Makedonski Telekom CA Certificate Policy (CP) Public part of the rules defined by Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje as a certificate authority

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Makedonski Telekom CA Certificate Policy (CP) Public part of the rules defined by Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje as a certificate authority"

Transcription

1 Makedonski Telekom CA Certificate Policy (CP) Public part of the rules defined by Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje as a certificate authority

2 Document versions Document Makedonski Тelekom CA Certificate Policy (CP) Version 1.0 Date Author: Makedonski Telekom CA Operation Authority 2

3 Content 1. INTRODUCTION Overview Document name and identification PKI participants Certification authorities Makedonski Telekom CA Registration authorities (RA) Subscribers Relying parties Other participants Certificate usage Appropriate certificate uses Prohibited certificate uses Policy administration Organization administering the document Contact person Person determining CPS suitability for the policy CPS approval procedures Definitions and acronyms PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES Repositories Publication of certification information Time or frequency of publication Access controls on repositories IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION Naming Types of names Need for names to be meaningful Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Rules for interpreting various name forms Uniqueness of names Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Initial identity validation Method to prove possession of private key Authentication of organization identity Authentication of individual identity Non-verified subscriber information Validation of authority Criteria for interoperation Identification and authentication for re-key requests Identification and authentication for routine re-key Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Identification and authentication for revocation request CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Certificate Application Who can submit a certificate application Enrollment process and responsibilities Certificate application processing Performing identification and authentication functions Approval or rejection of certificate applications Time to process certificate applications Certificate issuance CA actions during certificate issuance Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate Certificate acceptance Conduct constituting certificate acceptance Publication of the certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Key pair and certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage Relying party public key and certificate usage Certificate renewal (without generating a new key) Circumstance for certificate renewal Who may request renewal Processing certificate renewal requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

4 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate re-key (renewal with generating a new key) Circumstance for certificate re-key Who may request certification of a new public key Processing certificate re-keying requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate modification Circumstance for certificate modification Who may request certificate modification Processing certificate modification requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate Publication of the modified certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate revocation and suspension Circumstances for revocation Who can request revocation Procedure for revocation request Revocation request grace period Time within which CA must process the revocation request Revocation checking requirement for relying parties CRL issuance frequency (if applicable) Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable) On-line revocation/status checking availability On-line revocation checking requirements Other forms of revocation advertisements available Special requirements regarding key compromise Circumstances for suspension Who can request suspension Procedure for suspension request Limits on suspension period Certificate status services Operational characteristics Service availability Optional features End of subscription Key escrow and recovery Key escrow and recovery policy and practices Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS Physical controls Site location and construction Physical access Power and air conditioning Water exposures Fire prevention and protection Media storage Waste disposal Off-site backup Procedural controls Trusted roles Number of persons required per task Identification and authentication for each role Roles requiring separation of duties Personnel controls Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements Background check procedures Training requirements Retraining frequency and requirements Job rotation frequency and sequence Sanctions for unauthorized actions Independent contractor requirements Documentation supplied to personnel

5 5.4. Audit logging procedures Types of events recorded Frequency of processing log Retention period for audit log Protection of audit log Audit log backup procedures Audit collection system (internal vs. external) Notification to event-causing subject Vulnerability assessments Records archival Types of records archived Retention period for archive Protection of archive Archive backup procedures Requirements for time-stamping of records Archive collection system (internal or external) Procedures to obtain and verify archive information Key changeover Compromise and disaster recovery Incident and compromise handling procedures Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted Entity private key compromise procedures Business continuity capabilities after a disaster CA or RA termination TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS Key pair generation and installation Key pair generation Private Key delivery to subscriber Public key delivery to certificate issuer CA public key delivery to relying parties Key sizes Public key parameters generation and quality checking Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls Cryptographic module standards and controls Private key (n out of m) multi-person control Private key escrow Private key backup Private key archival Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module Private key storage on cryptographic module Method of activating private key Method of deactivating private key Method of destroying private key Cryptographic Module Rating Other aspects of key pair management Public key archival Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods Activation data Activation data generation and installation Activation data protection Other aspects of activation data Computer security controls Specific computer security technical requirements Computer security rating Life cycle technical controls Development controls Security management controls Life cycle security controls Network security controls Time-stamping CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES Certificate profile Version number(s) Certificate extensions Algorithm object identifiers Name forms

6 Name constraints Certificate policy object identifier Usage of Policy Constraints extension Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension CRL profile Version number(s) CRL and CRL entry extensions OCSP profile Version number(s) OCSP extensions COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS Frequency or circumstances of assessment Identity/qualifications of assessor (internal audit) Assessor's relationship to assessed entity (internal audit) Topics covered by assessment Actions taken as a result of deficiency Communication of results OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS Fees Certificate issuance or renewal fees Certificate access fees Revocation or status information access fees Fees for other services Refund policy Financial responsibility Insurance coverage Other assets Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities Confidentiality of business information Scope of confidential information Information not within the scope of confidential information Responsibility to protect confidential information Privacy of personal information Privacy plan Information treated as private Information not deemed private Responsibility to protect private information Notice and consent to use private information Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process Other information disclosure circumstances Intellectual property rights Representations and warranties CA representations and warranties RA representations and warranties Subscriber representations and warranties Relying party representations and warranties Representations and warranties of other participants Disclaimers of warranties Limitations of liability Indemnities Term and termination Term Termination Effect of termination and survival Individual notices and communications with participants Amendments Procedure for amendment Notification mechanism and period Circumstances under which OID must be changed Dispute resolution provisions Governing law Compliance with applicable law Miscellaneous provisions Entire agreement Assignment Severability

7 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) Force Majeure Other provisions Closing part Appendix

8 1.1. Overview 1. INTRODUCTION The document herein is the public part of the rules defined by Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje, as a certificate authority. The purpose of this document is to clarify the technical, procedural and organizational activities, as well as the application of the public key infrastructure (PKI of Makedonski Telekom CA) and the implemented certification procedures, which demonstrate the confidentiality of Makedonski Telekom AD- Skopje as a public key certificate authority. This document is harmonized with the requirements of the Law on Data in Electronic Form and Electronic Signature and the by-laws adopted on the basis of the said Law. The rules defined in this document are based upon the RFC 3647 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework which contains the basis of the Certification Authority rules and is harmonized with ETSI TS Policy requirements for Certification authorities issuing qualified certificates and ETSI TS V1.2.2 ( ) Policy requirements for Certification authorities issuing public key certificates. The policy describes the public rules for the following categories of qualified certificates: Certificate category Cert Usage/backup Token Usage M - mandatory, enrolled by user O - optional, enrolled by user I - issued on tokey by CA Confidentiality KS+ Qualified DS on token M Confidentiality KS Qualified DS O Confidentiality KS++ Qualified DS issued on token I Confidentiality KSSC+ Qualified DS on token M Confidentiality KSSC++ Qualified DS on token I Confidentiality KSN+ Confidentiality KSN Qualified with two key pairs on token: DS (no recovery); KE (recovery) Qualified two key pairs: DS (no recovery); KE (recovery) Confidentiality KSS+ Qualified DS,KE (no recovery) on token M Confidentiality KSS DS,KE (no recovery) 0 Confidentiality KSS++: Confidentiality KS Non-repudiation Qualified DS,KE (no recovery) issued on token Qualified NR (no recovery, non repudiation) M O I I And the following categories of normalized certificates: Certificate category Cert Usage/backup Token Usage M - mandatory, enrolled by user O - optional, enrolled by user I - issued on tokey by CA Confidentiality NSER+ Normalized KE (with recovery) on token M Confidentiality NSER Normalized KE (with recovery) O Confidentiality NSE+ Normalized KE (no recovery)on token M 8

