WIF Well Integrity Workshop Clarion Hotel Air Horizontal x-mas tree

Transcription

1 AWV PT WOV Debris Cap ITC with plug Tbghng plug WIF Well Integrity Workshop Clarion Hotel Air Horizontal x-mas tree Sola, 9 th June 2016 CIV1 TCI THI MIV AMV PMV PT HXT extension B XOV Jan Saeby, Norske Shell, WIF Chairman 10 ¾"-9 ⅝" 431m MD C 400m MD 20" csg 824 m MD/ 822m TVD A 13 ⅜" csg 2292 m MD/2079 m TVD Prod packer 1.96 sg Prod. 4871m MD/4068m TVD 7" liner 4895 m MD/ 4086 m TVD 9 ⅝" csg 4992 m MD/4162 m TVD Cap rock 1.96 sg 7" liner 5893 m MD/ 4569 m TVD

2 Agenda Well Integrity History and Background WIF Organisational Setup and Members General activities/priorities and Task Forces Guideline Review and Reporting Achievements and Comments

3 Well Integrity History and Background Prior to 1990, Well Integrity Management during the operational phase was often neglected, ad hoc and lots of wells on NCS and elsewhere were experiencing serious WI issues In some cases serious leaks and also Blow Outs were experienced due to poor WI, leading to serious accidents with people injuries and fatalities, material damages, environmental discharges and loss of production. There was little structured approach towards WI. WI was not included as prime focus of the industry like drilling, production and other HSE aspects, i.e. It was not very sexy to work on WI After 1990, and encouraged/enforced by authorities, Operating companies started to put more structured Well Integrity Management systems in place Norsok D-010 adopted the 2 barrier philosophy with colour coded Well Barrier Diagrams (blue/red colours for primary and secondary barriers) Since +/- 2000, the industry started to put web-based WIMS systems in place PSA Survey in 2006 showed that the industry was still having problems with knowing the WI status of their wells Followed up with creation of WIF forum and other measures (regular reporting, regulations updates, audits etc...)

4 Wellhead DHSV Conductor ASV Tubing GLV Casing Cement Packer Pack off Chemical inj. line TRSV Fluid barrier Design Formation Number of wells Number of wells Well Integrity Statistical Failures Well Integrity according to Norsok: Drilling/side-track activities Well testing activities Completion activities Production/Operations incl. closed in wells Well interventions (workover, suspensions, stimulations, pumping operations abandonment, wireline, CT, snubbing) 16 Age and category of barrier element failure Number of w ells w ith w ell integrity problem < to 4 5 to 9 10 to to to to 29 Age in years Wellhead DHSV Conductor ASV Tubing GLV Casing Cement Packer Pack off Chemical inj.line TRSV Fluid barrier Design Formation C a t e r or y ba r r i e r e l e me nt f a i l ur e Well integrity failure statistics by age and barrier element failures. From PSA pilot study of well on the NCS in 2006 indicated 18% of the wells had leaks or well integrity issues.

5 WIF Organisational Setup Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Ministry of Oil and Energy (OED) Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA - Ptil) Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD - OD) Operating Companies in Norway Norwegian Oil and Gas Drilling Managers Forum (DMF) Well Integrity Forum (WIF) Facilitator: Tove Rørhuus Plug and Abandon Forum (PAF)

6 WIF - Mandate Purpose: Network to secure and contribute to Industry objectives related to WI matters Scope: - place to discuss industry and regulatory requirements and guidelines - share experiences - identify common goals - cooperate to solve common WI challenges during lifecycle of wells Focus Areas: - Contribute to high industry HSE standards - Monitor, influence and promote cost effective framework conditions, including regulatory requirements and industry norms such as best practices, guidelines & standards - Promote close cooperation with authorities (PSA Ptil) => with main focus on WI in the operational (and final abandonment) phase

