Karsten Nohl, Breaking GSM phone privacy
|
|
|
- Winfred McKinney
- 8 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 arsten Nohl, Breaking GSM phone privacy
2 GSM is global, omnipresent and wants to be hacked 80% of mobile phone market 200+ countries 5 billion users! GSM encryption introduced in 1987 then disclosed and shown insecure in 1994 Source:Wikipedia, Bitkom press statement July 28 th 2010 Breaking GSM privacy 1
3 Industry responds to GSM cracker by creating a new challenge the GSM call has to be identified and recorded from the radio interface. [ ] we strongly suspect the team developing the intercept approach has underestimated its practical complexity. A hacker would need a radio receiver system and the signal processing software necessary to process the raw radio data. GSMA, Aug. 09 This talk introduces signal processing software to decode GSM calls Source: GSMA press statement Breaking GSM privacy 2
4 GSM uses symmetric session keys for call privacy Operator and Random nonce phone share a master key to de- Master key rive session keys Hash function Session key Random nonce and session key Random nonce Communication A5/1- Operator Home Location Register Base station encrypted with session key Cell phone This talk discusses a technique for extracting session keys Breaking GSM privacy 3
5 A5/1 is vulnerable to generic precomputation attacks Code book attacks Code books break encryption functions with small keys Secret state A52F8C02 62B9320A C309ED0A Output 52E E E91003 Code book provides a mapping from known output to secret state An A5/1 code book is 128 Petabyte and takes 100,000+ years to be computed on a PC This talk revisits techniques for computing an A5/1 code book fast and storing it efficiently Breaking GSM privacy 4
6 ey requirement of code book generation is a fast A5/1 engine Time on single threaded CPU: 100,000+ years Parallelization Bitslicing increases already large number of parallel computations by a factor of 256 Algorithmic tweaks Compute 4 bits at once Cryptographic tweaks Executing A5/1 for 100 extra clock cycles decreases key space by 85% Result: 1 month on 4 ATI GPUs *NVidia CUDA and ATI Brook GPUs are supported Breaking GSM privacy 5
7 1 GPUs allow for massive parallelization of code book computation Bitslicing: 1 PC with 3 graphics cards à 2 GPUs à 60 cores computes almost 100,000 A5/1 operations in parallel Source:iX 5/2010: Geheimnislos Breaking GSM privacy 6
8 3 A5/1 key space shrinks to 2 61 secret states Ring with 2 64 states LFSR used in older stream ciphers preserve the full output space of a function However, they have statistical weaknesses These states can be ignored for A5/1 attacks Relevant states: Rings with 2 61 states Newer stream ciphers therefore use NLFRs The output space of NLFSR slowly collapses The 100 extra A5/1 clocks in GSM shrink the output space by 85% (resulting in 30 faster cracking!) Breaking GSM privacy 7
9 Pre-computation tables store the code book condensed E233 2F06 503A OCFE DB18 22CB B951 CAF3 A8F3 CAF3 77CF 77CF Collision 87A4 49A6 118F B33F Longer chains := a) less storage, b) longer attack time Source:c t Breaking GSM privacy 8
10 Distinguished point tables save hard disk lookups 7707 BEFO 6100 B0F0 44B2 F415 44B2 A200 A200 Collision CA06 302F B400 Hard disk access only needed at distinguished points Source:c t Breaking GSM privacy 9
11 Rainbow tables mitigate collisions E B2 2 BBA8 3 1B22 Collision DB18 1 ODE3 2 44B2 3 5DE2 22CB 1 6C7A 2 55D A A4 11F6 362E C7D5 Rainbow tables have no mergers, but an exponentially higher attack time Source:c t Breaking GSM privacy 10
12 The combination of both table optimizations provides best trade-off Start End Distinguished points: Last 15 bits are zero Breaking GSM privacy 11
13 Open source components fit together in analyzing GSM calls GnuRadio records data from air Airprobe parses control data raken cracks A5/1 key Airprobe decodes voice Requires Software radio, ie. USRP Recommended for upstream: BURX board Requires 2TB of rainbow tables ATI graphics card and SSD/RAID for fast cracking Breaking GSM privacy 12
