Naming & Necessity Lectures I and II: Reference and Descriptions PY4617 The Philosophy of Saul Kripke Week Two

Transcription

1 Naming & Necessity Lectures I and II: Reference and Descriptions PY4617 The Philosophy of Saul Kripke Week Two Theories of reference-fixing vs theories of meaning Frege thought names referred to objects, but also thought that names had descriptive senses. Descriptions do two things in that theory: Express the sense of names. The sense of Aristotle is expressed by something like: the most famous pupil of Plato. Determine / fix the reference of names. Frege says that Aristotle refers to a certain individual i who was the teacher of Alexander the Great. Why does Aristotle denote i? Because i is picked out by the sense! For Frege, the referent of a name is whatever object uniquely satisfies the description that provides the meaning of the name. A semantic theory should tell us a word s meaning and reference That a name has a certain referent is a broadly semantic fact meaning and reference are both of interest to semantics But note, a theory that states what the referents of various names are is not thereby a theory of what determines / fixes the reference of names. E.g.: The referent of Aristotle is Aristotle. This is a correct theory of what the referent is, but it isn t a theory of what determines reference. Why is Aristotle the referent? A theory of reference-determination for names is a meta-semantic theory, an account of why bits of language have their semantics The distinction between semantics and meta-semantics is clearer when we look at sentences: La neige est blanche in French means that snow is white. This is (part of) a semantic theory for French. A French sentence has the meaning it does in virtue of that meaning being the thought that French speakers conventionally intend to convey when uttering that sentence. This is a (possible, very rough) meta-semantic theory for French. Similarly, consider two claims about predicates: The meaning of water is H2O. Water has as its meaning whatever natural kind is typically present when English speakers utter the word. A given theory of reference-determination could be combined with a variety of theories of meaning. E.g.: The referent of Aristotle is determined by what properties individual speakers have in mind when they use the name. + The meaning of Aristotle is: the most famous pupil of Plato. Or perhaps: The meaning of Aristotle is: the individual that speakers have in mind when they utter Aristotle. Or: The meaning of Aristotle is its referent, Aristotle. Pg. 1 of 6 E. Glick 29/01/15

2 It is thus significant that Frege takes the meanings of names to also determine the reference of names. 20th century philosophers of language generally agreed that Frege s view should be modified It s not very plausible that any one description in particular should express the meaning and fix the reference of a name Why think that Aristotle means the most famous pupil of Plato rather than the teacher of Alexander the Great, or the conjunction of the two, or the last great philosopher of antiquity? Cluster theory of descriptions: Speakers associate with a name a cluster of descriptions, like a catalog of all the famous deeds, properties, etc. of a given object or person They take the referent of the name to be the object that satisfies a sufficiently large proportion of the descriptions in the cluster Descriptivism about names Kripke argued that both the simple and cluster theory of descriptions fail. Let s follow Kripke in stating more explicitly some of the theses of the cluster theory of names: The following hold for any substitution of a name in English for n and a name of a speaker of English who uses that name for A : (1) There is a cluster of properties φ such that A believes that n has φ. If A uses name n, then A surely has some beliefs about what n is like. Perhaps A thinks n is F, n is G, etc (2) One of those properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely. If we think we re picking out something with n, surely we think that it s the unique thing with all the properties we associate with the name (3) If most of the φs are satisfied by some unique object y, then y is the referent of n. If we think we re picking out some object with n, and we think we re picking out whatever has the properties we associate with n, then that thing really is the referent. The properties really do determine reference. (4) If no object uniquely satisfies most of the φs, then n does not refer. If reference determination works via a set of properties, then when those properties fail to identify anything, no referent gets determined. The following theses 5 and 6 require us to use the notions of a priority and necessity. Note that one is epistemological, the other metaphysical. (5) A knows a priori that if n exists, n has most of the φs. As long as A is aware of how the referent of a name is determined, it should be obvious to A that n refers to whatever the properties pick out. So it should be obvious that n has most of the properties. (6) It is a necessary truth that if n exists, then n has most of the φs. This thesis is only part of a theory that a name s meaning is given by a description It s implied by that theory because if n means the thing with most of the φs, then if n exists, n has most of the φs will mean something that s obviously a necessary truth: If the thing with most of the φs exists, the thing with most of the φs has most of the φs. Pg. 2 of 6 E. Glick 29/01/15