9 Certificate category Cert Usage/backup Token Usage M - mandatory, enrolled by user O - optional, enrolled by user I - issued on tokey by CA Confidentiality NSE Normalized KE (no recovery) O Confidentiality SSL NS Confidentiality VPN NS Confidentiality CS NS Normalized DS, KE (serverauth) Normalized DS, KE (serverauth) Normalized DS (codesign) O O O 1.2. Document name and identification This document is Makedonski Telekom Certification Authority Certificate Policy. The document can also be referenced with short name as a Makedonski Telekom CA CP. The policy herein is published on url and is publicly available. The following Object Identifiers (OIDs) are assigned to certificate categories issued under this CP: Certificate policy identification Certificate category (OID) Confidentiality KS+ OID Confidentiality KS OID Confidentiality KS++ OID Confidentiality KSSC+ OID Confidentiality KSSC++ OID Confidentiality KSN+ OID Confidentiality KSN OID Confidentiality KSS+ OID Confidentiality KSS OID Confidentiality KSS++: OID Confidentiality KS Non-repudiation OID Confidentiality NSER+ OID Confidentiality NSER OID Confidentiality NSE+ OID Confidentiality NSE OID Confidentiality SSL NS OID Confidentiality VPN NS OID Confidentiality CS NS OID PKI participants Certification authorities Makedonski Telekom CA is intended for issuing public key certificates to organizations or individuals that are outside of Makedonski Telekom AD-Skopje, as well as to be used for internal needs. 9

10 Makedonski Telekom CA operates on the basis of self-signed certificate issued by itself in the process of Root Key Generation ceremony. Makedonski Telekom CA includes people who are responsible for the overall operation of the CA and people who operate and maintain the CA server and the CA software. The CA Operation Authority (OA) is responsible for the establishment and administration of the CA Practice Statement and management of CA private cryptographic keys. The OA is responsible for reviewing the operations of the RAs. The OA reports to the PMA regarding issues of CA operation. The CA Officers are responsible for the operation and administration of the CA server and CA software. The Makedonski Telekom CA is responsible for: CA key pairs generation, the secure management of CA private keys, and the distribution of CA public keys; establishing an environment and procedure for certificate applicants to submit their certificate applications; the identification and authentication of individuals or entities applying for a certificate; the approval or rejection of certificate applications; signing and issuance of X.509 certificates binding subscribers with their public keys in response to approved certificate applications; disseminating X.509 certificates through Directories; the initiation of certificate revocations, either at the subscriber s request or upon the entity s own initiative; the revocation of certificates, including issuing and publishing Certificate Revocation Lists ( CRLs ); the identification and authentication of individuals or entities submitting requests to renew certificates or seeking a new certificate following a re-keying process, and processes set forth above for certificates issued in response to approved renewal or re-keying requests; operating the CA in accordance with MK laws and this CPS; approving and assigning individuals to fulfill PKI Officer positions; reviewing and auditing RA and LRA operations within its domain; resolving disputes between end users and the CA, RA or LRA; requesting revocation of CA Officer s and RAs' certificates. When necessary, this CPS distinguishes the different users and roles accessing the CA functions. When this distinction is not required, the term CA is used to refer to the total CA entity, including the software and its operations Makedonski Telekom CA Registration authorities (RA) Makedonski Telekom CA RA service uses two general categories of RAs. The first RA category (Local Registration Authority, or LRA) includes RAs who are responsible for performing face-to-face identity proofing and user information collection to support user enrollment and routine re-keys. The second RA category (Primary Registration Authority or PRA) includes personnel who review user information and approve registration requests. LRA functions for public certificates are performed by dedicated employees from Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje. PRA functions are performed by dedicated sales managers from Makedonski Telekom AD- Skopje. LRA officers are responsible and accountable for: 10

11 the identification and authentication of individuals or entities applying for a certificate; the identification and authentication of individuals or entities submitting requests to renew certificates or seeking a new certificate following a re-keying process, and processes set forth above for certificates issued in response to approved renewal or re-keying requests; the approval or rejection of certificate applications; verifying and confirming the identity of Subscribers; verifying data on a subscriber applications, and submitting certificate requests, key recovery requests, certificate suspension requests and certificate revocation requests to the Makedonski Telekom CA OA. PRA officers are responsible and accountable for: the approval certificate issuance; receiving from the Makedonski Telekom CA OA, and distributing, subscriber; authorization codes and assisting with subscriber activation within the prescribed time period for activation; monitoring the status of subscriber information Subscribers Subscribers of Makedonski Telekom CA are entities including natural persons (individuals) and/or legal persons (companies) that use Makedonski Telekom CA PKI services. Subscriber is a party requiring Makedonski Telekom CA certificate on behalf of one or more subjects. For example, company requiring certificate for its employees. Subject is entity identified in a certificate as the holder of the private key associated with the public key given in the certificate. The subscriber bears ultimate responsibility for the use of the private key associated with the public key certificate but the subject is the individual that is authenticated by the private key. In the case of certificates issued to individual for their own use the subscriber and subject is the same entity. Subscriber and subject (certificate holder) terms with this explicit distinction are used in this document wherever it is meaningful to do so Relying parties Relying parties are entities including natural persons (individuals) and/or legal persons (companies) that rely on a certificate and/or electronic signature verifiable with reference to a public key listed in a subject's certificate. To verify the validity of a certificate they receive, relying parties must always refer to the Makedonski Telekom CA CRL prior to relying on information in a certificate Other participants Not applicable Certificate usage Appropriate certificate uses Makedonski Telekom CA certificates may serve the following purposes: Applications requiring the use of qualified certificates in line with the Law on Data on Electronic Form and Electronic Signature of the Republic of Macedonia Article 13. Encrypt and decrypt documents in electronic form 11

12 Verify electronically signed documents Certificate holder identification Secure communication Other purposes at the request of the users and in line with the Law on Data in Electronic Form and Electronic Signature and other relevant laws in RM Prohibited certificate uses All certificates issued by the Makedonski Telekom CA shall be used in accordance with the Republic of Macedonia legislation Policy administration Organization administering the document Makedonski Telekom CA is managed by Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje Contact person Address: Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje Orce Nikolov b.b., Skopje Internet: cainfo@telekom.mk Person determining CPS suitability for the policy Not applicable CPS approval procedures Makedonski Telekom CA CP is developed and maintained by Makedonski Telekom CA Operations Authority, and approved by the Chief Executive Officer Definitions and acronyms Definitions: Electronic signature denotes a sequence of data in an electronic form, which are comprised in or logically related to other data in an electronic form and which are aimed at establishing the authenticity of the data and the identity of the signer. Advanced electronic signature is deemed as electronic signature if: It is exclusively and solely related to the signer; It provides the possibility of determining the signer with certainty; It is created by using data and devices for advanced signature which are under the full control of the signer, and It is related with the data to which it refers in a manner which enables the acknowledgement of any further modification of the data to which the signature refers or a modification of the logical relation of the data themselves. Time-stamp denotes an electronically signed certificate by the certificate authority, on certain data content at a specific time and date. Signer is the person who affixes an electronic signature, i.e. signs in an electronic form on his/her own behalf or on behalf of another legal or physical entity which he/she represents. Information system is the system used for compiling, sending, receiving, storing or other type of electronic data processing. 12

13 Signature-creation data are the only data used during the creation of the electronic signature, such as codes or private cryptographic keys. Signature-creation device is a configured program or machine equipment used for forming the electronic signature. Secure-signature-creation device - SSCD is: a device which provides unique, safe and confidential data on electronic signature, prevents the possibility of obtaining data on the electronic signature within a reasonable time and by means of reasonable devices from the data for verification of the electronic signature, ensure the protection from forgery of the electronic signature by using a currently available technology and provides for the signer to be able to safely guard the data on electronic signature against unauthorized access. Signature-validation data are the only data used in the course of the electronic signature validation, such as codes or public cryptographic keys. Signature-validation device for an electronic signature is a configured program or machine equipment which is utilized for validation of the electronic signature. Certificate is a certification in an electronic form which certifies the relation between the data for validation of the electronic signature with a certain person, the certificate subject and the identity of that person. Qualified certificate is a certificate containing the name or title and the country of the residence, i.e. the seat of the authority, the name or the title, i.e. the pseudonym of the subject or the title, i.e. the pseudonym of the information system bearing the designation of the subject, data for verification of the electronic signature which are related to the data for electronic signature, commencement and expiry of the certificate validity, certificate identification number, advanced electronic signature of the authority and possible limitations on the utilization of the certificate. Normalized certificate is a certificate having the same technical properties and offering the same level of confidentiality as the qualified certificate, however without the legal constraints of its intended purpose. Certificate authority is any legal or physical entity which issues certificates or provides other services relating to certificates, i.e. electronic signatures. Subject is any entity identified in the certificate as lessee of a private key related with a public key included in the certificate. Subscriber is a party requesting a certificate from a certificate authority on behalf of one or several subjects. The subscriber may also be a subject when issuing the certificate to an individual for personal use. Relying party is an entity which has reasonable confidence in the certificate. Computer user account - a computer user account denotes a set of attributes which enable access to the computer system for a certain person. Each user account is unique for each computer system, which is implemented by means of internal functions of the computer system. The basis for access to the user account is a pair of a user name and a password. The user name is a sequence of alpha-numeric characters which comprises an identification name of the user in a given computer system. Such identification name has to be unique on the level of the computer system. The password is also a sequence of alpha-numeric characters, which is known solely to the user account user. The user password for those computer systems which require a high level of security may be supplemented or replaced with a chip card. Encryption key pair denotes a pair of symmetric keys comprised of a public encryption key and an auxiliary private decryption key. It is also known as a confidentiality key pair. Private decryption key see Encryption key pair. 13

