# OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN*t

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2 OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN Basic definitions and assumptions. To begin, we must develop our basic definitions and assumptions, to describe the class of auction design problems which this paper will consider. We assume that there is one seller who has a single object to sell. He faces n bidders, or potential buyers, numbered 1,2,...,«. We let N represent the set of bidders, so that ^={1,...,«}. (2.1) We will use ( andy to represent typical bidders in A'. The seller's problem derives from the fact that he does not know how much the various bidders are willing to pay for the object. That is, for each bidder /, there is some quantity?, which is /'s value estimate for the object, and which represents the maximum amount which / would be willing to pay for the object given his current information about it. We shall assume that the seller's uncertainty about the value estimate of bidder i can be described by a continuous probability distribution over a finite interval. Specifically, we let a, represent the lowest possible value which i might assign to the object; we let bf represent the highest possible value which /' might assign to the object; and we let /. [a;,fe,]-^r+ be the probability density function for I's value estimate f,. We assume that: - oo < a, < i, < + oo; /(?,) > 0, Vr, e [a,,ft,]; and /( ) is a continuous function on [a,,^,]. /): [a,, fc,]^[0,1] will denote the cumulative distribution function corresponding to the density/( ), so that 'ddsr (2-2) Thus Fj(ti) is the seller's assessment of the probability that bidder / has a value estimate of?, or less. We will let T denote the set of all possible combinations of bidders' value estimates; that is, r=[a,,6,]x x[a,ft ]. (2.3) For any bidder /, we let r_, denote the set of all possible combinations of value estimates which might be held by bidders other than i, so that ^M (2-4) Until 7, we will assume that the value estimates of the n bidders are stochastically independent random variables. Thus, the joint density function on T for the vector t = (tf,..,, tj of individual value estimates is /(o= urnjn Of course, bidder / considers his own value estimate to be a known quantity, not a random variable. However, we assume that bidder / assesses the probability distributions for the other bidders' value estimates in the same ways as the seller does. That is, both the seller and bidder i assess the joint density function on r_, for the vector (_, = (?,,..., f,^ I,(;+1,...,( ) of values for all bidders other than ; to be /-/('-,)= n fjcj)- ye A' The seller's personal value estimate for the object, if he were to keep it and not sell it to any of the n bidders, will be denoted by t^. We assume that the seller has no private information about the object, so that /Q is known to all the bidders.

3 60 ROCiFR B. MYfiRSON There are two general reasons why one bidder's value estimates may be unknown to the seller and the other bidders. First, the bidder's personal preferences might be unknown to the other agents (for example, if the object is a painting, the others might not know how much he really enjoys looking at the painting). Second, the bidder might have some special information about the intrinsic quality of the object (he might know if the painting is an old master or a copy). We may refer to these two factors as preference uncertainty and quality uncertainty.^ This distinction is very important. If there are only preference uncertainties, then informing bidder / about bidder /'s value estimate should not cause / to revise his valuation. (This does not mean that / might not revise his bidding strategy in an auction if he knew j \ value estimate; this means only that /'s honest preferences for having money versus having the object should not change.) However, if there are quality uncertainties, then bidder / might tend to revise his valuation of the object after learning about other bidders" value estimates. That is, if / learned that t^ was very low, suggesting thaty had received discouraging information about the quality of the object, then ; might honestly revise downward his assessment of how much he should be willing to pay for tbe object. In much of the literature on auctions (see [11], for example), only the special case of pure preference uncertainty is considered. In this paper, we shall consider a more general class of problems, allowing for certain forms of quality uncertain as well. Specifically, we shall assume that there exist n revision effect functions e^: [a,,6,]-^(r such that, if another bidder / learned that t^ was /'s value estimate for the object, then ; would revise his own valuation by ei(t-). Thus, if bidder / learned that t = (t^...., tj was the vector of value estimates initially held by the n bidders, then / would revise his own valuation of the object to Similarly, we shall assume that the seller would reassess his personal valuation of the object to if he learned that t was the vector of value estimates initially beld by the bidders. In the case of pure preference uncertainty, we would simply have ej{tj) = 0, (To justify our interpretation of r, as i's initial estimate of the value of tbe object, we should assume that these revision effects have expected-value zero, so that /G.V However, this assumption is not actually necessary for any of the results in this paper: without it, only the interpretation of the f, would change,) 3. Feasible auction medianisnis. Given the density functions / and tbe revision effect functions e, and u, as above, the seller's problem is to select an auction mechanism to maximize his own expected utility. We must now develop the notation to describe the auction mechanisms which he might select. To begin, we shall restrict our attention to a special class of auction mechanisms: tbe direct revelation mechanisms. In a direct revelation mechanism, the bidders simultaneously and confidentially announce their value estimates to the seller; and the seller then determines who gets ' I am indebted to Paul Milgrom for pointing out this distinction.