14 Downstream can be recorded for large areas Downstream recording range: 5 35km Upstream recording range: m Breaking GSM privacy 13
15 GSM discloses more known keystream than assumed in previous crack attempts Assignment Frame with known or guessable plaintext Very early Early Late nown Channel Timing known through Unknown Channel Mobile terminated calls Network terminated calls 1. Empty Ack after Assignment complete 2. Empty Ack after Alerting 3. Connect Acknowledge 4. Idle filling on SDCCH (multiple frames) 5. System Information 5+6 (~1/sec) 6. LAPDm traffic 1. Empty Ack after Cipher mode complete 2. Call proceeding 3. Alerting 4. Idle filling (multiple frames) 5. Connect 6. System Information 5+6 (~1/sec) 7. LAPDm Stealing bits Counting Counting frames Stealing bits Counting Source:GSM standards Breaking GSM privacy 14
16 Randomized padding would mitigate attack potential SDCCH trace d b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b e 02 ea 81 5c b 2b 2b d 9f 6d b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b a a e 0d 02 d b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b Padding in GSM has traditionally been predictable (2B) Every byte of randomized padding increasing attack cost by two orders of magnitude! Randomization was specified in 2008 (TS44.006) and should be implemented with high priority Additionally needed: randomization of system information msg. Breaking GSM privacy 15
17 Open research into GSM security grows exponentially??? OsmoconBB: phone firmware HLR tracking of phone users GSM Security Project: A5/1 decrypt tool OpenBTS: Full base station emulation OpenBSC: Controller for base stations CryptoPhone et al.: End-to-end encryption on phones Breaking GSM privacy 16
18 Questions? Research supported by Tables, Airprobe, raken Project Wiki arsten Nohl srlabs.de reflextor.com/trac/a51 Many thanks to Sascha rißler, Frank A. Stevenson, MvdS, Dieter Spaar, Harald Welte, Philipp Maier and David Burgess! Breaking GSM privacy 17
Karsten Nohl, Chris Paget 26C3, Berlin GSM SRSLY?
Karsten Nohl, Chris Paget 26C3, Berlin GSM SRSLY? Summary: GSM Encryption needs to be shown insecure GSM is constantly under attack: A5/1 cipher shown insecure repeatedly Lack of network authentication
Evaluating GSM A5/1 security on hopping channels
Evaluating GSM A5/1 security on hopping channels Bogdan Diaconescu v1.0 This paper is a practical approach on evaluating A5/1 stream cipher on a GSM hopping network air interface called Um. The end goal
Defending mobile phones. Karsten Nohl, nohl@srlabs.de Luca Melette, luca@srlabs.de
Defending mobile phones Karsten Nohl, nohl@srlabs.de Luca Melette, luca@srlabs.de GSM networks provide the base for various attacks SS7 Phone Base station GSM backend network User database (HLR) Vulnerability
GSM Research. Chair in Communication Systems Department of Applied Sciences University of Freiburg 2010
Chair in Communication Systems Department of Applied Sciences University of Freiburg 2010 Dennis Wehrle, Konrad Meier, Dirk von Suchodoletz, Klaus Rechert, Gerhard Schneider Overview 1. GSM Infrastructure
1. a. Define the properties of a one-way hash function. (6 marks)
1. a. Define the properties of a one-way hash function. (6 marks) A hash function h maps arbitrary length value x to fixed length value y such that: Hard to reverse. Given value y not feasible to find
GSM Risks and Countermeasures
GSM Risks and Countermeasures STI Group Discussion and Written Project Authors: Advisor: Johannes Ullrich Accepted: February 1, 2010 Abstract Recent research has shown that GSM encryption can be cracked
802.11 Security (WEP, WPA\WPA2) 19/05/2009. Giulio Rossetti Unipi Giulio.Rossetti@gmail.com
802.11 Security (WEP, WPA\WPA2) 19/05/2009 Giulio Rossetti Unipi Giulio.Rossetti@gmail.com 802.11 Security Standard: WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy The packets are encrypted, before sent, with a Secret Key