14 Private signing key see Encryption key pair. Public encryption key see Encryption key pair. Public dual-usage key certificate is a certificate which contains a public key that is used in parallel both for encryption and for verification. Public encryption key certificate is a certificate containing a public encryption key. Public signature verification key see Encryption key pair. Public signature verification key certificate is a certificate containing a public key for signature. Signature key pair is a pair of asymmetric key comprised of a private signature key and an auxiliary public key for signature verification. SSCD (Smart Card) is a smart card / token on which all key pairs can be stored. Abbreviations: A list of abbreviations, which are mentioned in this document and in the Policy, is given in the following table: Abbreviation Explanation ARL Authority Revocation List CA Certification Authorities CN Common Name X.500 CPS Certification Practice Statement CRL Certificate Revocation List DN Distinguished Name X.500 EAL MAKEDONSKI TELEKOM AD Skopje LRA FIPS PKCS #10 PKI PKIX PKIX-CMP Evaluation Assurance Level Makedonski Telekom AD - Skopje Local registration offices responsible employees from Makedonski Telekom AD -Skopje Federal Information Processing Standards Public-Key Cryptography Standard #10 Public Key Infrastructure X.509 based PKI PKIX-Certificate Management Protocols described in RFC 4510 RA Registration Authority X.509 Standard for electronic certificates, described in RFC

15 2.1. Repositories 2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES Makedonski Telekom CA is publishing certification services related information in the repositories on the following addresses: Public web site: LDAPv3 directory: ldap://ldap-ca.ca.telekom.mk 2.2. Publication of certification information Makedonski Telekom CA is publishing: Issued encryption certificates Partitioned and combined Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) CA s certificate Certification Policy End Users Agreements Application forms List of Local Registration Authorities Makedonski Telekom CA notices and announcements, and other certification services related public information 2.3. Time or frequency of publication Certificates are published immediately after they are issued as specified in Section 4.4. The CRL is published immediately after they are issued, and as specified in Section All information is published promptly after it is changed or becomes available to the CA Access controls on repositories All public information is accessible as read-only without restrictions. Repositories are additionally protected from unauthorized modifications. 15

16 3.1. Naming Types of names 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION The subject name attribute in the certificates issued by the Makedonski Telekom CA contains the subscriber s authenticated name as defined for a Common Name (CN) in a table in section Rules for interpreting various name forms. The certificate Subject attribute in the CA certificate and in certificates issued to subscribers is the form of X.501 Distinguished Name (DN) type. The DN is in the form of a X.501 UTF8String and it must be present in all issued certificates Need for names to be meaningful The set of certificate s subject DN attributes uniquely identifies each certificate holder and has meaningful values. The serialnumber attribute is, when present, used to differentiate between names where the subject field would otherwise be identical Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Not applicable Rules for interpreting various name forms The subject name field is defined as the X.501 type Name (x.500 Distinguished Name), in conformity with RFC Makedonski Telekom CA subject attribute and Certificate Authority attribute in the CA certificate is: Distinguished Name component Value Country (C) МК Organization (О) Makedonski Telekom Common Name (CN) Makedonski Telekom CA The x.500 Distinguished Name in the certificates issued by the Makedonski Telekom CA takes the following format: Distinguished Name component Country (C ) Organization (O ) Organizational Unit (OU ) Organizational Unit (OU ) Common Name (CN) Serial Number (serialnumber ) Value MK Makedonski Telekom Name and tax number of the legal entity; or residential optional department / level of organization unit (in a certificates issued to legal persons) Name and surname of the certificate holder when the certificate is issued to a natural persons Fully qualified domain name or IP address when for servers, services or devices, and optional unique serial number The CRL combined list announcement is of the following type: Distinguished Name component Value Country (C) МК Organization (О) Makedonski Telekom 16

17 Common Name (CN) Makedonski Telekom CA: Certificate Revocation List The announcement of the distributed CRL is of the following type: Distinguished Name component Value Country (C) МК Organization (О) Makedonski Telekom Common Name (CN) Makedonski Telekom CA Common Name (CN) CRLn (n = ordinal number in the Registry) Serial number (serialnumber) is, if used, included in the Distinguished Name as part of the multi-valued RDN (RDN = CN + serialnumber) Uniqueness of names Makedonski Telekom CA assigns in the certificate subject a combination of Distinguished Name attributes, as defined in sections and 3.1.4, to ensure un-ambiguity and uniqueness of names Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Makedonski Telekom CA will strictly adhere to the rules for assigning names given under items Types of names and meaningful names. The subscribers are forbidden to request the name of the entities which would cause a breach of the intellectual and property rights of the other subscribers. Makedonski Telekom CA makes reasonable efforts to resolve disputes that may arise over the allocation of names, e.g. the CA may contact the applicant and agree that the Common Name (CN) attribute in the subject be modified, to distinguish the DN from an existing DN. Makedonski Telekom CA may at its discretion, reject, change, re-issue or revoke certificates in relation to any DN Initial identity validation Method to prove possession of private key Proof of possession of subscriber private keys is provided via a secure exchange between the CA application and PKI client applications using Certificate Management Protocols in accordance with PKIX-CMP, or PKCS#10 in accordance with RSA PKCS#10 Certification Request Syntax Standard Authentication of organization identity An organization (legal person), wishing to become Makedonski Telekom CA subscriber, must provide sufficient evidence that the organization has the identity it claims to possess. The form for obtaining qualified digital certificate for legal entities registered for the performance of activities (on behalf of a legal entity) is filled in by the legal entity s authorized person. The authorized person or the person authorized thereby submits the completed form together with their ID documents and Power of Attorney of the legal entity verified by a notary to the authorized RA given in the list of RA. Makedonski Telekom CA will verify the identity of the authorized person as defined in section Authentication of individual identity, and his authority to act on behalf of the organization as defined in section Validation of authority. Makedonski Telekom CA keeps a records of the means by which the identity of the organization and the individual authorized to act on behalf of the organization has been verified. Makedonski Telekom CA doesn t keep the copies of the identification documentation itself. 17

18 Authentication of individual identity All individuals (natural persons), wishing to become Makedonski Telekom CA subscriber, will be verified face to face. The physical person is identified by the person in charge of registration matters by viewing a valid ID card or passport and a copy of an ID card or passport of the person requesting the certificate or service. Makedonski Telekom CA keeps a records of the means by which the identity of the individual has been verified. Makedonski Telekom CA doesn t keep the copies of the identification document itself Non-verified subscriber information Not applicable Validation of authority The individual requesting a certificate in the name of an organization (legal person) must provide valid documentation for the organizational (corporate) name that should be included in the certificate, in compliance with provisions of section Authentication of organization identity. The organizational or corporate name that should be included in the certificate must be identical to the organizational full or short name as determined in the documentation provided. Subscribers making requests for public certificates for the use on their own must be authenticated as the person identified in the certificate Criteria for interoperation Makedonski Telekom CA shall be mutually recognized with the other registered CAs of the Ministry of Finance by means of a joint contract and in accordance with the LAW ON DATA IN ELECTRONIC FORM AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE and all relevant bylaws in the Republic of Macedonia. Procedures and practices of cross-certified CAs shall be materially equivalent to the Makedonski Telekom CA procedures and practices defined in this Certificate Policy. The Makedonski Telekom CA defines detailed requirements on a case-by-case basis Identification and authentication for re-key requests Identification and authentication for routine re-key Routine rekeying takes place when the validity of the certificate or private key usage period expires. For the certificates issued and managed in accordance with PKI-CMP, a new key and its associate certificate will be generated automatically. Subscribers are authenticated using their valid digital signature key pairs. The subscribers using certificates issued and managed in accordance with PKIX#10, are authenticated as specified in sections Authentication of organization identity and Authentication of individual identity after expiration of the contract. During the Contract the new key and its associate certificates will be generated as specified in section without subscriber s certificate application and authentication Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Subscribers requesting re-key after revocation are authenticated as specified in sections Authentication of organization identity and Authentication of individual identity. This verification is performed prior to the re-key a certificate issuance. 18