4 OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN 61 the object and how much each bidder must pay, as some functions of the vector of announced value estimates? = (/,,..., / ), Thus, a direct revelation mechanism is described by a pair of outcome functions (p,x) (of the formp.t->w and x -.T-^R") such that, if t is the vector of announced value estimates then /?,(/) is the probability that i gets the object and Xj(t) is the expected amount of money which bidder / must pay to the seller, (Notice that we allow for the possibility that a bidder might have to pay something even if he does not get the object.) We shall assume throughout this paper that the seller and the bidders are risk neutral and have additively separable utility functions for money and the object being sold. Thus, if bidder / knows that his value estimate is /,, then his expected utility from an auction mechanism described by {p,x) is (t_,)dt_, (3.1) where dt i = dt^... dti_idti^i... dt^. Similarly, the expected utility for the seller from this auction mechanism is where dt = dt^... dt^. Not every pair of functions {p,x) represents a feasible auction mechanism, however. There are three types of constraints which must be imposed on {p,x). First, since there is only one object to be allocated, the function p must satisfy the following probability conditions: 2 Pj{t) < 1 and pi{t) > 0, V/ e A', V? G T. (3.3) jen Second, we assume that the seller cannot force a bidder to participate in an auction which offers him less expected utility then he could get on his own. If he did not participate in the auction, the bidder could not get the object, but also would not pay any money, so his utility payoff would be zero. Thus, to guarantee that the bidders will participate in the auction, the following individual-rationality conditions must be satisfied: U,{p,x,t,)>0, \/ien, V,e[a,,Z.,]. (3.4) Third, we assume that the seller could not prevent any bidder from lying about his value estimate, if the bidder expected to gain from lying. Thus the revelation mechanism can be implemented only if no bidder ever expects to gain from lying. That is, honest responses must form a Nash equilibrium in the auction game. If bidder ; claimed that.?, was his value estimate when /, was his true value estimate, then his expected utility would be where (r _,,.5,) = (r,,..., r,_,,5,,?, +,,..., / ). Thus, to guarantee that no bidder has any incentive to lie about his value estimate, the following incentive-compatibility conditions must be satisfied: {v,{t)p^(t^,,s,)-x,{t^,,s,))f_,(t_,)dt_, (3,5)

5 62 ROGBR B. MYERSON We say that (p,x) is feasible (or that (p,x) represents a feasible auction mechanism) iff (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) are all satisfied. That is, if the seller plans to allocate the object according to p and to demand monetary payments from bidders according to x, then the scheme can be implemented, with all bidders willing to participate honestly, if and only if (3.3)-(3.5) are satisfied. Thus far, we have only considered direct revelation mechanisms, in which the bidders are supposed to honestly reveal their value estimates. However, the seller could design other kinds of auction games. In a general auction game, each bidder has some set of strategy options 9,; and there are outcome functions jp : e, X X e,, ~^M" and x ; (>?, X X e -»M", which described how the allocation of the object and the bidders' fees depend on the bidders' strategies. (That is, if ^ = (S,,.,., 9^) were the vector of strategies used by the bidder in the auction game, then^,(^) would be the probability of / getting the object and Xi{9) would be the expected payment from /' to the seller.) An auction mechanism is any such auction game together with a description of the strategic plans which the bidders are expected to use in playing the game. Formally, a strategic plan can be represented by a function ^,: [a,, 6,]-^,, such that ^,(/,) is the strategy which / is expected to use in the auction game if his value estimate is f,. In this general notation, our direct revelation mechanisms are simply those auction mechanisms in which 0, = [a,,6,] and ^(r,) = /,. In this general framework, a feasible auction mechanism must satisfy constraints which generalize (3.3)-(3.5). Since there is only one object, the probabilities ^,(^) must be nonnegative and sum to one or less, for any 9. The auction mechanism must offer nonnegative expected utility to each bidder, given any possible value estimate, or else he would not participate in the auction. The strategic plans must form a Nash equilibrium in the auction game, or else some bidder would revise his plans. It might seem that problem of optimal auction design must be quite unmanageable, because there is no bound on the size or complexity of the strategy spaces 0, which the seller may use in constructing the auction game. The basic insight which enables us to solve auction design problems is that there is really no loss of generality in considering only direct revelation mechanisms. This follows from the following fact. LEMMA 1. (THE REVELATION PRINCIPLE.) Given any feasible auction mechanism, there exists an equivalent feasible direct revelation mechanism which gives to the seller and all bidders the same expected utilities as in the given mechanism. This revelation principle has been proven in the more general context of Bayesian collective choice problems, as Theorem 2 in [6]. To see why it is true, suppose that we are given a feasible auction mechanism with arbitrary strategy spaces 0,, with outcome functions p and x, and with strategic plans 9j, as above. Then consider the direct revelation mechanism represented by the functions/?: T-^W and x:t^w such that That is, in the direct revelation mechanism (p,x), the seller first asks each bidder to announce his type, and then computes the strategy which the bidder would have used according to the strategic plans in the given auction mechanism, and finally implements the outcomes prescribed in the given auction game for these strategies. Thus, the direct revelation mechanism {p,x) always yields the same outcomes as the given auction mechanism, so all agents get the same expected utilities in both mechanisms. And {p,x) must satisfy the incentive-compatibihty constraints (3.5), because the

