Assessing the Intended and Unintended Effects of Employer Incentives in Disability Insurance: Evidence from the Netherlands

Save this PDF as:
 WORD  PNG  TXT  JPG

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Assessing the Intended and Unintended Effects of Employer Incentives in Disability Insurance: Evidence from the Netherlands"

Transcription

1 Assessing the Intended and Unintended Effects of Employer Incentives in Disability Insurance: Evidence from the Netherlands Pierre Koning (VU University, IZA, Tinbergen Institute, and Ministry of Social Affairs) Thursday March , 12:30-13:30 ELS Seminar Series OECD, Paris

2 Introduction The Netherlands stands out as a country with high Disability Insurance (DI) employer incentives Since 1998: Experience rating of DI benefits and Optingout to private insurance since 1998 Since 2004/2006: Wage continuation sick leave extended from 1 to 2 years at maximum, at the cost of the employer These measures were taken to curb DI inflow Enrolment peaked to about 12% of working population.. Employers needed to be stimulated to increase preventative and reintegration activities

3 Did these measures work?

4 This presentation Study on intended and unintended effects of experience rating (work with Nynke de Groot) Effects on DI inflow, DI outflow, and employer bankruptcies Dif-in-dif setup: experience rating abolished for time period between 2004 and 2006 Study on incentive effects of opting-out (with Wolter Hassink and Wim Zwinkels) Private insurance as a means to curb moral hazard? Decomposition of selection and incentive effects

5 Part I Assessing the impact of Experience Rating on DI inflow, DI outflow and employer bankruptcies (work in progress!)

6 Experience rating (ER) The Netherlands is one of the few countries with DI experience rating DI premiums ranged between 0 and 8% of the wage sum of firms between 2000 and 2011, with 1.5% on average Koning (2009): firms are triggered to increase prevention and reintegration after premium increase. Effect estimate: 16% less DI inflow

7 Other studies Experience rating DI: Korkeamaki and Kyyra (2012) and Kyyra and Tuomala (2013): mixed evidence on effect pension reform on DI inflow that is experience rated ER in Workers Compensation Survey: Tompa et al. (2013) Negative impact on inflow, fatalities, injuries. Positive impact on return to work Unintended: underreporting, increased lawsuits

8 Institutional setting: timeline

9 Experience rating ER is based on the employer risk, equaling the ratio of the DI benefit costs of (former) workers and the employers wage sum The DI premium is bounded by a minimum premium if the DI risk is zero, and a maximum premium to mitigate large fluctuations. The minimum and maximum premiums differ between firms that are classified as small or large

10 Experience rating: policy reforms 1998: Start of DI experience rating (ER) 2003: Removal of ER for firms with wage sum < 15 x average wage sum. 2003: Threshold for small firms increased from 15 to 25 x average wage sum 2008: Re-introduction of ER for small firms (but only partially and/or temporarily disability costs) This allows us to use a difference-indifference design with two treatment groups! (small and medium sized firms)

11 Extent of Experience Rating: share of DI costs borne by employers 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% One enrollee in DI 1 or more enrollees in DI

12 Employer and worker data, In principle, all workers (13,000,000) and employers (360,000) in this period are included in the analysis Statistics Netherlands: Individual data on DI benefits, individual data on employment, firm level data Social benefit administration: Experience rating data Note: employer DI inflow rates measured in percentage point Firm types (small, medium sized and large) are defined by their total wage sum, with 15 and 25 times the average wage sum as thresholds.

13 Empirical strategy Estimate DiD model for employer DI inflow: Control for employer size effects, year dummies, and worker characteristics Control for employer fixed effects Treatment effect: firm is small in years (=not experience rated). Estimate DiD model for worker DI outflow Similar setup, duration model (so without fixed effects) Treatment effect: individual was employed in a firm that is small in years (=not experience rated)

14 Empirical strategy, continued Estimate probability of firm quit in duration model, explained by: Time varying firm characteristics Year effects DI risk Treatment effect defined as DI risk, multiplied by years where experience rating did not apply (for small and medium sized firms only)

15 Estimated effects on DI inflow (fractional Probit model): main results Removal of ER, small firm 0.053** (0.011) Removal of ER, medium-sized firm (0.013) Small firm (0.056) Medium-sized firm (0.031) Average partial effects: removal of ER, small firm ** (0.002) removal of ER, medium-sized firm (0.0002) 0.031* (0.017) (0.026) 0.333** (0.089) 0.133** (0.049) * (0.0001) (0.0002) Number of observations 855, ,272 Number of unique employers 250, ,079

16 Estimated effects of DI outflow Cox duration model First year of DI benefit Removal of ER, small firm 0.867** (0.024) Removal of ER, mediumsized firm (0.046) Small firm 0.959* (0.020) Medium-sized firm (0.034) (0.088) (0.190) 0.966* (0.019) (0.032) First and second year of DI benefit ** (0.021) (0.042) (0.061) (0.117) (0.083) (0.164) (0.047) (0.089) Number of observations 118,806 32, ,806 32,642 Indication of size of the effect for small employers, before 2005: Removal of ER increases the probability of remaining in DI after 1 year with 2,6%-point (from 76.9% to 79.6%), after 2 years with 2.5%-point (from 69.4% to 71.8%)