7 WIF members 2016, Who are we? Workgroup member Anders Hjellen Ryan Graham Kristian Lundemo Thomas Vold Thomas Berge Egil Aune Olaf.Sissener Morten Perander Gulnara M Shafikova Mehryar Nasseri Karstein Hagenes Jan Sæby (leader) Jan-Erik Sandvik Jan Egil Asbjørnsen Preben Randhol (Vara: Steffen Kristiansen) Knut Stanghelle Ståle Johnsen Pål Skjelstad Paal Ludvik Jørgensen Rørhuus, Tove Company BP Centrica ConocoPhillips Det norske Eni ExxonMobil ENGIE (GDF Suez E&P Norge AS) Norske Shell Statoil Repsol Total Wintershall Lundin WIF/Facilitator Month Day/Date Host 2016 January Tuesday 26 th ConocoPhillips February Wednesday 24 th Wintershall-Bergen March Tuesday 15 th Lundin -Oslo April Tuesday 26 th BP May Tuesday 24 th Centrica June Thursday 9th WIF workshop in June 2016 June Tuesday 21 th Eni August Tuesday 23 th Norske Shell September Tuesday 27 th Engie October Tuesday 25th Total November Tuesday 22 th Det Norske December Tuesday 13 th Statoil Monthly meetings w/facilitator, MOM s, host on rotation between the companies Mandated by and reporting to DMF 13 operating companies as members (mainly WI specialists) Set up of task forces to work on various issues Approved Yearly Action Plan and Budget Liaising with PSA, Universities, Research institutes, Norsk Standard, ISO... Tove Rørhuus replaced Jan Krokeide as facilitator end 2014

8 WIF General Activities Main WIF activities: Working out WI guidelines for the industry (e.g. Guideline 117 and 135) Reviewing Case studies for cross lateral learnings Discussing, follow up and reporting of WI incidents Ensure consistency in reporting (well categorisation for RNNP) Maintain contact with relevant authorities (e.g. PSA) Review regulatory changes and standard updates (Norsok, ISO...) Propose changes and improvements to Norsok D-010 and other standards Focus on WI training and learnings Yearly Well Integrity seminars/workshops organised for the industry (Operating Companies) Contact w/other Industry Forums: DMF and PAF Sister forum in UK: WLCPF (Well Life Cycle Practices Forum set up in 2010)

9 WIF Major Achievements Norwegian Oil and Gas, Industry Guideline 117 for Well Integrity written by WIF 1. Well Integrity Training 2. Well Handover Documentation 3. Well Barrier Schematics for the Operational Phase 4. Well Integrity Well Categorisation (WI Colour Coding reporting system) 5. Well Integrity Management System (WIMS) 6. Sustained Casing Pressure Norwegian Oil and Gas, Industry Guideline 135, Classification of Well Control Incidents, Chapter 4 written by WIF (Guideline for Well Integrity Incidents, classification and reporting) Development of WI Compendium for use in Universities (UiS and NTNU) Input to Norsok D-010 Updates, other Industry Standards (ISO) and regulatory changes Review and follow up on PSA reporting and industry trends (RNNP) Annual WI Industry Workshops/Seminars to share learnings and improve general WI understanding

10 WIF Well Categorisation Categorisation Basis (based on Norwegian PSA guidelines) A well with another significant issue is YELLOW Category Principle Example Red Orange Yellow One barrier has failed, the other is degraded or has not been verified. Or leak to surface One barrier has failed, the other is intact. Or a single failure may lead to a leak to surface One of two barriers is degraded or has not been verified; the other is intact. Completion leak rate above acceptance criteria. Production casing integrity not proven Completion leak rate above acceptance criteria. Production casing integrity proven Completion leak rate within acceptance criteria. Production casing integrity proven Green No or minor integrity issue SSSV leak rate within acceptance criteria Developed in 2007, Annual reporting to PSA from 2008 onwards (RNNP reporting) Focus on Well Barrier Envelopes consisting of Individually tested and verified Well Barrier Elements Firmly establishes the 2 Barrier Philosophy as the Industry standard Gradually accepted as a Best Practice in the Industry Significant improvements in Well Integrity Management and overall safety But: Problems w/consistency in reporting WIF working on clarifications and improvements, including risk level