19 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request Revocation requests can be made by the subscriber or certificate holders by sending a signed revocation application by surface mail or fax, in person in the CA registration authority office, or by digitally signed request, which shall be signed with the private signature key of the subject requesting revocation. Authorized individuals requesting a revocation via a signed electronic communication are authenticated on the basis of their digital signature, even when the private signing key used is suspected of having been compromised. Otherwise, authorized individuals are authenticated based on information contained in the subscriber s file or as provisioned in sections Authentication of organization identity and Authentication of individual identity. 19

20 4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Certificate Application Who can submit a certificate application Certification application for public certificates can submit: any individual (natural person) who fulfills the requirements specified in the registration form, Makedonski Telekom CA Certificate Policy and relevant End-User Agreement; any organization (legal person) that fulfills the requirements specified in the registration form, Makedonski Telekom CA Certificate Policy and relevant End-User Agreement and has valid contract between CA and Client Corporation Enrollment process and responsibilities Makedonski Telekom CA issues certificates only after subscriber s identity validation and successful completion of the registration process. The main steps of the certificate enrollment process are: Subscriber submits signed registration form and provides valid identification documentation Subscriber accepts the Makedonski Telekom CA Certificate Policy and his obligations by signing the End-User Agreement Certification request is approved by the Makedonski Telekom CA Registration Authority Registration Authority submits certification request to the Makedonski Telekom CA OA Makedonski Telekom CA OA creates a user with appropriate certificate profile and generates Activation Codes, which consist of a Reference Number and Authorization Code. BothActivation Codes are needed by the end user to request a certificate from a CA application. Activation Codes for certificate enrollment are send to a certificate's holder: o o Reference Number is ed to the subscriber on the address provided on the certificate registration form. Authorization Code is sent to subscriber using surface mail; SMS or personally provided at CA registration authority offices printed in security envelop message. The subscriber uses Activation Codes to request his certificate from the CA application, using client application provided by the Makedonski Telekom CA, or internet browser. List of supported client applications and Internet browsers is published, together with user guides; on the Makedonski Telekom CA public web page listed in section 2.1 Repositories Certificate application processing Performing identification and authentication functions Makedonski Telekom CA performs identification and authentication forms as defined in sections Authentication of organization identity and Authentication of individual identity Approval or rejection of certificate applications Certification request for Makedonski Telekom CA certificate will be approved if all of the following requirements are met: The subscriber has submitted the registration form and presented identification documentation in person; 20

21 The applicant has appropriate authorization, if acting on behalf of an organization (legal person); Registration form, provided identification documentation and authorizations has been verified successfully, The requestor has signed End-User Agreement or has valid contract between Makedonski Telekom CA and legal person. In the case that any of the criteria above is not met, or if a reasonable doubt exists that a requestor violates the provisions of this document, End-User Agreement or applicable legislation, the Makedonski Telekom CA Registration Authority will reject a certification request. Makedonski Telekom CA reserves the right to reject certification request without giving reasons Time to process certificate applications Certification request application and identification documentation are verified and processed during requestor s presence in the Makedonski Telekom CA Registration Authority office Certificate issuance CA actions during certificate issuance The Makedonski Telekom CA application will upon receipt of a certification request: verify the validity of activation codes included in the request; verify that a subscriber possesses private key associated with the public key sent for certification, as provisioned in section Method to prove possession of private key; verify the certificate requests for compliance with the protocol (PKIX-CMP or PKCS#10) technical specification. Issue the requested certificate if all of the above conditions are met Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate Makedonski Telekom CA application will present to the requestor issued certificate immediately, so there is no need for additional notification Certificate acceptance Conduct constituting certificate acceptance The certificate enrollment procedure depends on the certificate type. SSCD (smart card / Token) is delivered to the subscriber personally or by registered mail to the subscriber s address if it concerns a physical person, whereas for legal persons it is delivered to the address of the legal entity or by personal collection; The Confidentiality KSN and Confidentiality KSN+ certificates are enrolled using a PKIX- CMP protocol and appropriate application; Confidentiality KS, Confidentiality KS+, Confidentiality CS NS, Confidentiality SSL NS, and Confidentiality VPN NS certificates are enrolled using Internet Browser application. The instructions for certificate enrollment can be found on the Makedonski Telekom CA WEB page at the address The subscriber will also receive instructions by when he/she receives the reference number. The instructions themselves are subject to change in accordance with the current changes within the PKI and are not an integral part of this Policy. For successful certificate enrollment, the last published instructions are relevant. The subscriber can enroll certificate (this does not refer to the SSCD certificates) only with valid activation data: reference number and authorization code. The lifetime of activation data 21

22 is limited to 30 days. Upon the expiry of the activation data, the registration procedure needs to be repeated. In the case of unsuccessful enrollment process, certificate holder shall report the problem to the Makedonski Telekom CA RA (see RA contact information in section Contact person) Publication of the certificate by the CA Makedonski Telekom CA will publish all certificates with encryption bit set in public LDAP directory specified in section 2.1. Repositories. Certificates used only for digital signatures (only digital signature of non-repudiation bit set) will not be published Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Makedonski Telekom CA will not notify any other entities Key pair and certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage The Makedonski Telekom CA is issuing certificates that can support a number of key usages. This support is provided by the inclusion of the appropriate key usage extensions. Subscribers shall use certificates in accordance with keyusage and extkeyusage X.509 certificate extensions and for purposed defined in section Appropriate certificate uses. Subscribers must keep their private key secure, and take precautions to prevent key compromise and unauthorized usage Relying party public key and certificate usage Relying party shall restrict reliance on public keys contained in certificates issued by the Makedonski Telekom CA to appropriate use as detailed in section Appropriate certificate uses. Relying part is also responsible for: Be aware of the limitations of the certificate and the CA liability as detailed in this Policy. Ensure that the certificate has not been revoked by accessing on-line, any and all applicable Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Immediately notify the CA of any suspected or known misuse of any certificate issued by the CA Certificate renewal (without generating a new key) Certificate renewal is a process in which a CA issues new certificate for the same subject and public key. The certificate renewal in is not allowed and supported by the Makedonski Telekom CA Circumstance for certificate renewal Not supported as stated in 4.6. Certificate renewal Who may request renewal Not supported as stated in 4.6. Certificate renewal Processing certificate renewal requests Not supported as stated in 4.6. Certificate renewal Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Not supported as stated in 4.6. Certificate renewal. 22

23 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate Not supported as stated in 4.6. Certificate renewal Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA Not supported as stated in 4.6. Certificate renewal Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Not supported as stated in 4.6. Certificate renewal Certificate re-key (renewal with generating a new key) Certificate re-key is a process in which a CA issues new certificate to a subscriber. New certificate contains the same subject information as the old certificate and new public key Circumstance for certificate re-key Certificate re-key takes place: after a certificate revocation; after a certificate has expired or key usage period has expired Who may request certification of a new public key Certificate re-key may request subscriber, certificate holder or authorized representative who requested initial certificate issuance Processing certificate re-keying requests Certificate re-key of the certificates managed using PKIX-CMP is performed automatically before the holders signing private key expires. If the private key expires before the certificate re-key took place, the process is the same as for initial certificate request. Certificate re-key of the certificates managed using PKCS#10 is performed in the same manner as initial certificate request after expiration of the contract. During the Contract the new key and its associate certificates will be generated as specified in section without subscriber s certificate application and authentication Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber As described in section Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate As described in section Conduct constituting certificate acceptance Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA As described in section Publication of the certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities As described in section Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate modification Certificate modification is procedure which facilitates subscribers to request a certificate with modified information. Certificate modification mandates certificate re-key and is processed as initial certification request. 23

Gandi CA Certification Practice Statement

Gandi CA Certification Practice Statement Gandi CA Certification Practice Statement Gandi SAS 15 Place de la Nation Paris 75011 France Version 1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.INTRODUCTION...10 1.1.Overview...10 1.2.Document Name and Identification...10

More information

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.1 January, 2009 Table of Contents: TABLE OF CONTENTS:...2 1. INTRODUCTION...7 1.1 OVERVIEW...7 1.2 DOCUMENT

More information

CMS Illinois Department of Central Management Services

CMS Illinois Department of Central Management Services CMS Illinois Department of Central Management Services State of Illinois Public Key Infrastructure Certification Practices Statement For Digital Signature And Encryption Applications Version 3.3 (IETF

More information

THE RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE Certification Practice Statement For RSA Certificate Authorities (CAs) Published By: RSA Security Inc.

