Shareholders, Ladies and Gentlemen,

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1 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, APRIL 14, 2015 ADDRESS BY CHAIRMAN DR. PAUL J. HÄLG Shareholders, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank Jan Jenisch and Mr. Tschopp for their presentations, which provided an impressive demonstration of how we are successfully implementing our growth model. Before we move on to the individual items on the agenda, I wish to recapitulate the Board's position on the intended sale of Sika to Saint Gobain. Why is the Board so staunchly opposed to this unfriendly takeover? Why does the Board enjoy the support of an impressive front put up by shareholders, management, employees, financial analysts and politicians? The main reasons are as follows: First: The transaction is devoid of industrial logic Saint Gobain aims to fully consolidate Sika despite the fact that the targeted holding represents only 16 percent of the share capital. It cites extensive synergies as justification for the exorbitant purchase price. However, full legal integration is impossible because of the public shareholders who own the remainder of the shares, making the announced synergies completely unrealistic. Whichever way you look at it, any potential is practically limited to the mortar sector, where we are competitors. But to be able to exploit the envisaged synergies nevertheless would require complicated agreements between Saint Gobain and Sika companies in the individual countries. In our estimate, the associated direct and indirect costs by far outweigh any possible synergies. And unrealistic synergies are not the Board's only cause for concern. Negative reactions from customers also give grounds to fear that Sika's

2 business would be adversely impacted. Many of them are Saint Gobain's competitors. In the event of a merger, these customers would want to avoid giving trade to the competition and so would stop buying products from Sika. For others it is essential that Sika remains independent. Cautious estimates already put potential meltdown losses in the region of CHF 200 million in sales. From an industrial standpoint, it makes no sense for the two companies to join forces. On the contrary, it would herald the end of our successful growth model. Sika's streamlined management structure with its clearly assigned results based responsibilities would be eroded and our employees' market focus and motivation undermined. In other words: Everything that has made Sika such a success would be fundamentally called into question. Over the past few decades, Sika has convincingly proven that it is not dependent on a strategic partner. Second: Saint Gobain aims to secure control with only 16% of the share capital Saint Gobain would like to gain control of Sika with just 16% of the share capital. To achieve this, it is willing to pay a handsome 80% premium to the sellers. Public shareholders would not only come away empty handed, they would also suffer substantial losses. Our analysis of the planned deal has shown that the synergies are worth much less than the 80% premium of approximately one billion Swiss francs which Saint Gobain plans to pay the family. Our calculations reveal a shortfall of several hundred million francs. It is clear even today that the announced plans are only the beginning. Economic considerations would compel Saint Gobain to resort to furtherreaching measures in order to justify the purchase price. And things may 2/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

3 well get worse: Saint Gobain has no interest at all in a high priced bearer share. Quite the opposite: a low price would allow Saint Gobain to increase its capital share cheaply on the market and reduce the high premium. The Board of Directors is therefore wondering what Saint Gobain's true intentions are. Third: No appropriate representation of public shareholders on the Board. Up to now, the Sika Board of Directors has always been made up of a majority of independent members. This structure was one of the factors behind our company's success and over the decades has also guaranteed an appropriate representation of all shareholders in the highest governing body. It is Saint Gobain's declared aim to secure a majority on the Board of Directors despite holding only 16% of the share capital. The French group is also laying claim to the office of Board chair. The remaining shareholders would represent a minority on the Board although they hold a majority of 84 percent of the capital. This would pave the way for Saint Gobain to push through its strategic plans unhindered, making it impossible for the interests of the public shareholders on the Board to be adequately represented. Fourth: Saint Gobain is a direct competitor of Sika. Saint Gobain is Sika's largest competitor worldwide in the fast growing lucrative mortar business. We are direct competitors in some 50 countries. And we are a truly uncomfortable competitor at that. None of our businesses is growing faster or showing higher margins than the mortar sector. Over the past few years, we have systematically wrested market share from Weber, Saint Gobain's mortar brand, and in the current year are targeting sales of one billion francs in this segment for the first time. Saint Gobain views the deal as an opportunity to have Weber and Sika compete against one another "under the same roof." The different 3/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