6 OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN 63 Strategic plans formed an equilibrium in the given feasible mechanism, (If any bidder could gain by lying to the seller in the revelation game, then he could have gained by "lying to himself" or revising his strategic plan in the given mechanism,) Thus, (p, x) is feasible. Using tbe revelation principle, we may assume, without loss of generality, that the seller only considers auction mechanisms in the class of feasible direct revelation mechanisms. That is, we may henceforth identify the set of feasible auction mechanisms with the set of all outcome functions {p,x) which satisfy the constraints (3,3) through (3,5), The seller's auction design problem is to choose these functions p: T -^U" and X : T-^W so as to maximize Uo(p,x) subject to (3,3)-(3,5), Notice that we have not used (2,7) or (2.8) anywhere in this section. Thus (3,3)-(3,5) characterize the set of all feasible auction mechanisms even when the bidders compute their revised valuations t;,(/) using functions t),: T->R, which are not of the special additive form (2,7), However, in the next three sections, to derive an exphcit solution to the problem of optimal auction design, we shall have to restrict our attention to the class of problems in which (2.7) and (2.8) hold. 4. Anaiysis of tiie probiem. Given an auction mechanism (p, x) we define {t-ddt-, (4.1) for any bidder / and any value estimate ;,. So Qi(p,tj) is the conditional probabihty that bidder i will get the object from the auction mechanism ip,x) given that his value estimate is?,, Our first result is a simplified characterization of the feasible auction mechanisms. LEMMA 2, (p, x) is feasible if and only if the following conditions hold: ifs,<t, then Qi(p,s,) < Q,{p,t^), y/ign, V5,,r, e[a,,fe,.]; (4,2) and mp,x,t,) = mp,x,a,) -(- [' Q,(p,s,)ds,, V/ G N, V/, s[a,,ba; (4,3) -'a, Ui(p,x,ai)>0, y/ien; (4,4) 2 Pj{t) < 1 and p,{t) > 0, V/ G iv, Vf G T. (3.3) PROOF. Using (2.8), our special assumption about the form of t),(?), we get Thus, the incentive-compatibility constraint (3.5) is equivalent to,t,) > U,{p,x,s,) + (?, - 5,) Q>(p,s,), \/i G N, Vr,,^, G [a,,*,]. (4.6) Thus {p,x) is feasible if and only if (3.3), (3.4), and (4.6) hold. We will now show that (3.4) and (4.6) imply (4.2)-(4.4).

