Comments of Airlines for America, Inc. and the Cargo Airline Association

Transcription

1 BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C In the matter of: : : Notice of Proposed Rulemaking : Docket No. FAA Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes : Directorate Identifier : 2015-NM-028-AD : Comments of Airlines for America, Inc. and the Cargo Airline Association Communication with respect to this document should be sent to: ROBERT IRELAND Managing Director Engineering and Maintenance Airlines for America, Inc Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, DC (202) rireland@airlines.org STEPHEN A. ALTERMAN President Cargo Airline Association 1620 L Street, NW Suite 610 Washington, DC (202) salterman@cargoair.org September 19, 2016 Page 1

2 Table of Contents I. Introduction...3 II. Summary of A4A/CAA Position...4 III. Consolidated A4A/CAA member comments on the proposed Airworthiness Directives...4 A. The current design is safe and the proposed AD is unwarranted B. The proposed Airworthiness Directives are arbitrary and capricious IV. Compliance time considerations V. Summary September 19, 2016 Page 2

3 BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C In the matter of: : : Notice of Proposed Rulemaking : Docket No. FAA Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes : Directorate Identifier : 2015-NM-028-AD : I. Introduction Airlines for America, Inc. (A4A), on behalf of its affected member airlines operating exclusively cargo aircraft, and the Cargo Airline Association (CAA), on behalf its similarly situated members, submit these comments in response to the Federal Aviation Administration s (FAA) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the NPRM) concerning Airbus A-300 and A310 series airplanes, requiring modification of the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS). According to the preamble, the FAA is concerned about development of an ignition source inside the center fuel tank due to electrical fault conditions. As presented, the Airworthiness Directives (AD) contemplated by the NPRM, the proposed AD would require modifying the FQIS to prevent development of an ignition source inside the center fuel tank due to electrical fault conditions. As an alternative for cargo airplanes, the proposed AD would provide the option to modify the airplane by separating FQIS wiring routed between the FQIS processor and the center fuel tank, provided repetitive BITE checks (checks of built-in test equipment) of the FQI computer are also performed. A4A is the principal trade and service organization of the U.S. scheduled airline industry. The proposed AD affect two U.S. member operators. 1 CAA is the nationwide organization representing members of the all-cargo air carrier industry. 2 1 A4A airline members are (affected members in bold): Alaska Airlines, Inc.; American Airlines, Inc.; Atlas Air, Inc.; Federal Express Corporation; Hawaiian Airlines; JetBlue Airways Corp.; Southwest Airlines Co.; United Air Lines, Inc.; United Parcel Service Co. A4A Airline Associate Member: Air Canada. 2 CAA airline members are ABX Air, Atlas Air, Inc., Federal Express Corporation, Kalitta Air and United Parcel Service Co. September 19, 2016 Page 3

4 II. Summary of A4A/CAA Position A4A and CAA (the Associations) and their cargo-operator members strongly oppose the rulemaking contemplated by the referenced NPRMs. We have not commented upon two corollary NPRMs for fleets either not operated as freighters by our members (A series), or which have incorporated alternate Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) (B777), but do find them equally objectionable and applicable if our members were to acquire affected aircraft. We are separately commenting on the associated NPRM for the Boeing 737, 747, and 767 series. FAA seeks to promulgate severely misguided regulatory action, imposed earlier this year on the B757 freighter fleet, that reflects 1) disregard or lack of proper consideration of system design, particularly the lack of a consistent design standard that could achieve the intended ends, and 2) disregard of FAA s own guidance about probability of a failure. There is no new data to support the proposed regulations. The proposed rules are completely arbitrary. Although probability data supported excluding freighters from Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) or fuel tank inerting, analyses do not support FQIS modifications in airplanes without FRM. The proposed rulemakings should be withdrawn. III. Consolidated A4A/CAA member comments on the proposed Airworthiness Directives A. The current design is safe and the proposed AD is unwarranted. Airbus has demonstrated that the Center Wing Tank ( CWT ) on its A300 allcargo fleet is a low flammability tank. The flammability of the A300/A310 fleet was originally determined in the 2003 in accordance with the FAA policy contained in the FAA s SFAR 88 AD decisions policy (Policy Memorandum ANM dated February 25, 2003) The A300 fleet has changed significantly since the center wing tank flammability classification both worldwide and in the United States. All-cargo aircraft represent approximately 64% of the worldwide A300/A310 fleet which was 369 in-service aircraft as of March Currently in the United States, the only A300/A310 aircraft in-service are in the September 19, 2016 Page 4