12/3/08. Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks. Wireless Magnifies Exposure Vulnerability. Mobility Makes it Difficult to Establish Trust
Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks Wireless Magnifies Exposure Vulnerability Information going across the wireless link is exposed to anyone within radio range RF may extend beyond a room or
Mobile network security report: Poland
Mobile network security report: Poland GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin February 2015 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common
Three attacks in SSL protocol and their solutions
Three attacks in SSL protocol and their solutions Hong lei Zhang Department of Computer Science The University of Auckland zhon003@ec.auckland.ac.nz Abstract Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer
The Misuse of RC4 in Microsoft Word and Excel
The Misuse of RC4 in Microsoft Word and Excel Hongjun Wu Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore hongjun@i2r.a-star.edu.sg Abstract. In this report, we point out a serious security flaw in Microsoft
Mobile network security report: Belgium
Mobile network security report: Belgium GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin December 2014 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common
GSM security country report: USA
GSM security country report: USA GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin August 2013 Abstract. GSM networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common attacks.
GSM security country report: Germany
GSM security country report: Germany GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin December 2013 Abstract. GSM networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common attacks.
Mobile network security report: Greece
Mobile network security report: Greece GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin October 2012 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common
Key Hopping A Security Enhancement Scheme for IEEE 802.11 WEP Standards
White Paper Key Hopping A Security Enhancement Scheme for IEEE 802.11 WEP Standards By Dr. Wen-Ping Ying, Director of Software Development, February 2002 Introduction Wireless LAN networking allows the
Authentication in WLAN
Authentication in WLAN Flaws in WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) Based on draft 3 of the IEEE 802.11i. Provides stronger data encryption and user authentication (largely missing
Lab 7. Answer. Figure 1
Lab 7 1. For each of the first 8 Ethernet frames, specify the source of the frame (client or server), determine the number of SSL records that are included in the frame, and list the SSL record types that
Lecture Objectives. Lecture 8 Mobile Networks: Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks. Agenda. References
Lecture Objectives Wireless Networks and Mobile Systems Lecture 8 Mobile Networks: Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks Introduce security vulnerabilities and defenses Describe security functions
SecureCom Mobile s mission is to help people keep their private communication private.
About SecureCom Mobile SecureCom Mobile s mission is to help people keep their private communication private. We believe people have a right to share ideas with each other, confident that only the intended
Overview of Cryptographic Tools for Data Security. Murat Kantarcioglu
UT DALLAS Erik Jonsson School of Engineering & Computer Science Overview of Cryptographic Tools for Data Security Murat Kantarcioglu Pag. 1 Purdue University Cryptographic Primitives We will discuss the
Mobile network security report: Netherlands
Mobile network security report: Netherlands GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin July 2014 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common
Mobile network security report: Germany
Mobile network security report: Germany GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin December 2014 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common