7 64 ROGER B. MYERSOX Using (4,6) twice (once with the roles of,?, and /, switched), we get Then (4,2) follows, when,s, < r,. These inequalities can be rewritten for any S > 0,s^) < Q,{p,s, + 6)5, Since Qi{p,s,) is increasing in s^, it is Riemann integrable. So: ''Qi(P^s.)dSi= Ui{p,x,t,)- U,{p,x,a,), which gives us (4,3), Of course, (4,4) follows directly from (3,4), so all the conditions in Lemma 2 follow from feasibility. Now we must show that the conditions in Lemma 2 also imply (3,4) and (4,6), Since Qi{p,s^) > 0 by (3,3), (3,4) follows from (4,3) and (4,4), To show (4,6), suppose,y, < ;,; then (4,2) and (4,3) give us: ^(p,x,t,)= U,ip,x,s,)+ {' Q:{p,r,)dr, > U,ip,x,s,)+f''Q,.(p,s,)dr, Similarly, if s^ >?, then U,{p,x,t,)= U,(p,x,s,)- f''q^(p,r,),s^)- (''Q,(p,s,)dr, Thus (4,6) follows from (4,2) and (4,3), So the conditions in Lemma 2 also imply feasibility. This proves the lemma. So (p,x) represents an optimal auction if and only if it maximizes UQ(P,X) subject to (4.2)-(4,4) and (3,3), Our next lemma offers some simpler conditions for optimality. LEMMA 3, Suppose that p: T-^W maximizes subject to the constraints (4,2) arui (3,3), Suppose also that x,{t) = p,(t)v,{t) - [''p,(t._,,s^)ds,, \/i EN, V/ G r, (4,8) Then (p,x) represents an optimal auction. PROOF, Recalling (3,2), we may write the seller's objective function as \p^(t)(^{t)-va{t))f{t)dt I <=,V dt. (4,9)

8 OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN 65 But, using Lemma 2, we know that for any feasible {p,x): U,(p,x,a,)- U,{p,x,a) - \\\ Ja, From (2.7) and (2.8) we get Substituting (4.10) and (4.11) into (4.9) gives us: f,(0 - MO ='. -'o - ^,(',)- (4-11) + {VQ{t)f{t)dt- 2 U,{p,x,a). (4.12) 'T ien So the seller's problem is to maximize (^4.12) subject to the constraints (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), and (3.3) from Lemma 2. In this formulation, x appears only in the last term of the objective function and in the constraints (4.3) and (4.4). These two constraints may be rewritten as = mp,x,a,) > 0, V/ G N, V?, e [a,,b,]. If the seller chooses x according to (4.8), then he satisfies both (4.3) and (4.4), and he gets which is the best possible value for this term in (4.12). Thus using (4.8), we can drop x from the seller's problem entirely. Furthermore, the second term on the right side of (4.12) is a constant, independent of ip,x). So the objective function can be simplified to (4.7), and (4.2) and (3.3) are the only constraints left to be satisfied. This completes the proof of the lemma. Equation (4.12) also has an important implication which is worth stating as a theorem in its own right. COROLLARY (THE REVENUE-EQUIVALENCE THEOREM). The seller's expected utility from a feasible auction mechanism is completely determined by the probability function p and the numbers Ujip,x,aj) for all i. That is, once we know who gets the object in each possible situation (as specified by p) and how much expected utility each bidder would get if his value estimate were at its

9 66 ROGER B. MYERSON lowest possible level a-, then the seller's expected utility from the auction does not depend on the payment function x. Thus, for example, the seller must get the same expected utility from any two auction mechanisms which have the properties that (1) ihe object always goes to the bidder with the highest value estimate above / and (2) every bidder would expect zero utility if his value estimate were at its lowest possible level. If the bidders are symmetric and all e, = 0 and a^ = 0, then the Dutch auctions and progressive auctions studied in [11] both have these two properties, so Vickrey's equivalence results may be viewed as a corollary of our equation (4,12), However, we shall see that Vickrey's auctions are not in general optimal for the seller. 5. Optimal auctions in the regular case. With a simple regularity assumption, we can compute optimal auction mechanisms directly from Lemma 3, We may say that our problem is regular if the function id), (?,)- ^^ (5,1) is a monotone strictly increasing function of /,, for every i in A^, That is, the problem is regular if c,(5',)< c,(/,) whenever a, <,?,. < /, < bj. (Recall that we are assuming / (r,) > 0 for all t, in [a,,/?,], so that c,(?,) is always well defined and continuous.) Now consider an auction mechanism in which the seller keeps the object if tq > max,gjv(c,(/,)), and he gives it to the bidder with the highest c,(/,) otherwise. If c,(?,) = Cj{tj) = max^^g^ (cyi.(^/j)) > tq, then the seller may break the tie by giving to the lower-numbered player, or by some other arbitrary rule, (Ties will only happen with probability zero in the regular case.) Thus, for this auction mechanism. Pi(t) > 0 implies c,(/,) = Tmx{Cj(t^)) > tq. (5,2) For all t in T, this mechanism maximizes the sum subject to the constraints that 2 Pj{t) < 1 and pi{t) > 0, V/, Thus/? maximizes (4.7) subject to the probability condition (3,3), To check that it also satisfies (4.2) we need to use regularity. Suppose 5, < r,. Then c,(,s,) < c,(/,), and so whenever bidder i could win the object by submitting a value estimate of s^, he could also win if he changed to r,. That is/>,(?,,,\$,) < p^{t^i,t>), for all /_^,. So Qi{p,ti), the probability of / winning the object given that f, is his value estimate, is indeed an increasing function of?,, as (4.2) requires, Thus/> satisfies all the conditions of Lemma 3. To complete the constniction of our optimal auction, we let x be as in (4,8): This formula may be rewritten more intuitively, as follows. For any vector t _, of value estimates from bidders other than /, let z,(t_,) = inf{5, c,(5,) > tq and c,(5,) > c^(?,), Vy' ^ /}, (5.3)

