Melanie Rieback (Faculty of Sciences Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) Rina Steenkamp (CBP Dutch Data Protection Agency)

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1 Confirmed speakers (C.V. s and abstract are given below) Adam Laurie (The Bunker) Christof Paar (Ruhr University Bochum) Patrick Pype (NXP) Matthew Reynolds (ECE, Duke University) Melanie Rieback (Faculty of Sciences Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) Damith Ranasingh (Auto-ID Labs Cambridge) Bart Schermer (RFID Platform Nederland) Rina Steenkamp (CBP Dutch Data Protection Agency) Adam Stubblefield (Johns Hopkins University) Wouter Teepe (University of Nijmegen) Mark Witteman (Riscure) C.V. s Christof Paar Christof Paar has the Chair for Communication Security at Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany. From 1994 to 2001 he was with WPI in Massachusetts, USA. He co-founded, with Cetin Koc, the CHES (Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems) workshop series, which has evolved into the leading forum for research in embedded security. His research interests cover highly efficient software and hardware of cryptography, security in pervasive applications, physical security, secure ad-hoc networks, and cryptanalytical hardware. He also works on real-world applications of embedded security, e.g., in RFID, consumer devices, cars, or smart cards. Christof has over 80 peer-reviewed publications in embedded security and holds several patents. He is co-founder of escrypt â Embedded Security and has extensive consulting experience with leading international companies. He has taught many industry courses, including courses at GTE, NASA, Motorola Research, and Philips Research. Christof will be with the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in the 2008/09 academic year.

2 Damith Ranasinghe Damith Ranasinghe is a member of the University of Cambridge Auto-ID Lab. He is based at the Institute for Manufacturing, in the Department of Engineering, where he is also invovled in the acitivities of the Distributed Information and Automation Laboratory. Damith is currently working on the PROMISE project, which is an EU-funded project that aims to improve the management of products throughout their lifecycle by better management of the product lifecycle information and also the BRIDGE project which aims to building world-wide RFID solutions that integrate into existing industrial business processes. Matt Reynolds Matt Reynolds is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Duke University. He is also co-founder of the RFID systems firm ThingMagic Inc, and has been designing commercial RFID systems for over 10 years. Matt's research interests include energy efficiency at the physical layer of wireless communication, the physics of sensing and actuation, radiolocation, and digital signal processing. Matt holds a Ph.D. from the MIT Media Lab, where he was a Motorola Fellow, as well as S.B. and M.Eng. degrees in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT. Matt has one issued and 10 patents pending before the USPTO. Melanie Rieback Melanie Rieback is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, in the group of Prof. Andrew Tanenbaum. Melanie's research concerns the security and privacy of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, and she leads multidisciplinary research teams on RFID security (RFID Malware) and RFID privacy management (RFID Guardian) projects. Her research has attracted worldwide media attention, appearing in the New York Times, Washington Post, Reuters, UPI, Computerworld, CNN, BBC, MSNBC, and many other print, broadcast, and online news outlets. Melanie's research has received several awards (Best Paper: IEEE PerCom '06, Best Paper: USENIX Lisa '06, NWO I/O Prize, VU Mediakomeet, ISOC Award finalist), and Melanie has also served as an invited expert for RFID security discussions with both the American and Dutch governments. In a past life, Melanie also worked on the Human Genome Project at the Whitehead Institute / MIT Center for Genome Research. Bart Schermer Bart Willem Schermer was born in Alkmaar on July 1, He studied law (IT law and criminal law) at Leiden University. Bart has worked as a legal consultant for ECP.NL since For the past 3 years Bart was the secretary of the RFID Platform Nederland. Currently he is partner in consulting firm Considerati BV and researcher at the University of Leiden. His work and research focuses on privacy and ambient intelligence. Rina Steenkamp Since November 2007, Rina Steenkamp joined the Dutch data protection authority as a technologist. One aspect of her work is assessing the privacy implications of the use of new technologies. For the previous twenty-five years she worked in various IT-related positions in both the private and the public sector.

