1 A "BENIGN" APARTHEID: HOW GENDER APARTHEID HAS BEEN RATIONALIZED Ann Elizabeth Mayer* An examination of the situation of women in some Middle Eastern countries reveals patterns of systematic, egregious gender discrimination. However, to date international law has failed to classify such treatment as a kind of apartheid, and the international community has failed to impose sanctions to deter such treatment of women. This article explores why gender ' Ann Elizabeth Mayer is an Associate Professor of Legal Studies in the Department of Legal Studies in the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. She has conducted research and traveled in countries ranging from Morocco to Pakistan. Her scholarship centers on Islamic law in North Africa and the Middle East, comparative law, and international law. Her special interests include problems of Islamic law in contemporary legal systems and human rights issues in North Africa and the Middle East. She has published extensively on issues of law in the Middle East. Her book ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. TRADITION AND POLITICS (1999) is now in its third edition. 237
2 238 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 237 (2000) apartheid, despite its direct analogies to racial apartheid, has largely been seen as a relatively benign phenomenon. Both countries defending their discriminatory treatment of women and Western apologists for such treatment depoliticize laws and policies discriminating against women. Cultural relativist proclivities mean that the reality of male domination and women's oppression is obscured and that people can be persuaded that women's status is merely an expression of cultural and religious traditions that outsiders are bound to respect. At the same time, certain U.S. academics are working to discredit critics of gender apartheid by attacking women's international human rights, ascribing advocacy of the latter to a destructive totalitarian ideology that is inimical to freedom of religion and religious values. A critical appraisal of the attempts to rationalize gender apartheid reveals flawed logic and serious misrepresentations of the politics of gender in Middle Eastern countries. I. INTRODUCTION 239 II. THE TREATMENTS OF RACIAL APARTHEID AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 III. GENDER DISCRIMINATION AMOUNTING TO GENDER APARTHEID IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 252 IV. A BENIGN APARTHEID: INTRODUCTION TO HOW THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN RACIAL APARTHEID AND THE SYSTEMATIC OPPRESSION OF WOMEN ARE DENIED OR OBSCURED 266 A. Politics and the Reactions to the Taliban's Gender Apartheid. 274 B. Politics and the (Mis)representation of Iran's Gender Apartheid. 279 V. MAKING GENDER APARTHEID SEEM BENIGN: HOW WESTERN FOES OF WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATE SUPPORT FOR SUCH RIGHTS WITH COLONIALISM/IMPERIALISM, TOTALITARIANISM, ATTACKS ON RELIGION AND CULTURE, AND OTHER EVILS 290 A. How Azizah al-hibri Depoliticizes Gender Apartheid and Discredits Supporters of Women's International Human Rights
3 A "Benign " Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized 239 B. How David M. Smolin Portrays the Women's Convention as a Tool of Cultural Genocide 319 Vl. SUMMATION 334 Vll. CONCLUSION 335 I. INTRODUCTION In what follows I shall contrast the uncompromisingly tough stance that the international community and international human rights law have taken on racial apartheid with the much weaker and more ambivalent stance that has been taken regarding analogous discrimination against women. Confronting two closely related phenomena, international law has made one, racial apartheid, anathema, because it involves inhuman acts amounting to a crime against humanity. However, international law has avoided criminalizing equivalent inhuman treatment of women. After establishing what racial apartheid signifies in international law, I shall briefly review some facets of gender discrimination in Middle Eastern and North African countries (these two regions being conflated and referred to subsequently for convenience as "the Middle East" with the adjective "Middle Eastern"). My focus on the Middle East results from my own research interests, but I believe that developments in that region provide especially interesting material for examining cases of egregious, systematic discrimination against women and for illustrating the largely apathetic international response to these cases. I shall draw a preliminary sketch of how the more extreme forms of discriminatory treatment meted out to women in the Middle East warrant the term apartheid even though differing in certain ways from apartheid as this is currently defined in international human rights law. How the similarities between racial and gender apartheid have been obscured will then be discussed. Racial apartheid is defined in international law as involving domination by one group and the
