The Afghanistan-Pakistan War: Measuring Success (or Failure)

Transcription

1 1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC Phone: Fax: Web: The Afghanistan-Pakistan War: Measuring Success (or Failure) Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy July

2 2 Success: Version One Stable, unified, secular democracy(ies). Islamist, extremist and other threats eliminated. Upper third of global economies and per capita income. Human rights and rule of law equal to US standards. Example transforms neighboring states and region. NATO and alliance structures transformed No narcotics.

3 Success: Version Two Our strategic goals remain that Afghanistan is: 1) a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens. Achieving these goals requires the application of a whole-of-government approach, along multiple lines of operation, including security, governance, and development OSD, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June

4 4 Success: Version Three Depart unstable state(s) with some pluralistic elements. Threats localized and contained. Level of poverty reduced. Rising educational standards. Culture adapting to modern economic needs. NATO and alliance structures undamaged. No regional or global backlash

5 5 The Limits of Success Cannot control the future after the US leaves -- or even while it stays. Cannot transform an entire society, political system, or set of values. Partnership means taking risks and having a partner and not a client. Pakistan may emerge as the more critical challenge. Risk and uncertainty remain local, national, and regional.

6 The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES ~49,000 AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN Land Mass 647,500 sq km Population 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: $35.B GDP, $1,000 PC Budget: $2.6; $8.9B in aid pledges Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved Restrictive terrain dominates the country IRAQ IRAQ Land Mass 432,162 sq km Population 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy Economy dominated by the oil sector: $100.0B GDP, $3,600 PCI Budget $48.4 billion; $33B+ in aid pledges Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES ~176,000

7 7 Success: Counterinsurgency vs. Armed Nation-Building? Stability operations and counterinsurgency are misnomers. Nation building imposes special burdens. The non-military dimension is as critical, or more critical, than the military one. Only the host country can ultimately win, and it must win politically, in governance, and in economics, as well as in security terms.

8 8 The Elements of Success in a Joint Afghan-Pakistan-Regional Campaign Plan - If We Only Had One Ideology and Motivation Political Accommodation Security Governance Development

9 Counter-Insurgency Approach REPLACE FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY WITH TRUST AND CONFIDENCE Connect People to the Government Build Trust and Confidence in Government Build Capacity Develop Leadership Build a Trusted National Security Capability Promote Good Governance Facilitate Growth and Development Develop Momentum INFORMATION DOMAIN Degrade Destabilizing Forces Isolate Insurgents from People and Government Disrupt Support Networks Interdict Border Infiltration Disrupt Movement Separate Insurgents from the People Limit Options to Reconcile, Capture, Kill, or Flee Solidify Popular Support of Government Strengthen The Nation Promote Afghan Ownership Sustain Momentum and Confidence in the Future Continue to Develop Afghan Leadership Capacity Support Afghanistan in Defeating the Insurgency Discredit Insurgent Vision and Ideology INFORMATION DOMAIN

10 Source: MNF-I, April 9,

11 Bamyan Ghazni DISTRICT CHANGE SINCE JULY: +81 Increased (88) Decreased (7) Wardak Parwan Paktika Paktya Khowst Nuristan Nangarhar Konar Measure Success Where the Fight Is: RC-East Assessment Summary Secure environment Occasional threats Frequent threats Dangerous environment Activities / operations impeded SECURITY Areas with good governance have good security ANA showing increased capacity to lead, but lack combat enablers: C2, intel, logistics, QRF, access to fires Lack of ANP leadership hinders development, but ANA support and focused training is making progress GOVERNANCE Government increasingly identifying major issues such as corruption but lacks accountability measures National and local government capacities are growing, but won t decentralize authorities and resources due to lack of trust Lack of Rule of Law and legal capacities impedes accountability and discourages international investment Bamyan DISTRICT CHANGE SINCE JULY: +40 Increased (55) Decreased (15) Ghazni Wardak Parwan Paktika Paktya Khowst Nuristan Nangarhar Konar Full authority Emerging Ineffective Dysfunctional Non-existent Bamyan DISTRICT CHANGE SINCE JULY: +63 Increased (78) Decreased (15) Ghazni Wardak Parwan Paktika Paktya Khowst Nuristan Nangarhar Konar Sustainable Growth Dependent Growth Minimal Growth Stalled Growth Population At Risk DEVELOPMENT Expansion of the road network facilitates Afghanistan's role as an economic link to the Central Asian states Lack of large scale power limits industrial development Licit economy growing faster than the narco-economy, but a black-market born of necessity hinders licit growth 11