17 Estimated effects on bankruptcies (duration model): main results ( ) Coefficient Standard error Difference in premium due to ER ** (0.0070) Average national premium ** (0.0101) Risk percentage ** (0.0003) Small firm ** (0.0426) Medium-sized firm (0.0458) Job openings ** (0.0019) Number of observations 423,387 Number of unique firms 115,836 Indication of size of the effect: an increase of the premium of 10% (due to ER), increases the quit rate with 0.08%-point. Note: Bankruptcies also include mergers and changes of the legal form.

18 Conclusions (preliminary) Experience rating (ER) has worked in the Netherlands, for better or for worse Substantial effects, but smaller than reforms w.r.t. the sickness waiting period (Van Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2012) Effect of ER has diminished since 2005, when the sickness waiting period has been extended to two years and DI reform started

19 Part II Assessing the Effect of Disability Insurance Opting-out to Private Insurance: Selection and/or Incentive Effects?

20 Privatization of Disability Insurance? Privatization is one way to combat moral hazard. Yet.. This may lead to incomplete insurance at worker level And: Employer experience rating may also induce incentives in case of public insurance! Next to DI experience rating, opting-out from public insurance may enhance incentives, while maintaining full insurance coverage of workers. This implies a mixed-system of DI. Two examples: Opting-out of Workers Compensation in Texas Opting-out to private insurance in the Netherlands since 1998

21 Current analysis Studies relative effectiveness of private DI providers, compared to public insurance with experience rating Measured as employer DI inflow rates for Extensive controls for (adverse) selection effects In line with public experience rating system, we distinguish between small and large employers

22 Related literature General literature on moral hazard and adverse selection in social insurance Cohen & Spiegelman 2010, Dionne et al Literature on opting-out Limited to studies on effect underreporting (Butler 1996) or motives of opting-out (Morantz 2006)

23 Conditions of opting-out After opting-out: private insurers became responsible for prevention and reintegration of workers. employers committed to private insurance for three years tail charges of current and expected DI benefit costs have to be financed by deposits (i.e., capital financing) Practically all employers that switched opted for private insurance, not self-insurance In , virtually no employers returned to UWV Probably due to strong competition on premium rates

24 Opting-out and experience rating In the public scheme, DI employer premiums were experience rated, with incomplete rating Maximum premium was higher for employers with more than 25 workers; Thus, minimum premium was lower for this sample In this setting, any premium gains of opting-out were critically determined by room for crosssubsidies.. which in turn depended on employer size!

25

26 Calculate your financial rewards instantly and choose the best insurer! We have workers in our firm that are sick for longer than six months

27 Data DI inflow and DI enrollment rates of employers for as key variables This only includes fixed term workers that are assigned to (former) employers DI recipients are only partially and/or temporarily disabled We focus on a balanced panel of about 140,000 employers Comparison of employers that have opted-out, or not. Improves efficiency of panel data models Large employer: total wage sum > 25 x average wage sum per worker

28 Selection effects?

29 Estimation strategy Private insurers and employers had some room to exploit information on DI risks, key challenge is to account for this Our research strategy aims to control for three sources of (adverse) selection: 1. Selection on time constant employer DI risks that cannot be observed by the researcher 2. Anticipation effects due to waiting period 3. Remaining anticipation effect, based on time varying information on DI risks

30 Estimation strategy in three steps 1. Control for employer fixed effects for selection on time constant unobservables 2. Use lagged value of private insurance to control for waiting period anticipation effects 3. Compare Fixed Effect and First Difference estimates of effect private insurance (vs. public insurance) as a test on further anticipation effects (Wooldridge 2002)

31 Specification i (i=1, I ) indicates the individual employer t (t=1, T ) indicates time X includes age and gender composition Y indicates the year u is the employer fixed effect ε is a residual term that is i.i.d. with (0, σ 2 )

32 Estimation results for small employers

33 Estimation results for large employers

34 Estimation results, summarized Both small and large employers: lower premiums of those who opted-out explained by sickness waiting anticipation effects Weak evidence of higher DI inflow in case of private insurance for small employers Less incentives due to higher employer coverage? Selection effects strongest in sectors with high DI risk

35 Assessing the impact of experience rating: small versus large employers Some employers may have switched from small to large in ER system, or reverse Switch implied strong increase or decrease in extent of rating Idea: perform Fixed Estimate estimation of effect of changes in experience rating on probability of private insurance.. while controlling for employer size

36

37 To conclude.. Our analysis provides consistent evidence that private insurers succeeded in attracting employers with lower DI risks, due to: Lower current DI enrollment Anticipation on DI inflow the next year No evidence on incentive effects Is likely in light of private insurance contracts Overall: no value added of opting-out, compared to public system with experience rating

Employers Opting Out of Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects?