4 ownership structures Weber is a wholly owned subsidiary of Saint Gobain, while only 16% of Sika would belong to Saint Gobain make it virtually inevitable that Sika would be disadvantaged by insoluble conflicts of interest. Saint Gobain would have an obvious interest in giving preference to its own mortar operation when it comes to opportunities for acquisitions or new business, for instance. The same would apply to the allocation of cost synergies. The planned amalgamation of production plants would also mean Sika relinquishing control over its value chain and losing know how, thereby seriously jeopardizing Sika's successful growth model. Fifth: Our employees are deeply worried. Sika has a very strong company culture which places a lot of trust in the individual and permits a great deal of scope for action. Key decisions are subject to prior consultation. Strategy 2018 was not dictated from on high, but was talked through with national teams. This lends decisions much greater legitimacy and enforceability, and is what enables us to achieve our higher than average margins in the first place. It is no surprise that Sika's 160 senior managers have been with the company on average around 20 years, nor is it uncommon for nonmanagerial staff to have been working at Sika for more than 20 or 30 years. Greatly unsettled by last December's developments, many employees are placing their trust in the present Board and Group Management in the hope that a positive outcome is reached. Saint Gobain is inspiring no confidence whatsoever. The latter's constant refusal to discuss with the Board and General Management the genuine problems underlying the deal is not going down very well. Many see the inherent contradictions in statements made by Saint Gobain's Chairman and CEO, who promises that there will be no lay offs, yet at the same time, when presenting his company's annual 4/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

5 figures, stresses the need to make savings because he has no growth to report. No one can see the industrial logic behind this transaction. Something else unique has also happened: in two letters sent directly to Mr. de Chalendar, over 100 of Sika's senior managers have expressed their disapproval of the deal. And headhunters are out in full force trying to recruit Sika people. Anyone working at Sika usually has superb references. Thanks to Group Management's efforts, no one has handed in their notice so far. Our executives remain committed to Sika and expect a good solution to be found. 5/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

6 Sixth: Sika is losing its excellent credit rating. Last December, Standard & Poor s announced that if the deal went through, it would lower Sika's credit rating by two notches from A (long term) to BBB (on a par with Saint Gobain's rating). This would mean considerably higher refinancing charges for Sika, especially if interest rates go up. And Sika's market reputation would suffer long term damage. This is the outcome of two separate analyses: - The first was conducted independently by Group Management and focused primarily on operational issues; - The second was conducted by the Board of Directors and focused on the strategic components and corporate governance issues. The independent Board members, the entire Group Management and the overwhelming majority of Sika's senior managers unanimously came to the same conclusion: This unfriendly takeover is not in Sika's interests: - The strategic strengths and weaknesses that I outlined earlier would be fundamentally undermined; and - The growth model and Strategy 2018 would be severely jeopardized. The intended transaction is devoid of any industrial logic and has not been thought through. As part of their analysis, the Board commissioned Perella Weinberg to provide an independent opinion evaluating the financial implications of the unfriendly takeover for Sika. I would now like to summarize the results for you: A comparison of the two companies shows that Sika's business model is significantly superior both operationally and in terms of creating shareholder value. Sika has reported sales growth of 6.9% p.a. over the last four years, while 6/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

7 sales by the corresponding division of Saint Gobain have shrunk by 2.7% p.a. And at 11.4% in 2014, Sika's operating margin was twice as high as that of the French group's division. This is also reflected in the share price. Sika's share rose 34.1% between the end of 2013 and December 5, 2014, while Saint Gobain's stock had gained only 2.9%. The fact that the investor community is expecting more high yield growth from Sika than from Saint Gobain going forward is reflected in Sika's EBITDA multiple of 11.3 compared to Saint Gobain's 7.3. Sika's successful business model is in jeopardy. Our streamlined structure based on entrepreneurial responsibility is under threat from a complex, centralized organization. Wherever the two companies are in competition, there are harmful overlaps for Sika this applies particularly to high margin products and to growth markets such as Indonesia, Poland, Brazil and Africa, and is of great importance in acquisitions. How can we quantify this? For example by assuming that Sika will in future no be longer able to carry out acquisitions in the mortar sector, where it competes with Saint Gobain, that the expected synergies are not as expected and meltdown losses occur instead. Adjusting Sika's business plan for the projected effects of the acquisition, adding the synergies derived by Sika and subtracting the expected customer erosion based on feedback received to date results in a loss in value for Sika of approximately 1 billion Swiss francs. The impact on the market value would likely be considerably higher since EBITDA multipliers correlate closely with sales growth. In view of the anticipated fall in EBITDA and lower sales growth, Sika's market value would probably be reduced by around 2.8 billion Swiss francs. 7/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

