North Korea s International Negotiating Behavior: Continuities and Changes. Yong-Ho Kim (Inha University, South Korea,

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1 North Korea s International Negotiating Behavior: Continuities and Changes Yong-Ho Kim (Inha University, South Korea, kimyh1358@gmail.com) This paper intends to address two major questions regarding North Korean international negotiating behavior: 1) Are North Korean negotiating behaviors unique in a sense that we can hardly find similar behaviors in the process of international negotiations of other countries?; 2) Is North Korean negotiating behavior recently changing during the Kim Jong-Il government in comparison to that of his father s government? 1. The Essence of North Korean Negotiating Style North Korea negotiating behavior is not unique, but distinctive in a sense that the country's mix of moves is different from that of other countries. Even though each move of North Korean negotiators is very similar to that of other countries' negotiators, the way in which the North Koreans carry out their international negotiations are quite different from that of other countries. A combination of some common moves which North Koreans often adopt at a variety of international negotiations is discernible. "Outmaneuvering" captures the essence of the North Korean negotiating style. North Korean negotiators very often try to outmaneuver over their counterparts by manipulating the bargaining environment with preemptive measures as well as the bargaining issues with a variety of tactics. North Korea often attempts to change the bargaining environment in its favor by using its brinkmanship tactics or other radical measures. North Korea's announcement of unilaterally withdrawing itself from the NPT in March 1993 was a good example in which such an act brought the United States to negotiate directly with North Korea in June, the same year. 1 For the purpose of outmaneuvering over their counterparts, North Koreans very often intentionally ignores or attempts to challenge the international norms and organizations as to maneuver the bargaining environment to its advantage. This behavior is quite distinct from that of many other small countries like South Korea, which are likely to accept their international 1 1) Denny Roy, "North Korea and the 'Madman' Theory," Security Dialogue, 25:3, (1994). 1

2 environments as givens. More importantly, North Korean radical acts are very calculated and intentional to outmaneuver over the country's counterparts. The country's radical acts eventually turn out to be tactical moves. Even though North Korea's radical moves appear to exclude any chance to negotiate, the country tends to seek new channels of dialogue with the counterpart country. When North Koreans are ready to negotiate, they sometimes employ positive means to manipulate the bargaining environment to their advantage. For example, North Korean leaders provided unusual hospitality to the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung in June 1994 and June 2000 respectively, in a way to lead the negotiation process. The former North Korean President Kim Il-sung unprecedentedly brought his wife to a meeting on a yacht in Pyongyang's Daedong River in order to entertain Carter and his wife. The same outmaneuvering tactic was adopted by Kim Il-sung's son, Jong-Il who surprisingly came to the Pyongyang international airport to welcome his South Korean counterpart, Kim Dae-jung. These examples strongly suggested that North Korean leaders prefer Pyongyang as their negotiation venue, when they are serious in getting the results by mobilizing their manpower and other resources in their hands as much as they can. They strongly believe that it is necessary to bring their counterparts to Pyongyang in order to persuade them for a success of negotiations. We can find many cases to prove this finding: Kim Il-sung and his son invited former Vice President of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party Kanemaru Sin, former President Jimmy Carter, former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, former United States Secretary of State Madlaine Albright to Pyongyang to manipulate them with unexpected hospitality. Since the North Korean leaders could easily mobilize resources for manipulation only when the negotiations were held in their capital city, they prefer to holding serious negotiations in Pyongyang instead of other cities of foreign countries. The second important characteristic of North Korean negotiating style is that the country's negotiators are very skillful in manipulating the agenda through escalating its demands, crafting new bargaining issues, making extortionary demands, a surprise proposal or a new initiative. North Korea's surprise proposal of replacing the graphite nuclear reactor with a light-water nuclear reactor at the second round of North Korea-US nuclear negotiations in Geneva in July 1993 was a good example. Kim Il-sung's offer of an option to Jimmy Carter of freezing the country's nuclear activities was another example. 2