10 OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN 67 Then z,(r_,) is the infimum of all winning bids for / against f_,; so if5,.>z, (/_,), 'This gives us ri i t: - Z:(t :) if?, > z, Finally, (4,8) becomes 0 ifp,(n = o. (5.6) That is, bidder /' must pay only when he gets the object, and then he pays t3,(f_,, Zi(t_i)), the amount which the object would have been worth to him if he had submitted his lowest possible winning bid. If all the revision effect functions are identically zero (that is, e,(/,) = 0), and if all bidders are symmetric (a, = a,,fe, = bj, fi-) = fj{-)) and regular, then we get = max c,-' (?o),max/,. j, (5.7) That is, our optimal auction becomes a modified Vickrey auction [11], in which the seller himself submits a bid equal to c,"' (to) (notice that all c, = Cj in this symmetric case, and regularity guarantees that c, is invertible) and then sells the object to the highest bidder at the second highest price. This conclusion only holds, however, when the bidders are symmetric and the c,(-) functions are strictly increasing. For example, suppose t^ = 0, each a, = 0,Z>, = 1(K), e,(^,) = 0, and/(r;) = 1/100, for every / and every f, between 0 and 100. Then straightforward computations give us <:,(?,) = 2/, - 100, which is increasing in tj. So the seller should sell to the highest bidder at the second highest price, except that he himself should submit a bid of c," '(0) = /2 = 50, By announcing a reservation price of 50, the seller risks a probability (1/2)" of keeping the object even though some bidder is willing to pay more than t^ for it; but the seller also increases his expected revenue, because he can command a higher price when the object is sold. Thus the optimal auction may not be expost efficient. To see more clearly why this can happen, consider the example in the above paragraph, for the case when n = 1. Then the seller has value estimate ^ = 0, and the one bidder has a value estimate taken from a uniform distribution on [0,100]. Ex post efficiency would require that the bidder must always get the object, as long as his value estimate is positive. But then the bidder would never admit to more than an infinitesimal value estimate, since any positive bid would win the object. So the seller would have to expect zero revenue if he never kept the object. In fact, the seller's optimal poucy is to refuse to sell the object for less than 50, which gives him expected revenue 25. More generally, when the bidders are asymmetric, the optimal auction may sometimes even sell to a bidder whose value estimate is not the highest. For example, when e,(/,) = 0 and /(?,)= 1/(6, - a,) for all?, between a, and 6, (the general uniformdistribution case with no revision effects) we get

11 68 ROCJBR B. MYERSON which is increasing in /,. So in the optimal auction, the bidder with the highest c,(/,) will get the object. If /?, < b^, then / may win the object even if ;, < t^, as long as 2tj bj > 2tj bj. In effect, the optimal auction discriminates against bidders for whom the upper bounds on the value estimates are higher. This discrimination discourages such bidders from under-representing value estimates close to their high b, bounds. 6. Optimal auctions in the general case. Without regularity, the auction mechanism proposed in the preceding section would not be feasible, since it would violate (4.2). To extend our solution to the general case, we need some carefully chosen definitions. The cumulative distribution function 7^ : [a,,/j,]->[0,1] for bidder / is continuous and strictly increasing, since we assume that the density function / is always strictly positive. Thus /^( ) has an inverse F, ' :[0, l]^[a,,z),], which is also continuous and strictly increasing. For each bidder /, we now define four functions which have the unit interval [0.1 ] as their domain. First, for any q in [0,1], let and let ) (6,1) j%{r)dr. (6.2) Next let G,:[0,1]->R be the convex hull of the function //,(); in the notation of Rockafellar ([9, p. 36]) {w,/-,r2} C[0,1] and wr, + (1 - w)r2 = ^}, (6,3) That is, G,( ) is the highest convex function on [0,1] such that Gi(q) < H;(q) for every As a convex function, G, is continuously differentiable except at countably many points, and its derivative is monotone increasing. We define g, :{0,1]^R so that g^(q)=g;(q) (6.4) whenever this derivative is defined, and we extend gj(-) to all of [0,1] by rightcontinuity. We define c,: [a,,6,]->r so that (It is straightforward to check that, in the regular case when c,(.) is increasing, we get Gi = ^,. gi = ^;' and c, = c,.) Finally, for any vector of value estimates t, let M(t) be the set of bidders for whom C;(tj) is maximal among all bidders and is higher than fg. M(t) = I /1 /o < c^i'i) = maxc (/)). (6,6)