3 Adam Stubbelfield Dr. Adam Stubblefield is an Assistant Research Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Johns Hopkins University. He has been involved in several public analyses of real-world systems including the Diebold voting machines, TIRIS RFID transponders, b WEP, and the SDMI candidate watermarking schemes. Stubblefield holds a BA in Mathematics from Rice University and a PhD in Computer Science from Johns Hopkins University. Wouter Teepe Wouter Teepe (1977) is researcher at the Digital Security group of the Radboud University Nijmegen, and was closely involved in the recent dismantling of the Mifare Classic RFID chip. He is the delegate of the Radboud University in the "wetenschapsforum" of the OV-chipkaart. Teepe is coordinator of the Centre for Cybercrime Studies (Cycris), an academical institute and think-tank that addresses the gap between legal and technological security. Teepe holds a Ph.D. from the University of Groningen, where he invented cryptographic protocols resolving chicken-and-egg like epistemical deadlock situations (i.e. do you know the secret that I know?). Moreover, he has proven unsoundness (not mere incompleteness!) of the old-style BAN authentication logic. In his spare time, Teepe makes party profile websites: online expert systems for political voting advice. Marc Witteman Marc Witteman has an MSc in Electrical Engineering from the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. He has been involved with security and smart card projects for over a decade and worked on applications in mobile communications, payment industry, identification, and pay television. In 2005 he was the first to report security issues with the introduction of e-passports. Since then he has been actively involved in security research and testing of RFID technology. Marc is Chief Technology Officer at Riscure and can be reached at witteman@riscure.com or via Abstracts Adam Laurie Practical RFID hacking without soldering irons (or patent attorneys) RFID is being embedded in everything... From Passports to Pants. Door Keys to Credit Cards. Mobile Phones to Trash Cans. Pets to People even! For some reason these devices have become the solution to every new problem, and we can't seem to get enough of them... This talk will look at the underlying technology, what it's being used for, how it works and why it's sometimes a BadIdea(tm) to rely on it for secure applications, and, more worryingly, how this off-the-shelf technology can be used against itself... Software and Hardware tools and techniques will be discussed and demonstrated, and a range of exploits examined in detail.

4 Christof Paar Breaking Authentication Tokens with Side-Channel Analysis: The Complete Break of KeeLoq KeeLoq remote keyless entry systems are widely used for access control purposes such as garage door openers or car anti-theft systems. We demonstrate how real-world implementations of KeeLoq can completely be broken with differential power analysis. Our attack combines side-channel cryptanalysis with specific properties of the KeeLoq algorithm. This allows for efficiently revealing both the secret key of a remote transmitter and the manufacturer key stored in a receiver. As a result, a remote control can be cloned from only ten power traces, allowing for a practical key recovery in few minutes. Once knowing the manufacturer key, we demonstrate how to disclose the secret key of a remote control and replicate it from a (long!) distance, just by eavesdropping of at most two messages. This key-cloning without physical access to the device has serious real-world security implications. Unlike purely mathematical attacks against KeeLoq, our analysis allows to break both hoping code ("rolling code") and challenge-and-response ("IFF") protocols with KeeLoq, and it is applicable to virtually all key derivation modes. Finally, we mount a denial-of-service attack on a KeeLoq access control system. The proposed attacks have been verified on several commercial realizations of KeeLoq. One particularly worrysome aspect of our attack is that is most likely applicable even if KeeLoq would be replaced by cryptographically stronger algorithms such as AES or 3DES, as long as the implementation is not protected against side-channel attacks. Patrick Pype, NXP Semiconductors From Barcodes to the Internet of Things The first patent for a barcode dates from Commercial use started in 1966 and in the 1980ies success has been proliferating tremendously. RFID technology has been around since 1920 in defence applications, but only started to become commercially end of the 20 th century, replacing barcodes and rapidly being applied in a wide range of application domains, as e.g. transportation & logistics, retail, passports, health cards, transport ticketing, access badges & keys, animal tagging & food safety. Initial pilot projects demonstrating the benefits of using RFID & NFC have turned into massive deployments in both industrial & consumer applications. A widespread vision exists that this will evolve into a society of the Internet-of-Things, where everything is connected and can communicate with everything. Therefore a lot of attention is paid on the societal impact of the RFID technology, including privacy and security aspects. A tradeoff analysis can be made of costs versus security for every type of application, while protection of privacy remains a condition sine qua non for everything. Therefore a tight cooperation between industry, universities, consumer groups and standardization committees is needed to ensure that the Internet-of-Things is not evolving into a Big Brother is watching you society, but into a society which is beneficial for all of us and makes our life much more simple and easy, without endangering our private lives.