3 Against thesis 2 First note this isn t a thesis about what the referent of n is! The thesis simply seems empirically false in many cases where we use names, we don t have anything we take to single out a particular object I can assert that Agatha Christie was a writer. But I know little else Similarly, Gasherbrum IV is a very large mountain in the Himalayas. Kripke s cases: Can you uniquely identify Feynman? Do you know anything that distinguishes him from Gell-Mann? What about Cicero? Many people know he was a famous orator, but know nothing else. Natural reply: Surely Agatha Christie is the most famous writer named Agatha Christie. So you can uniquely identify an individual that way! Well, it is true that that s uniquely identifying But for the description theory as a whole to succeed, the φs must determine who the name names it can t do that by relying on who the name names! Generally, using the notion of being named, or of being called, etc., in your account of reference-determination runs a danger of circularity So, similarly, we better not say that the referent of Feynman is determined by who has the property of being a physicist and being called Feynman Compare several descriptions I might associate with a name: (a) Agatha Christie is the person I call Agatha Christie. (b) Agatha Christie is the person my friend Bill calls Agatha Christie. (c) Agatha Christie is the writer that informed people call Agatha Christie. Using (a) to determine the referent of my use of Agatha Christie is blatantly circular and useless Using (b) might be circular does Bill have an independent means of identifying an individual, or does he just say Agatha Christie is the writer my friend Ephraim calls Agatha Christie? Similarly, (c) might be circular who are the informed people, and do they have an independent way of identifying an individual? A less obvious circularity problem arises if we try to use two names to determine each other s reference We might think the φs I associate with the name Ed Miliband suffice to uniquely identify an object: Ed Miliband is a politician who is David Miliband s brother. But what if all I know about David Miliband is that he is a politician who is Ed Miliband s brother? In this case, the descriptions I associate with the two names don t suffice to uniquely identify any objects they only determine that there are two politicians who are brothers. Against thesis 3 Refuted by the fact that our successful reference to objects is not hostage to our beliefs about those objects being correct E.g.: For many people, the only φs for Alexander Graham Bell might be: a Scottish inventor, or the creator of the first telephone. But here s something that might be true: the first telephone was really created by an American inventor, Elisha Gray. But Gray s creation was patented and presented to Pg. 3 of 6 E. Glick 29/01/15

4 the public by a certain Scotsman. If the story is true, does Alexander Graham Bell refer to Elisha Gray? No! Similarly, for many people the only description associated with Christopher Columbus is the discoverer of the Americas. But probably some prehistoric Asian or some Viking was the real discoverer of the Americas. So thesis 3 says most people are talking about a Viking when they say Columbus! Fake examples work just as well here For many people, David Cameron is only associated with the property being the current Prime Minister of the UK. But suppose the real Prime Minister is Ed Miliband. Authorities faked the election results, paid Miliband to keep quiet, and reported that the Conservative Party had won. If the description theory is true, then ordinary people use David Cameron to refer to Miliband! But that s wrong. Against thesis 4 Many of the above examples can be easily transformed to refute thesis 4 (if no unique object uniquely satisfies most of the φs, then n does not refer). Perhaps there is no current Prime Minister, since the election was invalid due to violation of an unnoticed technicality in the law. Then according to thesis 4, David Cameron doesn t refer to anyone. But really, David Cameron still refers to a certain prominent politician. Perhaps the telephone was jointly invented by two people. Then according to thesis 4, Alexander Graham Bell doesn t refer to anyone. But really, the name refers to a certain Scottish inventor. Against thesis 5 This is effectively already refuted: It s not a priori for anyone that if David Cameron exists, he is the PM of the UK. It s not a priori for anyone that if Christopher Columbus exists (or existed), then he was the discoverer of the Americas. It s not a priori for anyone that if Alexander Graham Bell exists (or existed), then he invented the telephone. Note that I ve been ignoring clusters of descriptions. But they don t help. E.g. why would you know a priori that if Cameron exists, he is most of the following: the PM, the head of CP, etc.??? Against thesis 6 On Frege s original theory, Aristotle meant the F, for some F that an ordinary speaker associates with the name. This means that if Aristotle exists, Aristotle is F would mean if the F exists, the F is F. The latter is a necessary truth. But this shows that the theory is wrong, for it s contingent that if Aristotle exists, Aristotle is F. (For any F an ordinary speaker might associate with the name, Aristotle might not have been F.) E.g., Aristotle might have decided from a young age to be a plumber. In that case he wouldn t have been the last great philosopher of antiquity, wouldn t have taught Pg. 4 of 6 E. Glick 29/01/15