5 all-cargo configuration. A majority of the flights for the all-cargo fleet happen at night in cooler temperatures which reduce the flammability exposure time below the 7% threshold. According to Airbus s analysis, the center wing tank ( CWT ) on its A300 all cargo fleet is not a highly flammable tank. Airbus has demonstrated that the CWT flammability for all cargo aircraft is approximately 5% exposure time, which would classify the CWT as a low flammability tank. This analysis (performed in 2013) was based upon real operational data furnished by both UPS and Federal Express. Based upon policy contained in the FAA s SFAR 88 AD decisions policy (Policy Memorandum ANM dated February 25, 2003), this would drive the all-cargo A300 fleet into Element 2.a of the Unsafe Condition Evaluation Criteria since the CWT has been demonstrated to be a low flammability tank. This is the same criteria (Element 2.a) which is being applied to all low flammability outer wing tanks and results in no FQIS wire separation is being required. i. The criteria of latent plus one is not supported by the 14 CFR (a)(3) and therefore justifying the AD with a single failure regardless of probability is not supported by regulation. The main safety concern with the FQIS as stated by the FAA in related AD is a single failure, regardless of probability, on the worst reasonably anticipated flight. The worst anticipated flight is a flight with a latent FQIS failure and a high flammability tank. This latent plus one failure with regardless of probability for a single failure is not support by the current regulation 14 CFR (a)(3): Fuel tank ignition prevention. (a) No ignition source may be present at each point in the fuel tank or fuel tank system where catastrophic failure could occur due to ignition of fuel or vapors. This must be shown by: (3) Demonstrating that an ignition source could not result from each single failure, from each single failure in combination with each latent failure condition not shown to be extremely remote, and from all combinations of failures not shown to be extremely September 19, 2016 Page 5

6 improbable. The effects of manufacturing variability, aging, wear, corrosion, and likely damage must be considered. The regulation currently does not include the language regardless of probability. The regulation was carefully written and published without the language regardless of probability and cannot be arbitrarily ascribed with additional unwritten intent. Adding this language either implied or explicit into the published regulation substantially changes its meaning. In current AC C dated 09/18/2008, paragraph 10.a.(1)(b) contains the latent plus one philosophy with wording different from the wording published in 14 CFR (a)(3). The AC introduces the extra wording of regardless of the probability of occurrence which is not part of 14 CFR published regulation. The Associations believe that based upon the wording currently published in 14 CFR (a)(3), an analysis using the overall probability of a single failure plus probability of latent failure is acceptable. The Associations consider the safety assessment conducted by The Boeing Company on the Center Wing Tank (CWT) FQIS system based upon the probability of the ignition source as completely valid in concluding the risk to be less than extremely improbable and that no action is required. Recommendation: The proposed ADs should be withdrawn. B. The proposed Airworthiness Directives are arbitrary and capricious. i. No new data has been introduced since the FTFR rule that justifies FQIS wire separation. All-cargo aircraft were excluded from the Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) Rule published in the Federal Register on July 21, 2008 (73 FR ). In the FTFR rule, the FAA stated We did not receive any data on the costs, benefits or risks for all-cargo airplanes in response to our request in the NPRM and we do not have any data to justify the retrofit of FRM or IMM on the current fleet of all-cargo airplanes. We will continue to gather additional data regarding these factors and my initiate further rule making if the flammability of these airplanes is found to be excessive. (73 FR 42453) September 19, 2016 Page 6