Mobile network security report: Poland
Mobile network security report: Poland GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin October 2014 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common
Wireless Networks. Welcome to Wireless
Wireless Networks 11/1/2010 Wireless Networks 1 Welcome to Wireless Radio waves No need to be physically plugged into the network Remote access Coverage Personal Area Network (PAN) Local Area Network (LAN)
TLS and SRTP for Skype Connect. Technical Datasheet
TLS and SRTP for Skype Connect Technical Datasheet Copyright Skype Limited 2011 Introducing TLS and SRTP Protocols help protect enterprise communications Skype Connect now provides Transport Layer Security
Chapter 6 CDMA/802.11i
Chapter 6 CDMA/802.11i IC322 Fall 2014 Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 6 th edition Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley March 2012 Some material copyright 1996-2012 J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross,
Network Security CS 5490/6490 Fall 2015 Lecture Notes 8/26/2015
Network Security CS 5490/6490 Fall 2015 Lecture Notes 8/26/2015 Chapter 2: Introduction to Cryptography What is cryptography? It is a process/art of mangling information in such a way so as to make it
Privacy through Pseudonymity in Mobile Telephony Systems
Privacy through Pseudonymity in Mobile Telephony Systems Eike Ritter University of Birmingham Joint work with Myrto Arapinis, Loretta Mancini and Mark Ryan Eike Ritter Privacy in Mobile Telephony Systems
Mobile network security report: Norway
Mobile network security report: Norway GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin August 2014 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common
Security Protocols/Standards
Security Protocols/Standards Security Protocols/Standards Security Protocols/Standards How do we actually communicate securely across a hostile network? Provide integrity, confidentiality, authenticity
Mobile Security. Practical attacks using cheap equipment. Business France. Presented the 07/06/2016. For. By Sébastien Dudek
Mobile Security Practical attacks using cheap equipment Presented the 07/06/2016 Business France By Sébastien Dudek For Content Security measures Recent publications in the hacking community Practical
Fast Implementations of AES on Various Platforms
Fast Implementations of AES on Various Platforms Joppe W. Bos 1 Dag Arne Osvik 1 Deian Stefan 2 1 EPFL IC IIF LACAL, Station 14, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland {joppe.bos, dagarne.osvik}@epfl.ch 2 Dept.
GSM Channels. Physical & Logical Channels. Traffic and Control Mutltiframing. Frame Structure
GSM Channels Physical & Logical Channels Traffic and Control Mutltiframing Frame Structure Engr. Mian Shahzad Iqbal Lecturer Department of Telecommunication Engineering Radio Interface The radio interface
Developing and Investigation of a New Technique Combining Message Authentication and Encryption
Developing and Investigation of a New Technique Combining Message Authentication and Encryption Eyas El-Qawasmeh and Saleem Masadeh Computer Science Dept. Jordan University for Science and Technology P.O.
ANALYSIS OF RSA ALGORITHM USING GPU PROGRAMMING
ANALYSIS OF RSA ALGORITHM USING GPU PROGRAMMING Sonam Mahajan 1 and Maninder Singh 2 1 Department of Computer Science Engineering, Thapar University, Patiala, India 2 Department of Computer Science Engineering,
Chapter 17. Transport-Level Security
Chapter 17 Transport-Level Security Web Security Considerations The World Wide Web is fundamentally a client/server application running over the Internet and TCP/IP intranets The following characteristics
Table of Contents. Bibliografische Informationen http://d-nb.info/996514864. digitalisiert durch
1 Introduction to Cryptography and Data Security 1 1.1 Overview of Cryptology (and This Book) 2 1.2 Symmetric Cryptography 4 1.2.1 Basics 4 1.2.2 Simple Symmetric Encryption: The Substitution Cipher...
