1 This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5 Volume Author/Editor: Olivier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, editors Volume Publisher: MIT Press Volume ISBN: Volume URL: Conference Date: March 9-10, 1990 Publication Date: January 1990 Chapter Title: Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries Chapter Author: Francesco Giavazzi, Marco Pagano Chapter URL: Chapter pages in book: (p )
2 Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano UNIVERSITA DI BOLOGNA, CEPR, AND NBER/UNIVERSITA DI NAPOLI AND CEPR Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries* 1. Budget cuts in Europe: contractionary or expansionary? In most European countries, the high real interest rates of the early 1980s combined with the large stock of public debt inherited from the 1970s to create a potentially explosive debt problem. As governments started to tackle the problem with contractionary fiscal policies, public officials and economists voiced different beliefs about the likely effects of these measures. In Denmark, for example, while the Parliament was discussing a package of severe budget cuts in January 1983, the Ministry of Finance anticipated that the fiscal contraction would "dampen private consumption," in truly Keynesian fashion: Curtailing domestic demand will lead to a temporary increase in unemployment... and will have a dampening effect on business fixed investment.... It is to be expected that the Government's policy will secure a marked reduction in the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. (Danish Ministry of Finance, 1983) The German Council of Economic Experts, on the contrary, proposed the view that the impact of budget deficits on demand was predominantly negative (Sachverstandigenrat 1981), so that fiscal retrenchment should *We wish to thank Olivier Blanchard, Allan Drazen, Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli, Tullio Jappelli, Mervyn King, Luigi Spaventa, Niels Thygesen, and participants to the 1990 NBER Macroeconomics Annual Conference for helpful suggestions and advice. Anders Moller Christensen and Dan Knudsen of Danmarks Nationalbank have provided a wealth of data and illuminating discussions on the Danish economy. Michael Moore of the Central Bank of Ireland has spent long hours discussing with us the Irish experience. We also thank Gianluca Squassi for providing competent and enthusiastic research assistance.
3 76 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO be seen as the premise for an expansion, rather than a recession. In their retrospective account of the German fiscal consolidation, Fels and Froehlich (1986, pp ) summarize this anti-keynesian view: Fiscal consolidation had a benign impact on expectations... [An] important explanation is the way fiscal consolidation was actually brought about. Rather than raising taxes, the deficit was reduced by keeping a lid on expenditure growth... By absorbing a smaller share of GNP, the public sector made room for the private sector to expand. In a later reappraisal of that experience, Hellwig and Neumann (1987, pp ) take an eclectic stance, merging the Keynesian and the "German" views on budget cutting: According to conventional wisdom, any policy of consolidation is likely to contract real aggregate demand in the shorter run. This Keynesian conclusion, however, is misleading as it neglects the role of expectations. A more adequate analysis differentiates between the direct demand effect of cutting the growth of government expenditure and the indirect effect of an induced change in expectations. The direct demand impact of slower public expenditure growth is clearly negative... The indirect effect on aggregate demand of the initial reduction in expenditure growth occurs through an improvement in expectations if the measures taken are understood to be part of a credible medium-run program of consolidation, designed to permanently reduce the share of government in GDP... [and thus] taxation in the future. Only the empirical evidence can clarify which of these two contending views about fiscal policy is more appropriate-or, in Hellwig and Neumann's terms, how often the contractionary Keynesian effect of a spending cut prevails on its expansionary expectational effect. The aim of this paper is precisely to bring new evidence to bear on this issue: we draw on some of the data generated by the European exercise in fiscal rectitude of the 1980s, and focus on its two most extreme cases-denmark and Ireland. The European experience is especially rich, not only because the severity of budget cutting varied widely across countries, but because the relative contributions of taxes and spending to the final outcome were quite different. Figure 1 shows that some countries were able to implement a very substantial turnaround of the budget over the years 1981 to 1989 (for the United Kingdom, that was an "early starter," the interval is ). In Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, the budgetary position of the public sector improved by amounts