4 240 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 237 (2000) systematic oppression of another.' The discussion will point out how those seeking to defend what amounts to gender apartheid have tried to turn the discussion away from actual patterns of oppression of women, endeavoring to depoliticize this phenomenon by, among other things, minimizing the important role of the state. Instead of acknowledging that governments of modern states are controlled by men and that these men may have vested interests in retaining a status quo that favors them, they pretend that religion and culture are independent determinants of women's status. As will be shown, a widespread predisposition to downgrade the significance of any gender discrimination that claims to be rooted in religion and culture is exploited by governments and allied apologists in their efforts to discredit advocates of women's international human rights. The result is that defenses that would never excuse racial apartheid wind up being greeted as plausible rationalizations for gender apartheid. This article also analyzes attempts that have been made by some U.S. academics to induce U.S. opinion to reject international human rights law as the criterion for judging the treatment of women in the Middle East. Religion and culture are depicted by such academics as if these set parameters regarding the treatment of women that are accepted by insiders to a given society, only being contested and criticized by outsiders. Such depictions completely ignore the intense controversies about women's rights that are going on within Middle Eastern societies. These academics work to discredit advocacy of women's international human rights, deliberately associating challenges to gender discrimination with negatives like neocolonialism/imperialism and attacks on culture and religion. Specters of a feminist totalitarianism that aims to bring about genocide have even been invoked. By such tactics, apologists for systematic gender discrimination have tried to make patterns of pervasive gender discrimination and segregation seem relatively innocuous, presenting these patterns as a kind of benign apartheid. 1 See G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at Art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
5 A "Benign " Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized 241 II. THE TREATMENTS OF RACIAL APARTHEID AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Even a cursory review of stances taken by the UN suffices to show how racial apartheid has been excoriated as an inexcusable crime. International human rights documents have emphatically and unequivocally condemned racial apartheid. Among the relevant human rights documents dealing with race are the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ( the Racial Discrimination Convention ),3 the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (the "Apartheid Convention"),4 and the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports. s There are various reasons why racial apartheid has been especially harshly stigmatized. Certainly, one reason is the fact that South Africa perpetrated so many gross violations of human rights under its apartheid policy. 6 The heinous nature of its treatment of non-whites prompted sanctions and boycotts in the 1980s both at the national and international level. South Africa wound up a pariah state, excluded from international sports and ostracized by other members of the international community, leading to the crippling of its economy. g Unable to withstand the sanctions, South Africa ended its apartheid policy in G.A. Res. 1904, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). 3 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force on Jan. 4, 1969). 4 G.A. Res. 3068, supra note 1. 5 G.A. Res. 40/64, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 37, U.N.Doc. A/40/53 (1985). 6 For a review of these violations, see Lennox S. Hinds, The Gross Violations of Human Rights of the Apartheid Regime under International Law, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 231 (1999). See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Rearming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J (1996). 7 See, e.g., How SANCTIONS WORK: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA (Neta C. Crawford & Audie Kotz eds., 1999); DOUGLAS BOOTH, THE RACE GAME: SPORT AND POLITICS IN SOUTH
6 242 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 237 (2000) Racial apartheid and related forms of racial discrimination rest on a discredited racist philosophy that assumed the inherent superiority of the European colonizers and the backwardness and inferiority of the races they colonized. The assumption of European superiority was wielded to legitimize the displacement, exploitation, and oppression of the subjugated races. In current circumstances, it is hard to find people willing to stand up and proffer justifications for the colonialist and racist premises behind South African apartheid. The notion that one race should be entitled to subjugate another is generally viewed today as abhorrent and indefensible. Although Apartheid is a special category it has links to the broader problem of racial discrimination. The Apartheid Convention treats the human rights documents concerning racial discrimination and the doctrines of racial superiority that they condemn as being closely related to apartheid issues. It refers in its preamble to the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, observing that "States particularly condemn racial discrimination and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature" and expresses alarm over manifestations of "governmental policies based on racial superiority or on hatred, such as policies of apartheid, segregation or separation."9 According to the preamble to the Racial Discrimination Convention "any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous," and there is "no justification for racial discrimination, either in theory or in practice, anywhere."10 Article 1. 1 of the Apartheid Convention declares that "apartheid is a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law."11 AFRICA (Frank Cass ed., 1998); Bronwen Manby, South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 175 (1992). 9 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 3, Preamble. 10 Id. 11 G.A. Res. 3068, supra note], Art. 1.1.