THE RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE Certification Practice Statement For RSA Certificate Authorities (CAs) Published By: RSA Security Inc. THE RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE Certification Practice Statement For RSA Certificate Authorities (CAs) Last Revision Date: June 28, 2007 Version: 3.0 Published By: RSA Security Inc. Copyright 2002-2007 by

More information

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.3 May 15, 2014 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS:... 2 1. INTRODUCTION... 7 1.1 OVERVIEW... 7 1.2 DOCUMENT

More information

TeliaSonera Public Root CA. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 2006-11-17. Version: Rev A. Published by: TeliaSonera Sverige AB

TeliaSonera Public Root CA. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 2006-11-17. Version: Rev A. Published by: TeliaSonera Sverige AB Document no 1/011 01-AZDA 102 213 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Certification Practice Statement Rev A TeliaSonera Public Root CA Certification Practice Statement Revision Date: 2006-11-17 Version: Rev A Published

More information

THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATE POLICY. July 2011 Version 2.0. Copyright 2006-2011, The Walt Disney Company

THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATE POLICY. July 2011 Version 2.0. Copyright 2006-2011, The Walt Disney Company THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATE POLICY July 2011 Version 2.0 Copyright 2006-2011, The Walt Disney Company Version Control Version Revision Date Revision Description Revised

More information

The Boeing Company. Boeing Commercial Airline PKI. Basic Assurance CERTIFICATE POLICY

The Boeing Company. Boeing Commercial Airline PKI. Basic Assurance CERTIFICATE POLICY The Boeing Company Boeing Commercial Airline PKI Basic Assurance CERTIFICATE POLICY Version 1.4 PA Board Approved: 7-19-2013 via e-mal PKI-233 BCA PKI Basic Assurance Certificate Policy Page 1 of 69 Signature

More information

Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CNRS/CNRS-Projets/Datagrid-fr

Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CNRS/CNRS-Projets/Datagrid-fr Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CNRS/CNRS-Projets/Datagrid-fr Version 0.3 August 2002 Online : http://www.urec.cnrs.fr/igc/doc/datagrid-fr.policy.pdf Old versions Version 0.2 :

More information

Apple Corporate Email Certificates Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Apple Inc.

Apple Corporate Email Certificates Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Apple Inc. Apple Inc. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 2.0 Effective Date: April 10, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Trademarks... 4 1.2. Table of acronyms... 4 1.3.

More information

KIBS Certification Practice Statement for non-qualified Certificates

KIBS Certification Practice Statement for non-qualified Certificates KIBS Certification Practice Statement for non-qualified Certificates Version 1.0 Effective Date: September, 2012 KIBS AD Skopje Kuzman Josifovski Pitu 1 1000, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia Phone number:

More information

VeriSign Trust Network Certificate Policies

VeriSign Trust Network Certificate Policies VeriSign Trust Network Certificate Policies Version 2.8.1 Effective Date: February 1, 2009 VeriSign, Inc. 487 E. Middlefield Road Mountain View, CA 94043 USA +1 650.961.7500 http//:www.verisign.com - 1-

More information

TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement v.1.4 TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CA name Validation OID TeliaSonera Server CA

More information

Globe Hosting Certification Authority Globe Hosting, Inc. 501 Silverside Road, Suite 105, Wilmington, DE 19809, County of New Castle, United States

Globe Hosting Certification Authority Globe Hosting, Inc. 501 Silverside Road, Suite 105, Wilmington, DE 19809, County of New Castle, United States Globe Hosting Certification Authority Globe Hosting, Inc. 501 Silverside Road, Suite 105, Wilmington, DE 19809, County of New Castle, United States www.globessl.com TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION...

More information

Neutralus Certification Practices Statement

Neutralus Certification Practices Statement Neutralus Certification Practices Statement Version 2.8 April, 2013 INDEX INDEX...1 1.0 INTRODUCTION...3 1.1 Overview...3 1.2 Policy Identification...3 1.3 Community & Applicability...3 1.4 Contact Details...3

More information

Fraunhofer Corporate PKI. Certification Practice Statement

Fraunhofer Corporate PKI. Certification Practice Statement Fraunhofer Corporate PKI Certification Practice Statement Version 1.1 Published in June 2012 Object Identifier of this Document: 1.3.6.1.4.1.778.80.3.2.1 Contact: Fraunhofer Competence Center PKI Fraunhofer

More information

EuropeanSSL Secure Certification Practice Statement

EuropeanSSL Secure Certification Practice Statement EuropeanSSL Secure Certification Practice Statement Eunetic GmbH Version 1.0 14 July 2008 Wagnerstrasse 25 76448 Durmersheim Tel: +49 (0) 180 / 386 384 2 Fax: +49 (0) 180 / 329 329 329 www.eunetic.eu TABLE

More information

SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY

SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY Document Classification: Public Version Number: 2.5 Issue Date: June 25, 2015 National Center for Digital Certification Policies and Regulations Department Digitally

More information

Malaysian Identity Federation and Access Management Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

Malaysian Identity Federation and Access Management Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Malaysian Identity Federation and Access Management Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 2.2 Document OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.36355.2.1.2.2 February 2012 Contents

More information

California Independent System Operator Certification Practice Statement for Basic Assurance Certification Authority. Version 3.

California Independent System Operator Certification Practice Statement for Basic Assurance Certification Authority. Version 3. California Independent System Operator Certification Practice Statement for Basic Assurance Certification Authority Version 3.4 April 2015 Table of Contents 1.0 INTRODUCTION... 8 1.1 OVERVIEW... 8 1.2

More information

Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.14 Effective Date: September 9, 2015

Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.14 Effective Date: September 9, 2015 Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.14 Effective Date: September 9, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 5 1.1. Trademarks...

More information

Certification Practice Statement

Certification Practice Statement FernUniversität in Hagen: Certification Authority (CA) Certification Practice Statement VERSION 1.1 Ralph Knoche 18.12.2009 Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Overview... 4 1.2. Scope of the Certification

More information

Certificate Policy. SWIFT Qualified Certificates SWIFT

Certificate Policy. SWIFT Qualified Certificates SWIFT SWIFT SWIFT Qualified Certificates Certificate Policy This Certificate Policy applies to Qualified Certificates issued by SWIFT. It indicates the requirements and procedures to be followed, and the responsibilities

More information

apple WWDR Certification Practice Statement Version 1.8 June 11, 2012 Apple Inc.

apple WWDR Certification Practice Statement Version 1.8 June 11, 2012 Apple Inc. Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.8 Effective Date: June 11, 2012 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Trademarks... 4 1.2.

