Child Support: Scope of Need

Transcription

1 Child Support Enforcement & Problem- Solving Courts Finding Child Support: Scope of Need 28% of all children under 18 live in single parent homes 85% live with mother Only 5% receive child support payments Only 25% get full amount of payment I-Fen, L. (2) Perceived fairness and compliance with child support obligations. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(2) Problem-solving Court(s) as a Solution? Problem-solving courts: dockets that bring together community resources to address a specific problem 24: the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators passed Resolution 22 which supports the use of problem-solving court principles and methods in all courts Partnerships between courts, public agencies and community-based organizations facilitate the delivery of services Ashton, J. (26) Child support dockets benefit from uprising problem-solving court principle. Juvenile and Family Justice Today, 14 (4),

2 The Goals Increased Child Support Payments Reduced Jail Overcrowding Jail-Avoidance savings The Cycle Parent is ordered to pay child support Parent doesn t pay Parent is issued a show cause Parent is served and comes to court Parent is found in contempt Parent is ordered to pay a purge or go to jail Parent pays the purge and parent is released Cycle repeats itself over again Ruth, K. (26) Breaking the cycle: Alternatives to incarceration lead to collections in Wake Co., North Carolina. Child Support Report, 38 (1) 2. Breaking The Cycle Judge-Driven Hearings and Service Integration Electronic Monitoring Vocational/ Counseling Services Custody Visitation/ Mediation 2

3 The Process Accountability + Opportunity + Judge = Success Electronic Monitoring With Field Supervision Vocational/ Counseling With Visitation Mediation Status Hearings With Performance Reports Increased Compliance > Payments < Jail Days < Failures Procedure(s) Show Cause Finding of Willful Contempt Conditions of Judges Order Regular Reviews If participant violates conditions, arrest warrant may be issued Typical Conditions: Used Alone or in Combination Depending on the Specifics of Each Case Electronic Monitoring: To Establish Daily Curfew Working for Kids Program Seek/Secure Employment Attend Substance Abuse Classes Address Mental Health Issues Address Education Needs 3

4 Local Impact: Contributes to Overall CSE Collections Wake CSE Collections - 1 Year Annual Trendline 4,, 35,, 3,, 25,, 2,, 15,, $16,33,655 $16,574,553 $18,581,291 $2,469,44 $22,232,795 $24,134,389 $26,51,965 $28,524,195 $32,282,758 $35,38,77 1,, 5,, Local Impact Jail Avoidance Savings Wake Electronic Monitoring Service Days and Savings by Fiscal Year In FY 27: 29,5 Days which = $2,6, in Jail Avoidance Savings FY-6 FY-7 3, 2,5 2,25 2,39 2,272 2,48 2,59 2,451 2,52 2,24 2,65 2,66 2,61 2,54 2, 1,5 1, 5 JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN Academic Research Meredith College Phase I study named Child Support Sanctions and Effects on Non-custodial Parent Compliance Designed and led by Dr. Rhonda Zingraff, Professor of Sociology at Meredith College 4

5 Compliance c Compliancec Abstract The sanctions this research focuses on is the use of Electronic House Arrest (EHA) and Working For Kids (WFK) programs in increasing child support payment compliance. The analysis of compliance focuses on payment histories of non-custodial parents placed in the programs six months prior and six months after the sanction was implemented. The data is examined to see if the child support payment compliance sanctions have a significant effect on compliance of noncustodial parents vs. the traditional use of jail incarceration as the primary or sole sanction. Significance of change in payment compliance before and after EM/EHA 7 EHA Summary Data th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st On EHA 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Months Pre- and Post-EHA Any Pay Over 5% 1% 1 Above 1% 6 Significance of change in payment compliance before and after WFK Working for Kids Summary Data th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st Begin WFK 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Months Pre- and Post-WFK Any Pay Over 5% 1% Above 1% 5

6 Compliance Compliancec Significance of change in payment compliance before and after JAIL 6 Jail Incarceration Summary Data th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st Enter Jail 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Months Pre- and Post-Jail Time Any Pay Over 5% 1% 1 Above 1% Comparison of change in payment compliance by Sanction 9 Sanction Comparisons Pre-EHA Pre-WFK Pre-Jail Post-EHA Post-WFK Post-Jail Problem Solving Sanctions Consistency Payment Level Conclusions Strong implications that the EHA and WFK sanctions do impact payment compliance and performance. Evidence that both sanctions increase child support compliance in terms of frequency of payment and levels of payment. Evidence of increased employment particularly after EHA sanction. Evidence that EHA compares favorably to Jail and WFK as effective sanction. 6

7 PRELIMINARY RESEARCH Drug Treatment Enhancement to EHA within the This program enhancement seeks to improve CSE collections by providing assessment and specialized drug treatment/testing services to targeted addicted and abusing nonpayors of child support on EHA. The measurements of success are increased sobriety, employment and compliance with court-ordered child support payments. Employment Compliance before and after EM/EHA with Drug Treatment 2 Monthly Employment for Long-Term Participants (defined as 45+ days in program) Mnths Pre- Entry 5 Mnths Pre- Entry 4 Mnths Pre- Entry 3 Mnths Pre-Entry 2 Mnths Pre-Entry 1 Mnths Pre-Entry 1st Mnth Post-Entry 2nd Mnth Post-Entry 3rd Mnth Post-Entry 4th Mnth Post-Entry 5th Mnth Post-Entry 6th Mnth Post-Entry Yes No Unable to Measure Payment % Compliance before and after EM/EHA with Drug Treatment 2 Monthly Payment Percentage for Long-Term Participants (defined as 45+ days in program) Mnths Pre- Entry 5 Mnths Pre- Entry 4 Mnths Pre- Entry 3 Mnths Pre-Entry 2 Mnths Pre-Entry 1 Mnths Pre-Entry 1st Mnth Post-Entry 2nd Mnth Post-Entry 3rd Mnth Post-Entry 4th Mnth Post-Entry 5th Mnth Post-Entry 6th Mnth Post-Entry 6 Mos Pre-Entry Tot. 6 Mos Post Entry Tot. % >%, <5% 5%, <1% 1% Unable to Measure 7

8 Contact Information Judge Kristin Ruth