3 It is no wonder that the North Korean negotiators have very often been manipulating bargaining issues during inter-korean negotiations. When North Korea finds itself uncomfortable with carrying out inter-korean negotiations, the country almost always brings an unacceptable issue as a new agenda for discussion. More importantly, North Korea has often attempted to create a new bargaining issue by partially renunciating its obligations previously agreed upon. 2 For example, North Korea has been avoiding Kim Jong-il's visit to Seoul which was previously declared as an item of June-15th summit declaration of the two Koreas, even though the North Korean authorities have currently been blaming South Korea's Lee Myungbak government for its ignorance of the June-15th declaration. It must be noted that North Korea's attempts to manipulate the bargaining environment and agenda have not always been successful. For example, in 2001, North Korea's insistence on demanding that the issue of United States compensations for the delay of constructing the light-water nuclear reactors be the top agenda for a new round of North Korea-United States negotiation failed, because the new U.S. administration led by the former President Bush abruptly rejected such a demand by setting its own agenda of North Korea's violation of the 1994 North Korea-United States nuclear Agreement. Depending upon the success or failure of North Korea's outmaneuvering attempts, the assessment of its negotiating power differs extremely. When North Korea's outmaneuvering is successful, it is highly praised "brilliant." 3 The best example is the 1994 nuclear agreement. In contrast, North Korea is highly condemned or criticized as being "recalcitrant," "intransigent," or "an international outcast" when the country's outmaneuvering is not successful. 4 North Korea's failure in its attempts to induce the United States to the negotiation of peace treaty by partially renunciating the 1953 Armistice Treaty in 1996 was such a case. 2. Comparisons of negotiating style between North Korean and other countries It is worth noting that North Korean negotiating behavior has been strongly influenced by the way in which the former Soviet and Chinese Communists carried out their negotiations in the 1950s and 60s. The Soviet and Chinese Communists once held a perception of international negotiation such that winning a battle was very important in conducting international negotiations and that manipulation was more important than persuasion. This Larry Niksch, "Comprehensive Negotiation with North Korea: A Viable Alternative (Summer 1994). author's conversation with professor Chong-Sik Lee. Chuck Downs, Over the Line: Understanding North Korea's Negotiating Strategy, (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1999). 3 for a Failed U.S. Strategy," Korea and World Affairs, Vol.18, No.2,

4 shows a sharp contrast to the way in which Western diplomats conduct international negotiations. To them, compromise is the essence of negotiation, and the craft of persuasion and the reconciliation of conflicting interests is very important. However, North Koreans do not perceive international negotiation as a problem-solving process which South Koreans and Westerners tend to do. In the latter case, the negotiators intend to seek common interests with their counterparts, given the international and domestic constraints. In contrast, North Koreans are often inclined to change the bargaining context, process, and outcomes in their favor even with internationally unacceptable means. Although the international negotiating style of North Korea is influenced by that of other Communist countries, at the same time, the former's style is also very distinctive from that of other Communist countries as well as that of other East Asian countries. Chinese Negotiating style can be characterized as one of pursuing the country's interest through old friends. 5 Chinese negotiators try to make their negotiating counterparts the friends of the Chinese people, and then demand some concessions from them as obligations of friendship. The Chinese style seems much more sophisticated, by establishing a strong personal relationship with foreigners for a longer period than the North Korean style does. On the other hand, North Korean negotiating style appears much tougher and more aggressive than the Japanese style, the essence of which can be characterized as "coping: cautiously appraising external situation, methodically weighing and sorting each and every option, deferring action on contentious issues, crafting a domestic consensus on the situation faced, making minimal adjustment or concessions in order to block, circumvent or dissolve criticism, and adapting to a situation with minimum risk." 6 3. Continuities and Changes of North Korean Negotiating Behavior During the Cold War period, no one seriously challenged to the theoretical perspective suggesting that North Korean negotiating behavior was typical of Communist style which is often characterized as that of "warrior." Like Soviet Union and Chinese Communist negotiators during the Cold-War period, North Koreans used all kinds of non-conventional tactics such as often shouting and lying, violating their promises, distorting the facts, intentional delay, and verbal threatening to win over the negotiations. Communists regarded the international negotiation as a tool of materializing socialist revolution instead of seeking the common 5 Richard Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests through 'Old Friends', (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), p Michael Blaker, Japanese Negotiating Style, unpublished manuscript, 1996, unpaged. 4

