 28 June Common Criteria Conformance The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. VMware vsphere 5.5 is: a. EAL 2 augmented, containing all security assurance requirements listed, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation - Page 3 of 11 -

8 b. Common Criteria Part 2 extended; with functional requirements based upon functional components in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated requirements defined in the ST: EXT_FAU_ARP.1 System event automatic response EXT_FAU_STG.1 External audit trail storage EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 vcenter SSO user login request EXT_VDS_VMM.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation c. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only upon assurance components in Part 3. 6 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope Consumers of VMware vsphere 5.5 should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE. 6.1 Secure Usage Assumptions The following Secure Usage Assumption is listed in the ST: Users are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all user guidance. 6.2 Environmental Assumptions The following Environmental Assumption is listed in the ST: VMware vsphere 5.5 will be located within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access. 6.3 Clarification of Scope VMware vsphere 5.5 incorporates CAVP-validated cryptography and was not subjected to CMVP (FIPS-140) validation. - Page 4 of 11 -

9 7 Evaluated Configuration The evaluated configuration for VMware vsphere 5.5 comprises: ESXi 5.5 Update 2 (build ) vcenter Inventory Service 5.5 Update 2 (build ) vsphere Client 5.5 Update 2 ( ) vsphere Web Client 5.5 Update 2 (build ) vsphere Web Client Integration Plugin 5.5 Update 2 (build ) vsphere Update Manager 5.5 Update 2 (build ) vcenter Server Virtual Appliance 5.5 Update 2 (build ) vcenter Server Virtual Appliance 5.5 Update 2a Patch (build ) vsphere Command-Line Interface (vcli) 5.5 Update 2 (build ) On a GPC running Windows Server 2008 R2. vcenter Server 5.5 Update 2 (build ) and vcenter Single Sign-On 5.5 Update 2 (build ) was tested as part of vcenter Server Appliance running on Suse Linux Enterprise 11. vcenter Server 5.5 Update 2 (build ) and vsphere PowerCLI 5.8 Release 1 (build ) were installed and tested on Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 64 Bit. The publications entitled VMware vsphere Installation and Setup, vsphere 5.5 Update 2 as well as VMware vsphere 5.5 Update 2 Guidance Document Supplement version 0.2 describe the procedures necessary to install and operate vsphere 5.5 Update 2 in its evaluated configuration. 8 Documentation The VMware Inc. documents provided to the consumer are as follows: a. VMware vsphere Installation and Setup, vsphere 5.5 Update 2, EN b. VMware vsphere Upgrade Guide, vsphere 5.5 Update 2, EN c. VMware vcenter Server Host Management Guide, Update 2, ESXi 5.5, vcenter 5.5, EN d. VMware vsphere Virtual Machine Administration Guide, Update 2, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN e. VMware vsphere Host Profiles Guide, Update 1, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN f. VMware vsphere Networking Guide, Update 2, vsphere 5.5, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN g. VMware vsphere Storage Guide, Update 2, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN Page 5 of 11 -

10 h. VMware vsphere Security Guide, Update 2, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN i. VMware vsphere Resource Management Guide, Update 2, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN j. VMware vsphere Availability Guide, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN k. VMware vsphere Monitoring and Performance Guide, Update 2, vsphere 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, ESXi 5.5, EN l. VMware vsphere Single Host Management Guide, Update 1, vsphere 5.5, ESXi 5.5, EN m. VMware vsphere Troubleshooting, Update 1, ESXi 5.5, vcenter Server 5.5, EN n. VMware vsphere Command-Line Interface Concepts and Examples, ESXi 5.5 Update 1, vcenter Server 5.5 Update 1, EN o. VMware Command-Line Management in vsphere 5 for Service Console Users, ESXi 5.5 Update 1, EN p. VMware vsphere Getting Started with vsphere Command Line Interfaces, ESXi 5.5 Update 1,vCenter Server 5.5 Update 1, EN q. VMware vsphere Web Services SDK Programming Guide, vsphere Web Services SDK 5.5, EN r. VMware vsphere PowerCLI User s Guide, vsphere PowerCLI 5.8 Release 1, EN s. Installing and Administering VMware vsphere Update Manager, Update 2, vsphere Update Manager 5.5, EN t. vsphere 5.5 Update 2 Guidance Documentation Supplement, Version Evaluation Analysis Activities The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of VMware vsphere 5.5, including the following areas: Development: The evaluators analyzed the VMware vsphere 5.5 functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the VMware vsphere 5.5 security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct. Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the VMware vsphere 5.5 preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and - Page 6 of 11 -