11 RNNP Reporting, Industry WI trends Annual snapshot since 2008, 1911 wells reported in 2015 Consistency in reporting according to guideline 117 has improved considerably Reporting has been based on both D-010 Rev 3 and Rev 4, - different requirements may change colors The number of red and orange wells has decreased over the last few years «Red» and «orange» wells are often low risk wells that have been secured and are awaiting repair or abandonment

12 Well Integrity Incident Reporting, Guideline 135 Revision No. BLOWOUT OR MAJOR HC RELEASE 1 Loss of all well barriers, uncontrolled outflow LEVEL Casing leak below production packer into formation above reservoir. Packer set in uncemented casing. Release to environment. Tubing and production casing leak resulting in leakage to an annulus not qualified as a barrier. Release to environment. 4 Loss of gas lift gas containment Resulting in high amount of HC gas threatening the whole facility. HC RELEASE LEVEL 2 1 Release of gas lift gas with functioning ASV. 2 Flowline rupture and failure of XT valves resulting in large amount of HC release until DHSV closes CROSSFLOW Casing leak below production packer into formation above caprock. Packer set in uncemented casing. No potential for breaching to surface. Leak through cement into formation above cap rock. No potential for breaching to surface. Leak of gas lift gas through production casing into formation. No potential for breaching to surface. 2. LEAK Failure of DHSV and MMV stem packing resulting in HC release to environment Gas lift leak into WH void and external leak through exit block. LEVEL 3 3 Accumulated HC in B-annulus released through WH. If large amount of HC released evaluate to raise to Level 2 or Tubing to annulus communication (TTAC) below DHSV and small leakage through XT valves to sea. Leak in TH neck seal and XT/WH connection (ring gasket). 6 Leak in control line with small release to installation DUAL BARRIER FAILURE DHSV, HMV & PMV failed but HC contained by valves down stream Casing leak below production packer into formation above reservoir. Packer set in uncemented casing. Resulting in HC in an annulus not qualified as barrier.

13 WIF Categorisation of Wells, Risk Assessment Risk Matrix developed by task force during 2014/2015 Being tested by WIF members No publication planned yet, reporting consistency may be difficult

14 WIF Member Feedback Why has WIF been successful in achieving results: Good set up in WIF (w/13 operating companies), good facilitator and use of small task forces contribute to success of the group Use of simple colour coding concepts (WI categorisation and WI incidents) Readable and simple to follow WI guidelines, picked up by the industry Good dialogue w/psa and authorities, universities etc. Consistency in group, continuity of members Having motivated and dedicated people to take the lead/responsibility of task force work, able to give input and work on WI issues Experienced team members believing in what they are doing and that they can have impact on the industry to improve WI understanding and make a safer business Believing that results can be achieved by educating both industry people and students alike Patience, dedication, time, persuasion Challenging and good subject WIF work is often referred to and the achievements has been recognised by authorities and industry in general

15 Final comments We believe our work on WI Management on the NCS is giving results, it makes our wells and operations safer and prevents accidents... Work done by WIF over the past years has changed focus and attitude in the industry, not only in Norway, but in many countries worldwide Norway is leading the way: «Look to Norway and the NCS» But accident still happens and our improvement journey continues...

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17 Workshop Agenda Registration Mingling and Coffee Welcome Agenda & Safety Tove Rørhus Introduction to Workshop Jan Sæby Well Integrity Quiz Pål Skjelstad Workshop Cases (1) Jan Egil Asbjørnsen LUNCH Workshop Cases (2) Thomas Vold Coffee Break/Networking Workshop Cases (3) Pål Skjelstad & Jan Sæby Wrap Up Jan Sæby Results of Quiz Pål Skjelstad