Employers Opting Out of Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects? Employers Opting Out of Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects? Wolter Hassink UTRECHT SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND IZA KRIEKENPITPLEIN 21-22 NL 3584 EC UTRECHT THE NETHERLANDS P.O. BOX 80125

More information

Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects?

Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects? DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 9181 Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects? Wolter H.J. Hassink Pierre Koning Wim Zwinkels July 2015 Forschungsinstitut

More information

Assessing the intended and unintended. effects of disability insurance experience. rating, the case of the Netherlands

Assessing the intended and unintended. effects of disability insurance experience. rating, the case of the Netherlands Assessing the intended and unintended effects of disability insurance experience rating, the case of the Netherlands Nynke de Groot and Pierre Koning December 15, 2014 Abstract In the Netherlands, employers

More information

Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects?

Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects? TI 2015-081/V Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects? Wolter H.J. Hassink 1 Pierre Koning 2 Wim Zwinkels 3 1 Utrecht University

More information

Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute

Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Utrecht School of Economics Utrecht University Vredenburg 138 3511 BG Utrecht The Netherlands telephone +31 30 253 9800 fax

More information

Stability in sickness and disability insurance

Stability in sickness and disability insurance ISF Report 2012:15 Stability in sickness and disability insurance Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate Stockholm 2012 Inspektionen för socialförsäkringen 1 Summary The Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate

More information

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES IN DISABILITY INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS. Summary

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES IN DISABILITY INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS. Summary De Economist (2007) 155:73 98 DOI 10.1007/s10645-006-9042-x Springer 2007 DE ECONOMIST 155, NO. 1, 2007 FINANCIAL INCENTIVES IN DISABILITY INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS BY ANNEMIEK H. VAN VUREN AND DANIEL

More information

The Effects of Reducing the Entitlement Period to Unemployment Insurance Benefits

The Effects of Reducing the Entitlement Period to Unemployment Insurance Benefits DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 8336 The Effects of Reducing the Entitlement Period to Unemployment Insurance Benefits Nynke de Groot Bas van der Klaauw July 2014 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der

More information

Does Experience Rating Reduce Disability Inflow?

Does Experience Rating Reduce Disability Inflow? DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 7344 Does Experience Rating Reduce Disability Inflow? Tomi Kyyrä Juha Tuomala April 2013 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Does

More information

WCB-Alberta. 2014 Premium Rates

WCB-Alberta. 2014 Premium Rates WCB-Alberta 2014 Premium Rates Foreword The Alberta Workers Compensation Board sets premium rates annually for each industry. This guide is meant to provide a basic understanding of the process for setting

More information

Insurance Search and Switching Behaviour at the time of the Dutch Health Insurance Reform

Insurance Search and Switching Behaviour at the time of the Dutch Health Insurance Reform HEDG Working Paper 09/14 Insurance Search and Switching Behaviour at the time of the Dutch Health Insurance Reform Jonneke Bolhaar Maarten Lindeboom Bas van der Klaauw July 2009 ISSN 1751-1976 york.ac.uk/res/herc/hedgwp

More information

Free Choice of Sickness Funds in Social Health Insurance - Theoretical Foundation and Empirical Findings in Germany

Free Choice of Sickness Funds in Social Health Insurance - Theoretical Foundation and Empirical Findings in Germany Stefan Greß, Jürgen Wasem (University of Greifswald) Erik Schut (University of Rotterdam) Free Choice of Sickness Funds in Social Health Insurance - Theoretical Foundation and Empirical Findings in Germany

More information

Self-insured Plans under Health Care Reform

Self-insured Plans under Health Care Reform Brought to you by Cottingham & Butler Self-insured Plans under Health Care Reform The Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes numerous reforms affecting the health coverage that employers provide to their employees.

More information

Back to work: Employment effects of tighter Disability Insurance eligibility in the Netherlands

Back to work: Employment effects of tighter Disability Insurance eligibility in the Netherlands Back to work: Employment effects of tighter Disability Insurance eligibility in the Netherlands Silvia Garcia Mandico a, Pilar Garcia Gomez a, Anne Gielen a, Owen O Donnell a,b a Erasmus School of Economics,

More information

SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS

SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS Philip de Jong University of Amsterdam and Aarts, De Jong, Wilms & Goudriaan Public Economics B.V. Maarten Lindeboom VU University Amsterdam Tinbergen Institute

More information

Earnings responses to payroll and income taxes Exploiting variation in Dutch pension rates

Earnings responses to payroll and income taxes Exploiting variation in Dutch pension rates Earnings responses to payroll and income taxes Exploiting variation in Dutch pension rates (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) Casper van Ewijk (University of Amsterdam, CPB, Netspar)

More information

EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors

EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors As of January 1, 2014, insurers are no longer able to deny coverage or charge higher premiums based on preexisting conditions

More information

The Impact of Stricter Criteria for Disability Insurance on Labor Force Participation

The Impact of Stricter Criteria for Disability Insurance on Labor Force Participation The Impact of Stricter Criteria for Disability Insurance on Labor Force Participation Stefan Staubli University of St. Gallen, University of Zurich & Netspar November 2, 2010 Abstract This paper studies