7 A "Benign" Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized 243 Although the emphasis is on governmental policies, the ban on apartheid, as set forth in the Apartheid Convention, does not apply only to states but extends to private conduct as well. Article 1.2 declares criminal "those organizations, institutions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid. 12 Where the ban on apartheid is concerned, there is an irrebuttable presumption that acts flouting it must amount to a crime, with the corollary that any proffered rationalization can be rejected out of hand. The Apartheid Convention in Article III endorses the notion that there shall be international criminal responsibility "irrespective of the motive involved" for acts of apartheid, including committing, participating in, directly inciting such, or conspiring in the commission of such acts. Among other reasons for the strong opprobrium attaching to racial apartheid is its historical association with European colonialism. The Apartheid Convention states in its preamble that "in the interests of human dignity, progress and justice, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith." 13 That is, racial apartheid is bound up with colonialism and the related practices of segregation and discrimination. The same convention in its preamble mentions the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 14 and the General Assembly's position that "the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible" and that "an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith."15 The preamble also refers to the Racial Discrimination Convention, which in its preamble condemns "colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith" and proclaims "the necessity of bringing them to a speedy and unconditional end. 16 As will be seen, this provides background for appreciating why the 12 Id. Art Id. Preamble. 14 G.A. Res. 1514, U.N.GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.Doc. A/4684 (1960). 15 G.A. Res. 3068, supra note 1, Preamble. 16 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 3.
8 244 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 237 (2000) international community reacts differently to racial apartheid and gender apartheid, the latter not being associated with colonialism. Article II of the Apartheid Convention defines the crime of apartheid as including "similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa" when applied to a subsequent list of "inhuman acts."17 In defining the crime, Article II points to a scheme of domination of one group over another. It speaks of "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them."18 By this characterization, the convention indicates that apartheid is linked to a political problem, the systematic oppression of one group by another. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 19 commonly known as the Women's Convention or as CEDAW, is the most important of the documents on women's human rights. Although this article will stress how relatively toothless an instrument CEDAW is in comparison with the Apartheid Convention, this is not to deny that it has enormous significance as a benchmark for gauging progress towards women's rights, a significance that has been assessed elsewhere. 20 This Convention has been widely ratified. Its largest group of non-ratifying countries, leaving aside a smattering of microstates, are countries following conservative versions of Islam such as Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. In 17 G.A. Res. 3068, supra note 1, Art Id. 19 G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). 20 For a general discussion of the convention, see Sarah Zearfoss, The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Radical, Reasonable, or Reactionary?, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903 (1991). For an examination of the problems of enforcement, see Alexander Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Process for the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 682 (1996). Offering hope that CEDAW could be more vigorously enforced in the future, an Optional Protocol has been adopted that would allow women to bring complaints of CEDAW violations to the CEDAW Committee. The Optional Protocol was opened for signature on December 13, 1999.