8 The capital market also predicts that the proposed deal would significantly destroy value. S&P has already announced that it would downgrade Sika's credit rating by a full two notches as a consequence of the takeover. Not one single financial analyst who writes about Sika is taking a positive stance on the deal. Even Saint Gobain analysts are critical. In the immediate wake of the announcement by Saint Gobain and SWH, analysts lowered target prices for the Sika share by an average of CHF 489, corresponding to a destruction in value of CHF 1.2 billion. And in the days following the announcement, the price of the Sika share slid by 29%, equivalent to a destruction in value of CHF 2.9 billion. It is no surprise that shareholders representing 55% of the company's capital have come out openly against the takeover and are supporting the Board in its efforts to find an acceptable solution. Depending on the perspective, the planned acquisition would mean a destruction in value for Sika shareholders of between CHF 1.1 and 2.9 billion. Then there is the question that has already been raised of what Saint Gobain actually hopes to achieve with the takeover: the controlling premium of around a billion Swiss francs that Saint Gobain paid to the Burkard family is higher even than the cash value of the synergies that Saint Gobain is claiming would be generated. Due in part to the need to protect the free shareholders, Sika calculates the realizable synergies to be much lower, resulting here in a difference of over CHF 600 million. This makes it clear that the deal would not pay off for Saint Gobain without a further transfer of value from Sika to Saint Gobain to the detriment of the free shareholders and with additional ramifications for Sika's going concern value and share price. To sum up, all of the evaluation methods used in the analysis by Perella Weinberg point to a drastic destruction in value for Sika as a consequence of the planned deal. 8/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

9 And Prof. Berndt of the University of St. Gallen has confirmed every aspect of Perella Weinberg's analysis. Regrettably, Saint Gobain has so far ignored all our misgivings and not shown any sign of willingness to enter into concessions. Saint Gobain is not even prepared to sit around a table with the Sika Board and General Management to discuss the critical aspects of the unfriendly takeover. Moreover, constructive alternative proposals, such as selling Saint Gobain's mortar business to Sika and combining the sale with acceptable corporate governance, have been rejected out of hand. We naturally remain open to productive discussions. Unfortunately, it is not only the industrial and financial aspects that make this unfriendly takeover bid so unprecedented, but the legal implications as well: Art. 4 of Sika AG's Articles of Association contains a restriction of transferability clause, which gives the Board of Directors the right to refuse an acquirer of registered shares as shareholder if the number of registered shares it is acquiring exceeds 5% of the total. The purpose of this clause is to allow the Board of Directors to monitor acquirers of significant packages of registered shares and to reject them if the underlying acquisition were to threaten Sika's independence. This provision applies only to registered shares and not to bearer shares, which is significant inasmuch as the Burkard family holds over 99% of all registered shares via Schenker Winkler Holding. The bottom line here is that Art. 4 of the Articles of Association can actually only be of relevance in one single case: the sale of this Sika shareholding. Saint Gobain is attempting to circumvent the restriction of transferability clause in that it is not purchasing Sika registered shares but is instead acquiring Schenker Holding AG. A direct purchase of Sika registered shares would undisputedly trigger application of Art. 4 of the Articles of Association and so 9/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

10 limit the registered shares that Saint Gobain could have entered in the share register to a maximum of 5%. The question now arises as to whether Art. 4 of the Articles of Association is also applicable to an indirect sale, in particular because this achieves the same economic end as a direct purchase notably, control over Sika. And because Sika would suffer a huge loss in value as a result of a transfer of control. Above all though, the opposing party has been trying for months to prevent the Board of Directors from using the restriction of transferability clause at all. The initial step was to attempt to hold an extraordinary general meeting to have the non amenable directors voted off the Board and replaced by members sympathetic to Saint Gobain. When the Board of Directors refused to immediately obey this request, SWH filed a suit against Sika with the Cantonal Court of Zug. The Board of Directors mandated Prof. Peter Nobel to prepare a legal opinion on the question. On the basis of this report, the Board of Directors decided to limit SWH's voting rights to the 5% stipulated by the Articles of Association and not to comply with the request to convene an extraordinary general meeting. SWH then made a request for a provisional order to prohibit the Sika Board from restricting the exercise of SWH's voting rights. And now SWH has even started showering individual Board members with threats of legal action. The Cantonal Court of Zug denied SWH's requests in both proceedings. The decision on the EGM is now legally binding. In the intervening period, SWH appealed the decision denying its request to prohibit the restriction of voting rights. Just as the Cantonal Court before, the Supreme Court of Zug denied SWH's request for an ex parte order prohibiting any restrictions of voting rights. The next attempt to transfer control to Saint Gobain will take place at today's AGM. A proposal is being tabled that, instead of me, Max Roesle someone 10/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