4 Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary?? 77 Figure 1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO FISCAL STABILIZATION Changes in the Ratio to GDP Between 1981 and IRE DK SWE BEL UK(*) GER FRA NDL ITA ESP USA _ Budget Improvement EZ1 Governmei nt Investment X] Taxes Minus Transfers Cr Interest P ayments '2l Government Consumption (*) SOURCE: OECD. Notional Income Accounts. US Gov. Inv. from IMF, Governement Finance Statistics ( ) ranging from 6.6 to 3% of GDP. In other countries, like Germany and France, the improvement in the budget was negligible, while in the Netherlands the deficit actually increased. The contribution of taxes was relatively more important in Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium, while most of the action in Germany came from cuts in current spending. In the Netherlands the effect of reduced government expenditure was more than offset by tax cuts; Italy and Spain, instead, raised spending while relying entirely on tax revenue to improve the budget-a policy that resembles that of the United States. Table 1 describes the response of real private consumption to these fiscal shocks. The regressions in the table are not to be seen as estimates of a structural model, but rather as a way to summarize the main correlations in the data. In row (1) the regressors are a constant, cyclically corrected
5 78 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO Table 1 EFFECTS OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION ON PRIVATE CONSUMPTIONa (regression on stacked data for 10 countries, ) Lagged Durbin's h C/Y* T*/Y* G/Y' M/Y* R2 sign. level Constrained estimates (1).86** -.08* -.23**.93.3E-6 (2).81** -.08* -.18*.08**.94.2E-5 Unconstrained estimates: (3).72** Belgium Denmark -.56** ** France Germany Ireland **.26** Italy * Netherl. -.63* -2.00* -.21* Spain *.27** Sweden U.K *.02 a All regressions use 170 observations. In each regression the dependent variable is real private consumption C as a share of potential output Y* (obtained by fitting an exponential trend on real GDP). T* are cyclically corrected taxes net of transfers and subsidies, G is public consumption. In regressions (2) and (3) the regressors include also real money (M2) as a share of potential output, (MIP)I Y*: in (2) its coefficient is constrained to be the same for all countries; in (3) it is left unconstrained across countries. In addition, each regression includes a constant, a proxy for the international cycle (deviations of OECD growth from trend) and country dummies on these two regressors. The corresponding estimates are not reported to save space. One (two) asterisk(s) indicates that the regressor is significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%) level. Data sources: OECD National Income Accounts, except for T*, which was provided by the EC. taxes net of transfers and subsidies,1 government consumption, and a proxy for the international cycle; in regressions (2) and (3) real money balances are also added to the list of regressors. All variables (except for the international cycle proxy) are measured relative to potential GDP. Taxes appear to correlate negatively with private consumption: in regressions (1) and (2), where the coefficients on the policy variables are constrained to be the same across countries, the coefficient on taxes is negative and significant; and it is generally negative (though often imprecisely estimated) also in regression (3), where it is left unconstrained across countries. Real money balances are positively correlated with private consumption and are often significant. 1. The cyclical correction of net taxes is intended to eliminate most of the endogeneity of taxes. Figures for cyclically corrected taxes were provided by the EC; their construction is described in European Economy, 1984, no. 22, (chapter 6).