Message Authentication Codes
2 MAC Message Authentication Codes : and Cryptography Sirindhorn International Institute of Technology Thammasat University Prepared by Steven Gordon on 28 October 2013 css322y13s2l08, Steve/Courses/2013/s2/css322/lectures/mac.tex,
Asymetrical keys. Alices computer generates a key pair. A public key: XYZ123345 (Used to encrypt) A secret key: ABC98765 (Used to decrypt)
Encryption keys Symmetrical keys Same key used for encryption and decryption Exchange of symmetrical keys between parties difficult without risk of interception Asymmetrical keys One key for encryption
Authentication requirement Authentication function MAC Hash function Security of
UNIT 3 AUTHENTICATION Authentication requirement Authentication function MAC Hash function Security of hash function and MAC SHA HMAC CMAC Digital signature and authentication protocols DSS Slides Courtesy
Network Security: Cryptography CS/SS G513 S.K. Sahay
Network Security: Cryptography CS/SS G513 S.K. Sahay BITS-Pilani, K.K. Birla Goa Campus, Goa S.K. Sahay Network Security: Cryptography 1 Introduction Network security: measure to protect data/information
Ch 2.3.3 GSM PENN. Magda El Zarki - Tcom 510 - Spring 98
Ch 2.3.3 GSM In the early 80 s the European community decided to work together to define a cellular system that would permit full roaming in all countries and give the network providers freedom to provide
SubmitedBy: Name Reg No Email Address. Mirza Kashif Abrar 790604-T079 kasmir07 (at) student.hh.se
SubmitedBy: Name Reg No Email Address Mirza Kashif Abrar 790604-T079 kasmir07 (at) student.hh.se Abid Hussain 780927-T039 abihus07 (at) student.hh.se Imran Ahmad Khan 770630-T053 imrakh07 (at) student.hh.se
How To Attack A Block Cipher With A Key Key (Dk) And A Key (K) On A 2Dns) On An Ipa (Ipa) On The Ipa 2Ds (Ipb) On Pcode)
Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 6 Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown (with edits by RHB) Chapter 6 Block Cipher Operation Many savages at the present day regard
CSCE 465 Computer & Network Security
CSCE 465 Computer & Network Security Instructor: Dr. Guofei Gu http://courses.cse.tamu.edu/guofei/csce465/ Secret Key Cryptography (I) 1 Introductory Remarks Roadmap Feistel Cipher DES AES Introduction
CIS 6930 Emerging Topics in Network Security. Topic 2. Network Security Primitives
CIS 6930 Emerging Topics in Network Security Topic 2. Network Security Primitives 1 Outline Absolute basics Encryption/Decryption; Digital signatures; D-H key exchange; Hash functions; Application of hash
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, J.D. Tygar, Victor Wen, and David Culler Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences, University of California
IEEE C802.20-03/88 An Alternative Approach for Enhancing Security of WMANs using Physical Layer Encryption
IEEE C802.20-03/88 An Alternative Approach for Enhancing Security of WMANs using Physical Layer Encryption By Arpan Pal Wireless Group Center of Excellence for Embedded Systems Tata Consultancy Services
Message authentication and. digital signatures
Message authentication and " Message authentication digital signatures verify that the message is from the right sender, and not modified (incl message sequence) " Digital signatures in addition, non!repudiation
Network Security. Security. Security Services. Crytographic algorithms. privacy authenticity Message integrity. Public key (RSA) Message digest (MD5)
Network Security Security Crytographic algorithms Security Services Secret key (DES) Public key (RSA) Message digest (MD5) privacy authenticity Message integrity Secret Key Encryption Plain text Plain
Privacy and Security in library RFID Issues, Practices and Architecture
Privacy and Security in library RFID Issues, Practices and Architecture David Molnar and David Wagner University of California, Berkeley CCS '04 October 2004 Overview Motivation RFID Background Library
Computer Networks. Network Security and Ethics. Week 14. College of Information Science and Engineering Ritsumeikan University
Computer Networks Network Security and Ethics Week 14 College of Information Science and Engineering Ritsumeikan University Security Intro for Admins l Network administrators can break security into two
Security in IEEE 802.11 WLANs
Security in IEEE 802.11 WLANs 1 IEEE 802.11 Architecture Extended Service Set (ESS) Distribution System LAN Segment AP 3 AP 1 AP 2 MS MS Basic Service Set (BSS) Courtesy: Prashant Krishnamurthy, Univ Pittsburgh
1 Step 1: Select... Files to Encrypt 2 Step 2: Confirm... Name of Archive 3 Step 3: Define... Pass Phrase
Contents I Table of Contents Foreword 0 Part I Introduction 2 1 What is?... 2 Part II Encrypting Files 1,2,3 2 1 Step 1: Select... Files to Encrypt 2 2 Step 2: Confirm... Name of Archive 3 3 Step 3: Define...
