The Situation in Colombia The need to approach new views on drug issues as key-factor to solve the conflict.

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1 Statement by Rafael Pardo at the colloquium on Colombian national security issues hosted by The Center for Latin American Issues (CLAI) and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College George Washington University Washington D.C. April 18th, 2007 The Situation in Colombia The need to approach new views on drug issues as key-factor to solve the conflict. Evolution of the illicit drugs issue in Colombia and, evolution of the conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 1. Anti-drugs policy in the 1980s: Eradication in Peru and Bolivia, aerial restriction in drug production areas, persecution of cartels in Colombia, consumption prevention in the United States Cocaine global business has changed in the past two decades. In the 1980s and up to mid-1990s, both coca leaf and coca paste were produced in Peru and Bolivia; cocaine hydrochloride was used to process near 80% to 90% of such paste at facilities located within the Colombian territory for subsequent exportation by Colombian cartels to the United States, where 90% of such cocaine was consumed (see graphic No. 1). The anti-drugs policy coordinated by the Andean countries and the United States (Cartagena summit) was the underlying cause for the changes to come and, further, it was the first evidence of the joining of efforts to face the problem. Such policy consisted of eradication 1

2 in production zones of Bolivia and Peru; detection and interdiction between Peru and Colombia, persecution against cartels and the search for and destruction of laboratories and taking off and landing tracks in Colombia; maritime and air restrictions in the Caribbean and, consumption prevention in the United States. Graphic No. 1 COCAINE SUPPLY tons Bolivia Perú Colombia TOTAL Source: Illicit Crop Monitoring Program, June 2006 UNODC-Government of Colombia. 2. Changes on the drug-business structure 2

3 Three events occurred by mid-1990s, the effect of which entails modifying the business structure. First, programs on eradication of coca crops proved to be successful in Bolivia; therefore, cultivated areas at Valle de Chapare decreased. Further, production from crops located at Valle de Huallaga in Peru fell, as a consequence of certain fungus. Second, a system of radar control along the Amazon River, between Ecuador, Peru and Colombia and, Peru s consent to overthrow illegal aircrafts. Consequently, Peruvian and Bolivian crop areas transferred to Colombia s southwestern forest, where one hundred thousand additional hectares of coca were sowed throughout four years. Colombia therefore passed from marginal coca producer (39,700 hectares in the year 1994) to be the world largest coca leaf producer (160,119 hectares in the year 1999). A third event consisted of the dismantling of cartels settled in Colombia, which controlled cocaine access to the US market. The Medellín cartel was indeed dismantled while the Cali cartel appeared to be trialed by judiciary organs. Therefore, control on the access to US markets came into Mexican cartels. Finally, consumption throughout Europe and Brazil increased. 3. Plan Colombia the response to a new structure The above are the circumstances surrounding creation of the Plan Colombia in the year 2000, aimed to control coca crops in Colombia which remained under protection of the FARC and the paramilitary groups, and, which, therefore, required military actions to foster the pursued eradication. Such one hundred eighty thousand hectares of coca leaf triggered the FARC s growth in the past decade. All these transformation relating coca issues forced a different approach aiming towards control of such illicit business. 3

4 The rationale underlying the anti-drugs fight is to affect the supply with the aim of achieving two goals: first, reduce the supply of alkaloids available in the markets; second, increase consumer prices, which in theory dissuades new consumers from engaging in their use. Accordingly, the Plan Colombia was an approach consistent with the new reality surrounding the business, where significant portions of the cultivated areas were protected by armed groups in regions hardly accessible. The above were reasons to reinforce the Army as the sole force capable of providing security for the eradication activities displayed in such areas. The Plan Colombia operated as anticipated, until the year Three targets, including military aid, programs on institutional strengthening and social development in areas hosting coca crops, were properly handled and the pursued goals were achieved, to wit: 50% reduction of coca sowed areas in six years. By year 2003, sowed areas had been reduced in 37.5% and, therefore, the 50% target set in year 2000 to be achieved in year 2006 was near to occur (see Graphic No. 2). Graphic No. 2 4

5 Initial anomalies were seen in the year Despite the astonishing reduction of cultivated areas, street-price in consumer markets dropped, instead of moving up or, in the best scenario, remained stable. It was then maintained that drugtraffickers held large amounts of cocaine in stock that they made available to the market to thus keep stable prices. The above hypothesis is groundless, but the most serious domestic and international agencies consented with it. A further anomaly was that, although fumigation remained at levels of near 140,000 hectares, total cultivated areas decreased to near 7%, undoubtedly a rather low figure. While in the year 2000 it was necessary to fumigate 3 hectares to eradicate one single hectare, in the year 2004 it was required to fumigate 22 hectares to eradicate one. Had fumigation reached its inefficiency level? Evidently, greater efforts were needed but lesser results were achieved. Accordingly, the year 2005 census proved that coca cultivated areas had increased from 7.5% to an aggregate of 86,000 hectares. It was then maintained 5