5 interests of participants in the negotiations through give-and-take. It is in a sharp contrast to that of "shopkeeper" which can be found in the non-communist negotiators. During the Cold- War period, Harold Nicholson, Fred Charles Ikle, and Karl J. Holsti strongly argued that Communist style of diplomacy and negotiation is fundamentally different from that of Western World. Their argument is shared by Admiral C. Turner Joy, Dong-bok Lee and Jong-Hwan Song who have long experience of negotiating with North Korean during the Cold-War period. Their view has still been supported by Chuck Downs, Do-tae Kim and Man-ho Heo who studied the North Korean negotiating behavior during the post Cold-War period. According to Heo, North-South Korean negotiations is still not a genuine negotiation of seeking some solutions over the dispute, but a pseudo-negotiation of attempting to propagate their cause and downgrade each other. Song has strongly argued that North Koreans still use the united front strategy to take advantage of the North-South Korean negotiations in a way to penetrate into the South Korean society for the future unification of the South under the Communist banner. North Koreans are now believed to take advantage of the North-South negotiations for buying time under the unfavorable international environment against their country, ever since the Soviet Union and other European Communist countries collapsed in the early 1990s. During the Cold War period, North Korea had very limited opportunities to get involved in negotiating with the non-communist countries, while the country has recently been actively engaged in a variety of international negotiations during the Post-Cold War period. North Korea has been actively engaged in a variety of international negotiations with South Korea, the United States, Japan, and other countries as well as many international organizations and NGOs on a wide range of agenda including denuclearization, economic and energy assistance, normalizations of bilateral relationships, in many different venues at different bilateral and multilateral modalities of negotiations. For example, North Koreans very successfully completed their nuclear negotiations with their American counterparts, which resulted in the 1994 Geneva Agreements, even though they were abolished in 2002 by the Bush administration in the wake of North Korea s violation of the Agreements by developing clandestine HEU (Highly enriched uranium) nuclear bomb. In addition, North Koreans have got involved in a variety of negotiations with South Koreans for initiating and implementing many kinds of public and private projects such as Kumkang Mountain Tourism and Gaesung Industrial Complex after the 2000 North-South Summit meeting. Scholars of North Korean and international negotiations have recently paid attention to new development of North Korean diplomacy and North-South Korean relations during the 5

6 post Cold-War period. As the modality, venue, agenda and participants of international negotiations on the part of North Koreans have been gradually expanded over the past three decades, scholars of North Korean negotiations pay attention to other theories of international negotiations, since they feel that the theory of Communist negotiation is not enough to understanding the recent process and outcomes of international negotiations participated by North Koreans. Jong-Hwan Song and Scott Snyder suggested a cultural approach, while Yong-Ho Kim and Samuel Kim employed a theory of asymmetrical negotiations to explain the North Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations. In addition, Chae-Han Kim and Leon Sigal paid attention to the game theory and a tit-for-tat strategy respectively for explaining the North Korean negotiating behavior. Even though many people have long expected any significant changes of the country s negotiating behavior in the rapidly changing post-cold War period, North Korean negotiating style has basically been the same. Since North Korea continues to keep its conception of international negotiation as a zero-sum game even during the new leadership of Kim Jong-Il after his father s death in 1994, its negotiation style of outmaneuvering cannot be expected to change in the near future. It is quite rational to assume that the inter-korean governmental negotiations will follow the existing pattern of go-and-stop which we have seen over the past three decades. In this regard, it is very hard to expect a breakthrough in fundamentally transforming the current confrontational relationship of the divided Korea into a new relationship of cooperation and peaceful coexistence through governmental negotiations in the foreseeable future. From a long-term perspective, however, I must emphasize that North Korea's negotiating style will not be fixed for the decades to come. When North Korea carries out its economic reforms and opening to the outside world in a substantial way, its negotiation style could be changed in response to its domestic and international needs. As Chinese negotiating style has gradually been changing ever since its opening to the outside world in the late 1970s, the same thing could take place in the case of North Korea. 6