Simulation of the effects of quota trading limitation in an ITQ fishery. Katell Hamon, Stewart Frusher, Rich Little, Olivier Thébaud

Transcription

1 Simulation of the effects of quota trading limitation in an ITQ fishery Katell Hamon, Stewart Frusher, Rich Little, Olivier Thébaud

2 Access regulations: a key issue in fisheries management Fish = common pool resources "race to fish overcapacity, economic inefficiency competition, conflicts depletion of fish stocks Typology of management measures Boncoeur et al Conservation of resource: preservation of productive / reproductive capacity of stocks (and habitats) 2. Regulation of access to resource: Allocation of this capacity among harvesters

3 The problem is recognised internationally The topic of allocation how to share, portion, allot, distribute is at the heart of any and all efforts around the world to manage fisheries. [ ] the longer fishing communities and fisheries managers avoid allocating fishing rights, the greater the risk of making decisions that, ultimately, do not lead to fisheries that are as healthy or as sustainably utilized as they could be (FAO, SOFIA, p85). effort Alternative approaches to access regulation Control variable? or catches ITQs administrative (norms / rules) Nontransferable individual authorisations Control method? or Taxation economic (incentives) Transferable individual authorisations* * So-called «rights-based management» in 16 OECD countries in OECD, 2006

4 Individual Transferable Quotas 1. TAC: sustainability of the fishing stock 2. Individual allocations: fishers develop harvesting strategies maximizing their returns Annala, Transferability: capacity reduction (efficient fishers buy out others) Campbell et al, Social issues: Equity, wealth distribution Brandt, 2005 Lack of global consensus on these impacts: what can we learn from studying the impacts of adopting ITQs?

5 The Tasmanian rock lobster fishery Coastal fishery targeting single species Jasus edwardsii 215 vessels fishing with baited traps AUD $60 million return per year 75% landings exported (mainly to China) ITQs introduced in 1998 Cap on quota ownership (<2%) Restrictive TAC Initial allocation based on trap ownership

6 Heterogeneity of the fishery Spatial - Size

7 Heterogeneity of the fishery Spatial - Size - Colour

8 Heterogeneity of the fishery Spatial - Size - Colour - Fishers

9 Heterogeneity of the fishery Spatial - Size - Colour - Fishers winter summer Seasonal - Price - Catch rates summer winter

10 Empirical analysis Fishery behaved as expected from literature Overall = structural + behavioural changes exit of fishers change in latitude (size) change in depth (colour) & seasonality (chinese market) 10

11 The model Inputs (source: DPIWPE databases) - catch & effort data - economic data - biological parameters - quota info - tagging data - vessel descriptors Management scenarios - TAC - Aggregation limits - Lobster Price Fleet individual based - quota allocation - effort distribution (spatial & seasonnal) Quota Market Outputs - stock state - catch - economic statistics

12 Fishing plan Next year Fish Begining of year Compute fishing plan Next month Expected marginal profit $/kg metiers Allocate quota to months months ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π ˆ π 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 Selection métier/month Probability to be chosen π met, month metiers vessel Metier's choice months Trade quota

13 Quota allocation Begining of year Next year Compute fishing plan Next month metiers vessel months Fish Total max catch:14 Allocate Quota owned : 5 quota to months π > π > π > π > π > π Trade quota

14 Quota trading Next year Fish Begining of year Compute fishing plan Next month Trade quota Quota price Q Allocate Supply>Demand quota to decrease Q months Demand>Supply Increase Q Compare Demand/ Supply ID profitable months Q π > π > π > π > π > π Profitable Q Demand/ Supply Demand = Fill profitable months Supply = quota in non profitable months Demand Supply

15 Fishing Begining of year Next year Fish Compute fishing plan Next month Allocate quota to months Allocate effort to areas for the month based on métier Simultaneous catch of quota allocated to the month Trade quota