12 Success is Transfer to Afghan Hands: Building a Stable Afghanistan: The Way Ahead Integrated governance, development and security framework Province focused, deliberate, condition-based approach Cooperative partnership and support Sustain national and international comprehensive counterinsurgency approach Instability Coalition Lead GIRoA Support We are here GIRoA Lead Coalition Support GIRoA Lead Coalition Enablers Security, Governance, Development Building Continuum GIRoA Lead Coalition Cooperation Stability

13 13 Success Must Be Measured in Realistic Timelines: History Takes Time United Nations Millennium Development Goals Afghan National Development Strategy Security Enemy Afghan National Security Forces Border Governance Government Population Legal Process Development Education Health Care Agriculture Roads Security Governance Governance Rule of Law Human Rights Econ & Social Development Education Health Agriculture Rural Development Infrastructure Natural Resources Private Sector Social Protection Security Governance Gender Equality Development Universal Primary Education Improve Maternal Health Reduce Child Mortality Control HIV/AIDS/Diseases Build Global Partnerships Environmental Stability Eradicate Extreme Poverty

14 Measuring Success from the Lessons of Armed Nation Building Conflict termination must treat the causes and not just the symptoms. Tactical victories become meaningless without political, ideological, information, and media dominance. Operations must focus on stability operations, exercises in stability and nation-building Success occurs where the fighting is: The local and regional level of operations is as important as the central government. Political accommodation and ideological operations have critical priority. Governance and provision of critical services in conflict and vulnerable areas become critical aspects of security. So is personal security for the population and preserving/creating the rule of law. Dollars are bullets: Value of economic incentives and aid, CERP, immediate employment and career status. Need incentives to convert, disarm terrorists, insurgents, irregular opponents, not just force: Carrots as well as sticks 14

15 15 Finding Effective Measures Accept complexity and uncertainty Net assessment of all sides and resulting risks and cost benefits. Integration of intelligence, operations, and policy. Ruthlessly demanding and objective intelligence analysis Make honest assessments of timelines and costs. Objective analysis of host country partner Objective analysis of neighbors, allies, NATO/ISAF Risk analysis: Model and game the full conflict, including exit strategies and possible defeats. Determine whether there are adequate military, civilian, aid, and advisory resources. Communication to the American people and Congress. Is transparency and honesty possible?

16 16 The Regional Challenge Afghan-Pakistan War at a Minimum: Battle for Greater Pashtunistan Ethnic, sectarian, political/ideological and tribal spillover will be the rule and not the exception. Neighbors create partial sanctuaries and proxy forces US operations directly or indirectly involve all neighboring states. Even friendly and allies states have different priorities and agendas. NATO/ISAF is a major intelligence challenge, and requires analysis as much as the threat.

17 All Wars is Local Analyze Combat and enemy activity in local, provincial, and district terms. Compare threat activity with US, allied, and Afghan forces, aid, development, and governance. Success of forward deployment, and win, hold, and build efforts at local level. Success of efforts to strengthen local and provincial governments, and tribal leaders. Compare enemy extremism, mistakes with own and friendly mistakes; local attitudes critical. Impact of raids, air strikes, civilian casualties collateral damage. 17

18 Joint Campaign Indicators - I Separation of Afghanistan from Pakistan Dual standards for US in East and NATO/ISAF Failure to realistically assess success in Taliban, other Islamist, and Al Qa'ida terms: They seek political and economic influence, and outlasting US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan government is victory. Kinetic - war fighting emphasis; local tactical versus broader district, provincial regional. Explicit, comparative analysis of ANA. ANP. Pakistani,and NATO/ISAF allied failures/limits. 18

19 Joint Campaign Indicators - II ONE WAR: Not US, NATO/ISAF, Pakistan Net assessment: Intel, ops, plans. Localize incident, casualty, and trend analysis and tie to patterns, risks, changes. Look at overall violence: kidnappings, extortion, corruption, displacement, intimidation US and allied actions. Map full range of Taliban, other Islamist, Al Qa ida activity: presence, economic and political influence, intimidation, ideological impact. Afghan, Pakistani perceptions critical at national, regional, district, and local levels. 19

20 20 Afghan/Pakistan Security Force Indicators - I Trained and equipped, authorized, budget close to meaningless. Presence, and transition out of, embedded advisors (SOF) and partner units. Combat history by order of battle to battalion level. What is actually there down to local level, linked to threat activity. Pay, facilities, operational weapons, medical, and benefits critical.