6 Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? * 79 So far, the data are consistent with the predictions of a Keynesian textbook. Increases in government spending, however, display a negative relationship with consumption. This result hides considerable crosscountry variation; the unconstrained estimates in regression (3), show that this negative correlation is strong and significant in some of the countries where, according to Figure 1, there were sharp cuts in public spending-ireland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In no country is the coefficient of public spending positive and significant. Figure 2 provides an alternative way to describe the relationship be- tween spending cuts and private domestic demand. The figure plots yearly changes in the sum of private consumption and investment against changes in public spending, both measured relative to potential GDP. Data referring to the early and late 1980s are displayed separately, Figure 2 PRIVATE DEMAND AND PUBLIC CONSUMPTION 46 Changes Relative to Potential Output n3 x ra 1 C.) O 1.4 IR2 C 52 D2 S2 UK1 0 A f N20 1K 9 G 2 b) -2 <a 81 O, S1 N1 IR D El Average Change in Public Consumption A: Austria ( , ) B: Bolgium ( , ) 0: Weet Germany ( , ) OK: Oenmark ( ) E: Spain ( , ) F: Fronce ( , ) G; Greece ( , ) r: toaly ( , ) SOURCE: OECO, Notional Income Account lm: Ireland ( , ) N: Netherlands ( , ) NO: Norway ( , ) S: Sweden ( , ) J: Japan ( , 1985-S9) UK: United Kingdom ( , ) US; United Stotes ( , )
7 80 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO since in many countries the two subperiods have coincided with two distinct waves of spending cuts. Dates vary somewhat across countries to capture the years when fiscal action was more evident. Figure 2 shows that the recession of the early 1980s was equally severe in countries that cut public spending and those that did not. The only exception is Denmark, where the ratio of public spending to potential output fell dramatically in , but private domestic demand grew vigorously. Instead, in the recovery of the late 1980s, there seems to be a negative relationship between private domestic demand and public consumption: all the observations for this subperiod lie in the second and fourth quadrants of the figure (with the only exceptions of Spain and the United States). Among these, Ireland stands out as the most prominent example of an expansionary cut in public spending. This negative correlation between private and public spending can hardly be credited to an endogenous response of public spending to the cyclical behavior of income; our spending variable is defined as purchases of goods and services by the public sector, and does not include such cyclical components as transfers and subsidies. In addition, most accounts of the spending cuts that have occurred in Europe in the 1980s point to an exogenous shift in policy, often associated with a change in government, rather than to an endogenous response of policymakers to an improved economic performance. This suggests that the "German view" of negative fiscal multipliers cannot be easily dismissed-at least for the countries where spending cuts were sharpest. According to this view, however, what should make a difference is not only the magnitude of current spending cuts, but their expected persistence; only reductions in spending that are expected to persist can yield permanently lower taxes (Barro 1979, 1981, Feldstein 1982). To assess the expected persistence of spending cuts, we have fitted rolling univariate ARIMA processes to real government consumption series of Denmark, Ireland, and Germany; the forecasts have been used to compute the present discounted value (PDV) of predicted public consumption, that provides a measure of "permanent spending."2 The results are reported in Figure 3. For all three countries the spending cuts 2. The ARIMA processes were selected on the basis of a standard Box-Jenkins identification search. After analysing the correlation and partial autocorrelation functions of the series, we discriminated among the models on the basis of the adjusted R2, of the Q- statistics for the first ten lags of the residuals, and of in-sample predictive efficiency. This search was repeated for each year, after adding the corresponding observation. We have then used each estimated process to generate dynamic forecasts of public consumption for 150 steps (years) ahead at each date, and then computed the PDV of this flow using a 5% discount rate. A similar procedure is followed in Ahmed (1987). See also Seater and Mariano (1985).
8 Figure 3 PDV OF PREDICTED PUBLIC SPENDING Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary?? CONSTANT PRICES, 1979 = Denmork Ireland... Germ ny SOURCE: OECD, Notionol Income Accounts of the 1980s are associated with lower permanent spending. The drop is more sudden in Germany and in Denmark, where it is concentrated in 1981 and in respectively; it is rnore gradual in Ireland, where it spreads almost over the entire decade. This evidence consistently points to the experiences of Denmark and Ireland as the two most striking cases of "expansionary stabilizations" in Europe. In Denmark, the fiscal turnaround of 1982 was accompanied by an unusually strong expansion in the subsequent four years. In Ireland a similar outcome occurred during the 1987 to 1989 stabilization, although a previous attempt in the early 1980s had plunged the economy in a severe recession. Denmark and Ireland, thus, offer a good testing ground to sort out the issues. Why does the experience of Denmark so sharply contradict the Keynesian prediction about the effects of a fiscal contradiction? What accounts for the early failure and later success of the Irish stabilization?