7 The alleged unsafe issue identified in these NPRMs was identified during the SFAR 88 review in the time frame. Based upon the comments above contained in the FTFR rule, the FAA implies that there is not an unsafe condition on all-cargo aircraft that needs to be addressed unless additional data is identified. No additional data has been publicly introduced since the FTFR rule that supports or justifies this rulemaking for all-cargo aircraft. All-cargo aircraft were excluded from the FTFR rule in order to meet the OMB cost benefit analysis to allow the FTFR rule to proceed. If the all-cargo aircraft retrofit were added, the cost benefit hurdle could not be met. Table 7 and Table 8 published in the Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) Rule (73 FR 42489) illustrate this point. Adding the all-cargo aircraft (including conversions and retrofitted cargo airplanes) would add $217 million dollars of cost with negligible benefits as shown in Table 7. The high present value cost to prevent an accident for retrofitted cargo airplanes is clearly documented at $1.719 billion and to prevent a fatality at $ billion. In the SPRM Docket No. FAA published February 23, 2015, the FAA makes statement (80 FR ): When we propose a new airworthiness standard, as in the case of the FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008), we are required to perform a cost versus-benefit comparison to justify the application of the new standard. The decision in that rulemaking action to not require FRM installation on cargo airplanes was based in significant part on cost estimates that industry provided to show that AD-required FQIS design changes would be far less costly than installing FRM on cargo airplanes. We specifically considered the option to not require retrofit of cargo airplanes with FRM because of the expectation that alternative design solutions to address the specific, known unsafe condition of FQIS latentplus-one vulnerability would still be required through AD actions. For this AD action, however, industry submitted written comments and made verbal statements that the cost of an FQIS design solution would be comparable to, and possibly greater than, the cost of its FRM modification. September 19, 2016 Page 7

8 The statement to not require FRM installation on cargo airplanes based upon cost estimates that industry provided for the FTFR rule to show that future AD-required FQIS design changes would be far less than installing FRM on cargo airplanes is misleading and not factual. No detailed design work on FQIS wire separation began on Boeing models until Airbus was contacted after the 2008 FTFR rule, and the initial thoughts were that the FQIS potential safety issue should be addressed with transient suppression units. Airbus has now developed FQIS wire separation that is similar to the Boeing concept. When the FTFR rule was published in 2008, there was no preliminary design work or instructions developed to determine feasibility or to develop cost estimates for FQIS wire separation. The FTFR rule as published in the Federal Register (73 FR ) makes no reference to the possibility of introducing future FQIS actions which would utilize FQIS wire separation. ii. There is no consistent design standard for the wire separation. The separation standard of trying to provide 2-inch separation is completely arbitrary. The approved standard appears to be a 2-inch separation for retrofit. The amount CWT FQIS wiring in the modified configuration meeting the criteria varies widely between models. For the 757, Boeing Service Bulletin is able to meet the 2-inch spacing for approximately 20-25% of the length. For the 767, Boeing Service Bulletin is only able to meet the 2-inch spacing for approximately 5-10% of the length. The 747, the Boeing Service Bulletin is able to meet the 2-inch spacing for approximately 90% of the length. The A300 Service Bulletin will only be able to meet the 2-inch separation for approximately 65% of the length. For the B737, there is no estimate of 2-inch separation achievability. No Boeing service information on B737 all-cargo configurations has been put forth, and the modifications are being accomplished through a third party design. We do recognize that other methods were employed in the areas not meeting the 2-inch spacing requirement to meet the intent of separation. Overall, the FQIS wire separation standards are arbitrary and inconsistent in application between the models affected. The CWT FQIS wire separation doesn t meet any consistent design standard and is completely arbitrary as illustrated between the affected models. iii. If a true unsafe condition exists, the proposed rule should be applicable to airplanes with Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) in addition to the aircraft September 19, 2016 Page 8