Authentication and Security in Mobile Phones
Authentication and Security in Mobile Phones Greg Rose QUALCOMM Australia ggr@qualcomm.com ABSTRACT Mobile telephone systems have a checkered reputation regarding security and authentication features after
Fast Software AES Encryption
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 2010 Fast Software AES Encryption Osvik, Dag Arne Proceedings FSE'10 Proceedings of the 17th
Encryption, Data Integrity, Digital Certificates, and SSL. Developed by. Jerry Scott. SSL Primer-1-1
Encryption, Data Integrity, Digital Certificates, and SSL Developed by Jerry Scott 2002 SSL Primer-1-1 Ideas Behind Encryption When information is transmitted across intranets or the Internet, others can
Wireless security (WEP) 802.11b Overview
Wireless security (WEP) 9/01/10 EJ Jung 802.11b Overview! Standard for wireless networks Approved by IEEE in 1999! Two modes: infrastructure and ad hoc IBSS (ad hoc) mode Independent Basic Service Set
Designing a Secure Client-Server System Master of Science Thesis in the Programme Software Engineering & Technology
Designing a Secure Client-Server System Master of Science Thesis in the Programme Software Engineering & Technology FREDRIK ANDERSSON Department of Computer Science and Engineering CHALMERS UNIVERSITY
SIM card exploita9on. The SRLabs Team. SRLabs Template v12
SIM card exploita9on The SRLabs Team SRLabs Template v12 SIM cards are fully programmable computer systems Applica'ons on modern SIM card Smartcard with real- 9me opera9ng system Basic func'ons Iden9fica9on
Chapter 10. Network Security
Chapter 10 Network Security 10.1. Chapter 10: Outline 10.1 INTRODUCTION 10.2 CONFIDENTIALITY 10.3 OTHER ASPECTS OF SECURITY 10.4 INTERNET SECURITY 10.5 FIREWALLS 10.2 Chapter 10: Objective We introduce
WHITE PAPER AUGUST 2014. Preventing Security Breaches by Eliminating the Need to Transmit and Store Passwords
WHITE PAPER AUGUST 2014 Preventing Security Breaches by Eliminating the Need to Transmit and Store Passwords 2 WHITE PAPER: PREVENTING SECURITY BREACHES Table of Contents on t Become the Next Headline
Speeding up GPU-based password cracking
Speeding up GPU-based password cracking SHARCS 2012 Martijn Sprengers 1,2 Lejla Batina 2,3 Sprengers.Martijn@kpmg.nl KPMG IT Advisory 1 Radboud University Nijmegen 2 K.U. Leuven 3 March 17-18, 2012 Who
Network Security Part II: Standards
Network Security Part II: Standards Raj Jain Washington University Saint Louis, MO 63131 Jain@cse.wustl.edu These slides are available on-line at: http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse473-05/ 18-1 Overview
SSL/TLS: The Ugly Truth
SSL/TLS: The Ugly Truth Examining the flaws in SSL/TLS protocols, and the use of certificate authorities. Adrian Hayter CNS Hut 3 Team adrian.hayter@cnsuk.co.uk Contents Introduction to SSL/TLS Cryptography
Error oracle attacks and CBC encryption. Chris Mitchell ISG, RHUL http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~cjm
Error oracle attacks and CBC encryption Chris Mitchell ISG, RHUL http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~cjm Agenda 1. Introduction 2. CBC mode 3. Error oracles 4. Example 1 5. Example 2 6. Example 3 7. Stream ciphers
Security of phone communications
Security of phone communications Authentication, identification and mobile security Matej Kovačič (CC) 2015 This work is published under Creative Commons licence: AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5
Enova X-Wall XO Frequently Asked Questions--FAQs
Enova X-Wall XO Frequently Asked Questions--FAQs Q: What is X-Wall XO? A: X-Wall XO is the fourth generation product that encrypts and decrypts the entire volume of the hard drive. The entire volume includes
Installation and usage of SSL certificates: Your guide to getting it right
Installation and usage of SSL certificates: Your guide to getting it right So, you ve bought your SSL Certificate(s). Buying your certificate is only the first of many steps involved in securing your website.