11 who does not possess any of the industrial or managerial experience needed to lead Sika be elected Chairman of the Board of Directors. We also expect that an attempt will be made to prevent the re election of the independent directors. To date, the Board has no knowledge of who would lead the Sika Group in place of these experienced directors. The motions to elect Dr. Roesle and remove the present independent directors clearly serve one purpose: to pave the way for an unfriendly takeover of Sika by Saint Gobain, to eliminate the "stumbling blocks" on the Board and so prevent it from deliberating and moving to apply Art. 4 of the Articles of Association. The losses of value I mentioned earlier and of which the opposing party is aware seem to be immaterial to these considerations. It is obvious that the family and Saint Gobain have conferred on how SWH's voting rights should be exercised at today's AGM. The disclosure made on April 7, 2015 by Saint Gobain and the Burkard family that they have allegedly dissolved their group does nothing to change this. Even after seeing the revised contract between the sellers and Saint Gobain, the Board of Directors does not regard this disclosure and the justification given for it (sale of individually held bearer shares to Schenker Winkler Holding AG) as valid, given the statements made in court proceedings and in public. Nor have the latest developments persuaded Prof. Nobel to change his assessment. He still considers that Saint Gobain, SWH and the Burkard family form a group, and he stands by his assessment. Prof. Nobel adheres to the view that the de facto transfer of voting rights from the family to Saint Gobain represents a legally inadmissible circumvention of Sika's restriction of transferability clause, and that the clause should also apply to the planned indirect acquisition of Sika shares via SWH. 11/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

12 The decision of the Cantonal Court of Zug does not provide a final legal ruling on the issue. At this stage, it is leaving it to the Board of Directors to determine whether, and to what extent, it wishes to restrict SWH's voting rights at the AGM. In the light of this legal situation and the interests that are at stake for Sika, the Board of Directors feels it is essential to maintain the status quo at Sika. By doing so we are acting in accordance with the decision of the Cantonal Court of Zug. In its ruling, the court states, among other things, that it is entirely appropriate to establish by due process of law whether the restriction of transferability clause in the Articles of Association is applicable in this case. This is precisely what we intend to achieve by maintaining the status quo. If candidates proposed by SWH were to be elected to the Board of Directors, the Burkard heirs and Saint Gobain would obtain immediate control of the company without the key issue being resolved by the courts. As part of the planned integration they could create irrevocable precedents: The loss of value that I have mentioned would begin. It would be virtually impossible to reverse integration into the Saint Gobain Group once it had taken place. This must not happen. The Board of Directors cannot permit it because it is not in Sika's interests. One principle must therefore apply: Until the matter has been finally settled by the courts, it is in Sika's interests for the existing Board of Directors to retain control. After carefully examining the Perella and Berndt opinions, the assessment of the transaction by the Board and Group Management, and all the legal arguments including those put forward by SWH and on the basis of several legal opinions, the Board of Directors has decided today to adopt a restrained 12/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

13 approach to the voting rights associated with the registered shares held by SWH at the AGM and only restrict them to the extent needed to prevent a premature transfer of control to Saint Gobain. In practice, this means that the voting rights associated with the registered shares held by Schenker Winkler Holding will be limited to 5 percent of all registered shares with regard to the following agenda items: 4.1. The re election of Ms. Ribar and Messrs. van Dijk, Sauter, Suter, Tobler and myself to the Board, but not the re election of Messrs Burkard, Leimer and Tinggren The first time election of Dr. Max Roesle and any further candidates to the Board of Directors 4.3. The election of the Chairman of the Board of Directors 4.4. The re election of members of the Nomination and Compensation Committee with the exception of Mr. Burkard In view of the situation, the Board of Directors is endeavoring to retain its current composition, in which it has been able to function successfully, until the pending legal issues have been resolved. SWH's voting rights will be restricted if any additional candidates are proposed. On all other agenda items, SWH will be able to exercise its voting rights without restriction. However, this will not apply to the election of the statutory auditors (agenda item 4.5) or to the separate proposals submitted by shareholders requesting a Special Audit and the appointment of Special Experts (agenda items 6.2 and 6.3), for which voting rights are determined by the nominal value of shares under Article 693 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. Furthermore, we are not restricting SWH's voting rights on Ethos' proposal on opting in, since this would go beyond our goal of maintaining the status quo. The opting out issue is already the subject of an action initiated by the 13/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