More information

Self-insured Plans under Health Care Reform

Self-insured Plans under Health Care Reform Brought to you by Good Neighbor Insurance Self-insured Plans under Health Care Reform The Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes numerous reforms affecting the health coverage that employers provide to their

More information

Employer Participation in the Texas Workers Compensation System: 2012 Estimates

Employer Participation in the Texas Workers Compensation System: 2012 Estimates Employer Participation in the Texas Workers Compensation System: 2012 Estimates Texas Department of Insurance Workers Compensation Research and Evaluation Group October 2012 Brief History of Non-subscription

More information

Journal of Public Economics

Journal of Public Economics Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 1223 1235 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Public Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jpube The impact of stricter criteria for

More information

ACA Impact on Premium Rates in the Individual and Small Group Markets

ACA Impact on Premium Rates in the Individual and Small Group Markets ACA Impact on Premium Rates in the Individual and Small Group Markets Paul R. Houchens, FSA, MAAA BACKGROUND The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) introduces significant changes in covered

More information

)LQDQFLDO$VVXUDQFH,VVXHV RI(QYLURQPHQWDO/LDELOLW\

)LQDQFLDO$VVXUDQFH,VVXHV RI(QYLURQPHQWDO/LDELOLW\ )LQDQFLDO$VVXUDQFH,VVXHV RI(QYLURQPHQWDO/LDELOLW\ ([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\ %\ 3URI'U0LFKDHO*)DXUH//0 DQG 0U'DYLG*ULPHDXG Maastricht University and European Centre for Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL) Final version

More information

Short Term Disability: Exempt Employees

Short Term Disability: Exempt Employees Short Term Disability: Exempt Employees Eligibility Minimum Hourly Requirement Waiting Period for Benefits Elimination period Benefit Percentage Maximum Duration Definition of Earnings Successive Periods

More information

STATISTICAL BRIEF #48

STATISTICAL BRIEF #48 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey STATISTICAL BRIEF #48 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality July 24 Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Characteristics, by Payroll for the Private Sector, 22 John

More information

Insurance Search and Switching Behavior

Insurance Search and Switching Behavior Insurance Search and Switching Behavior Jonneke Bolhaar Maarten Lindeboom Bas van der Klaauw September 2009 Abstract This paper looks into the search behavior of consumers in the market for health insurance

More information

Comparative Review of Workers Compensation Systems in Select Jurisdictions

Comparative Review of Workers Compensation Systems in Select Jurisdictions of Workers Compensation Systems in Select Jurisdictions JURISDICTION: TEXAS ENVIRONMENT Population Size 19.3 million in 1997. Labour Force 8 million (1997) Demographic and Economic Indicators has enjoyed

More information

Overview of Dutch working conditions 2014. Summary

Overview of Dutch working conditions 2014. Summary Overview of Dutch working conditions 2014 Summary Overview of Dutch working conditions 2014 Summary Authors Marjolein Douwes Anita Venema Seth van den Bossche Publisher TNO, Leiden, 2015 Commissioned by

More information

Changes in legislation on disability in the Netherlands

Changes in legislation on disability in the Netherlands Changes in legislation on disability in the Netherlands Manager International Department Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes (UWV) The Netherlands In the early 1990 s, The Netherlands faced an extremely

More information

Does Texas Need a Workers Compensation System? Bill Peacock Texas Public Policy Foundation

Does Texas Need a Workers Compensation System? Bill Peacock Texas Public Policy Foundation Does Texas Need a Workers Compensation System? Bill Peacock Texas Public Policy Foundation Beginnings of Workers Compensation Liability and Litigation in the 19 th Century The problem of industrial accidents

More information

How Group Disability Income and Individual Disability Income Policies are Similar and Different

How Group Disability Income and Individual Disability Income Policies are Similar and Different Agenda Item 5.A. How Group Disability Income and Individual Disability Income Policies are Similar and Different As you review the Draft standards, you will find that in many respects provisions for group

More information

Minnesota Workers' Compensation. System Report, 2012. minnesota department of. labor & industry. research and statistics

Minnesota Workers' Compensation. System Report, 2012. minnesota department of. labor & industry. research and statistics Minnesota Workers' Compensation System Report, 2012 minnesota department of labor & industry research and statistics Minnesota Workers Compensation System Report, 2012 by David Berry (principal) Brian

More information

Short Term Disability: Exempt Employees

Short Term Disability: Exempt Employees Short Term Disability: Exempt Employees Eligibility Minimum Hourly Requirement Waiting Period for Benefits Elimination period Benefit Percentage Maximum Duration Definition of Earnings Successive Periods

More information

How eligibility criteria and entitlement characteristics of unemployment benefits affect job finding rates of elderly workers

How eligibility criteria and entitlement characteristics of unemployment benefits affect job finding rates of elderly workers How eligibility criteria and entitlement characteristics of unemployment benefits affect job finding rates of elderly workers Arjan Heyma Jan C. van Ours September 22, 2005 Abstract In the Netherlands

More information

How Sensitive are Low Income Families to Health Plan Prices?