More information

SSL.com Certification Practice Statement

SSL.com Certification Practice Statement SSL.com Certification Practice Statement SSL.com Version 1.0 February 15, 2012 2260 W Holcombe Blvd Ste 700 Houston, Texas, 77019 US Tel: +1 SSL-CERTIFICATE (+1-775-237-8434) Fax: +1 832-201-7706 www.ssl.com

More information

Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy

Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy Version 2.8.5 Effective Date: September 8, 2011 Symantec Corporation 350 Ellis Street Mountain View, CA 94043 USA +1 650.527.8000 http//:www.symantec.com

More information

Registration Practices Statement. Grid Registration Authority Approved December, 2011 Version 1.00

Registration Practices Statement. Grid Registration Authority Approved December, 2011 Version 1.00 Registration Practices Statement Grid Registration Authority Approved December, 2011 Version 1.00 i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction... 1 1.1. Overview... 1 1.2. Document name and Identification... 1

More information

Telia hardware based e-legitimation v2. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 10 th June 2009. Version: 1.0

Telia hardware based e-legitimation v2. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 10 th June 2009. Version: 1.0 Document no 4/011 01-AZDA 102 213 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Certification Practice Statement Rev. 1.0 Telia hardware based e-legitimation v2 Certification Practice Statement Revision Date: 10 th June 2009

More information

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Server Certificates

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Server Certificates InCommon Certification Practices Statement for Server Certificates 16 August 2010 Version 1.0 Latest version: https://www.incommon.org/cert/repository/cps_ssl.pdf This version: https://www.incommon.org/cert/repository/cps_ssl_20100816.pdf

More information

SwissSign Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for Gold Certificates

SwissSign Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for Gold Certificates SwissSign Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for Gold Certificates Version March 2004 Version 2004-03 SwissSign Gold CP/CPS Page 1 of 66 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...9 1.1 Overview...

More information

CERTIFICATE POLICY (CP) (For SSL, EV SSL, OSC and similar electronic certificates)

CERTIFICATE POLICY (CP) (For SSL, EV SSL, OSC and similar electronic certificates) (CP) (For SSL, EV SSL, OSC and similar electronic certificates) VERSION : 09 DATE : 01.12.2014 1. INTRODUCTION... 10 1.1. Overview... 10 1.2. Document Name and Identification... 11 1.3. Participants...

More information

Bangladesh Bank Certification Authority (BBCA) Certification Practice Statement (CPS)

Bangladesh Bank Certification Authority (BBCA) Certification Practice Statement (CPS) [Draft] Bangladesh Bank Certification Authority (BBCA) Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Version: 1.00 August, 2015 Bangladesh Bank Page 2 of 42 Document Reference Title Document Type Bangladesh Bank

More information

Equens Certificate Policy

Equens Certificate Policy Equens Certificate Policy WebServices and Connectivity Final H.C. van der Wijck 11 March 2015 Classification: Open Version 3.0 Version history Version no. Version date Status Edited by Most important edit(s)

More information

Ford Motor Company CA Certification Practice Statement

Ford Motor Company CA Certification Practice Statement Certification Practice Statement Date: February 21, 2008 Version: 1.0.1 Table of Contents Document History... 1 Acknowledgments... 1 1. Introduction... 2 1.1 Overview... 3 1.2 Ford Motor Company Certificate

More information

epki Root Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Version 1.2

epki Root Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Version 1.2 epki Root Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Version 1.2 Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. August 21, 2015 Contents 1. INTRODUCTION... 1 1.1 OVERVIEW... 1 1.1.1 Certification Practice Statement...

More information

ESnet SSL CA service Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0

ESnet SSL CA service Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 ESnet SSL CA service Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 June 30, 2004 Table of Contents Table of Contents...2 1 Introduction...3 1.1 Overview...3 1.1.1 General Definitions...4

More information

Getronics Certification Certificate of Authentic Trustworthy

Getronics Certification Certificate of Authentic Trustworthy Getronics Version 3.0 Effective Date: 15 october, 2008 Getronics Nederland B.V. Fauststraat 1 P.O. Box 9105 7300 HN Apeldoorn The Netherlands Phone: +31 (0)20 570 4511 http://www.pki.getronicspinkroccade.nl

More information

TREND MICRO SSL CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. Version 2.0

TREND MICRO SSL CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. Version 2.0 TREND MICRO SSL CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.0 Effective Date: 14 April 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview 1.2 Document name and identification 1.3 PKI participants 1.3.1

More information

Vodafone Group CA Web Server Certificate Policy

Vodafone Group CA Web Server Certificate Policy Vodafone Group CA Web Server Certificate Policy Publication Date: 06/09/10 Copyright 2010 Vodafone Group Table of Contents Acknowledgments... 1 1. INTRODUCTION... 2 1.1 Overview... 3 1.2 Document Name

More information

X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Root Certificate Authority and Subordinate Certificate Authorities

X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Root Certificate Authority and Subordinate Certificate Authorities X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Root Certificate Authority and Subordinate Certificate Authorities Version 5.1 May 2014 Notice to all parties seeking to rely Reliance

More information

Advantage Security Certification Practice Statement

Advantage Security Certification Practice Statement Advantage Security Certification Practice Statement Version 3.8.5 Effective Date: 01/01/2012 Advantage Security S. de R.L. de C.V. Prol. Paseo de la Reforma # 625 Int 402, Col Paseo de las Lomas. Del Alvaro

More information

Metropolitan Police Service Enterprise PKI. Root Certificate Authority, Certificate Policy. Version 6.1 10 th February 2012 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Metropolitan Police Service Enterprise PKI. Root Certificate Authority, Certificate Policy. Version 6.1 10 th February 2012 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Metropolitan Police Service Enterprise PKI Root Certificate Authority, Certificate Policy Version 6.1 10 th February 2012 Version Control Issue Release Date Comments A 02/11/07 First draft release of CP

More information

Certification Practice Statement

Certification Practice Statement Certification Practice Statement Version 2.0 Effective Date: October 1, 2006 Continovation Services Inc. (CSI) Certification Practice Statement 2006 Continovation Services Inc. All rights reserved. Trademark

More information

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Client Certificates

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Client Certificates InCommon Certification Practices Statement for Client Certificates 14 February 2011 Version 1.0 Latest version: 14 February 2011 This version: 14 February 2011 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION... 4 1.1

More information

Danske Bank Group Certificate Policy

Danske Bank Group Certificate Policy Document history Version Date Remarks 1.0 19-05-2011 finalized 1.01 15-11-2012 URL updated after web page restructuring. 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 2. Policy administration... 4 2.1 Overview...

More information

X.509 Certification Practices Statement for the U.S. Government Printing Office Principal Certification Authority (GPO-PCA)

X.509 Certification Practices Statement for the U.S. Government Printing Office Principal Certification Authority (GPO-PCA) .509 Certification Practices Statement for the U.S. Government Printing Office Principal Certification Authority (GPO-PCA) June 11, 2007 FINAL Version 1.6.1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SIGNATURE PAGE U.S. Government

More information

CA Certificate Policy. SCHEDULE 1 to the SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT

CA Certificate Policy. SCHEDULE 1 to the SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT CA Certificate Policy SCHEDULE 1 to the SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT This page is intentionally left blank. 2 ODETTE CA Certificate Policy Version Number Issue Date Changed By 1.0 1 st April 2009 Original

More information

Trusted Certificate Service

Trusted Certificate Service TCS Server and Code Signing Personal CA CPS Version 2.0 (rev 15) Page 1/40 Trusted Certificate Service TCS Server CAs, escience Server CA, and Code Signing CA Certificate Practice Statement Version 2.0

More information

ING Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Practice Statement. Version 5.3 - June 2015

ING Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Practice Statement. Version 5.3 - June 2015 ING Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Practice Statement Version 5.3 - June 2015 Colophon Commissioned by Additional copies ING Corporate PKI Policy Approval Authority Additional copies of this document

More information

E-TUGRA INFORMATIC TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES CORP (E-TUGRA)

E-TUGRA INFORMATIC TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES CORP (E-TUGRA) E-TUGRA INFORMATIC TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES CORP (E-TUGRA) QUALIFIED CERTIFICATE POLICY AND PRACTICE STATEMENT (CP-CPS) VERSION 1.0 DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE : JUNE, 2008 OID 2.16.792.3.0.4.1.1.2 E-TUGRA

More information

GARR Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Version 1.0

GARR Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Version 1.0 GARR Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 November 2006 The PDF version of this document has been signed with following PGP key: pub 1024R/5BA9D271

More information

Adobe Systems Incorporated. Adobe Root CA Certification Practice Statement. Revision #5. Revision History

Adobe Systems Incorporated. Adobe Root CA Certification Practice Statement. Revision #5. Revision History Adobe Systems Incorporated Adobe Root CA Revision #5 Revision History Rev # Date Author Description of Change(s) 1 4/1/03 Deloitte & Touche First draft 2 4/7/03 Deloitte & Touche Further refinements 3

More information

- X.509 PKI EMAIL SECURITY GATEWAY. Certificate Policy (CP) & Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Edition 1.1

- X.509 PKI EMAIL SECURITY GATEWAY. Certificate Policy (CP) & Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Edition 1.1 - X.509 PKI EMAIL SECURITY GATEWAY Certificate Policy (CP) & Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Edition 1.1 Commerzbank AG - Page 1 Document control: Title: Description : RFC Schema: Authors: Commerzbank

More information

Ericsson Group Certificate Value Statement - 2013

Ericsson Group Certificate Value Statement - 2013 COMPANY INFO 1 (23) Ericsson Group Certificate Value Statement - 2013 COMPANY INFO 2 (23) Contents 1 Ericsson Certificate Value Statement... 3 2 Introduction... 3 2.1 Overview... 3 3 Contact information...