11 unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration. Life-cycle support: An analysis of the VMware vsphere 5.5 configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE short name configuration items were clearly marked. The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of TOE short name during distribution to the consumer. The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by developer for the VMware vsphere 5.5. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the product. All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts. 10 ITS Product Testing Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests Assessment of Developer Tests The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR 1. The evaluators analyzed the developer s test coverage analysis and found it to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer s test documentation and the functional specification was complete Independent Functional Testing During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation. All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the following list of test goals: a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the developer's tests; 1 The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review. - Page 7 of 11 -

12 a. Management of SSO Users: The objective of this test goal is to show that only a user with SSO Admin privileges can manage SSO Users and Identity sources; b. Reading Audit Records: The objective of this test case is to demonstrate that a valid vcenter Server User can view audit logs collected by the Syslog Collector available to the user according to the vcenter Server Access Control Policy; c. User and Role Management: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that users of different roles have different access levels; and d. Secure Communication: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate secure communication with TLS. b. Access Control on the vsphere Client, vsphere Web Client and Single Sign-On Modules: The objective of this test case is to show a user can only see the inventory objects to which he has explicitly been given permission. The test also shows that there are two distinct roles for the vcenter Server, by showing that users in the vcenter Server s Administrator role can alter permission pairs (on objects and users) which the limited access User role cannot; and c. PowerCLI VM and Authentication Manipulation: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate the management functionality present over the PowerCLI interface (as the evaluator noted that there was only account creation tested by the Vendor on this interface.) The test will demonstrate some of the other management functionality that is present over this interface such as creating a VM and demonstrate the access control is respected. Additionally the lab provides a negative test for the user authentication in this test case Independent Penetration Testing Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on: a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer vulnerabilities; b. PowerCLI Manipulation of VMs: The objective of this test case is to show that ESXi hosts have the ability to invoke operating-system-level commands on guest operating systems from the vsphere host. This raises the risk that separation of domains might be broken. The defense against this is user authentication. This test will try to bypass that authentication using users of different authorization levels available on the ESXi host, and different levels and methods for login to the guest operating system; and c. Password Guessing: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate how the TOE will react against online password guess attacks on the web interface, either by throttling attempts or logging the attack for notification of an administrator. - Page 8 of 11 -

13 The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment Conduct of Testing VMware vsphere 5.5 was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document Testing Results The developer s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that VMware vsphere 5.5 behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification. 11 Results of the Evaluation This evaluation has provided the basis for a EAL 2+ level of assurance. The overall verdict for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR. 12 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations VMware vsphere 5.5 and all its components form a complex product. Consumers of the TOE should be familiar with the excluded functionality as detailed in the Security target, section Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE. No claims are made against them and no vulnerability analysis was performed on them. The evaluator recommends that administrators of the TOE regularly review the VMware Knowledge Base, and Security Advisories, and adhere to the VMware vsphere 5.5 Update 2 Guidance Documentation Supplement. - Page 9 of 11 -

14 13 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations Acronym/Abbreviation/ Description Initialization 3DES Triple-DES AES Advanced Encryption standard CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme CPL Certified Products list CM Configuration Management DSA Digital Signature Algorithm EAL Evaluation Assurance Level ETR Evaluation Technical Report IT Information Technology ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada SFR Security Functional Requirement SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm SSO Single sign-on ST Security Target TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security Function RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman - Page 10 of 11 -

15 14 References This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report: a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September d. Security Target, Version 0.6, 28 June 2015 e. VMware Inc. VMware vsphere 5.5 Update 2 Common Criteria EAL 2+ Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 30 June Page 11 of 11 -