14 shareholder group led by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust and which is currently pending with FINMA. Similarly, the voting rights restriction will not apply to other, potentially sensitive, votes at this AGM, namely the decisions on the payment of a dividend, discharge of the Board of Directors and Group Management, and the compensation paid to the Board of Directors and Group Management. We assume that the family will exercise its voting rights on these issues responsibly and in the interests of the company. In recent months, a few critics have claimed that restricting SWH's voting rights is tantamount to expropriation. I would like to categorically refute these claims. Nobody on the Board of Directors wants to prevent the Burkard heirs from selling their shareholding in Sika. However, the Board of Directors is convinced that the form of the transaction planned by SWH and Saint Gobain will be highly detrimental to the company and, as a result, to all its other stakeholders. As I explained at the beginning of this speech, this transaction would destroy the value of this long established company and its chances of growth. When I was appointed Chairman of the Board three years ago, I undertook as did my fellow Board members to protect and preserve the legitimate interests of Sika. It is precisely this obligation that the independent members of the Board are fulfilling by using the resources at their disposal to oppose Saint Gobain's value destroying takeover plans. The independent Board members have submitted to the Burkard heirs an alternative proposal that aims to provide a premium for the heirs and an independent Sika with a single class of shares. So far I am sorry to say that the heirs have not been willing to discuss this proposal with us. Both the Board of Directors and Group Management deplore the current situation enormously. We were completely unprepared when the planned sale 14/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

15 was announced on December 5. Until then we had maintained a successful partnership with the family that had been very fruitful for both sides. The Board of Directors, Group Management and shareholders all felt reassured by the family's repeated avowals, the core message of which had not changed for years: The Burkard family stands behind Sika. Sadly, the sale has put an abrupt end to the trust that had existed until then. Sika's future has now become a matter for the courts and lawyers. Let me make something clear, however: The Board of Directors has not actively initiated any legal proceedings. Regardless of the legal wranglings, the current Board of Directors and the entire Group Management will continue to do their utmost to ensure that Sika is able to pursue its business successfully and without disruption. The growth, investments in new factories and acquisitions that we have seen in the first quarter are compelling proof of this. While the Board of Directors respects the Burkard heirs' intention to break their links with Sika, it very much regrets it. At the same time, though, the Board of Directors takes its legal obligations very seriously. We cannot consent to a backdoor sale that circumvents all safeguards, not least because such a sale threatens to destroy a large part of Sika's value. Faced with such a crisis, the Board of Directors has a legal obligation to defend the company's interests. These decisions are guided neither by personal interest, nor by the interests of a main shareholder that holds just 16% of the company's capital, nor by the interests of Saint Gobain, but solely by the corporate interests of Sika! This is the only consideration to which the Board of Directors is gearing its actions. 15/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

16 In the opinion of the Board of Directors, it is therefore in Sika's interests to have the pending legal issues resolved by due process of law. In such proceedings, the company represented by an independent Board of Directors will have an opportunity to set out its position in the interests of all shareholders. To this end, the current Board of Directors and Group Management should continue to run the business and thus maintain Sika's value until the pending issues have been finally resolved by the courts. The opposing side frequently puts it about that the Board of Directors is being autocratic and only pursuing its own interests. This statement, more than any other, illustrates the attempts that are being made to disregard the realities. For, just as unprecedented as the unfriendly takeover bid itself are the expressions of support that the Board of Directors is receiving: We have received letters of explicit support from the majority of public shareholders who together represent more than 50% of Sika's capital. Financial analysts who have been observing Sika for years unanimously reject the takeover. Only one of the analysts who tracks Saint Gobain is in favor of the deal, all the rest are opposed. The vast majority of management is opposed to the unfriendly takeover. Staff organizations representing more than 8000 employees have expressly condemned the bid. In an unprecedented move for Switzerland, various national and local politicians have spoken out against the takeover. Standard & Poor's has put Sika on its watch list and will lower its rating by two notches from A to BBB (Saint Gobain's rating). Furthermore, it is a fact that the Board of Directors has not received a single letter from any shareholder (with the exception of the Burkard family), employee or customer that expresses support for the takeover. They are all 16/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