6 that such measuring included areas not formerly observed in satellite flights and, therefore, that no comparison was feasible. The question is whether such previously zones unreported also hosted coca crops. The latest anomaly was recently disclosed by Revista Cambio which published a government-supported report showing that the total production of processed cocaine outward bound from Colombia had not decreased from 900 tons per year, to less than 500 tons, as generally affirmed, but, rather, that it remained at levels substantially identical to those five years ago. Since the year 2001 the U.S. government allocated near five billion US Dollars to reduce drug supply. However, strategic outcomes seem farthest. The passage of time proves that according to the Plan Colombia the costs involved in destroying one single hectare increases steadily, while efficacy of those fumigations also decreases. 4. The United States Choice The debate focuses on the success or failure of the U.S. anti-drugs policy in Colombia, rather than on the Plan Colombia. The theory underlying this policy is simple. It refers to the joining of resources to hinder or alter the supply with the aim of making the provision of drugs to consumers more expensive, and, given such high prices, to dissuade new consumers from engaging into the habit. According to the United States, such are the purposes of the Plan Colombia. Colombian purposes under the Plan Colombia are the same but added with one that is of utmost relevance. As coca crops are the major source of financial resources for the FARC, reduction of such source of resources and take-over of concerned zones is the priority. 6

7 Judicially speaking, the anti-drugs fight does not seem in the right path either. Drug business involves poor population at the pyramid base and, multimillionaires at the top. Retailers, that is, farmers, never get richer through the coca business. On the contrary, they may be imprisoned, isolated from their families and, thus, become part of a vicious circle of crime from where they cannot depart and no richness is achieved either. Extradition is a judicial instrument designed to enforce actual punishment against those placed at the pyramid top. But, erosion has also been seen on the issue. Not because of the number of extradited individuals which is nevertheless immense, but because of their profile that has lowered along the pyramid. Few drug lords and many small and medium traffickers and traquetos are extradited, but such is not the spirit of that exceptional instrument of trial addressed to top chiefs, rather than to replace domestic justice. Treatment accorded to paramilitaries involved in drug-trafficking also deteriorates the nature and meaning of extradition. Those growing coca are trialed and imprisoned while traquetos are extradited and, the barons are given reduced penalties. For example, any coca farmer in Guaviare or Putumayo who is arrested with two kilos of coca paste will remain in prison for no less than six years, the penalty to which major paramilitary chiefs will be subject. There is one choice among two. Either the theory underlying the anti-drugs policy requires to be reviewed or the theory is adequate but enforcement fails, or both. In any case, what is needed is to calmly review the whole anti-drugs policy together with the U.S. authorities, investigate how the business operates currently and, evaluate the effectiveness of both consumption and crop reduction programs. The foregoing must be undertaken thoroughly to provide prompt responses, correctives and rectifications. The U.S. authorities must be invited to take part in such joint review. 7

8 The usual approach towards the economy of drugs and of the consequent antidrugs fight, deserve to be reviewed. The logics of affecting the supply, either by reducing cultivated areas through fumigation, by restricting air or maritime transportation, by searching and destroying the finished product or the production facilities (laboratories, taking off and landing tracks, etc.), is to trigger the consumer prices, to thus discourage consumers, new consumers in particular. The logics of legalization are the opposite: lesser prohibitions foster lower prices and, although such lower prices may induce new consumers or generate greater consumption, these also discourage producers in view of their reduced margins of profit. The drugs fight has entailed death of thousands of Colombian citizens, hundreds of thousand hectares of forests destroyed by farmers and fumigated by the authorities, five thousand million US Dollars funded by the United States and similar figures from the Colombian national budget. Furthermore, there is no certainty as to effectiveness of such policy as the quantity of coca produced is also obscure and there is no clarity on the reasons why price and consumption remain the same. The above, added with uncertain data as to how much resources are given by drug-traffickers to the illegal groups. Additionally, the controversial but exceptional instrument of extradition, designed to apply against the business lords, turned to become massive, generalized and aimed towards small and medium traffickers to substitute the domestic judiciary. Meanwhile, drug barons are protected under the negotiations carried among the government and the paramilitaries. Thomas S. Kuhn, author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions describes what happens when a given set of knowledge conventionally accepted as dominant theory is no longer capable of explaining all events in the concerned area. Where facts do not coincide with the premises set forth in the conventional theory, these are therefore deemed to be anomalies. Nonetheless, where the number of anomalies arrives to certain dimension, then the theory itself is 8