Using TEMS Pocket. Johan Montelius
Using TEMS Pocket Johan Montelius Introduction In this laboration you will get acquainted with the TEMS Pocket tool. You will examine both the Monaco network and a commercial network. Since this is your
Network Security (2) CPSC 441 Department of Computer Science University of Calgary
Network Security (2) CPSC 441 Department of Computer Science University of Calgary 1 Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy well-known in network security world Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate
How To Understand And Understand The History Of Cryptography
CSE497b Introduction to Computer and Network Security - Spring 2007 - Professors Jaeger Lecture 5 - Cryptography CSE497b - Spring 2007 Introduction Computer and Network Security Professor Jaeger www.cse.psu.edu/~tjaeger/cse497b-s07/
SPYTEC 3000 The system for GSM communication monitoring
SPYTEC 3000 The system for GSM communication monitoring The SPYTEC 3000 system is intended for passive (if system encryption is absent of if A5.2 encryption is used) or semi-active (if A5.1 encryption
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition. Chapter 6. Wireless Network Security
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Chapter 6 Wireless Network Security Objectives Overview of IEEE 802.11 wireless security Define vulnerabilities of Open System Authentication,
Practical Attacks on DOCSIS
Practical Attacks on DOCSIS Who am I? @drspringfield Security researcher at Accuvant Work in embedded device security, reverse engineering, exploit dev No background in DOCSIS, but I find it interesting
UMTS security. Helsinki University of Technology S-38.153 Security of Communication Protocols k-p.perttula@hut.fi 15.4.2003
UMTS security Helsinki University of Technology S-38.153 Security of Communication Protocols k-p.perttula@hut.fi 15.4.2003 Contents UMTS Security objectives Problems with GSM security UMTS security mechanisms
Introduction to WiFi Security. Frank Sweetser WPI Network Operations and Security fs@wpi.edu
Introduction to WiFi Security Frank Sweetser WPI Network Operations and Security fs@wpi.edu Why should I care? Or, more formally what are the risks? Unauthorized connections Stealing bandwidth Attacks
Network Security. Modes of Operation. Steven M. Bellovin February 3, 2009 1
Modes of Operation Steven M. Bellovin February 3, 2009 1 Using Cryptography As we ve already seen, using cryptography properly is not easy Many pitfalls! Errors in use can lead to very easy attacks You
Wireless LAN Security Mechanisms
Wireless LAN Security Mechanisms Jingan Xu, Andreas Mitschele-Thiel Technical University of Ilmenau, Integrated Hard- and Software Systems Group jingan.xu@tu-ilmenau.de, mitsch@tu-ilmenau.de Abstract.