How Sensitive are Low Income Families to Health Plan Prices? American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 100 (May 2010): 292 296 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.2.292 The Massachusetts Health Insurance Experiment: Early Experiences How

More information

Japan s Personal Insolvency Law

Japan s Personal Insolvency Law Japan s Personal Insolvency Law JUNICHI MATSUSHITA * SUMMARY I. OVERVIEW OF JAPAN S PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW: BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS...766 A.

More information

Policy Brief June 2010

Policy Brief June 2010 Policy Brief June 2010 Pension Tension: Understanding Arizona s Public Employee Retirement Plans The Arizona Chamber Foundation (501(c)3) is a non-partisan, objective educational and research foundation.

More information

Decline in Federal Disability Insurance Screening Stringency and Health Insurance Demand

Decline in Federal Disability Insurance Screening Stringency and Health Insurance Demand Decline in Federal Disability Insurance Screening Stringency and Health Insurance Demand Yue Li Siying Liu December 12, 2014 Abstract This paper proposes that the decline in federal disability insurance

More information

Financial Services Compensation Scheme

Financial Services Compensation Scheme Financial Services Compensation Scheme FSCS approach to calculating expected thirty-six month compensation costs Ff FSCS approach to calculating expected 36 month compensation costs Purpose of this paper

More information

Promoting private health insurance in Ukraine

Promoting private health insurance in Ukraine Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting in Ukraine German Advisory Group on Economic Reform Reytarska 8/5-A, 01034 Kyiv, Tel. (+38044) 278-6342, 278-6360, Fax 278-6336 E-mail: institute@ier.kiev.ua,

More information

the Affordable Care Act: What Colorado Businesses Need to Know

the Affordable Care Act: What Colorado Businesses Need to Know 22 About questions the Affordable Care Act: What Colorado Businesses Need to Know 1 What is the Affordable Care Act? Who is impacted (small, large businesses and self-insured)? The Patient Protection and

More information

THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYER BASED HEALTH INSURANCE FOLLOWING HEALTH REFORM

THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYER BASED HEALTH INSURANCE FOLLOWING HEALTH REFORM THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYER BASED HEALTH INSURANCE FOLLOWING HEALTH REFORM National Congress on Health Insurance Reform Washington, D.C., January 20, 2011 Elise Gould, PhD Health Policy Research Director Economic

More information

Navigating the Employer Mandate

Navigating the Employer Mandate Navigating the Employer Mandate The Employer Mandate is the Health Care Reform provision that requires all employers with 50 or more full time equivalent employees to offer a certain level of health insurance

More information

Bank risk taking and liquidity creation following regulatory interventions and capital support

Bank risk taking and liquidity creation following regulatory interventions and capital support following regulatory interventions and capital support ALLEN N. BERGER U N I V E R S I T Y O F S O U T H C A R O L I N A W H A R T O N F I N A N C I A L I N S T I T U T I O N S C E N T E R C e n t E R

More information

Screening disability insurance applications

Screening disability insurance applications Screening disability insurance applications Philip de Jong Maarten Lindeboom Bas van der Klaauw WORKING PAPER 2006:15 The Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) is a research institute under

More information

Netspar panel papers. Pieter Gautier and Bas van der Klaauw. Labor Market Policy and Participation over the Life Cycle

Netspar panel papers. Pieter Gautier and Bas van der Klaauw. Labor Market Policy and Participation over the Life Cycle Netspar panel papers Pieter Gautier and Bas van der Klaauw Labor Market Policy and Participation over the Life Cycle Pieter Gautier and Bas van der Klaauw Labor Market Policy and Participation over the

More information

Health care reform for large businesses

Health care reform for large businesses FOR PRODUCERS AND EMPLOYERS Health care reform for large businesses A guide to what you need to know now DECEMBER 2013 CONTENTS 2 Introduction Since 2010 when the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into

More information

Short Term Disability Insurance

Short Term Disability Insurance Short Term Disability Insurance This subsection summarizes the group Short Term Disability Insurance plan available through PEBB. It is a summary only. For full details, see the Certificate of Insurance

More information

YEL INSURANCE ENTREPRENEUR S GUIDE 2016

YEL INSURANCE ENTREPRENEUR S GUIDE 2016 ENTREPRENEUR S GUIDE 2016 CONTENTS Whom does YEL concern? 3 Effects of company form and ownership on the obligation to insure 3 Insuring family members 4 Impact of YEL income on pension and social security

More information

What determines annuity demand at retirement?

What determines annuity demand at retirement? What determines annuity demand at retirement? Giuseppe Cappelletti Giovanni Guazzarotti Pietro Tommasino Banca d Italia International Pension Workshop - Netspar 2011 Cappelletti, Guazzarotti, Tommasino

More information

Bank of Japan Review. Japanese Life Insurance Companies' Balance-Sheet Structure and Japanese Government Bond Investment. February 2013.

