conflicts. After the creation of Israel, the Arab states created the Palestine Liberation Organization

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1 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is one of the longest lasting and most publicized of all current conflicts. After the creation of Israel, the Arab states created the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter referred to as the PLO) to defeat the Zionist colonizers and unite Palestine with the rest of the recently liberated Arab World. The history of the PLO and its various tactics can be broken into four eras: its time under Arab domination, its time in Jordan and Black September, its time in Lebanon, and its time since it left Lebanon. Before the PLO can be understood, a sense of the long and complex history of Palestine and its people is important. It was controlled by the Ottoman Turks, from the 13 th to the 20 th century. The British, who had controlled Egypt since the late 1800's, sought assistance from the Palestinians against the Ottoman Empire in World War One, promising the Arabs their own state. However, with the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Britain also promised the land for a Jewish homeland. To cool subsequent hostilities, the British proposed a two-state solution, but this was rejected by most Palestinians. During World War II, international attention was focused elsewhere, but because of the Holocaust and other factors the question of Palestine quickly returned. After the war ended, there was endemic rioting, bloodshed, and terrorism. The United Nations Partition Plan (UNPP) was passed on November 29, 1947, creating two states in Palestine: one Jewish and one Arab. Soon after the UN s plan was signed, the Arab States announced their plans to invade the newly created Israel on the day it achieved its independence. The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia all invaded Israel, but were defeated by the Israeli Defense Force. This cemented the place of Israel in the Middle East for the time being. Israel took control over much of Arab Palestine, while the rest of the Arab State outlined in the UNPP was absorbed into Jordan and Egypt. Additionally nearly 60% of the Arab Population of Palestine was relocated; many fled to refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria and especially Jordan. Many insurgency groups emerged as a result of this violence. The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded in 1964 by the Arab League. It was formed as a sort of government in exile,

2 democratically elected and serving the needs of the Palestinian people. The early PLO was dedicated to the ideas of self-determination and pan-arabism. Although composed of Palestinians, the PLO was not self-sufficient; it was supported and manipulated by the states of the Arab League. Many of the groups that would later constitute the PLO were opposed to this early version. The PLO s immediate goals were to form an effective force to combat Israel. The main way they sought to do this was through conventional war. Because the PLO relied so heavily on the Arab states for assistance, tensions between the states reduced the effectiveness of the early PLO. Meanwhile, Syria was directing the PLO units within its borders to harass Israel to the brink of war, succeeding in June The Six-Day War was a devastating defeat for the Arab states. The new gains of Israel were promptly put under military rule and hundreds of thousands more Palestinians fled to neighboring Arab states. Many settled in the still occupied camps from the 1948 war, but more camps were founded to contain the influx of refugees. The Arab defeat signaled the end not only of conventional warfare as a viable tactic, but the end of Arab League domination of the PLO. Another group that was developing at the same time as the PLO was Fatah. Although it predates the PLO, Fatah would not become a major player in Palestinian struggle until the Six Day War. The name is a reverse acronym which translates to The Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine. Fatah is also an Arabic word for conquering or victory. It was founded in 1958 by Yasser Arafat, Khalid al-wazir, Salah Khaleb and Faruq al Qaduwi, who were all university students in Cairo at the time and wanted to begin an armed struggle for the freedom of Palestine. Palestinian nationalism, secularism and military struggle formed the core of Fatah's ideology. Fatah and the independent insurgent groups would initially reject the formation of the PLO because it was an alien organization, out of touch with the will of the Palestinian people, but these groups joined the PLO after the Six-Day War. Because the Arab states were again humiliated and had lost all credibility, Palestinians wanted a new group to lead the PLO. These groups who recently joined jockeyed for position in the PLO leadership. Fatah was the oldest and largest of the newcomers, but they still needed a catalyst to make a move. In 1968, the