Message Authentication
Message Authentication message authentication is concerned with: protecting the integrity of a message validating identity of originator non-repudiation of origin (dispute resolution) will consider the
Special Topics in Security and Privacy of Medical Information. Reminders. Medical device security. Sujata Garera
Special Topics in Security and Privacy of Medical Information Sujata Garera Reminders Assignment due today Project part 1 due on next Tuesday Assignment 2 will be online today evening 2nd Discussion session
Protocol Rollback and Network Security
CSE 484 / CSE M 584 (Spring 2012) Protocol Rollback and Network Security Tadayoshi Kohno Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee,
Content Teaching Academy at James Madison University
Content Teaching Academy at James Madison University 1 2 The Battle Field: Computers, LANs & Internetworks 3 Definitions Computer Security - generic name for the collection of tools designed to protect
CS 161 Computer Security Spring 2010 Paxson/Wagner MT2
CS 161 Computer Security Spring 2010 Paxson/Wagner MT2 PRINT your name:, (last) SIGN your name: (first) PRINT your class account login: cs161- Your T s name: Your section time: Name of the person sitting
Lecture Note 8 ATTACKS ON CRYPTOSYSTEMS I. Sourav Mukhopadhyay
Lecture Note 8 ATTACKS ON CRYPTOSYSTEMS I Sourav Mukhopadhyay Cryptography and Network Security - MA61027 Attacks on Cryptosystems Up to this point, we have mainly seen how ciphers are implemented. We
Network Security. Chapter 3 Symmetric Cryptography. Symmetric Encryption. Modes of Encryption. Symmetric Block Ciphers - Modes of Encryption ECB (1)
Chair for Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics TU München Prof. Carle Network Security Chapter 3 Symmetric Cryptography General Description Modes of ion Data ion Standard (DES)
Chapter 23. Database Security. Security Issues. Database Security
Chapter 23 Database Security Security Issues Legal and ethical issues Policy issues System-related issues The need to identify multiple security levels 2 Database Security A DBMS typically includes a database
Communication Systems SSL
Communication Systems SSL Computer Science Organization I. Data and voice communication in IP networks II. Security issues in networking III. Digital telephony networks and voice over IP 2 Network Security
Chapter 11 Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Basic Cryptography
Chapter 11 Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Basic Cryptography What Is Steganography? Steganography Process of hiding the existence of the data within another file Example:
HOW ENCRYPTION WORKS. Introduction to BackupEDGE Data Encryption. Technology Overview. Strong Encryption BackupEDGE
HOW ENCRYPTION WORKS Technology Overview Strong Encryption BackupEDGE Introduction to BackupEDGE Data Encryption A major feature of BackupEDGE is the ability to protect archives containing critical client
Secure Socket Layer. Security Threat Classifications
Secure Socket Layer 1 Security Threat Classifications One way to classify Web security threats in terms of the type of the threat: Passive threats Active threats Another way to classify Web security threats
How To Encrypt With A 64 Bit Block Cipher
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) As mentioned earlier there are two main types of cryptography in use today - symmetric or secret key cryptography and asymmetric or public key cryptography. Symmetric
Cipher Techniques on Networks. Amit Konar Math and CS, UMSL
Cipher Techniques on Networks Amit Konar Math and CS, UMSL Why to learn Cipher Techniques on Networks? Because 1) Cryptographic systems are sensitive to environments, 2) using cryptography on networks
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
Due to the fact that nearly all businesses have websites (as well as government agencies and individuals) a large enthusiasm exists for setting up facilities on the Web for electronic commerce. Of course
Message authentication
Message authentication -- Hash based MAC unctions -- MAC unctions based on bloc ciphers -- Authenticated encryption (c) Levente Buttyán (buttyan@crysys.hu) Secret preix method MAC (x) = H( x) insecure!
SSL A discussion of the Secure Socket Layer
www.harmonysecurity.com info@harmonysecurity.com SSL A discussion of the Secure Socket Layer By Stephen Fewer Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 Encryption Techniques 3 3 Protocol Overview 3 3.1 The SSL Record
Security in the Age of Nanocomputing. Hacking Devices
Security in the Age of Nanocomputing Matthew Tan Creti Hacking Devices The ESA estimates its total worldwide losses due to piracy at $3 billion annually [2] One million unlocked iphones could cost Apple
dect provides high protection against unauthorized access
dect provides high protection against unauthorized access BACKGROUND 2 Wireless communication for voice and data is growing worldwide. The amount of DECT (Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications)
Client Server Registration Protocol
Client Server Registration Protocol The Client-Server protocol involves these following steps: 1. Login 2. Discovery phase User (Alice or Bob) has K s Server (S) has hash[pw A ].The passwords hashes are