Bank of Japan Review. Japanese Life Insurance Companies' Balance-Sheet Structure and Japanese Government Bond Investment. February 2013. Bank of Japan Review 213-E-2 Japanese Life Insurance Companies' Balance-Sheet Structure and Japanese Government Bond Investment Financial System and Bank Examination Department Kazutoshi Kan, Yoshiyuki

More information

Insurance Risk Classification

Insurance Risk Classification Insurance Risk Classification How much is socially optimal? Pradip Tapadar University of Kent, Canterbury, UK P.Tapadar@kent.ac.uk Indian Statistical Institute, August 2015 P Tapadar (University of Kent)

More information

LONG-TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS

LONG-TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS How do We define Total Disability? LONG-TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS If the institutions are in session, Total Disability or Totally Disabled means that during the first 24 consecutive months of benefit payments

More information

Corporate Consulting Services, Ltd. Workers Compensation in Today s Environment

Corporate Consulting Services, Ltd. Workers Compensation in Today s Environment Corporate Consulting Services, Ltd. Workers Compensation in Today s Environment 2014 Corporate 2014 Corporate Consulting Consulting Services, Services, Ltd. Ltd. Forces Impacting Workers Compensation Today

More information

Why are Health Insurance Premiums So Much Higher for Public Employers Compared to Private Employers?

Why are Health Insurance Premiums So Much Higher for Public Employers Compared to Private Employers? Why are Health Insurance Premiums So Much Higher for Public Employers Compared to Private Employers? Alice Zawacki U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies Tom Buchmueller University of Michigan,

More information

pwc.com.au NT WorkSafe Actuarial review of Northern Territory workers compensation scheme as at June 2014

pwc.com.au NT WorkSafe Actuarial review of Northern Territory workers compensation scheme as at June 2014 pwc.com.au NT WorkSafe Actuarial review of Northern Territory workers compensation scheme as at June 2014 30 June 2013 Key findings Funding ratio The following table shows the funding ratio for the scheme

More information

For advisor use only. Wage Loss Replacement Plan. Insurance advisor guide

For advisor use only. Wage Loss Replacement Plan. Insurance advisor guide For advisor use only. Wage Loss Replacement Plan Insurance advisor guide Contents Importance of income protection 1 What is a Wage Loss Replacement Plan (WLRP)? 2 Advantages of a WLRP 2 Eligibility and

More information

Q+A AOW: Basic Old age pension

Q+A AOW: Basic Old age pension Q+A AOW: Basic Old age pension What is the AOW? The General Old Age Pensions Act (AOW) is a basic pension for people aged 65 and over. In addition, the AOW grants a supplementary allowance to people entitled

More information

Daemen College Health Insurance

Daemen College Health Insurance Background: Daemen College Extremely difficult budget year: Downturn in enrollment? Every FTE lost =$25,455. 10 FTE = $254,550 Minimum wage increases $8.75; $9.00; $9.70 in 2016 end of year = $40,000 Increase

More information

STATISTICAL BRIEF #98

STATISTICAL BRIEF #98 Agency for Healthcare Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Research and Quality STATISTICAL BRIEF #98 September 5 Costs to small private sector employers who offered employer-spon- sored health insurance to

More information

PAYGO systems and their problems

PAYGO systems and their problems A Global Perspective on Old Age Security Systems by Estelle James forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Global Studies, ed. H. Anheier, V. Faessel, M. Juergensmeyer. New York : Sage Publications, 2012 In pre-industrialized

More information

Earnings, Disposable Income, and Consumption of Allowed and Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants

Earnings, Disposable Income, and Consumption of Allowed and Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 8893 Earnings, Disposable Income, and Consumption of and Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants Andreas Ravndal Kostøl Magne Mogstad February 2015 Forschungsinstitut

More information

Risk Adjustment Overview

Risk Adjustment Overview Risk Adjustment Overview Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Department of Health and Human Services. May 7, 2012 CONTEXT The contents of

More information

STATISTICAL BRIEF #160

STATISTICAL BRIEF #160 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey STATISTICAL BRIEF #16 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality January 27 A Comparison of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Characteristics for the Private Sector for

More information

Your health insurance renewal is coming up.. What do I do? What should I look at? What options should I consider?

Your health insurance renewal is coming up.. What do I do? What should I look at? What options should I consider? Evaluating and Renewing Employee Health Insurance Plan Your health insurance renewal is coming up.. What do I do? What should I look at? What options should I consider? The following discusses some of

More information

STATISTICAL BRIEF #40

STATISTICAL BRIEF #40 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey STATISTICAL BRIEF #40 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality May 2004 Health Insurance Coverage and Income Levels for the U.S. Noninstitutionalized Population under

More information

MySuper consultation working group

MySuper consultation working group MySuper consultation working group Issues paper on Insurance March 2011 PROPOSED REFORMS AND OBJECTIVES New arrangements for the selection and management of the external insurance cover procured by trustees,