9 A "Benign" Apartheid- How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized 245 the West, Monaco, San Marino, and the United States are the only countries that have not ratified the treaty. 21 CEDAW was preceded by the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 22 Neither of these documents condemns gender discrimination in the kind of forceful terms used in declarations and conventions dealing with racial discrimination and apartheid. One recalls that the Apartheid Convention in Article II speaks of "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them."23 CEDAW never expressly says that men are "oppressing" women, nor does it describe regimes of gender discrimination as being used for purposes of male "domination" of women. The omission of such characterizations is significant, because many of the same patterns of oppression and domination that were recognized as underlying South African apartheid can be found in the ways that men have subjugated women, especially in some Middle Eastern countries where women are completely excluded from roles in the political establishment. Thus, one could say that the language of CEDAW, in avoiding terms like "oppression" and "domination," opens the door to various depictions of women's status that attempt to portray the treatment of women as the product of culture rather than politics. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of is exceptional in acknowledging that force is used to keep women in a subordinate position and that the politics of male domination lie behind discrimination against women. In its preamble, the declaration proclaims that the General Assembly is: Recognizing that violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, 21 An assessment of the U.S. stance is offered in Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Refections on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDAW.- Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (1996). 22 G.A. Res. 2263, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). 23 G.A. Res. 3068, supra note 1, Art G.A.Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48 /104 (1994).
10 246 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 237 (2000) which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men. 25 Although one could say that the recognition of the political significance of violence against women is a positive development, one could also evaluate the presence of such recognition in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, along with the absence of any such recognition in CEDAW, as negative in that the disparity could be construed to mean that gender discrimination, by itself and in the absence of violence, is not a crucial mechanism by which male domination is secured. In contrast to the criminalization of racial apartheid established in the Apartheid Convention, CEDAW does not criminalize either the policies or the practices of gender discrimination, even where these involve the most rigid forms of segregation and the most egregious, pervasive, and harmful forms of discrimination. CEDAW instead offers hortatory provisions, enjoining states to undertake various measures designed to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. Article II, the central article in the Convention, affirms that state parties "condemn discrimination against women in all its forms," but goes on to state that they "agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women."26 That is, there is prescriptive language indicating that states are to undertake appropriate measures in the direction of eliminating gender discrimination, but there is no command that countries practicing gender discrimination must cease such practices forthwith and unconditionally. CEDAW repeatedly qualifies its injunctions to take measures to eliminate discrimination against women by appending the adjective "appropriate," which opens the way for various interpretations by 2s Id. Preamble. 26 G.A.Res. 34/180, supra note 19, Art. 2.
11 A "Benign " Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized 247 individual states about which measures would be "appropriate" to meet CEDAW obligations. 27 Treating racial apartheid as criminal while treating comparable forms of gender discrimination as less deserving of sanctions is not the obvious outcome of the scheme set forth in the first human rights instruments. In an important analysis, Courtney W. Howland has shown that in the United Nations Charter 28 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),29 racial and gender discrimination were equally prohibited and there was no indication that gender discrimination could be excused on grounds that would not excuse racial discrimination. 30 However, the UN declarations and conventions specifically dealing with gender discrimination take a distinctly more reticent stance than those dealing with racial discrimination and apartheid. The difference is substantial enough to show that gender discrimination is not nearly as strongly reprehended as its racial counterpart, which is not surprising in the UN system. Noting the male monopoly of political power both at the national and international levels, feminist critics of the current international system have proposed that women's concerns are naturally devalued in international law. As feminist scholars have noted, because "men generally are not the victims of sex discrimination, domestic violence, and sexual degradation and violence," this means that "these matters can be consigned to a separate sphere and tend to be ignored.. 31 When compared to the muscular denunciations of racial discrimination and apartheid, the language in CEDAW seems reticent, 27 For example, Article 7 enjoins states to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country." G.A. Res. 34/180, supra note 19, Art. 7. Article 10 calls on states to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education." Id. Art. 10. Article 11.1 calls on states to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment." Id. Art June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71, U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948). 30 See Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, , 349 (1997). 31 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 625 (1991).