9 challenged to subsequently generate another set of concepts to match a new theory. New damages or anomalies arise and punctuated explanation therefor is pursued; however, excessive anomalies accumulate and paradigms come into crisis, whereby replacement thereof becomes a necessity. Without seeking to compare theoretical physics with something as harmful and detrimental as the illicit trafficking with drugs, what one may witness in this field is that the dominant paradigm, that is, the conventional theory, is no longer capable of providing explanations for the concerned facts; accordingly, the policy based on such theory fails like a worn-out car. In view of the numberless anomalies, wouldn t it be required to review the paradigm underlying the anti-drugs policy? Wouldn t it be necessary to thoroughly analyze what is now happening, jointly with top scholars and analysts? What is it that actually works and what doesn t? Resorting to Kuhn once again, when a given theory ceases to have explicative powers, as unexplainable anomalies come to surface, then the time to set a new paradigm has arrived. 5. My Proposal Following are my ideas, in the spirit of contributing to build the path to follow, rather than to be exhaustive on the subject: With regards to social problematic: 1. Building adequate plans of regional development based on productive chains to embrace farmers and to absorb significant rural workmanship in specific areas near the affected zones of cropping, but within agricultural boundaries. The rationale is that the State is more efficient in generating development conditions in regions that are competitive, than in fostering settlers from distant zones to subsist under ancient conceptions of alternative development. 9

10 2. Selective purchase of crops. It is required to design a mechanism for the purchase of certain products. It does not mean to go back to those times when the former IDEMA (the Institute for Agricultural Marketing) purchased several product crops nationwide. Rather, it should seek to implement a program focused on certain key zones and selected products. Rubber or corn may be encouraged among farmer organizations and for stated periods of time. Otherwise, it is very unlikely that farmers would eradicate coca plantations to change for medium- or late-productivity products without relying on farming activities that provide income in the meanwhile. The above would be a program on food security. 3. Adjust the program on forest-guard families. The program is appropriate but insufficient. Further to the coverage, sequential phases may be established. At the outset, it would operate as the current program, that is to say, those families performing eradication activities would receive 600 thousand Colombian pesos, bi-monthly. The second phase might involve the growing of mid-profitability and/or subsistence products. All the above, might be framed under stronger organization developments. With regards to security organisms 1. Fumigation should not become an indefinite-use tool. If fumigation is indeed effective, a time target should be established to achieve sensible reduction of cultivated areas. For the reduction of crops to be meaningful it must go beyond the goal of increasing cocaine prices in consuming markets, as the ultimate effect should be the general collapse of the market in view of the sensitive shortage thus produced. 2. A program to support the Army. Two programs are proposed, to wit: one, consisting of a small-project fund managed by the Army. To the possible 10

11 extent, the Army should not only consolidate the concerned areas but, also, rely on resources to encompass settlers and indigenous in their production projects. Second, the creation of a conciliation center at the Ministry of National Defense to train personnel on issues relating dispute resolution and conciliation. The center will allocate specialized personnel to areas where the central government is only present through the Army. Generally, the idea is replacing the existing para-state whether para-military or para-guerrilla with the legitimate State, rather than banishing illegal armed groups through actions by the Public Forces. 3. Designate a top-level manager to coordinate and support government institutions. An accompanying top civil official is required to act jointly with the military authority. 4. Designation of superior-rank officials in the National Police Department, to prepare the institution towards achievement of consolidation and to gradually replace the Army in surveillance and control tasks. The new situation under the Plan Colombia in year 2000 and, reaffirmed by President Uribe in year 2002 prove the advances achieved in gaining territorial control. Roads and small towns now rely on the presence of Public Forces, something partially inexistent during the Caguán negotiations that took place between 1998 and 2002 while Pastrana was the President. This phase of territorial control has properly functioned and some even speak of the FARC strategic withdrawal. Nonetheless, the subsequent phase on consolidation of recovered zones has been improvised and irregular. Those regions abandoned by paramilitaries are once again occupied by them or by the guerrilla. 11

12 The phase providing attack against the FARC backline the so called Plan Patriota has not yet produced results as expected. Such plan has been restated and re-named, although its essence remains the same: uprooting the FARC backline where they carry command, control, communication and training of leading squads. Matching among military and social plans is feeble. The Army presently occupies many areas where the FARC ruled in the past, but the remaining State presence is discontinued, erratic and superficial. It concerns about the replacement of a para-state with a material and substantive State, rather than replacing irregular military forces with legitimate ones. Proposals I am of the opinion that creation of a specialized force on territorial control dependent from the Army or the Policy is necessary, as well as the establishment of a national guard formed with recruited young farmers to be soldiers to act in selected municipalities. Also, the Army should handle directly any programs on immediate social assistance to support its presence in conflicting zones. Creation of a special government program devoted to zones undergoing poverty and violence situations. Social components under the Plan Colombia have not been broadened and depend on funds provided by the United States. 12