12 OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN 69 We can now state our main result: that in an optimal auction, the object should always be sold to the bidder with the highest c,(f,), provided this is not less than Nonius, we may think of c,(/,) as the priority level for bidder i when his value estimate is if,, in the seller's optimal auction. THEOREM. Letp:T->W and x:t^w satisfy ifigm{t), and ; f',s,)ds^ (6.8) for all i in N and t in T. Then {p,x) represents an optimal auction mechanism. PROOF, First, using integration by parts, we derive the following equations. (6.9) But G, is the convex hull of //, on [0,1] and //, is continuous, so G,(0) = //^,(0) and G,(l) = Hi{\). Thus the endpoint terms in the last expression above are zero. Now, recall the maximand (4.7) in Lemma 3. Using (6.9) we get: f + 2 i (6,10) - S P {H,{F,{t,))-G,{F,{t,)))dQ,{p,t,). Now consider {p, x) as defined in the theorem. Observe that p always puts all probability on bidders for whom (c,(?,) - t^ is nonnegative and maximal. Thus, for any/7 satisfying (3.3): t)dt. Of course p itself does satisfy the probability condition (3,3).

13 70 ROGER B. MYERSON For any/7 which satisfies (4,2) (that is, for which Qi(p, f,) is an increasing function of /,), we must have f"' (H,{F,(t,)) - G,{F,{tj)))dQj{p,t,) > 0 (6,12).ft, a, since //, > G,, To see that p satisfies (4.2), observe first that c,(?,) is an increasing function of /,, because /] and g, are both increasing functions, Thusp,(r) is increasing as a function of tj, for any fixed r_,, and so Qj(p, tj) is also an increasing function of /,, So p satisfies (4,2), Since G is the convex hull of H, we know that G must be flat whenever G < H; that is, if Gj(r) < Hj{r) then g;(r) = G/'(r) = 0. So if Hj(Fj{tj)) - G,(F,(?,)) > 0 then c,(f,) and Qj{p,t,) are constant in some neighborhood of tj. This implies that - Gj{Fj(tj)))dQj{p,tj) = 0, (6.13) Substituting (6,11), (6,12), and (6.13) back into (6,10), we can see that^ maximizes (4,7) subject to (4,2) and (3,3), This fact, together with Lemma 3, proves the theorem. To get some practical interpretation for these important c, functions, consider the special case of n = 1; that is, suppose there is only one bidder. Then our optimal auction becomes: Xi{ti)='Pxiti) min(5, c,(5,) > t^] That is, the seller should offer to sell the object at the price and he should keep the object if the bidder is unwilling to pay this price. Thus, if bidder / were the only bidder, then the seller would sell the object to / if and only if c,(?,) were greater than or equal to ^o- In other words, c,(f,) is the highest level of tq, the seller's personal value estimate, such that the seller would sell the object to / at a price of?, or lower, if all other bidders were removed, 7. The ind^^deace assmoftion. Throughout this paper we have assumed that the bidders' value estimates are stochastically independent. Independence is a strong assumption, so we now consider an example to show what optimal actions may look like when value estimates are not independent. For simplicity, we consider a discrete example. Suppose there are two bidders, each of whom may have a value estimate of?, = 10 or?; = 100 for the object. Let us assume that the joint probability distribution for value estimates (?,, ^2) is: Pr(10,10) = Pr(100,100) = ^, Pr(10,100) = Pr(100,10) Obviously the two value estimates are not independent. Let us also assume that there are no revision effects (e, = 0), and t^ = 0. Now consider the following auction mechanism. If both bidders have high value estimates (r, = t2 = 100), then sell the object to one of them for price 100, randomizing equally to determine which bidder buys the object. If one bidder has a high value estimate (100) and the other has a low value estimate (10), then sell the object to the

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