More information

TC TrustCenter GmbH. Certification Practice Statement

TC TrustCenter GmbH. Certification Practice Statement TC TrustCenter GmbH Certification Practice Statement NOTE: The information contained in this document is the property of TC TrustCenter GmbH. This Certification Practice Statement is published in conformance

More information

Public Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement of Chunghwa Telecom (PublicCA CPS) Version 1.5

Public Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement of Chunghwa Telecom (PublicCA CPS) Version 1.5 Public Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement of Chunghwa Telecom (PublicCA CPS) Version 1.5 Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. August 21, 2015 Contents 1. INTRODUCTION... 1 1.1 OVERVIEW... 1

More information

e-tuğra CERTIFICATE POLICY E-Tuğra EBG Bilişim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.Ş. Version: 3.1 Validity Date: September, 2013 Update Date: 30/08/2013

e-tuğra CERTIFICATE POLICY E-Tuğra EBG Bilişim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.Ş. Version: 3.1 Validity Date: September, 2013 Update Date: 30/08/2013 e-tuğra CERTIFICATE POLICY E-Tuğra EBG Bilişim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.Ş. Version: 3.1 Validity Date: September, 2013 Update Date: 30/08/2013 Ceyhun Atıf Kansu Cad. 130/58 Balgat / ANKARA TURKEY

More information

TACC ROOT CA CERTIFICATE POLICY

TACC ROOT CA CERTIFICATE POLICY TACC ROOT CA CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATE PRACTICES STATEMENT (In RFC 3647 format) January 20, 2009 OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17940.5.1.1.1 Version 1.2 1 INTRODUCTION... 3 1.1 Overview...3 1.2 Document Name

More information

Operational Research Consultants, Inc. Non Federal Issuer. Certificate Policy. Version 1.0.1

Operational Research Consultants, Inc. Non Federal Issuer. Certificate Policy. Version 1.0.1 Operational Research Consultants, Inc. Non Federal Issuer Certificate Policy Version 1.0.1 Operational Research Consultants, Inc. 11250 Waples Mill Road South Tower, Suite 210 Fairfax, Virginia 22030 June

More information

phicert Direct Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement

phicert Direct Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement phicert Direct Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement Version 1. 1 Effective Date: March 31, 2014 Copyright 2013-2014 EMR Direct. All rights reserved. [Trademark Notices] phicert is a

More information

SWITCHaai Metadata CA. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

SWITCHaai Metadata CA. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement SWITCHaai Metadata CA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0, OID 2.16.756.1.2.6.7.1.0 July 15, 2008 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...6 1.1 Overview...6 1.2 Document name

More information

QUOVADIS ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY/ CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. OIDs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.

QUOVADIS ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY/ CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. OIDs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0. QUOVADIS ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY/ CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT OIDs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.3 Effective Date: 03 April 2007 Version: 4.3 Copyright QuoVadis

More information

TeliaSonera Root CA v1 Certificate Practice Statement. Published by: TeliaSonera AB

TeliaSonera Root CA v1 Certificate Practice Statement. Published by: TeliaSonera AB 2007-10-18 1 (46) TeliaSonera Root CA v1 Certificate Practice Statement Published by: TeliaSonera AB Company Information Created Modified Approved Valid from 2007-10-12 Reg. office: Printed Coverage Business

More information

L@Wtrust Class 3 Registration Authority Charter

L@Wtrust Class 3 Registration Authority Charter Class 3 Registration Authority Charter Version 1.0 applicable from 09 November 2010 Building A, Cambridge Park, 5 Bauhinia Street, Highveld Park, South Africa, 0046 Phone +27 (0)12 676 9240 Fax +27 (0)12

More information

Certificate Policy for the United States Patent and Trademark Office November 26, 2013 Version 2.5

Certificate Policy for the United States Patent and Trademark Office November 26, 2013 Version 2.5 Certificate Policy for the United States Patent and Trademark Office November 26, 2013 Prepared by: United States Patent and Trademark Office Public Key Infrastructure Policy Authority This page is intentionally

More information

HKUST CA. Certification Practice Statement

HKUST CA. Certification Practice Statement HKUST CA Certification Practice Statement IN SUPPORT OF HKUST CA CERTIFICATION SERVICES Version : 2.1 Date : 12 November 2003 Prepared by : Information Technology Services Center Hong Kong University of

More information

Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy

Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy Version 2.8.20 May 20, 2016 Symantec Corporation 350 Ellis Street Mountain View, CA 94043 USA +1 650.527.8000 www.symantec.com - i - Symantec Trust Network

More information

SSL CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT

SSL CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT SSL CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi TÜBİTAK Yerleşkesi, P.K. 74 Gebze 41470 Kocaeli, TURKEY Tel: +90 (0) 262 648 18 18 Fax: +90 (0) 262 648 18 00 www.kamusm.gov.tr

More information

thawte Certification Practice Statement

thawte Certification Practice Statement thawte Certification Practice Statement Version 3.7.5 Effective Date: 4 June, 2012 (All CA/Browser Forum-specific requirements are effective on July 1, 2012) thawte Certification Practice Statement 2012

More information

REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (RA) POLICY. Registration Authority (RA) Fulfillment Characteristics SECURITY DATA SEGURIDAD EN DATOS Y FIRMA DIGITAL, S.A.

REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (RA) POLICY. Registration Authority (RA) Fulfillment Characteristics SECURITY DATA SEGURIDAD EN DATOS Y FIRMA DIGITAL, S.A. REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (RA) POLICY Registration Authority (RA) Fulfillment Characteristics SECURITY DATA SEGURIDAD EN DATOS Y FIRMA DIGITAL, S.A. INDEX Contenido 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK... 4 1.1. Legal Base...

More information

Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement DigiCert Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement DigiCert, Inc. Version 3.03 March 15, 2007 333 South 520 West Lindon, UT 84042 USA Tel: 1-801-805-1620 Fax: 1-801-705-0481 www.digicert.com

More information

CERTIFICATE POLICY KEYNECTIS SSL CA

CERTIFICATE POLICY KEYNECTIS SSL CA CERTIFICATE POLICY KEYNECTIS SSL CA Date: 05/02/2009 KEYNECTIS SSL CA CERTIFICATE POLICY Subject: KEYNECTIS SSL CA Certificate Policy Version number: 1.1 Number of pages: 49 Status of the Project Final

More information

X.509 Certificate Policy for India PKI

X.509 Certificate Policy for India PKI X.509 Certificate Policy for India PKI Version 1.4 May 2015 Controller of Certifying Authorities Department of Information Technology Ministry of Communications and Information Technology Document Control

More information

CERTIFICATION POLICY QUEBEC CERTIFICATION CENTRE. 2015 Notarius Inc.