9 82 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO The challenge posed by these experiences goes beyond the interpretation of "what really happened" in each of these countries. It offers an opportunity to identify the conditions under which severe fiscal contractions can be expansionary. This opportunity is all the more valuable because, in spite of all the discussion about the German view of fiscal policy, so far, to our knowledge, no evidence has been brought to bear on its empirical relevance. We begin, in Section 2, by reviewing the key facts about the Danish and Irish experiments, highlighting the importance of the monetary and exchange rate policies that accompanied the fiscal stabilization. Next, in Section 3, we discuss how the surge of private consumption can be related to these policy shocks. We attack this problem in two steps. In the first step, we investigate to what extent the increase in consumption can be explained by the direct effects of policy shifts, acting via changes in current taxes, spending, and asset prices. The three channels we examine are: (1) the fall in disposable income due to the increase in current taxes; (2) the wealth effect due to the fall in nominal and real interest rates; (3) the reduced provision of public services to consumers. In the second step we consider if the portion of the surge in consumption left unexplained by the change in current variables can be attributed to changes in expectations about future fiscal policy, along the lines of the German view. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss to what extent the extraordinary performance of private investment in Denmark can be related to the stabilization package. 2. Tales of two expansionary contractions The similarity among the stabilization policies adopted by Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s does not reside only in the sheer magnitude of the fiscal turnaround. In both cases, cuts in spending and tax increases were accompanied by a shift in the balance of political power, and by complementary monetary and exchange rate policies; after an initial devaluation, both countries pegged their currencies to the German mark, inducing a sharp monetary disinflation, and liberalized capital flows. Each of these complementary policy moves had an important role in determining the final outcome of the stabilization; the effects of the fiscal turnaround cannot be understood if they are not placed against the backdrop of the accompanying monetary and exchange rate policies. In the 1970s, these countries had experienced not only large budget deficits but high rates of inflation and currency depreciation. In the stabilizations of the 1980s, monetary tightening was invariably the first step of the plan: Central Banks moved first, while political parties were still
10 Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary?? 83 wrangling to gather enough social consensus to cut spending and raise taxes. The monetary contraction did not take place by reducing money supply growth, as in the United States and Britain in , but by using the exchange rate vis-a-vis the German mark as a nominal anchor. The sudden disinflation led to a deterioration of the financial position of the public sector, through the loss of seigniorage and the increase in the real cost of servicing fixed-rate debt issued when nominal interest rates were high. This heightened the sense of urgency about the need for a fiscal correction. Prompt fiscal action was required also for the success of the monetary stabilization itself, since, for the currency to be success- fully pegged to the mark, the danger of future monetization of public debt had to be ruled out. A sharp reduction of the deficit could contribute to the long-run credibility of the exchange rate, providing a signal that the government would meet its obligations via tax revenue or spending cuts, and dispense with seigniorage. 2.1 DENMARK In 1982 Danish public debt was growing rapidly (from 29% of GDP at the beginning of 1980 to 65% at the end of 1982), fueled by high real interest rates and large primary deficits (3.1% of GDP). The deficit was the result of the government's attempt to boost demand in the middle of the world recession of the early 1980s. Despite the stimulus to aggregate demand, unemployment was 4.2 percentage points higher relative to 1979, and the current account had worsened, bringing external debt from 17.5% to 33% of GDP over the same interval. In October 1982 long-term interest rates reached 22%, while inflation was only 10%; in the presence of such astronomical real interest rates, the public started questioning the sustainability of public debt, while S&P added a "credit watch" to the AAA rating of Danish foreign debt. At that time, a Conservative coalition formed a new government, and adopted a draconian program of fiscal retrenchment. Within four years, the turnaround in the full-employment primary budget was as large as 10% of GDP, of which 2.8% was accounted for by a fall in government consumption, 0.4% by cuts in government investment, and the rest by discretionary increases in taxes net of transfers.'the improvement in the actual primary budget was an even more dramatic 15.4%. As a result, the debt-gdp ratio started declining. In the monetary area, the fiscal package was accompanied by the announcement that the exchange rate of the Danish kroner versus the German mark would henceforth be fixed. The credibility of the commitment to a fixed parity was enhanced by the gains of competitiveness that Denmark had attained since the inception of the EMS through a se-