17 unanimous in rejecting an unfriendly takeover bid, the extreme nature of which is unrivaled not just in Switzerland but worldwide. At this point, I would like thank you, our shareholders on behalf of myself and the other independent Board members most sincerely for your support during this turbulent period. We also want to express our gratitude to the thousands of Sika employees who have stated so clearly that they stand behind us. We have received letters of support not only from Switzerland, Germany, Spain and other European countries, but also from employees in Africa, South America and the Far East. Many of them are justifiably worried about their jobs after the takeover. What's more, many of them are also shareholders and have therefore joined us today in Baar. This demonstrates impressively that the incomparable Sika Spirit, which has conveyed the unique sense of cohesion and mindset in our company for more than a century, is not just empty words. It is very much alive in the company every day, throughout the world. And we intend to ensure that it remains so. I would now like to look again at a number of agenda items that are particularly relevant to the planned, value destroying transaction and possible change in control. The election of the Board of Directors is a crucial point. All current members of the Board of Directors are standing for re election. We, the independent Board members, are willing to continue to commit all our energies to Sika so that its success story can continue. Re electing the entire Board or Directors and me as its Chairman would prevent a backdoor change in control and guarantee continuity of management at least while the current legal proceedings are in progress. Dr. Roesle, whom SWH is proposing as Chairman, can hardly guarantee the same continuity. In the light of what I said earlier, it will be no surprise to you that the Board of Directors is recommending that you do not 17/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

18 elect Dr. Roesle. We are very pleased that such respected advisory firms as ISS are supporting the Board of Directors' line and recommending that SWH's proposal be rejected. Furthermore, a shareholder group led by the Ethos Foundation has submitted a proposal to delete the opting out clause. SWH and Saint Gobain are using this clause to justify their claim that their planned transaction is exempt from the requirement to make an offer to the remaining shareholders. A majority of the Board of Directors recommends accepting this proposal. However, I must make it clear that the Board of Directors is not restricting SWH's voting rights on this agenda item because it would go beyond what is necessary to prevent a premature transfer of control. Furthermore, the proposals by the shareholders Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Cascade Investment, Fidelity Worldwide Investment and Threadneedle Investments have been placed on the agenda. These shareholders are requesting a Special Audit of the events leading up to the announcement of the transaction by SWH and Saint Gobain. The Special Audit would investigate whether non public information was made available to Saint Gobain or SWH within the 24 months prior to the 2015 AGM. In addition, the Special Audit would clarify whether any arrangements have been made between Board members and Saint Gobain or SWH. Sika's Board of Directors recommends that this proposal be accepted. As I mentioned earlier, a majority of capital is sufficient to carry this motion. Furthermore, the same shareholders are proposing that a Special Expert Committee be appointed until at least the 2017 AGM. This Committee would become active if there were to be any change to the current structure of the Board of Directors, i.e. if there were no longer six independent members. The 18/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

19 Committee would review and investigate the future conduct of Sika's business relating to SWH, the Burkard family and Saint Gobain, particularly with regard to its effect on you, the company's public shareholders. Sika's Board of Directors recommends that this proposal be accepted. Here again, the proposal is subject to a majority of capital, not a majority of voting rights. The Board has also received a request for information from SWH. We will respond to this after the agenda items listed in the invitation have been dealt with. Shareholders, ladies and gentlemen, all our efforts over the past few months have been geared to just one thing: safeguarding the interests of a prospering Sika. The Board of Directors and Group Management are working shoulder to shoulder to continue the Sika success story that is now more than a century old. We are fighting to preserve the Sika Spirit the one thing above all that will ensure our company stays successful. The idea of serving our own interests is completely foreign to us. In our fight to safeguard the essence of Sika, we are reliant on you, the company's shareholders. We call on you to give us your trust because you alone at this AGM can decide the fate of this successful, long established company. With your votes, you have the power to set the course of Sika's future. Thank you for your attention. 19/19 April 17, 2015 Sika AG

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