More information

4 Distribution of Income, Earnings and Wealth

4 Distribution of Income, Earnings and Wealth 4 Distribution of Income, Earnings and Wealth Indicator 4.1 Indicator 4.2a Indicator 4.2b Indicator 4.3a Indicator 4.3b Indicator 4.4 Indicator 4.5a Indicator 4.5b Indicator 4.6 Indicator 4.7 Income per

More information

Government Intervention in Health Insurance Markets

Government Intervention in Health Insurance Markets Florian Scheuer 4/22/2014 Government Intervention in Health Insurance Markets 1 Overview health care - institutional overview rise in health spending impact of health insurance: spending and benefits other

More information

Sickness and Disability Schemes in the Netherlands

Sickness and Disability Schemes in the Netherlands Sickness and Disability Schemes in the Netherlands Country memo as a background paper for the OECD Disability Review November 2007 www.oecd.org/els/disability 1 2 Country memo as a background paper for

More information

3. you are under the Regular Care of a Physician.

3. you are under the Regular Care of a Physician. Am I eligible? What is Long Term Disability Insurance? Why do I need Long Term Disability Insurance? What is disability? You are eligible if you are an active, full-time Employee who works at least 30

More information

An analysis of funding allocations for staff and research degree completions in the Performance-Based Research Fund

An analysis of funding allocations for staff and research degree completions in the Performance-Based Research Fund An analysis of funding allocations for staff and research degree completions in the Performance-Based Report An analysis of funding allocations for staff and research degree completions in the Performance-Based.

More information

ability to accumulate retirement resources while increasing their retirement needs; and

ability to accumulate retirement resources while increasing their retirement needs; and Consulting Retirement Consulting Talent & Rewards The Real Deal 2012 Retirement Income Adequacy at Large Companies RETIREMENT YOU ARE HERE About This Report This study assesses whether employees of large

More information

S.Y.B.COM. (SEM-III) ECONOMICS

S.Y.B.COM. (SEM-III) ECONOMICS Fill in the Blanks. Module 1 S.Y.B.COM. (SEM-III) ECONOMICS 1. The continuous flow of money and goods and services between firms and households is called the Circular Flow. 2. Saving constitute a leakage

More information

Occupational Health and Safety Surveillance of Temporary Workers in Washington State

Occupational Health and Safety Surveillance of Temporary Workers in Washington State Occupational Health and Safety Surveillance of Temporary Workers in Washington State Michael Foley SHARP Washington State Department of Labor and Industries CDC/NIOSH Grant #U60OH008487-6 Growth of Contingency

More information

Retirement routes and economic incentives to retire: a cross-country estimation approach Martin Rasmussen

Retirement routes and economic incentives to retire: a cross-country estimation approach Martin Rasmussen Retirement routes and economic incentives to retire: a cross-country estimation approach Martin Rasmussen Welfare systems and policies Working Paper 1:2005 Working Paper Socialforskningsinstituttet The

More information

How to Hire a Personal Injury Attorney

How to Hire a Personal Injury Attorney How to Hire a Personal Injury Attorney When you hire a personal injury attorney, you need to weigh your options carefully. This report was designed to help you address some of the issues you will face

More information

In preparing the February 2014 baseline budget

In preparing the February 2014 baseline budget APPENDIX B Updated Estimates of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act In preparing the February 2014 baseline budget projections, the Congressional Budget Office () and the staff

More information

Online Group Life Policy for Registered Schemes Technical Guide

Online Group Life Policy for Registered Schemes Technical Guide For commercial customers and their advisers only Online Group Life Policy for Registered Schemes Technical Guide Reference BGR/5576/SEP13 Contents Page Its aims Employers your commitment Risk factors How

More information

An explanation of social assistance, pension schemes, insurance schemes and similar concepts

An explanation of social assistance, pension schemes, insurance schemes and similar concepts From: OECD Framework for Statistics on the Distribution of Household Income, Consumption and Wealth Access the complete publication at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264194830-en An explanation of social

More information

Health Care Reform Update. Spring 2014

Health Care Reform Update. Spring 2014 Health Care Reform Update Spring 2014 Quincy Quinlan Texas Association of Counties 512 478 8753 quincyq@county.org http://www.county.org Today s Agenda Timeline Fees/Taxes Individual Mandate Marketplace

More information

Attempt of reconciliation between ESSPROS social protection statistics and EU-SILC

Attempt of reconciliation between ESSPROS social protection statistics and EU-SILC Attempt of reconciliation between ESSPROS social protection statistics and EU-SILC Gérard Abramovici* * Eurostat, Unit F3 (gerard.abramovici@ec.europa.eu) Abstract: Two Eurostat data collection, ESSPROS

More information

Estimation of. Union-Nonunion Compensation Differentials. For State and Local Government Workers

Estimation of. Union-Nonunion Compensation Differentials. For State and Local Government Workers Estimation of Union-Nonunion Compensation Differentials For State and Local Government Workers William Even Raymond E. Glos Professor of Economics Miami University Oxford, OH 45056 David Macpherson E.M.

