Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems
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1 Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems Rita Wells Idaho National Laboratory Program Sponsor: National Cyber Security Division Control Systems Security Program
2 Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems Background Foundation How to Use Department of Homeland Security: Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems August 2008 Content
3 Procurement Language for Control Systems Main Contributors: Department of Homeland Security NCSD/CSSP Department of Energy NSTB Idaho National Laboratory Asset Owners, Vendors New York State SANS U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Latest Release August 2008 Version 2.0
4 Risk Reduction Work with public and private sectors to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks Software Assurance A Strategic Initiative to Promote Integrity, Security, and Reliability in Software Procurement Specification for Control Systems Initiative to develop procurement language for control systems (hardware and software)
5 Project Goal & Scope Goal Develop common procurement requirements and contractual language that the owners can use to ensure control systems they are buying or maintaining have the best available security Scope New control systems Maintenance of systems Legacy systems Information and personnel security
6 Foundation Analyzed 54 Assessments: Assessments funded by DHS, DOE, Industry, and Assetowners Each assessment ranges from hours of cyber security researcher and additional efforts for control system and network engineers 20 in-lab and 18 on-site assessments Identified common vulnerabilities Also identified unique defensive architectures
7 When to Use: New Systems Request for Proposal Proposal Submittal Bid Review Contract Award Statement of Work Design Review Document Review Factory Acceptance Testing Site Acceptance Testing Maintenance Procurement Language FAT Measurements SAT Measurements Maintain
8 When to Use: Legacy Systems Negotiating a new maintenance contract Applying Upgrades Accepting Updates Applying security add-ons Procurement Language FAT Measurements SAT Measurements Maintain
9 How to Use: Security Culture Not a cut and paste Still need to engineer system and understand the architecture, functional requirements and operational constraints Does your company have past experience: Need for an ongoing security program (not a one time project) Strong security culture or outsource? Accustom to providing adequate funding for security Have adequate security staff for support
10 How to use: Functional Architecture Procurement Language Aggressive project designed to provide a buyers tool kit Provide security requirements for inclusion into RFPs Use common, grounded and valuable language Support Bid Reviews (gauge responsiveness) Provide the detail required to support SOW development and Design Creation & Review Starting with greatest risk that can be addressed Procurement Language FAT Measurements SAT Measurements Maintain
11 Factory Acceptance Test Measurements Linked to the procurement requirement Provides language to include in Factory Acceptance Testing requirements and specifications Designed to validate the requirement has been met Allows for rigorous security testing in an isolated environment Gives the vendor the opportunity to verify the product meets the security requirements prior to installation in the field. Procurement Language FAT Measurements SAT Measurements Maintain
12 Site Acceptance Test Measurements Linked to the procurement requirement Provides language to include in Site Acceptance Testing requirements and specifications Designed to validate the risk reducing requirement is not lost during implementation in the Asset Owners environment Important step that requires an understanding of why it was delivered that way First hand-off from the procurement / provider team to the actual operator and maintainer Procurement Language FAT Measurements SAT Measurements Maintain
13 Maintenance Language & Operating Guidance Linked to the procurement requirement Provides language to include in maintenance contracts Designed to further reduce the risk to control systems during their life-time Critical step to ensure the benefits of the security requirements are not lost during the technologies operational lifespan Requires an understanding of why it was delivered that way Procurement Language FAT Measurements SAT Measurements Maintain
14 Procurement Language Topics System Hardening Removal of Unnecessary Services and Programs Host Intrusion Detection systems Changes for File Systems and OS Permissions Hardware Configurations Heartbeat Signals Installing OS applications and 3 rd party software Perimeter Protection Firewalls Network Intrusion Detection Systems Canaries Account Management Disabling, Removing or Modifying Well-Known or Guest Accounts Session Management Password/Authentication Policy and Management Account audit and Logging Role-based Access Control Single Sign-on Separation Agreement Coding Practices Coding for Security Department of Homeland Security: Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems August 2008 Flaw remediation Notification and Documentation from Vendor Problem Reporting Malware Detection and Protection Host Name Resolution Network Addressing and Name Resolution