12 248 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 237 (2000) even ladylike. There is no denunciation of any doctrine of male superiority as being scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous. A rare passage where the Women's Convention makes a negative characterization of the philosophy behind gender discrimination occurs in Article V. This implies a connection between discrimination against women and prejudices about the superiority of one group and the inferiority of another, prejudices central to apartheid. Article V(a) provides that state parties shall take all appropriate measures: [t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. However, CEDAW refrains from denouncing the patterns of conduct resulting from prejudices or practices mentioned in Article V(a) as criminal or inhuman, even where they result in women being treated much the same as non-whites were treated under the racial apartheid system. From CEDAW, one gathers that apartheid is an altogether separate phenomenon from the problems that it addresses. CEDAW does not use the term apartheid for gender discrimination, and it limits references to apartheid to a preambular expression of a conviction that "the eradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination and interference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of men and women."33 That is, fighting apartheid is treated as a vital cause, but one distinguishable from the cause of ending discrimination against women. 32 G.A. Res. 34/180, supra note 19, T Art. 5.a. 33 Id. Preamble. 33. Id. Preamble.
13 A "Benign"Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized 249 The failure of the text of CEDAW to establish a link between racial and gender apartheid is noteworthy, because the UN General Assembly was dealing with apartheid issues in the period when CEDAW came into being. Moreover, the opening of CEDAW for signature, ratification, and accession occurred on December 18,1979, which virtually coincided with the proclamation of the Declaration on South Africa on December 12, The Declaration on South Africa called on UN members to "recognize the right of the oppressed people of South Africa to choose their means of struggle" and to take various actions to isolate the South African regime and impede its attempts at aggression and subversion. Among those working in the international human rights system, apartheid was a central concern in the years when CEDAW was being prepared. In these circumstances, the absence in the text of CEDAW of any reference to "gender apartheid" proves that treatment amounting to apartheid but targeting women was not recognized as an evil comparable to what was being perpetrated in South Africa. That is, CEDAW seems to understand apartheid in its conventional sense, as being limited to the kind of racial discrimination practiced in South Africa. It is likewise significant that declarations and conventions on apartheid do not refer to gender apartheid as a comparably obnoxious form of discrimination. Instead, in documents on apartheid, the language sometimes seems deliberately to turn its back on the related phenomenon of gender discrimination as if to deny that racial and gender discrimination are on a par and are equally violative of human rights law. The references to relevant passages in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights [UDHR]35 sometimes obscure the fact that sex originally was listed alongside race in Article II of the UDHR, which guaranteed all persons "the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 34 G.A. Res. 34/93, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 36, U.N.Doc. A/34/46 (1979). 35 G.A. Res. 217A (111), supra note 29, at 71.
14 250 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 237 (2000) property, birth or other status."36 For example, the preamble to the Apartheid Convention invokes the 1JDHR Article 2 provision, but changes the wording, rephrasing it as "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, color or national origin." 37 Although the intention may have been to focus on the categories most relevant for a document dealing with racial discrimination in South Africa, the changed wording nonetheless obscured the fact that discrimination based on sex and race had originally been placed on the same level. One implication of the way "race, colour or national origin" have been singled out and sex excluded is that gender discrimination is not a directly related phenomenon and not one deserving of the same priority as ending racial apartheid. Similar rephrasing occurs in the preamble to the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, which states that the UDHR provides that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration without distinction of any kind, particularly in regard to race, colour or national origin," 3g again cutting out the reference to gender in the original. The wording of this list indicates that the authors of this convention were untroubled by the phenomenon of gender apartheid in international sports. Of course, this 1976 Convention was made at a time when many countries were blatantly excluding all women from participation in the Olympics and other sports events. Via the altered phrasing of the original UDHR language, the Convention on Apartheid in Sports signaled that ending gender discrimination in sports was deemed unworthy of attention. More reasons for the failure to grasp the analogies between racial apartheid and gender apartheid will be discussed in a later section, but one factor is that, although in the past men would speak openly about their belief in female inferiority, contemporary proponents of gender apartheid rarely speak so candidly. As already noted, racial apartheid is linked to doctrines of the superiority of Europeans and/or the White race. Although the presumption of female inferiority still underlies much of the treatment 36 Id. at Apartheid Convention, supra note 1, Preamble G.A. Res. 40/64, supra note 5, Preamble.