More information

RentersPLUS Move In Special

RentersPLUS Move In Special $500.00 $658.00 $125.00 Security Deposit Insurance is for $500.00 of coverage and is a non refundable premium. Move In Savings of $375.00 by Choosing Security Deposit Insurance. $288.00 $750.00 $908.00

More information

ANTICIPATING POPULATION AGEING CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES. Peter Whiteford Social Policy Division, OECD www.oecd.org www.oecd.

ANTICIPATING POPULATION AGEING CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES. Peter Whiteford Social Policy Division, OECD www.oecd.org www.oecd. ANTICIPATING POPULATION AGEING CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES Peter Whiteford Social Policy Division, OECD www.oecd.org www.oecd.org/els Outline z z z What is the OECD and what does it do? Anticipating the challenges

More information

The Effect of Disability Insurance Benefit Cuts on Labor Supply within the Household

The Effect of Disability Insurance Benefit Cuts on Labor Supply within the Household The Effect of Disability Insurance Benefit Cuts on Labor Supply within the Household Lukas Kauer a a Center for Disability and Integration, School of Economics and Political Science, University of St.Gallen,

More information

Extract from. Études et Dossiers No. 333. M.O.R.E. 21 Seminar of The Geneva Association. Paris, 24-25 September 2007

Extract from. Études et Dossiers No. 333. M.O.R.E. 21 Seminar of The Geneva Association. Paris, 24-25 September 2007 International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics Études et Dossiers Extract from Études et Dossiers No. 333 M.O.R.E. 21 Seminar of The Geneva Association Paris, 24-25 September 2007 & 25

More information

LECTURE: HEALTH INSURANCE AND LABOR MARKETS HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 OUTLINE OF LECTURE: 1. Introduction and background

LECTURE: HEALTH INSURANCE AND LABOR MARKETS HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 OUTLINE OF LECTURE: 1. Introduction and background LECTURE: HEALTH INSURANCE AND LABOR MARKETS HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 OUTLINE OF LECTURE: 1. Introduction and background 2. Theory of health insurance and mobility Madrian Job Lock, QJE 3. Theory of

More information

Examining the adequacy of workers compensation benefits

Examining the adequacy of workers compensation benefits issue briefing Examining the adequacy of workers compensation benefits A key objective of workers compensation programs is to provide adequate compensation for lost earnings to people who experience work-related

More information

Designing public private crop insurance in Finland

Designing public private crop insurance in Finland Designing public private crop insurance in Finland Liesivaara 1, P., Meuwissen 2, M.P.M. and Myyrä 1, S 1 MTT Agrifood Research Finland 2 Business Economics, Wageningen University, the Netherlands Abstract

More information

Income Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/idd)

Income Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/idd) Income Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/idd) TERMS OF REFERENCE OECD PROJECT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOMES 2014/15 COLLECTION October 2014 The OECD income distribution questionnaire aims

More information

Assessment and recommendations

Assessment and recommendations ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Assessment and recommendations Mental ill-health represents a high cost for the Swiss economy, accounting for roughly 3.2% of GDP through lost productivity of workers

More information

Health Care Reform 101 for June 3, 2013

Health Care Reform 101 for June 3, 2013 Commercial & Personal Insurance Employee Benefits Retirement Plan Services Wealth Management Health Care Reform 101 for June 3, 2013 Requirements: Pre-HCR vs. Post-HCR Offering/Maintaining Health Insurance

More information

Casualty Actuarial Society

Casualty Actuarial Society Antitrust Notice The Casualty Actuarial Society is committed to adhering strictly to the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws. Seminars conducted under the auspices of the CAS are designed solely to

More information

Managing the financial consequences of LTC risks Christophe Courbage

Managing the financial consequences of LTC risks Christophe Courbage Managing the financial consequences of LTC risks Christophe Courbage The Geneva Association What is LTC risk? Risk of becoming dependent (functional limitation) and of needing LTC in the future LTC is

More information

Fund 60040 Health Benefits Fund

Fund 60040 Health Benefits Fund Focus Fund 60040,, is the administrative unit for the County s self insured health plans. For the self insured plans, the County pays only for claims and third party administrative fees. The cost to fund

More information

Documento de Trabajo. Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality. Time Series Evidence from Chile.

Documento de Trabajo. Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality. Time Series Evidence from Chile. Documento de Trabajo Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality. Time Series Evidence from Chile. Rodrigo Navia Carvallo 1997 El autor es Ph.D in Economics, Tulane University, EEUU. Máster of Arts in Economics,

More information

THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND YOU. An Overview for Large Groups

THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND YOU. An Overview for Large Groups THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND YOU An Overview for Large Groups TABLE OF CONTENTS Find Answers to Your Questions About Employer Mandate... 3 Access to Coverage... 5 Coverage Changes... 7 Health and Wellness

More information

Risk Aversion and Sorting into Public Sector Employment

Risk Aversion and Sorting into Public Sector Employment DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 3503 Risk Aversion and Sorting into Public Sector Employment Christian Pfeifer May 2008 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Risk

More information