STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, BRENT ALEXANDER HARGOUS, Appellant. No. 1 CA-CR

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1 NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. BRENT ALEXANDER HARGOUS, Appellant. No. 1 CA-CR Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County Nos. S0100CR ; S0100CR ; S0100CR ; S0100CR The Honorable Donna J. Grimsley, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General s Office, Phoenix By Terry M. Crist Counsel for Appellee Emily L. Danies, Tucson Counsel for Appellant

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Randall M. Howe, presiding, delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined. H O W E, Judge: 1 Hargous was charged with multiple crimes in four different cases. 1 The trial court consolidated the cases and, after Hargous entered into plea agreements admitting various charges, placed Hargous on four years intensive probation, with terms including attending drug court, serving some jail time, and participating in inpatient drug rehabilitation. Among the conditions of probation, Hargous agreed to (1) keep his probation officer advised of his progress in any drug rehabilitation treatment program and report to his probation officer within 72 hours of release from treatment, and (2) actively participate and cooperate in rehabilitation. 2 The court ordered Hargous to participate in the Tucson Salvation Army rehabilitation program. On June 11, 2013, Hargous probation officer, Officer L, received a voic from the intake coordinator at the Salvation Army rehabilitation program stating that Hargous had been terminated from the program. Officer L waited a week for Hargous to contact her, but the week passed without response. On June 18, Officer L petitioned to revoke Hargous probation alleging that Hargous had been terminated from the rehabilitation program and had not contacted her within 72 hours. 3 On June 24, Officer L discovered that Hargous was hiding at his girlfriend s home. Officer L searched the home with the homeowner s consent, found Hargous hiding in a bedroom, and took him into custody. 4 Upon questioning, Hargous girlfriend told Officer L that Hargous failed out of the rehabilitation program. Hargous had told his girlfriend that he had found illegal drugs and had thrown them away. The 1 The charges included multiple drug-related offenses, forgery, theft and fraudulent schemes. 2

3 Salvation Army discovered another participant with the drugs and terminated Hargous for contributing to the failure of the other participant s sobriety. 5 The trial court held a hearing on the petition to revoke probation. The State informed the court that it was unable to obtain any documentation from the Salvation Army to verify that Hargous was removed from the program. Officer L testified that she had been a probation officer for two years and frequently worked with probationers in the Salvation Army rehabilitation program. When a probationer is terminated from the program, the Salvation Army s standard practice was for its intake coordinator, George, to notify Officer L by phone, and if necessary, voic . Officer L testified that George had left her a voic stating that Hargous had been terminated from the rehabilitation program. Officer L recognized George s voice because they had spoken to each other on several occasions. While Hargous objected to Officer L s testimony about the voic claiming it was unreliable, the court overruled the objection. 6 The court found that Hargous had violated the conditions of probation requiring Hargous to attend drug treatment and report to Officer L if he was released from treatment. The court revoked probation and sentenced Hargous to consecutive prison terms of 3 years in case CR , 10 years in case CR , 3 years in case CR , and 2 years in CR , for a total of 18 years to be served. Hargous timely appeals. DISCUSSION 7 On appeal, Hargous argues that the trial court relied on unreliable hearsay as sufficient evidence that he violated the terms of his probation. Specifically, Hargous argues that the voic from George was unreliable because Officer L was never able to follow-up with George or get documentation about the event that led to Hargous termination. We review the trial court s rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, , 140 P.3d 930, 937 (2006). The trial court s finding of a probation violation will be upheld unless it is arbitrary or unsupported by any theory of the evidence. State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 313 3, 996 P.2d 113, 114 (App. 1999). 8 A trial court may revoke probation if the State proves by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant violated a condition of probation. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.8(b)(3), (c)(2). In making this determination, 3

4 the court may receive any reliable nonprivileged evidence, including hearsay. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.8(b)(3). Reliable evidence is evidence that is trustworthy. State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 82, 695 P.2d 1110, 1120 (1985). Hearsay evidence is reliable if the circumstances are such as to afford a reasonable assurance of the truthfulness of the hearsay and the circumstances warrant its use. State v. Brown, 23 Ariz. App. 225, 231, 532 P.2d 167, 173 (1975), quoted in Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82, 695 P.2d at Reliable hearsay evidence is not limited by the recognized hearsay exceptions. Brown, 23 Ariz. App. at 231, 532 P.2d at The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that George s voic was reliable hearsay. Officer L testified that she had been a probation officer for two years and frequently worked with probationers at the Salvation Army rehabilitation program. Officer L testified that she recognized George s voice because they had worked together several times. She testified that George s standard practice was to call her when a probationer left the program. The trial court thus had reasonable assurances that the voic was truthful. 10 This evidence itself was sufficient for the trial court to find that Hargous had violated the terms of his probation. State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 420, 542 Ariz. 1115, 1119 (1975) ( probation can be revoked exclusively on hearsay testimony ). But the trial court had other evidence as well. Hargous told his girlfriend that he had been terminated from the rehabilitation program. Hargous had also failed to contact his probation officer after the officer had been notified of Hargous termination and was attempting to hide from the officer when he was apprehended. This is further evidence that Hargous knew that he had violated the terms of his probation. See State v. Weible, 142 Ariz. 113, 116, 688 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1984) ( Flight or concealment after a crime is admissible because it bears on the issue of the defendant s consciousness of guilt. ). The trial court had more than sufficient evidence to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Hargous had violated the terms of his probation. 4

5 CONCLUSION 11 We find no error in the trial court s finding that Hargous violated the terms of his probation. We therefore affirm. 5