21 21 Afghan/Pakistan Security Force Indicators - II Win, hold, build or buy time/lose. Army can win; police, rule of law (legal process, courts, and jails), employment, and governance build, and hold. Proper balance of central, provincial, district, and local power. Viable sectarian/ethnic balance. Acceptable corruption, levels of ghosts, missing, and promotion/retention problems.

22 22 Economic Indicators - I Long-Mid Term Development currently irrelevant. National macro economic indicators - GNP/GDP, PCI meaningless Inputs in terms of budgets and aid expenditures largely meaningless. Project activity unrelated to lasting impact and valid requirements meaningless. Popular perceptions at the province, district, and local level critical and usually ignored in official reporting.

23 Economic Indicators - II Current employment, income distribution, trends, and perception with emphasis on combat/risk areas Progress by key sector in meeting actual needs. Roads, water, power, jobs. Tie budget and aid spending to valid requirements, measures of effectiveness, and polls. Focus on combat and high risk areas. For mid-term on, get real about demographics, opportunities, impacts of programs. Unity of government. Official, and NGO efforts. 23

24 24 Governance Indicators - I People do not live in the dawn of tomorrow; they live in the noon of today. Central governments are hardest to fix, and will lack core competence in many areas for length of campaign. Inevitably linked to success in political accommodation and security. Governance can only win if present at the provincial, district, and local level and you win where you govern. Following the money far more critical than compacts, plans, strategies. Laws and legislative action only meaningful in terms of how actually enforced over time. Focus on key tasks or paralysis and failure.

25 25 Governance Indicators - II Legitimacy and popular support are not the product of elections, but of the quality of representation, day-to-day security, and services that affect local populations. Key tests are mix of: Security and rule of law, key utilities, education, and medical support, local aid/spending impacts, and level of of corruption. Local legitimacy and security cannot be separated from sectarian, ethnic, and tribal issues. Patience: Long timelines, limited outside competence in aid, Local political culture will often survive

26 26 Narcotics Indicators - I Eradication is not a measure of success, either measured in area or estimated output. Impacts on low income growers and lower levels of traffickers meaningless = Overhead. Displacing growing and trafficking into hostile and Taliban-dominated areas is not success. Alienating population is is not success. Corrupt programs are not success. Programs that do not impact decisively on world consumption and street prices are not success. Programs decoupled from agricultural development and improved incomes for low income farmers are not success.

27 27 Narcotics Indicators - II Narcotics must be measured as subset of agricultural and economic development. Cannot succeed except through sustained agricultural development and market-driven shifts to other groups: Roads, power, water, capital. Must measure in terms of impact on insurgency and security: Reactions of impacted Afghans and income to Taliban/Al Qa ida etc. Gains in counternarcotics must be measured in terms of iimpact on high and mid-level traffickers, and operations of processing and distribution networks. No meaningful success unless affects global distribution and street prices.

28 28 Ideology, Perception, and Political Indicators - I Mirror imaging Western/US values disguises actual situation. Polling or estimating nation-wide trends is pointless and disguises what is happening in combat and high threat areas. Impact of psyops, public diplomacy, and information warfare programs must be independently and critically validated or results are worthless.. Spinning and validating policy and strategy cost lives and make success far more difficult.

29 29 Ideology, Perception, and Political Indicators - II Measure success in Afghan terms and values Measure perceptions and trends in all key areas, including economics, governance, local security. Analyze perceptions of threat, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan government indirectly comparable terms. Explicitly poll and measure perceptions of actions of US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan government security forces. Identify key negatives and positives and trends. Poll and track in Islamic, ethnic, and tribal terms. Track all aid and governance activity in terms of polls of impact on Afghan perceptions and attitudes.

30 How to Measure Success in Ways That End in Failure Try to measure success without a real-world strategy that lays out the plan, budget, and resources necessary to track success. Say what you want to hear; downplay problems and complexity. Support policy and strategy for advancement and career security. Spin the situation to win short term public, media, and Congressional support. Compartment key parts of the the problem. Lie by omission and don t measure the entire set of key variables. Put alliance and host country considerations before reality and the truth. Use past measurements regardless of changes in the situation. 30