11 84 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO quence of devaluations. The new government strengthened the credibility of its announcement with two signals. A few months after coming to office (in March 1983) there was a general EMS realignment; for the first time since joining the system, the Danish authorities refrained from devaluing the kroner, and thus effectively abandoned the "weak currencies camp" (see Christensen 1986 and Andersen and Risager 1987). At the same time, they removed exchange controls; restrictions on capital inflows were abolished immediately, and controls on outflows were phased out over the subsequent two years (Thygesen 1985). The term structure of Danish interest rates around the announcement of the stabilization, shown in Figure 4, offers some evidence on the credibility of the new policy. When the government passed the test of the March 1983 realignment, the long-term interest rate fell sharply-by 5.5% in two months. (The gap with German rates, however, did not actually close; as late as 1986, the differential was still 4.6%.) As mentioned in Section 1, rather than reducing aggregate demand and income, the severe Danish contraction was accompanied by an average growth of 3.6% in real GDP over the years from 1983 to Growth was driven by domestic demand; private consumption increased rapidly Figure 4 DENMARK: THE TERM STRUCTURE ",,, Oct 82 Mar vern 3 months 2 years 5 yeors 10 years 20 yeors 30 years SOURCE: Danmorks Nationalbonk, Monetory Review
12 Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary?? 85 in spite of the reduction of disposable income due to higher taxes, and investment boomed spectacularly (see Table 2). In the econometric model of the Danish Central Bank, the increase in consumption appears to be remarkably well tracked by its correlation with wealth (Christensen 1988). In fact, as shown by Figure 5, consump- Table 2 KEY STATISTICS ON THE DANISH AND IRISH STABILIZATIONSa (percentage values per year) Government Average growth rate of: Public consumption Public investment Average change in full-empl. net taxes as % of GDP Average change in full-empl. deficit as % of GDP Public debt as % of GDP Private sector Average growth rate of: Disposable income Consumption Business investment Exports GDP Denmark Ireland Long-term interest rates (period averages) Nominal 19.6 Real (ex ante)b a Source: All data are drawn from OECD National Income Accounts, except the cyclically adjusted budget balance, described in footnote 1, and for nominal interest rates, which for Denmark are average yields on long-term government bonds (from European Economy), and for Ireland are yields on five-year government bonds (from the Quarterly Bulletin of the Central Bank of Ireland). b The methodology used to construct ex-ante real rates is described in footnote
13 86 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO Figure 5a DENMARK: WEALTH AND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION / 150- W I J i 1 1 * T T I I I I I I I t T I T II III I II I 1i III 1 II I f I VT I l I rr I U U Indices 1972: Figure 5b DENMARK: COMPONENTS OF REAL PRIVATE WEALTH (Billions Kr. of 1971:1) , \ o imwmt sonde 20?O_,,,,,,,,t,.,zTrL,T Source: Danmarks Nationalbank
14 Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary?? 87 tion and wealth reacted with striking simultaneity to the announcement of the stabilization plan in the fall of The increase in the market value of wealth3 was mostly due to the increase in house prices. Figures 6a and 6b suggest that the jump in the value of equity (houses and shares) was related to the sharp fall in real interest rates that occurred in early 1983, at the time of the EMS realignment.4 As shown in Figure 5b, public debt also played a role in the increase of households' wealth. As we show in Section 3, there were two reasons for the increase in the market value of debt: the fall in expected inflation raised the real value of the future interest payments on nominal debt, and the fall in the real interest rate decreased the discount rate applying to the real value of those interest payments. This was compounded by the fact that most of the outstanding debt had very long maturities: at the time of the stabilization, Treasury Bills accounted for 15% of the Danish domestic debt; 85% were fixed-rate bonds with maturities ranging from 3 to 20 years, mostly issued when nominal rates were high. As shown in Figure 7, the long maturity "froze" the average cost of debt servicing at relatively high levels, even after its marginal cost-the yield on new issues-had fallen by over 10%. At the same time asset prices jumped and consumption started to rise, there was a sharp turnaround in "consumer confidence" (Figure 6c).5 The rise in consumer confidence may have resulted partly from the increase in financial and real wealth, and partly from optimism about future income; it is impressive that this wave of consumer optimism occurred at a time when taxes were being dramatically raised, and public services curtailed. 2.2 IRELAND The first Irish stabilization of the early 1980s provides instead an example of the textbook case. In 1981 Irish public finances were in a much worse situation than those of Denmark. As a share of GDP, the primary full-employment budget deficit was 8.4%, debt service absorbed 8.3%, and total national debt was 87%. The current account deficit exceeded 10% of GDP. The first serious attempt at fiscal adjustment began in 1982: 3. The data for total wealth, houses, and government bonds, shown in Figures 5a and 5b, are all at market value and constant prices. 4. We constructed ex ante real rates by deflating nominal rates using the forecast for inflation from a VAR for inflation, short and long nominal interest rates on quarterly data from 1970 to The VAR used to compute the forecast was reestimated each year. The horizon over which the forecast is taken is synchronized with the maturity of the nominal interest rate. 5. This index is provided by the EC (European Economy, Supplement B). Consumers are asked their views on the "general situation of the economy." A similar picture is obtained by employing an index of their views on their own "financial situation."