16 Simulations - Limits on quota aggregation Retrospective analysis ( ) of different trade limitations Scenario 4 Scenario 3 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Free quota trade Quota aggregation limits 200 QU 120 QU No quota trade (IQ) High concentration Economic efficiency No concentration Economic inefficiency

17 Spatial allocation of catch Scenarios vs reality: predictions close to reality BUT anomalies not explained by profit only changes of fishing strategies towards more valuable lobsters & lower costs (higher catch rates)

18 Economic effects 1- no trade vs trade: + vessels - efficient 2 - difference between trade scenarios: little difference 120/200 no difference 200/no limit 3- simulations vs real only profit driven temporary transfers only

19 Conclusion & perspectives Trade rationalization, increase of revenue Limits on quota use and cap on effort redundant (model) Limits on quota ownership efficient to avoid concentration (observation) Extension of study Integrating non economic factors in decisions Long term decisions Highgrading ITQs and fisheries management Already used in EU but unlikely to solve all CFP problems Models simulation to test implementation details discarding & high grading in mixed fisheries

20 Thank you Acknowledgements Ingrid van Putten (CSIRO) Andre Punt (CSIRO) Caleb Gardner (IMAS) Klaas Hartmann (IMAS) QMS PhD program and IFREMER

21 Introduction Case Study Empirical Analysis Simulations Conclusion The Model Management scenarios Climate Change Future of the fishery Ecological: Economic: Historical Climate change FD0 FD1 FD2 FD0 FD1 FD2 North pop South pop Total stock Short term effects of climate change Increase population in S (+ growth) Decrease population in N (- rec) Adaptive behaviour of the fleet Reallocation of fishing from N to S Profit driven fishers (FD2) higher profit Static fishers (FD0) higher costs with climate change & higher uncertainty

22 Simulations 1 Limits on quota aggregation 2 Climate and economic perturbations Projections ( ) of the fishery under climate and economic perturbations 3 fleet dynamic models No response of fleet Existing model used in stock assessment Developped model Climate change : T C dependent growth (+) & recruitment (-) Seasonal pattern and interannual trends of beach price

23 Problem How do fishers respond to incentive based management such as ITQs? Thesis objectives Compare the theoretical knowledge on ITQs with real data Develop a bio-economic model to simulate fishers behaviour in an ITQ fishery

24 Future of the fishery static fleet (FD0) unrealisticly high costs with climate change & higher uncertainty less economic impacts of perturbations when fleet adjusts reality between existing (FD1) and new model (FD2)

25 Outline Case study: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery Empirical analysis Modelling of the fishery Conclusion

26 Outline Case study: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery Empirical analysis Modelling of the fishery Conclusion

27 Introduction Case Study Empirical Analysis Simulations Conclusion Fishery response Fishers response Expected vs Observed impacts of ITQ Sustainability of the resource if the TAC is set at a sustainable level the stock should rebuild Rationalisation of the fishing fleet transferability more efficient fishers buy out least efficient fishers Strategies maximizing return fishers develop fishing strategies maximizing the return on individual catch allocation Concentration of quota ownership socially not desirable 27

28 Introduction Case Study Empirical Analysis Simulations Conclusion Fishery response Fishers response Evolution of the fishing activities Spatially Definition of métiers (based on Pelletier and Ferraris, 2000) 28

29 Introduction Case Study Empirical Analysis Simulations Conclusion Fishery response Fishers response Evolution of the fishing activities Spatially Definition of métiers (based on Pelletier and Ferraris, 2000) Evolution of métier choices 29

30 Introduction Case Study Empirical Analysis Simulations Conclusion Fishery response Fishers response Evolution of the fishing activities Spatially Definition of métiers (based on Pelletier and Ferraris, 2000) Evolution of metier choices Interannual shift 30

31 Introduction Case Study Empirical Analysis Simulations Conclusion Fishery response Fishers response Evolution of the fishing activities Spatially Definition of métiers (based on Pelletier and Ferraris, 2000) Evolution of metier choices Interannual shift Seasonally 31