5 Damith Ranasinghe Exploring lightweight security mechanisms for RFID and developments from a European project securing networked RFID systems Matt Reynolds RFID Security at the Physical Layer: Securing the tag read-zone Most recent work in RFID security has concentrated on strengthening data uthentication and encryption schemes to protect tag data itself. In this talk I will concentrate on answering the often-neglected question of "WHERE is the RFID tag at the moment it is read?" This question is important because many RFID application scenarios include an implicit use of an RFID tag's read-zone as a proxy for human intent, for example in a door access scenario, in a passport reader, at a point-of-sale terminal, or when giving access to a specific subway turnstile. I will show some of the ways this question is answered today, present some vulnerability scenarios, and present a few more robust approaches for future RFID systems. Melanie Rieback The RFID Guardian This talk will present the design and implementation of the RFID Guardian, the first-ever unified platform for RFID security and privacy administration. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are remotely-powered data carriers, that are often touted as "computers of the future", that bring intelligence to our homes and offices, optimize our supply chains, and keep a watchful eye on our pets, livestock, and kids. The RFID Guardian resembles an "RFID firewall", enabling individuals to monitor and control access to their RFID tags by combining a standard-issue RFID reader with unique RFID tag emulation capabilities. Our system provides a platform for coordinated usage of RFID security mechanisms, offering fine-grained control over RFID-based auditing, key management, access control, and authentication capabilities. We have prototyped the RFID Guardian using off-the-shelf components; compatible with the ISO 15693/14443 (13.56 MHz) RFID standards, it performs RFID tag emulation and selective RFID tag jamming. Bart Schermer Security, consumers and RFID In his talk Bart Schermer will place the issue of security in the broader perspective of privacy and consumer protection. His talk will focus on several security incidents featuring RFID, how these have impacted consumers, and how companies and politicians have responded to these incidents. From these examples he will give suggestions on how companies, academia, and politicians should move forward on this issue.

6 Rina Steenkamp RFID and privacy Public transport cards, the biometric passport, office ID tokens... RFID is increasingly used for purposes that involve gathering and processing personal data. When planning and designing RFID applications that involve the use of personal data, it's extremely important to recognize and address the privacy implications at an early stage. Adam Stubblefield Vulnerabilities in RFID Systems Vulnerabilities in RFID systems present unique challenges due to the scale of deployments, the disconnected nature of tags, and resource limitations that influence "patchability." In this talk, I'll discuss RFID vulnerabilities, lessons that have been learned in designing for, reporting, and mitigating vulnerabilities in other arenas, and how we can apply those lessons to RFIDs. Wouter Teepe, Roel Verdult Dismantling the Mifare Classic On March 7, a team of students and researchers of the Radboud University Nijmegen completed a practical attack on the Mifare Classic chip, which is made by NXP. Due to responsible disclosure, we can not yet explain all the technical details of the practical attack. In our talk, we will tell in abstract terms what we did, what an attack scenario looks like, what the impact is on access control systems and public transport ticketing systems, and share some of the experiences we had in the last few months. Moreover, we will relate our results to the other recent results, such as the OV-chipkaart disposable ticket issue, and the results of Karsten Nohl and Henryk Pltz. Marc Witteman The security paradox of e-passports The first generation of electronic passports has arrived. Although the technology still has imperfections when it comes to safeguarding privacy, it offers good anti-forgery protection. The next generation of e-passports should include reliable biometrics and Extended Access Control. Those e-passports may offer strong protection against lookalike fraud, but this will only benefit immigration authorities if all e-passports contain biometrics (thus preventing fraudsters from exploring the weaknesses of legacy passports). Issuing countries must therefore go ahead in adopting e-passports with reliable biometrics. At the same time we see that currently applied biometric techniques are immature and not ready for this purpose.