15 88 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO Figure 6a DENMARK: REAL INTEREST RATE AND REAL SHARE PRICE ' Reol Shore Prices t X -., i " 4-..: s 87 8a SMARE PRICE 1980:t * 4 Figure 6b DENMARK: REAL INTEREST RATE AND REAL HOUSE PRICE 1 - ; '" Real Mous Price.. ""**-... " _. / ,, * J'"%.. 9i~ -..."\ '" R? at t n f f t~~ ~ ~~~ ~~.-.t ~ ^j ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 Real Interest Rate t* 1 I [!! I!!!I f f F! r! r f! I F I I I I I I I r I F 1980 t a! a HOSE PRICC ts: (1972:4)/17 SOURCt: Shor Pnol IMF intrlttnoti FlnorofoW Stotltlos Houe Perio JAy Dmonw i Niotnol
16 Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary?? 89 Figure 6c DENMARK: INDEX OF CONSUMERS' CONFIDENCE / t SOURCE: Europeon Economy, Supplement B by 1984 the full-employment primary deficit had been reduced by more than 7 percentage points of GDP, most of it through higher discretionary taxes (5.5 percentage points). At the same time, the monetary authorities embarked on a sharp disinflation plan, by pegging the value of the Irish punt within the EMS and, thus, relative to the German mark. Although this resulted in a drop in both nominal and real interest rates, house and share prices declined, as shown in Figures 8a and 8b-contrary to what was happening in Denmark about the same time. The deflationary impact on domestic demand was tremendous; real private consumption fell by 7.1% in 1982 and remained almost flat in the following two years. Business investment decreased dramatically from 1982 to 1984, despite the fall in real interest rates. The recession was in no way connected with a slowdown in external demand; as shown in Table 2, in the period Irish exports fared exceptionally well on international markets. In spite of this early failure, the new government elected in February 1987, and led by Charles Haughey, decided to try again. In contrast with the failed stabilization of 1982, which had been carried out in the context
17 90 * GIAVAZZI & PAGANO Figure 7 DENMARK: MARGINAL AND AVERAGE COST OF PUBLIC DEBT 22 (PERCENTAGE) MARGINAL COST: nominal yield on governrment bonds on the market AVERAGE COST: nominal interest poyments divided by the stock of public debt on the market SOURCE: Doto provided by the European Commission of a weak and quarrelsome coalition government, "Mr. Haughey flatly refused to enter deals with anyone, and launched his minority government on the toughest austerity program the country had witnessed."6 Within two years the full-employment primary deficit was cut by an additional 7% of GDP. Real growth resumed, and for the first time since the early 1970s the debt-income ratio started to decline. This time, most of the cut in the primary budget came from lower government consumption and goverment investment, rather than from the increase in discretionary taxes as in 1982 (see Table 2; see also McAleese and McCarthy 1989). Moreover, what increase in tax revenue did take place was obtained by widening the tax base via a fiscal reform accompanied by a once-and-for-all tax amnesty; in contrast with the 6. Financial Times, Survey on Ireland, September 24, For an account of the second Irish stabilization see also McAleese (1990). Seidmann (1987) argues that because of the fragmentation of the opposition, the minority government that took office in 1987 was much stronger than the coalition governments of