CERTIFICATION POLICY QUEBEC CERTIFICATION CENTRE. 2015 Notarius Inc. CERTIFICATION POLICY QUEBEC CERTIFICATION CENTRE 2015 Notarius Inc. Document Version: 4.5 OID: 2.16.124.113550 Effective Date: July 17, 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS...8 1.1 PURPOSE...8

More information

Comodo Certification Practice Statement

Comodo Certification Practice Statement Comodo Certification Practice Statement Notice: This CPS should be read in conjunction with the following documents:- * LiteSSL addendum to the Certificate Practice Statement * Proposed Amendments to the

More information

Internet Security Research Group (ISRG)

Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Certificate Policy Version 1.0 Updated May 5, 2015 Approved by ISRG Policy Management Authority ISRG Web Site: https://letsencrypt.org Page 1 of 83 Copyright Notice

More information

Comodo Certification Practice Statement

Comodo Certification Practice Statement Comodo Certification Practice Statement Comodo CA, Ltd. Version 4.1.4 Effective: August 14, 2015 3rd Floor, Office Village, Exchange Quay, Trafford Road, Salford, Manchester, M5 3EQ, United Kingdom Tel:

More information

REVENUE ON-LINE SERVICE CERTIFICATE POLICY. Document Version 1.2 Date: 15 September 2007. OID for this CP: 1.2.372.980003.1.1.1.1.

REVENUE ON-LINE SERVICE CERTIFICATE POLICY. Document Version 1.2 Date: 15 September 2007. OID for this CP: 1.2.372.980003.1.1.1.1. REVENUE ON-LINE SERVICE CERTIFICATE POLICY Document Version 1.2 Date: 15 September 2007 OID for this CP: 1.2.372.980003.1.1.1.1.1 No part of this document may be copied, reproduced, translated, or reduced

More information

Certificate Policy KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP. Emmanuel Montacutelli 12/11/2014 DMS_CP_KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP_1.2

Certificate Policy KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP. Emmanuel Montacutelli 12/11/2014 DMS_CP_KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP_1.2 Certificate Policy KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP Emmanuel Montacutelli 12/11/2014 DMS_CP_KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP_1.2 KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP Version 1.2 Pages 51 Status Draft Final Author Emmanuel Montacutelli OpenTrust

More information

Certification Practice Statement (ANZ PKI)

Certification Practice Statement (ANZ PKI) Certification Practice Statement March 2009 1. Overview 1.1 What is a Certification Practice Statement? A certification practice statement is a statement of the practices that a Certification Authority

More information

CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT UPDATE

CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT UPDATE CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT UPDATE Reference: IZENPE-CPS UPDATE Version no: v 5.03 Date: 10th March 2015 IZENPE 2015 This document is the property of Izenpe. It may only be reproduced in its entirety.

More information

GlobalSign Subscriber Agreement for DocumentSign Digital ID for Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS)

GlobalSign Subscriber Agreement for DocumentSign Digital ID for Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS) GlobalSign Subscriber Agreement for DocumentSign Digital ID for Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS) Version 1.1 PLEASE READ THIS AGREEMENT CAREFULLY BEFORE USING THE DIGITAL CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO YOU

More information

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Signature Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.2.1 version 1.5

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Signature Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.2.1 version 1.5 PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Signature Certificates OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.2.1 version 1.5 Security Department NBP Warsaw, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Overview 1 1.2 Document

More information

Land Registry. Version 4.0 10/09/2009. Certificate Policy

Land Registry. Version 4.0 10/09/2009. Certificate Policy Land Registry Version 4.0 10/09/2009 Certificate Policy Contents 1 Background 5 2 Scope 6 3 References 6 4 Definitions 7 5 General approach policy and contract responsibilities 9 5.1 Background 9 5.2

More information

Certipost Trust Services. Certificate Policy. for Lightweight Certificates for EUROCONTROL. Version 1.2. Effective date 03 May 2012

Certipost Trust Services. Certificate Policy. for Lightweight Certificates for EUROCONTROL. Version 1.2. Effective date 03 May 2012 Certipost Trust Services Version 1.2 Effective date 03 May 2012 Certipost NV ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 2 13 Definitions : Activation Data Certificate Certificate Holder Certificate Public Registry Certificate

More information

Trustwave Holdings, Inc

Trustwave Holdings, Inc Trustwave Holdings, Inc Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement Version 2.9 Effective Date: July 13, 2010 This document contains Certification Practices and Certificate Policies applicable

More information

Trusted Certificate Service (TCS)

Trusted Certificate Service (TCS) TCS Personal and escience Personal CA CPS Version 2.0 (rev 15) Page 1/40 Trusted Certificate Service (TCS) TCS Personal CA, escience Personal CA, and Document Signing CA Certificate Practice Statement

More information

National Identity Exchange Federation (NIEF) Trustmark Signing Certificate Policy. Version 1.1. February 2, 2016

National Identity Exchange Federation (NIEF) Trustmark Signing Certificate Policy. Version 1.1. February 2, 2016 National Identity Exchange Federation (NIEF) Trustmark Signing Certificate Policy Version 1.1 February 2, 2016 Copyright 2016, Georgia Tech Research Institute Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS I 1 INTRODUCTION

More information

Meeting the FDA s Requirements for Electronic Records and Electronic Signatures (21 CFR Part 11)

Meeting the FDA s Requirements for Electronic Records and Electronic Signatures (21 CFR Part 11) Meeting the FDA s Requirements for Electronic Records and Electronic Signatures (21 CFR Part 11) Executive Summary...3 Background...4 Internet Growth in the Pharmaceutical Industries...4 The Need for Security...4

More information

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Encryption Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.3.1 version 1.2

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Encryption Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.3.1 version 1.2 PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Encryption Certificates OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.3.1 version 1.2 Security Department NBP Warsaw, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Overview 1 1.2 Document

More information

PostSignum CA Certification Policy applicable to qualified personal certificates

PostSignum CA Certification Policy applicable to qualified personal certificates PostSignum CA Certification Policy applicable to qualified personal certificates Version 3.0 7565 Page 1/60 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction... 5 1.1 Review... 5 1.2 Name and clear specification of a document...

More information

3.Practices and procedures. v 1.1 05.12.2014

3.Practices and procedures. v 1.1 05.12.2014 v 1.1 05.12.2014 3.Practices and procedures DOMENY.PL Ltd / DOMENY.PL sp. z o.o. Marcika 27 30-443 Krakow, Poland tel.: (+48) 12 296 36 63 fax: (+48) 12 395 33 65 hotline / infolinia: (+48) 501 DOMENY

More information

Version 2.4 of April 25, 2008

Version 2.4 of April 25, 2008 TC TrustCenter GmbH Certificate Policy for SAFE NOTE: The information contained in this document is the property of TC TrustCenter GmbH. This Certificate Policy is published in conformance with international

More information

ehealth Ontario PKI Certification Policy Manual

ehealth Ontario PKI Certification Policy Manual ehealth Ontario PKI Certification Policy Manual Part One: Concept of Operations Part Two: Certification Policies Version: 1.1 2005 January 25 Document Control Document Identification Title Location: Maintained

More information

DigiCert Certification Practice Statement

DigiCert Certification Practice Statement DigiCert Certification Practice Statement DigiCert, Inc. Version 2.22 June 01, 2005 333 South 520 West Orem, UT 84042 USA Tel: 1-801-805-1620 Fax: 1-801-705-0481 www.digicert.com 1 General...7 1.1 DigiCert,

More information

ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES

ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES Certification Practice Statement Version: 2.13 February 12, 2016 2016 Entrust Limited. All rights reserved. Revision History Issue Date Changes in this Revision 1.0 May 26,

More information

X.509 Certification Practice Statement for the Australian Department of Defence

X.509 Certification Practice Statement for the Australian Department of Defence X.509 Certification Practice Statement for the Australian Department of Defence Version 5.1 December 2014 Document Management This document is controlled by: Changes are authorised by: Defence Public Key

More information

TELSTRA RSS CA Subscriber Agreement (SA)

TELSTRA RSS CA Subscriber Agreement (SA) TELSTRA RSS CA Subscriber Agreement (SA) Last Revision Date: December 16, 2009 Version: Published By: Telstra Corporation Ltd Copyright 2009 by Telstra Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this

More information

GlobalSign CA Certificate Policy

GlobalSign CA Certificate Policy GlobalSign CA Certificate Policy Date: December 17 th 2007 Version: v.3.0 Table of Contents Document History...1 Acknowledgments...2 1. Introduction...3 1.1 Overview...4 1.1.1 GlobalSign Rootsign...5 1.1.2

More information

INFN CA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Version 2.3

INFN CA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Version 2.3 INFN CA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 2.3 February, 12 2008 The PDF version of this document has been signed with following PGP key pub 1024R/5BA9D271 1997-11-25 Roberto

More information