9 currently proposed in the applicability. The NPRMs applicability illustrates the arbitrary manner in which the proposed rulemaking is being applied. The proposed AD is applicable for all aircraft not modified with the FRM in the CWT. This applicability, which excludes aircraft with FRM, cannot be mathematically justified for the proposed unsafe condition. FAA Memorandum SFAR 88 Mandatory Action Decision Criteria differentiates between High Flammability and Low Flammability fuel tanks when determining if mandatory action is required for combinations of failures that are noncompliant with (a) or (b) or If applying this memo, an airplane without FRM in the CWT will be required to implement solutions to non-compliances (i.e. FQIS wire separation) that an identical airplane with FRM would not. The issue with this analysis is the arbitrary delineation of High Flammability vs. Low Flammability as a decision criterion without taking into account the actual probabilistic effect this difference in flammability has on the end potential of catastrophic failure. A High Flammability CWT has a flammability exposure of roughly 7%-10%, while a Low Flammability CWT with an FRM installed will have a flammability exposure of 3%. Even accepting at face value the FAA s findings that the installation of FRM will reduce the amount of time the CWT is at a flammable mixture by 60%-70%, such a reduction would not constitute a sufficiently significant safety improvement over non- FRM airplanes to warrant the solution proposed in the NPRM. Without a significant improvement as a result of the FRM, it is unclear why the FAA deems the FRM necessary to address the alleged unsafe condition. Given the above, the proposed AD s distinction between FRM and non-frm aircraft further reflects the arbitrary nature of the FAA s analysis. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is not the Associations intent to expand the scope of the proposed AD to all airplanes. Rather, the Associations support the aircraft manufacturers in their positions that an unsafe condition does not exist in the CWT FQIS system and that the proposed AD should be withdrawn. This point is illustrated by the FAA response to comments Request to Remove Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes in AD , docket FAA as published in the Federal Register on April 5, 2016 (81 FR 19477). Excerpts are as follows: September 19, 2016 Page 9

10 An issue that violates one or more of the individual flight risk guidelines would normally require corrective action that reduces the risk to a level that is below the unsafe condition guidelines. However, in this case the FAA acknowledged that the cost of corrective action is high, and that the available corrective action (fuel tank FRM systems) would reduce, but not eliminate, the number of expected flights with the condition we are concerned about (a latent failure plus flammable conditions inside the tank). The alternative actions for cargo airplanes would also reduce the number of expected flights with the condition we are concerned about, but to a lesser degree. The FAA has determined that allowing a moderate number of cargo flights per year (on average) with this condition provides an acceptable level of safety. The above excerpts illustrate that the risk level is arbitrary with the FRM installation and even more arbitrary when applying the FQIS wire separation to cargo aircraft. IV. Compliance time considerations A compliance time of 72 months is also consistent with AD in docket no. FAA for 757 aircraft. In addition, the Service Bulletins associated with the A300/310 fleets are not currently released which supports an implementation time being measured from approval of the service information to accomplish the modification. Recommendation: If the proposed ADs go forward, compliance time for the A300/310 should be extended to align with major maintenance cycles, but not less than 72 months after service information to accomplish the modification is approved. September 19, 2016 Page 10

11 V. Summary Airlines for America, the Cargo Airline Association and their affected members believe that FAA must withdraw the proposed rules for the outlined reasons. Our members and OEMs agree that the current FQIS design is safe and that the FAA identified risk is contrary to FAA s well-considered regulation 14CFR25.981(a)(3). In light of those facts, the proposed AD is arbitrary and capricious in the absence of new data since the FTFR rule, and still cannot fully physically meet 14CFR25.981(a). Further, in the event one or more of the ADs is enacted, the compliance time should be extended to at least 72 months following the availability of approved service information. The Associations and their members place the highest value on operational safety, however we cannot find a reasonable cause for FAA to have decided, at this late date, to advance the proposed additional rules that unduly harm the cargo airline industry without appreciable benefit. We sincerely appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule, and thank the FAA for consideration of our views and recommendations. If you have any question, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned. Airlines for America Cargo Airline Association September 19, 2016 Page 11