3 catalyst appeared: The battle of Karameh. The primary base for Fatah at the time was in a Jordanian town called Karameh. In 1969, Fatah was seen by Israel as an increasingly dangerous organization: carrying out 2,432 attacks in that year alone. Retaliating, the Israeli Defense Force invaded Karameh. Accounts vary, but Yasser Arafat is said to have given a rousing speech, encouraging the villagers and Fatah fighters to battle in the face of great odds. The battle was hailed as a great victory and Arafat became a hero of the Palestinian cause. He and the Fatah leadership gained control of the PLO executive committee. Arafat essentially became the sole leader as the Executive Committee Chairman, and he remained in control of the PLO until his death in With the loss of much of the Arab states' logistical, material and personnel support the PLO had to shift tactics from conventional war to guerrilla fighting. Additionally, Israel had an overwhelming military advantage. It was clear to PLO guerrillas that 4 th generation warfare was the route to victory; they needed to wear down the Israeli will to fight until they simply gave in. Because the PLO was based in Jordan they were able to perform raids throughout Israel easily. The harsh, repeated retaliation by the IDF against these attacks helped build support against Israel. Unwisely, the PLO also attempted to undermine the power of King Hussein of Jordan. The refugee camps in his country were not only homes for the displaced, but they became bases of operation, supply caches, and recruiting grounds. PLO fighters patrolled the area, and refused to allow Jordanian forces into the camps. Armed fighters even wandered the streets of Amman, the capital, with impunity. On September 1 st 1970, beginning the month that would become known as Black September, PLO groups attempted to assassinate the King several times. On September 7 th, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a PLO faction, hijacked four planes in Europe and flew them to the Middle East. Three of the planes landed at Dawson's Field in Jordan, while the fourth plane, which was too large for the small runway, was taken to Egypt. The PFLP eventually detonated explosives in all three aircraft. For nearly the first time, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was brought to the forefront of

4 international news. The PFLP chose Jordan as their landing site to humiliate King Hussein and flaunt its power in Jordan. In response, on September 12 th, Hussein declared martial law and the Jordanian army began to attack PLO positions and camps. By 1971, most of the PLO had been pushed out of Jordan and into nearby Lebanon. One third of the PLO guerrillas were killed in the fighting, 150,000 Palestinians were forced from the refugee camps, and the PLO had to nearly halt attacks against Israel to regroup. The PLO set up bases in much of southern Lebanon and Beirut. PLO groups saw the attention that the PFLP received with the Dawson's Field hijackings, and emulated their tactics. International terrorism became the weapon of choice because it not only demoralized Israel and its allies, but brought international attention to the Palestinian struggle for freedom. PLO groups assassinated, bombed and attacked Israeli citizens and Israel's allies, creating a worldwide association between Palestinians and terrorism. However, these attacks seemed to have little effect on the PLO s relations with other states, and in some cases countries, like the USSR, actually helped their cause. The PLO has been one of the best connected and funded insurgencies in the world. It has official offices in over 150 countries and has received support from the government of a wide variety of countries. The Arab world provided consistent yearly stipends to specific PLO groups as well as the PLO as a whole. The USSR was the largest supplier of weapons and equipment to the PLO. In 1989, it was estimated that the PLO had over fifty billion dollars worth of assets around the globe. It owned large farming plantations in Africa, arms manufacturing facilities in the Middle East and stocks in all of the major markets. Not only did the PLO make extensive connections to foreign governments, it connected with other insurgent groups as well. The PLO bases in Lebanon became training camps for a variety of groups, ignoring political lines; most notably, it supported both communist and neo-nazi groups in West Germany. Any group that would disrupt the status quo of western life was deserving of PLO assistance. When the non-state groups joined the PLO in the 1960 s, it became an umbrella