15 Procurement Language Topics - continued End Devices Intelligent electronic Devices Remote Terminal Units Programmable Logic Controllers Sensors, Actuators and Meters Remote Access Dial up Modems Dedicated Line Modems TCP/IP Web-based Interfaces Virtual Private Networks Serial Communications Physical Security Access of Cyber Components Perimeter Access Manual Override Control Intra-perimeter Communications Network Partitioning Network Devices Network Architecture Department of Homeland Security: Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems August 2008
16 A Page From the Tool Kit: Format Procurement Topic Security Risk or Basis Description Language Guidance Procurement Language Factory Acceptance Test Measurements Site Acceptance Test Measurements Maintenance and Operations Guidance References or Standards Dependencies
17 Subjects Version 2.0 System Hardening Removal of Unnecessary Services and Programs Host Intrusion Detection systems Changes for File Systems and OS Permissions Hardware Configurations Heartbeat Signals Installing OS applications and 3 rd party software Type Port Issue and Fix Security Issues and Fixes: Informational netbios-ssn (139/tcp) An SMB server is running on this port Nessus ID : Informational netbios-ns (137/udp) Synopsis : It is possible to obtain the network name of the remote host. Description : The remote host listens on udp port 137 and replies to NetBIOS nbtscan requests. By sending a wildcard request it is possible to obtain the name of the remote system and the name of its domain... The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter : 00:0e:0e:b1:08:d9 CVE : CVE Other references : OSVDB:13577 Nessus ID : Address of Host Port/Service netbios-ssn (139/tcp) netbios-ns (137/udp) Analysis of Host Issue regarding Port Security notes found Security notes found From a Nessus Scan ldap (389/tcp) Security notes found
18 Subjects Version 2.0 Perimeter Protection Firewalls Network Intrusion Detection Systems Canaries
19 Subjects Version 2.0 Account Management Disabling, Removing or Modifying Well-Known or Guest Accounts Session Management Password/Authentication Policy and Management Account audit and Logging Role-based Access Control Single Sign-on Separation Agreement User: dopey Password: badpassword
20 Subjects Version 2.0 Coding Practices Coding for Security Rating System Description of weaknesses Simplicity Impact A Database Software; SQL non-parametric query allows for SQL attacks B C Perl scripts taintness option not enabled - allowed for the uploading and execution of arbitrary code SQL Injection vulnerabilities used to exploit server on DMZ D Miscellaneous Client software, database connections, SQL injection E Real time database, SQL forward, IPSec can be disabled F Application point of failure, several variable overflows, ICCP, 3 rd party security product G Proprietary file share server, data listener, input output handler H Database and application server key logger attack I Input output handler, 3 rd party log monitor tool, OS scheduling utility proprietary listener J Proprietary listener and database OllyDbg
21 Subjects Version 2.0 Flaw Remediation Notification and Documentation from Vendor Problem Reporting 1988 Clear Text Vulnerability Impact EXAMPLE (CVE ) Simplicity Exposure Deployment
22 Subjects Version 2.0 Malware Detection and Protection SANS.org Internet Storm Center
23 Subjects Version 2.0 Host Name Resolution Network Addressing and Name Resolution Allowed Network Flows Host 1 Host 2 Port Host A Host B TCP 80 Host C Host D TCP 123 Alert on all other flows
24 New Subjects Version 2.0 End Devices Intelligent electronic Devices Remote Terminal Units Programmable Logic Controllers Sensors, Actuators and Meters Control Valves Remote Terminal Unit Sensors Smart Meters Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)
25 New Subjects Version 2.0 Remote Access Dial up Modems Dedicated Line Modems TCP/IP Web-based Interfaces Virtual Private Networks Serial Communications
26 New Subjects Version 2.0 Physical Security Access of Cyber Components Perimeter Access Manual Override Control Intra-perimeter Communications
27 New Subjects Version 2.0 Network Partitioning Network Devices Network Architecture
28 Vendors Audience is for asset owners or buyers of systems Support the vendors by addressing technology security problems they deal with as buyers of components - Important trend: Control System company is an integration & software effort Provide value to vendors which will pass on to asset owners, start the security dialog in a common language
29 International Outreach Pressure from multiple markets Europe & Asia International participation & interest 15 countries UK & Australia taking leadership role European Union discussions
30 Participant Creation Develop an Open Contribution framework Shift drafting from drafting team to participants Need to set up quality review process and rules 190+ asset owner members Multiple stakeholder communities Allow other programs to support (CPNI, AUS Gov, etc.) Sectors take ownership to apply sections needed unique to architectures System Integrators use as baseline Vendors use as discussion points
31 Vendor Response Map requirements to product offerings Distinguish what is provided to what is not No one entity will be able to provide all requirements Categorize the not provided functions to want to in the future or not needed because of other functions or architecture makes the requirement not relevant Start the dialog: Use the we don t provide that to open the discussion with the customers on why not or alternatives that work better for the functional needs
32 Discussion Gary J. Finco Idaho National Laboratory Rita Wells Idaho National Laboratory
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