5 Alexander, etc. So it s contingent that if he exists, he has any of those properties. Suppose Aristotle means something like the individual with most of the following properties: being F, G, H, etc. Then the following two sentences will mean the same: Aristotle has most of the following properties: being F, G, H, etc. The individual with most of the following properties: being F, G, H, etc. has most of the following properties: being F, G, H, etc. But (a) is contingent, while (b) is necessary. Thus they don t mean the same, so Aristotle doesn t mean the individual with most of the The notion of rigid designation Note, if Aristotle were descriptive, it might pick out different individuals depending on who happened to satisfy the description(s) But it doesn t. E.g.: If Alexander the Great s only teacher had been a time-travelling Albert Einstein, Alexander the Great wouldn t have met Aristotle. Here we re describing an alternative way the world could have been in which a different person satisfies taught Alexander the Great, but when we use Aristotle to describe that scenario, we re still using it to talk about Aristotle, not that other person. To describe this behavior of names, Kripke says that names are rigid designators, while (most) descriptions are non-rigid designators Before defining this explicitly, what is designation? Kripke treats various types of word as designators: names, demonstratives, definite descriptions. While Frege would say that a non-empty definite description refers to x, Kripke would say that it designates x Recall: For Frege, the referent of a name or definite description is whatever object is determined by its sense whatever the sense picks out And while Russell would say that a non-empty definite description denotes x, but doesn t refer at all, again Kripke would say that it designates x Saying that definite descriptions designate objects is neutral between Fregean and Russellian views of descriptions it s compatible with saying that descriptions don t really refer (as does Russell) or that they do (Frege) So is there a neutral definition of designate? Yes, at least roughly: Even on Russell s view, for any non-empty definite description, there s an object x that uniquely satisfies the description. And x is then the object relevant to the truth-value of (atomic) sentences in which it occurs. Now let t be a name or non-empty definite description, and is F a predicate. Then when used to talk about any possible scenario w, t designates w.r.t. w whatever object x is such that: t is F truly describes w iff x satisfies is F in w. E.g.: Suppose t is the PM, and we re describing how things actually are by saying The PM is bald. Then the PM designates whatever object x is such that: The PM is bald is true iff x satisfies is bald --- i.e. David Cameron. A term t is a rigid designator iff t designates the same object in every possible world where it designates anything Less confusingly: A term t is a rigid designator iff t designates the same object no matter what possible scenario we re using t to describe, as long as it designates anything in that scenario Pg. 5 of 6 E. Glick 29/01/15

6 Kripke s observation: Names, but not most descriptions, are rigid designators If he had been malnourished as a child, MJ might have been short. It had to have been the case that MJ was a human. It could have been the case that no one bought MJ s albums. If things had gone differently, a liberal might have been the PM. It could have been the case that the PM was a racist. It had to have been the case that the PM had parents. It s contingent that David Cameron is the PM. Kripke s picture of reference If the description theory of names is wrong, what s the right theory? Kripke doesn t propose a theory of meaning for names. But given his views, he can t hold Mill s theory. He does offer a picture of reference-determination. Names are introduced with dubbings, often ostensive. Later, others hear the name and intend to use it to refer to the same thing that it was used to refer to by the person they heard it from In this way, a chain of communication and intention connects our uses of names back to a certain object Note this isn t a full theory the notion of reference is appealed to! Some questions to think about as you read (and if you'd like, to blog about) Can the descriptivist avoid Kripke s objections by appealing to descriptions like the person generally believed to be F? Kripke can't say that the meaning of a name is just the name's referent. Can you see why? Can you think of any counterexamples to Kripke's picture of reference? Could Kripke's picture of reference be extended to a full theory? Why? Pg. 6 of 6 E. Glick 29/01/15