5 organization with influence but little actual control over its constituent groups. As a result terrorist attacks around the world continued even though Arafat and Fatah attempted to present a moderate facade to the world. It has been proven in more recent years that groups denounced by Arafat as counter-productive to the PLO's mission, often were supported by him in private, both materially and in spirit. In 1974, the Arab League named the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and Arafat spoke at the United Nations, a meeting boycotted by Israel. He spoke of holding both an olive branch and the freedom fighter's gun. He warned the United Nations not let him drop the branch. Diane Reishce describes the year very well: Even in the heady months of personal triumph in 1974, Arafat could not control the warring factions within the PLO, or prevent international terrorist raids by Palestinian radicals. Only six days after his UN speech, Palestinian terrorists killed four people in Israel. While Arafat might wave an olive branch, the deadly struggle between fedayeen and Israelis lurched along unchecked. Regardless of the continued violence, the UN also later recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, even giving them special observer status. Obviously, Israel viewed the PLO as a major threat to its security. Nearly daily attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians kept the entire country under stress. In early 1982, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, which was supported by the PLO, assassinated the second secretary in the Israeli embassy in Paris. On June 3 rd, Abu Nidal assassinated Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to Britain. Three days later the IDF invaded Lebanon to destroy the PLO threat once and for all. The IDF moved in, rapidly pushing back the PLO forces to Beirut, besieging them for sixty-seven days. Eventually the PLO escaped and fled to Tunisia, where it reestablished its headquarters. This increase in distance meant PLO forces and leadership had poor access to both targets and the majority of the Palestinian people in refugee camps and the Occupied Territories. Attacks against Israel and abroad became less frequent, causing the PLO to lose its spotlight on the world stage.

6 Because Arafat signed all checks, nepotism was rampant, and many PLO leaders lived expensive lifestyles in opulent homes across the world in stark contrast to the poor refugees in camps or crowded cities. From 1982 to 1987 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and refugee camps were becoming disheartened by the state of affairs and corruption within the PLO. In 1987, civilians (men, women and especially children) in the West Bank and Gaza rose up against Israeli rule. This Intifada shocked the PLO leadership, but they quickly mobilized their troops to take advantage of the uprising. The main strategy of struggle had shifted again, but, this time, without conscious intent. The struggle had shifted to the people: not conventional war, not guerrilla raids, not international terrorism, but people taking to the streets. This shocked the Israeli's who closed schools and put the area back under military rule. Israel could deal with border raids, but it could not subjugate five million people. The PLO met with Israel and signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, which eased hostilities and created the Palestinian National Authority (PA). After years of struggle against the British and later Israelis, the Palestinians actually had land they could govern semi-autonomously. Despite the ending of the First Intifada and a peace treaty, attacks by PLO groups continued, culminating in a second Intifada from The PLO was for much of its history the richest, most connected and powerful insurgent organization in the world. It was handed money and resources on a silver platter yet, as the title of this presentation suggests, it is a failed insurgency. The two main goals of the PLO were to represent the Palestinian people and to reclaim the lands lost to Israel. The leadership of the PLO was so focused on the second objective that they completely ignored the needs of the Palestinian people, to the point that the Palestinians rose up, not just against Israel, but against their own leaders. Not only were its armies and fighters routinely defeated, the PLO squandered its connections and made enemies out of friends, not to mention the constant infighting for power and prestige. Overall, the Palestinian Liberation Organization brought attention to the conflict and kept Israel constantly wary of attack, but in the end it actually hurt the cause and the people of Palestine.

7 Bibliography Alexander, Yonah. Palestinian Secular Terrorism. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Alexander, Yonah, and Joshua Sinai. Terrorism: The PLO Connection. New York: Crane Russak, "Fatah: Political Heavyweight Floored." BBC. israel_and_the_palestinians/profiles/ stm (accessed April 27, 2009). Kurz, Anat N. Fatah and the Politics of Violence. Portland, Oregon: Sussex Academic Press, Milton-Edwards, Beverley. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London: Routledge, O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism. 2nd, revised. ed. Washington, DC.: Potomac Books, Reische, Diana. Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. New York: Franklin Watts, 1991.